UNIVERSITY  OF  C   LIFORN  A   SAN  D  EGO 


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LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 


i  T  7  Rf  TI  T  ?Ali  MI?IA  SAN  DIEGO 

3  182202461  6245 


\ 


IN    THE   WORLD   WAR 


COUNT   OTTOKAR   CZERNIN 


IN 
THE  WORLD  WAR 


By 
COUNT  OTTOKAR  CZERNIN 

Former  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs 


Harper  &.  Brothers    Publishers 
New    York    and    London 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Copyright  1920,  by  Harper  &  Brothers 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 

Published  March,  1920 

c-u 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAG.E 

PREFACE *a 

I.  INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS i 

II.  KONOPISCHT 39 

III.  WILLIAM  II 6° 

IV.  RUMANIA 87 

V.  THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE 129 

VI.  ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE 150 

VII.  WILSON 209 

VIII.  IMPRESSIONS  AND  REFLECTIONS 217 

IX.  POLAND 222 

X.  BREST-LITOVSK 235 

XI.  THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST          287 

XII.  FINAL  REFLECTIONS 3°2 

APPENDIX 3°7 

INDEX                                    369 


PREFACE 

IT  is  impossible  in  a  small  volume  to  write  the  history 
of  the  World  War  in  even  a  partially  exhaustive  manner. 
Nor  is  that  the  object  of  the  book. 

Rather  than  to  deal  with  generalities,  its  purpose  is 
to  describe  separate  events  of  which  I  had  intimate 
knowledge,  and  individuals  with  whom  I  came  into 
close  contact  and  could,  therefore,  observe  closely;  in 
fact,  to  furnish  a  series  of  snapshots  of  the  great  drama. 

By  this  means  the  following  pages  may  possibly  pre- 
sent a  conception  of  the  war  as  a  whole,  which  may, 
nevertheless,  differ  in  many  respects  from  the  hitherto 
recorded,  and  possibly  faulty,  history  of  the  war. 

Every  one  regards  people  and  events  from  his  own 
point  of  view;  it  is  inevitable.  In  my  book,  I  speak  of 
men  with  whom  I  was  in  close  touch;  of  others  who 
crossed  my  path  without  leaving  any  personal  im- 
pression on  me;  and  finally,  of  men  with  whom  I  was 
often  in  grave  dispute.  I  endeavor  to  judge  of  them 
all  in  objective  fashion,  but  I  have  to  describe  people 
and  things  as  I  saw  them.  Wherever  the  description 
appears  to  be  at  fault,  the  reason  will  not  be  due  to  a 
prematurely  formed  opinion,  but  rather,  probably,  to  a 
prevailing  lack  of  the  capacity  for  judging. 

Not  everything  could  be  revealed.  Much  was  not 
explained,  although  it  could  have  been.  Too  short  a 
period  still  separates  us  from  those  events  to  justify  the 
lifting  of  the  veil  from  all  that  happened. 

But  what  remains  unspoken  can  in  no  way  change  the 
whole  picture  which  I  describe  exactly  as  imprinted  on 
my  mind. 

COUNT  OTTOKAR  CZERNIN. 


IN    THE    WORLD    WAR 


IN    THE    WORLD    WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS 


'"THE  bursting  of  a  thunder-storm  is  preceded  by  cer- 
•*  tain  definite  phenomena  in  the  atmosphere.  The 
electric  currents  separate,  and  the  storm  is  the  result 
of  atmospheric  tension  which  can  no  longer  be  repressed. 
Whether  or  no  we  become  aware  of  these  happenings 
through  outward  signs,  whether  the  clouds  appear  to 
us  more  or  less  threatening,  nothing  can  alter  the  fact 
that  the  electric  tension  is  bound  to  make  itself  felt 
before  the  storm  bursts. 

For  years  the  political  barometer  of  the  European  \ 
Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  stood  at ' '  storm. "     It  I 
rose  periodically,  to  fall  again;   it  varied — naturally;  | 
but  for  years  everything  had  pointed  to  the  fact  that 
the  peace  of  the  world  was  in  danger. 

The  obvious  beginnings  of  this  European  tension 
date  back  several  years,  to  the  time  of  Edward  VII. 
On  the  on  ehand,  England's  dread  of  the  gigantic  growth  j 
of  Germany;  on  the  other  hand,  Berlin's  politics,  which  j 
had  become  a  terror  to  the  dwellers  by  the  Thames; 
the_belief  that  the  idea  of  acquiring  the  dominion  of 
the  world  had  taken  root  in  Berlin.     These  fears,  partly 
due  merely  to  envy  and  jealousy,  but  partly  due  also 


2  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  a  positive  anxiety  concerning  existence — these  fears 
led  to  the  encircling  policy  of  Edward  VII,  and  thus 
was  started  the  great  drive  against  Germany.  It  is 
well  known  that  Edward  VII  made  an  attempt  to 
exercise  a  direct  influence  on  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  to  induce  him  to  secede  from  the  Alliance  and 
join  the  Powers  encircling  Germany.  It  is  likewise 
known  that  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  rejected  the 
proposal,  and  that  this  decided  the  fate  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  From  that  day  we  were  no  longer  the  in- 
dependent masters  of  our  destiny.  Our  fate  was 
linked  to  that  of  Germany;  without  being  conscious 
of  it,  we  were  carried  away  by  Germany  through  the 
Alliance. 

I  do  not  mean  absolutely  to  deny  that,  during  the 
years  preceding  war,  it  would  still  have  been  possible 
for  Germany  to  avert  it  if  she  had  eradicated  from 
European  public  opinion  all  suspicion  respecting  her 
dream  of  world-dominion,  for  far  be  it  from  me  to  assert 
that  the  Western  Powers  were  eager  for  war.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  my  firm  conviction  that  the  leading 
statesmen  of  the  Western  Powers  viewed  the  situation 
as  such,  that  if  they  did  not  succeed  in  defeating  Ger- 
many, the  unavoidable  result  would  be  a  German 
world-domination.  I  mention  the  Western  Powers,  for 
I  believe  that  a  strong  military  party  in  Russia,  which 
had  as  chief  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nicholaievitch, 
thought  otherwise,  and  began  this  war  with  satisfac- 
tion. The  terrible  tragedy  of  this,  the  greatest  mis- 
fortune of  all  time — and  such  is  this  war — lies  in  the 
fact  that  nobody  responsible  willed  it;  it  arose  out  of 
a  situation  created  first  by  a  Serbian  assassin  and  then 
by  some  Russian  generals  keen  on  war,  while  the  events 
that  ensued  took  the  monarchs  and  statesmen  com- 
pletely by  surprise.  The  Entente  group  of  Powers  is 
as  much  to  blame  as  we  are.  As  regards  this,  however, 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  3 

a  very  considerable  difference  must  be  made  between 
the  enemy  states.  In  1 9 1 4  neither  France  nor  England 
desired  war.  France  had  always  cherished  the  thought 
of  revenge,  but,  judging  from  all  indications,  she  had 
no  intention  of  fighting  in  1914;  but,  on  the  contrary 
— as  she  did  fifty  years  ago — left  the  decisive  moment 
for  entering  into  war  to  the  future.  The  war  came 
quite  as  a  surprise  to  France.  England,  in  spite  of  her 
anti-German  policy,  wished  to  remain  neutral  and  only 
changed  her  mind  owing  to  the  invasion  of  Belgium. 
In  Russia  the  Tsar  did  not  know  what  he  wanted,  and 
the  military  party  urged  unceasingly  for  war.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Russia  began  military  operations  with- 
out a  declaration  of  war. 

The  states  that  followed  after — Italy  and  Rumania 
— entered  into  the  war  for  purposes  of  conquest, 
Rumania  in  particular.  Italy  also,  of  course,  but, 
owing  to  her  geographical  position,  and  being  exposed 
to  pressure  from  England,  she  was  less  able  to  remain 
neutral  than  Rumania. 

But  the  war  would  never  have  broken  out  had  it  not 
been  that  the  growing  suspicion  of  the  Entente  as  to 
Germany's  plans  had  already  brought  the  situation  to 
boiling-point.  The  spirit  and  demeanor  of  Germany, 
the  speeches  of  the  Emperor  William,  the  behavior  of  ( 
the  Prussians  throughout  the  world — whether  in  the 
case  of  a  general  at  Potsdam  or  a  commis  wyageur  out 
in  East  Africa — these  Prussian  manners  inflicting  them- 
selves upon  the  world,  the  ceaseless  boasting  of  their  \ 
own  power  and  the  clattering  of  swords,  roused  through- 
out the  whole  world  a  feeling  of  antipathy  and  alarm, 
and  effected  that  moral  coalition  against  Germany 
which  in  this  war  has  found  such  terribly  practical 
expression.  On  the  other  hand,  I  am  fairly  convinced 
that  German,  or  rather  Prussian,  tendencies  have  been 
misunderstood  by  the  world,  and  that  the  leading  Ger- 


> 


4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

man  statesmen  never  had  any  intention  of  acquiring 
world-dominion.  They  wished  to  retain  Germany's 
place  in  the  sun,  her  rank  among  the  first  Powers  of 
the  world;  it  was  undoubtedly  her  rightf  but  the  real 
and  alleged  continuous  German  provocation  and  the 
ever-growing  fears  of  the  Entente  in  consequence 
created  just  that  fatal  competition  in  armaments  and 
that  coalition  policy  which  burst  like  a  terrible  thunder- 
storm into  the  war. 

It  was  only  on  the  basis  of  these  European  fears  that 
the  French  plans  of  revenge  developed  into  action. 
England  would  never  have  drawn  the  sword  merely 
for  the  conquest  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  but  the  French 
plan  of  revenge  was  admirably  adapted  to  suit  the 
policy  inaugurated  by  King  Edward,  which  was  derived 
not  from  French,  but  from  English  motives. 

Out  of  this  dread  of  attack  and  defense  arose  that 
mad  fever  for  armaments  which  was  characteristic  of 
pre-war  times.  The  race  to  possess  more  soldiers  and 
more  guns  than  one's  neighbor  was  carried  to  an  absurd 
extreme.  The  armaments  which  the  nations  had  to 
bear  had  become  so  cumbersome  as  to  be  unbearable, 
and  for  long  it  had  been  obvious  to  every  one  that  the 
course  entered  upon  could  no  longer  be  pursued,  and 
that  two  possibilities  alone  remained — either  a  volun- 
tary and  general  disarmament,  or  war. 

A  slight  attempt  at  the  first  alternative  was  made 
in  1912  through  negotiations  between  Germany  and 
England  respecting  naval  disarmament,  but  never  got 
beyond  the  first  stage.  England  was  no  readier  for 
peace,  and  no  more  disposed  to  make  advances,  than 
was  Germany,  but  she  was  cleverer  and  succeeded  in 
conveying  to  the  world  that  she  was  the  Power  en- 
dangered by  Germany's  plans  for  expansion. 

I  recollect  a  very  telling  illustration  of  the  German 
and  British  points  of  view,  given  to  me  by  a  prominent 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  5 

politician  from  a  neutral  state.  This  gentleman  was 
crossing  the  Atlantic  on  an  American  steamer,  and 
among  the  other  travelers  were  a  well-known  German 
industrial  magnate  and  an  Englishman.  The  German 
was  a  great  talker  and  preferred  addressing  as  large 
an  audience  as  possible,  expatiating  on  the  "uprising" 
of  Germany,  on  the  irrepressible  desire  for  expansion 
to  be  found  in  the  German  people,  on  the  necessity  of 
impregnating  the  world  with  German  culture,  and  on 
the  progress  made  in  all  these  endeavors.  He  dis- 
coursed on  the  rising  prosperity  of  German  trade  in 
different  parts  of  the  world;  he  enumerated  the  towns 
where  the  German  flag  was  flying;  he  pointed  out 
with  emphasis  how  "Made  in  Germany"  was  the  term 
that  must  and  would  conquer  the  world,  and  did  not 
fail  to  assert  that  all  these  grand  projects  were  built  on 
solid  foundations  upheld  by  military  support.  Such 
was  the  German.  When  my  informant  turned  to  the 
silent,  quietly  smiling  Englishman  and  asked  what  he 
had  to  say  to  it,  he  simply  answered,  ' '  There  is  no  need 
for  me  to  say  anything,  for  I  know  that  the  world 
belongs  to  us."  Such  was  the  Englishman.  This 
merely  illustrates  a  certain  frame  of  mind.  It  is  a 
snapshot,  showing  how  the  German  and  the  English 
mentality  was  reflected  in  the  brain  of  a  neutral  states- 
man; but  it  is  symptomatic,  because  thousands  have 
felt  the  same,  and  because  this  impression  of  the  Ger- 
man spirit  contributed  so  largely  to  the  catastrophe. 
The  Aehrenthal  policy,  contrary  to  what  we  were 
accustomed  to  on  the  Ballplatz,  pursued  ambitious 
plans  for  expansion  with  the  greatest  strength  and 
energy,  thereby  adding  to  the  suspicions  of  the  world 
regarding  us.  For  the  belief  gained  credence  that  the 
Vienna  policy  was  an  offshoot  of  that  of  Berlin,  and 
that  the  same  line  of  action  would  be  adopted  in 

Vienna  as  in  Berlin,  and  the  general  feeling  of  anxiety 
2 


6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

rose  higher.  Blacker  and  blacker  grew  the  clouds; 
closer  and  closer  the  meshes  of  the  net ;  misfortune  was 
on  the  way. 

II 

I  was  in  Constantinople  shortly  before  the  outbreak 
of  war,  and  while  there  had  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the 
political  situation  with  the  Markgraf  Pallavicini,  our 
most  efficient  and  far-seeing  ambassador  there.  He 
looked  upon  the  situation  as  being  extremely  grave. 
Aided  by  his  experience  of  a  decade  of  political  observa- 
tions, he  was  able  to  put  his  finger  on  the  pulse  of 
Europe,  and  his  diagnosis  was  as  follows:  that  if  a 
rapid  change  in  the  entire  course  of  events  did  not 
intervene,  we  were  making  straight  for  war.  He 
explained  to  me  that  he  considered  the  only  possibility 
of  evading  a  war  with  Russia  lay  in  our  definitely 
renouncing  all  claims  to  influence  in  the  Balkans  and 
leaving  a  field  to  Russia.  Pallavicini  was  quite  clear 
in  his  own  mind  that  such  a  course  would  mean  our 
resigning  the  status  of  a  great  Power;  but  apparently 
to  him  even  so  bitter  a  proceeding  as  that  was  pref- 
erable to  the  war  which  he  saw  was  impending. 
Shortly  afterward  I  repeated  this  conversation  to  the 
Archduke  and  heir,  Franz  Ferdinand,  and  saw  that  he 
was  deeply  impressed  by  the  pessimistic  views  of 
Pallavicini,  of  whom,  like  every  one  else,  he  had  a  very 
high  opinion.  The  Archduke  promised  to  discuss  the 
question  as  soon  as  possible  with  the  Emperor.  I 
never  saw  him  again.  That  was  the  last  conversation 
I  had  with  him,  and  I  do  not  know  whether  he  ever 
carried  out  his  intention  of  discussing  the  matter  with 
the  monarch. 

The  two  Balkan  wars  were  as  a  summer  lightning 
before  the  coming  European  thunder-storm.  It  was 
obvious  to  any  one  acquainted  with  Balkan  conditions 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  7 

that  the  peace  there  had  produced  no  definite  result, 
and  the  Peace  of  Bukharest  in  1913,  so  enthusiastically 
acclaimed  by  Rumania,  carried  the  germs  of  its  death 
and  its  birth.  Bulgaria  was  humiliated  and  reduced; 
Rumania  and,  above  all,  .$erbia.,  enlarged  out  of  all 
proportion,  were  arrogant  to  a  degree  that  baffles 
description.  Albania,  as  the  apple  of  discord  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  was  a  factor  that  gave  no 
promise  of  relief,  but  only  of  fresh  wars.  In  order  to 
understand  the  excessive  hatred  prevailing  between 
the  separate  nations,  one  must  have  lived  in  the  Bal- 
kans. When  this  hatred  came  to  an  outburst  in  the 
World  War  the  most  terrible  scenes  were  enacted,  and 
as  an  example  it  was  notorious  that  the  Rumanians 
tore  their  Bulgarian  prisoners  to  pieces  with  their  teeth, 
and  that  the  Bulgarians,  on  their  part,  tortured  the 
Rumanian  prisoners  to  death  in  the  most  shocking 
manner.  The  brutality  of  the  Serbians  in  the  war 
can  best  be  described  by  our  own  troops.  The  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph  clearly  foresaw  that  the  peace 
after  the  second  Balkan  war  was  merely  a  respite  to 
draw  breath  before  a  new  war.  Prior  to  my  departure 
for  Bukharest  in  1913  I  was  received  in  audience  by 
the  aged  Emperor,  who  said  to  me:  "The  Peace  of 
Bukharest  is  untenable,  and  we  are  faced  by  a  new 
war.  God  grant  that  it  may  be  confined  to  the  Bal- 
kans." Serbia,  which  had  been  enlarged  to  double 
its  size,  was  far  from  being  satisfied;  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, was  more  than  ever  ambitious  of  becoming  a 
great  Power. 

Apparently  the  situation  was  still  quiet.  In  fact,  a 
few  weeks  before  the  catastrophe  at  SarajevQ  the  pre- 
vailing state  of  affairs  showed  almost  an  improvement 
in  the  relations  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade.  But  it 
was  the  calm  before  the  storm.  On  June  28th  the  veil 
was  rent  asunder  and  from  one  moment  to  the  next  a 


8  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

catastrophe  threatened  the  world.  The  stone  had 
started  rolling. 

At  that  time  I  was  Ambassador  to  Rumania.  I  was 
therefore  only  able  from  a  distance  to  watch  develop- 
ments in  Vienna  and  Berlin.  Subsequently,  however, 
I  discussed  events  in  those  critical  days  with  numerous 
leading  personalities,  and  from  all  that  I  heard  have 
been  able  to  form  a  definite  and  clear  view  of  the  pro- 
ceedings. I  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  Berchtold, 
even  in  his  dreams,  had  never  thought  of  a  world  war  of 
such  dimensions  as  it  assumed ;  that  he,  above  all,  was 
persuaded  that  England  would  remain  neutral;  and  the 
German  Ambassador,  Tschirsky,  confirmed  him  in  the 
conviction  that  a  war  against  France  and  Russia  would 
inevitably  end  in  victory.  I  believe  that  the  state  of 
mind  in  which  Count  Berchtold  addressed  the  ultima- 
tum to  Serbia  was  such  that  he  said  to  himself,  either — 
and  this  is  the  most  favorable  view — Serbia  will  accept 
the  ultimatum,  which  would  mean  a  great  diplomatic 
success;  or  she  will  refuse  it,  and  then,  thanks  to  Ger- 
many's help,  the  victorious  war  against  Russia  and 
France  will  effect  the  birth  of  a  new  and  vastly  stronger 
monarchy.  It  cannot  for  a  moment  be  denied  that 
this  argument  contained  a  series  of  errors ;  but  it  must 
be  stated  that,  according  to  my  convictions,  Count 
Berchtold  did  not  intend  to  incite  war  by  the  ultimatum, 
but  hoped  to  the  very  last  to  gain  the  victory  by  the 
pen,  and  that  in  the  German  promises  he  saw  a  guar- 
antee against  a  war  in  which  the  participators  and  the 
chances  of  victory  were  equally  erroneously  estimated. 

Berchtold  could  not  have  entertained  any  doubt  that 

-jiX'^x*   a  ^er^an  war  would  bring  a  Russian  one  in  its  train. 

•   jfck  any  rate,  the  reports  sent  by  my  brother,  who  was  a 

'  business-  man  in  Petersburg,  left  him  in  no  doubt  on  the 

matter. 

Serbia's  acceptance  of  the  ultimatum  was  only  par- 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  9 

tial,  and  the  Serbian  war  broke  out.  Russia  armed  and 
joined  in.  But  at  this  moment  extremely  important 
events  took  place. 

On  July  soth,  at  midday,  Tschirsky  spoke  in  the  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  communicated  to  Berchtold 
the  contents  of  a  telegram  received  from  Lichnowsky. 
This  important  telegram  contained  the  following:  He 
(Lichnowsky)  had  just  returned  from  seeing  Grey,  who 
was  very  grave,  but  perfectly  collected,  though  pointing 
out  that  the  situation  was  becoming  more  and  more 
complicated.  Sassonoff  had  intimated  that  after  the 
declaration  of  war  he  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
negotiate  direct  with  Austria-Hungary,  and  requested 
England  to  resume  proceedings,  the  temporary  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities  to  be  taken  for  granted.  Grey  pro- 
posed a  negotiation  between  four,  as  it  appeared  pos- 
sible to  him  (Grey)  that  Austria-Hungary,  after  occu- 
pying Belgrade,  would  state  her  terms. 

To  this  Grey  added  a  private  comment,  calling  Lich- 
nowsky's  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  war  between 
Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  would  facilitate  England's 
neutrality,  but  that  the  conditions  would  inevitably 
change  in  the  event  of  Germany  and  France  tjeing 
involved.  Public  opinion  in  England,  which  after  the 
assassination  was  very  favorable  to  Austria,  was  now 
beginning  to  fluctuate,  as  it  was  difficult  to  understand 
Austria's  obstinacy. 

Lichnowsky  also  added  that  Grey  had  told  the  Italian 
Ambassador  that  he  thought  Austria  would  receive 
every  satisfaction  on  accepting  negotiation.  In  any 
case  the  Serbians  would  be  punished.  Even  with- 
out a  war  Austria  would  receive  a  guaranty  for  the 
future. 

Such  were  the  contents  of  the  communication  sent 
from  London  by  Tschirsky,  to  which  Bethmann  added 
that  he  urgently  requested  the  Vienna  Cabinet  to 


io  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

accept  the  negotiation.  On  receiving  this  information, 
Berchtold  conveyed  the  news  to  the  Emperor.  His 
position  was  this :  that  Russia  was  already  at  war  with 
the  Monarchy  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  on 
which  the  order  for  general  mobilization  was  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Emperor,  and  it  appeared  doubtful  to 
him  whether  a  postponement  of  their  own  mobilization 
would  be  possible  in  view  of  the  Russian  attack.  He 
had  also  to  take  into  consideration  the  different  parties 
prevailing  in  Russia,  and  no  guaranty  was  obtainable 
that  those  who  were  in  favor  of  negotiation  would  gain 
the  day.  Any  postponement  of  mobilization  might 
in  this  case  lead  to  incalculable  military  consequences. 
Obviously  hostilities  had  begun  without  the  knowledge 
and  against  the  wishes  of  the  Tsar;  if  they  were  also 
to  be  carried  on  against  his  wish,  then  Austria-Hungary 
would  be  too  late. 

I  have  never  discussed  this  phase  with  Berchtold,  but 
the  material  placed  at  my  disposal  leaves  no  doubt 
that  he  felt  bound  to  inquire  into  this  side  of  the  ques- 
tion and  then  leave  the  decision  to  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph. 

On  the  following  day,  July  3ist,  therefore,  Tschirsky, 
at  the  Ballplatz,  communicated  the  contents  of  a  tele- 
gram from  King  George  to  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia. 
It  ran  as  follows : 

Thanks  for  telegram.  So  pleased  to  hear  of  William's  efforts  to 
concert  with  Nicky  to  maintain  peace.  Indeed,  I  am  earnestly  de- 
sirous that  such  an  irreparable  disaster  as  a  European  war  should  be 
averted.  My  government  is  doing  its  utmost,  suggesting  to  Russia 
and  France  to  suspend  further  military  preparations  if  Austria  will 
consent  to  be  satisfied  with  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  the  neigh- 
boring Serbian  territory  as  a  hostage  for  satisfactory  settlement 
of  her  demands,  other  countries  meanwhile  suspending  their  war 
preparations.  Trust  William  will  use  his  great  influence  to  induce 
Austria  to  accept  his  proposal,  thus  proving  that  Germany  and 
England  are  working  together  to  prevent  what  would  be  an  inter- 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  n 

national  catastrophe.  Pray  assure  William  I  am  doing  and  shall 
continue  to  do  all  that  lies  in  my  power  to  preserve  peace  of 
Europe. 

GEORGE. 

Both  the  telegrams  cited  were  received  in  Vienna  on 
July  31  st,  subject  to  certain  military  precautions,  a  pro- 
ceeding that  did  not  satisfy  London. 

In  London,  as  in  Berlin,  an  effort  was  made  to  confine 
the  conflict  to  Serbia.  Berchtold  did  the  same.  In 
Russia  there  was  a  strong  party  working  hard  to 
enforce  war  at  any  price.  The  Russian  invasion  was  a 
fact,  and  in  Vienna  it  was  thought  unwise  to  stop  mo- 
bilization at  the  last  moment  for  fear  of  being  too  late 
with  defense.  Some  ambassadors  did  not  keep  to  the 
instructions  from  their  governments;  they  communi- 
cated messages  correctly  enough,  but  if  their  personal 
opinion  differed  they  made  no  secret  of  it,  and  it  cer- 
tainly weighed  in  the  balance. 

This  added  to  the  insecurity  and  confusion.  Berch- 
told vacillated,  torn  hither  and  thither  by  different 
influences.  It  was  a  question  of  hours  merely;  but 
they  passed  by  and  were  not  made  use  of,  and  disaster 
was  the  result. 

Russia  had  created  strained  conditions  which  brought 
on  the  World  War. 

Some  months  after  the  outbreak  of  war  I  had  a  long 
conversation  on  all  these  questions  with  the  Hungarian 
Prime  Minister,  Count  Stephen  Tisza.  He  was  decid- 
edly opposed  to  the  severe  ultimatum,  as  he  foresaw  a 
war  and  did  not  wish  for  it.  It  is  one  of  the  most 
widely  spread  errors  to  stigmatize  Tisza  to-day  as  one 
of  the  instigators  of  the  war.  He  was  opposed  to  it, 
not  from  a  general  pacifist  tendency,  but  because,  in 
his  opinion,  an  efficiently  pursued  policy  of  alliance 
would  in  a  few  years  considerably  strengthen  the 
powers  of  the  Monarchy.  He  particularly  returned  to 


12  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  subject  of  Bulgaria,  which  then  was  still  neutral 
and  whose  support  he  had  hoped  to  gain  before  we 
went  to  war.  I  also  obtained  from  Tisza  several  details 
concerning  the  activities  of  the  German  government 
as  displayed  by  the  German  Ambassador  immediately 
preceding  the  war.  I  purposely  made  a  distinction 
between  the  German  government  and  German  diplo- 
macy, as  I  am  under  the  impression  that  Herr  von 
Tschirsky  had  taken  various  steps  without  being 
instructed  so  to  do,  and  when  I  previously  have  alluded 
to  the  fact  that  not  all  the  ambassadors  made  use  of  the 
language  enjoined  by  their  governments,  I  was  allud- 
ing specially  to  Herr  von  Tschirsky,  whose  whole  tem- 
perament and  feelings  led  him  to  interfere  in  our  affairs 
with  a  certain  vehemence  and  not  always  in  the  most 
tactful  way,  thus  rousing  the  Monarchy  out  of  its 
lethargy. 

There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  all  Herr  von  Tschir- 
sky's  private  speeches  at  this  time  were  attuned  to  the 
tone  of  "Now  or  Never,"  and  it  is  certain  that  the 
German  Ambassador  declared  his  opinion  to  be  "that 
at  the  present  moment  Germany  was  prepared  to  sup- 
port our  point  of  view  with  all  her  moral  and  military 
power,  but  whether  this  would  prove  to  be  the  case  in 
future  if  we  accepted  the  Serbian  rebuff  appears  to  me 
doubtful."  I  believe  that  Tschirsky  in  particular  was 
firmly  persuaded  that  in  the  very  near  future  Germany 
would  have  to  go  through  a  war  against  France  and 
Russia,  and  he  considered  that  the  year  1914  would  be 
more  favorable  than  a  later  date.  For  this  reason, 
because  first  of  all  he  did  not  believe  in  the  fighting 
capacity  of  either  Russia  or  France,  and  secondly 
because — and  this  is  a  very  important  point — he  was 
convinced  that  he  could  bring  the  Monarchy  into  this 
war;  while  it  appeared  doubtful  to  him  that  the  aged 
and  peace-loving  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  would  draw 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  13 

the  sword  for  Germany  on  any  other  occasion  where  the 
action  would  center  less  round  him,  he  wished  to  make 
use  of  the  Serbian  episode  so  as  to  be  sure  of  Austria- 
Hungary  in  the  deciding  struggle.  That,  however,  was 
his  policy,  and  not  Bethmann's. 

This,  I  repeat,  is  the  impression  produced  on  me  by 
lengthy  conversations  with  Count  Tisza — impressions 
which  have  been  confirmed  from  other  sources.  I  am 
persuaded,  however,  that  Tschirsky,  in  behaving  as  he 
did,  widely  overstretched  his  prescribed  sphere  of 
activity.  Iswolsky  was  not  the  only  one  of  his  kind.  I 
conclude  this  to  be  so,  since  Tschirsky,  as  intimated  in 
a  former  despatch,  was  never  in  a  position  to  mate  an 
official  declaration  urging  for  war,  but  appears  only  to 
have  spoken  after  the  manner  of  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives when  anxious  to  adapt  the  policy  of  their 
government  to  their  own  point  of  view.  Undoubtedly 
Tschirsky  transmitted  his  instructions  correctly  and 
loyally,  nor  did  he  keep  back  or  secrete  anything.  An 
ambassador  attains  more  or  less  according  to  the  energy 
expended  by  him  in  carrying  out  the  instructions  of  his 
government;  and  the  private  opinion  of  the  ambas- 
sador is,  under  certain  circumstances,  not  easy  to  dis- 
tinguish from  his  official  one.  At  all  events,  the  latter 
will  be  influenced  by  the  former,  and  Tschirsky's  pri- 
vate opinion  aimed  at  a  more  vigorous  policy. 

In  complete  ignorance  of  impending  events,  I  had 
arrived  at  Steiermark  a  few  days  before  the  ultimatum 
in  order  to  establish  my  family  there  for  the  summer. 
While  there  I  received  a  message  from  Berchtold  to 
return  to  my  post  as  quickly  as  possible.  I  obeyed  at 
once,  but  before  leaving  had  one  more  audience  with 
the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  at  Ischl.  I  found  the 
Emperor  extremely  depressed .  He  alluded  qu  i  te  briefly 
to  the  coming  events,  and  merely  asked  me  if,  in  case 
pf  a  war,  I  could  guarantee  Rumania's  neutrality.  I 


i4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

answered  in  the  affirmative,  so  long  as  King  Carol  was 
alive;  beyond  that  any  guaranty  was  impossible. 


in 

Certain  extremely  important  details  relating  to  the 
time  immediately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  war  can 
only  be  attributed  to  the  influence  of  the  group  repre- 
sented by  Tschirsky.  It  is  incomprehensible  why  we 
granted  to  our  then  allies,  Italy  and  Rumania,  facilities 
for  playing  the  part  of  seceders  by  presenting  them  with 
an  ultimatum  before  action  was  completed,  instead  of 
winning  them  over  and  involving  them  also. 

I  am  no  accurate  judge  of  the  events  in  Rome,  but 
King  Carol  in  Rumania  had  certainly  tried  everything 
to  induce  Serbia  to  yield.  In  all  probability  he  would 
not  have  succeeded,  as  Serbia  had  no  idea  of  renounc- 
ing her  plans  for  a  Greater  Serbia;  but  presumably 
an  anxious  feeling  would  have  arisen  between  Bukha- 
rest  and  Belgrade,  which  would  strongly  have  influenced 
further  Rumanian  policy  in  our  favor. 

Bukharest  has  made  enormous  capital  out  of  the 
diplomatic  proceedings. 

Before  the  first  decisive  Cabinet  Council  Baron 
Fasciotti,  the  Italian  Ambassador,  harangued  all  the 
members  in  this  spirit,  and  declared  that  the  situation 
in  Rumania  and  Italy  was  similar,  and  in  each  case 
there  was  no  reason  for  co-operation,  as  neither  Rome 
not  Bukharest  had  previously  come  to  an  under- 
standing regarding  the  ultimatum.  His  efforts  were 
crowned  with  success. 

On  August  i,  1914,  I  sent  the  following  telegram  to 
Berchtold : 

The  Prime  Minister  has  just  notified  me  the  result  of  the  Cabinet 
Council.  After  a  warm  appeal  from  the  King  to  bring  the  treaty 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  15 

into  force,  the  Cabinet  Council,  with  one  exception,  declared  that 
no  party  could  undertake  the  responsibility  of  such  action. 

The  Cabinet  Council  has  resolved  that  as  Rumania  was  neither 
notified  nor  consulted  concerning  the  Austro-Hungarian  action  in 
Belgrade  no  ccsus  fcederis  exists.  The  Cabinet  Council  further 
resolved  that  military  preparations  for  the  safety  of  the  frontier  be 
undertaken,  which  would  be  an  advantage  for  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  as  several  hundred  miles  of  its  frontiers  would  thereby 
be  covered. 

The  Prime  Minister  added  that  he  had  already  .given  orders  to 
strengthen  all  military  posts,  after  which  by  degrees  general  mobiliz- 
ation would  follow. 

The  government  intends  only  to  publish  a  short  communique 
relating  to  the  military  measures  taken  for  the  safety  of  the  country. 

Secondly,  it  appears  incomprehensible  why  the 
ultimatum  was  drawn  up  as  it  was.  It  was  not  so 
much  a  manifestation  of  Berchtold's  wish  for  war  as  of 
other  influences,  above  all  that  of  Tschirsky.  In  1870 
Bismarck  also  desired  war,  but  the  Ems  telegram  was 
of  quite  a  different  character. 

In  the  present  case  it  appears  incomprehensible  why 
a  note  should  have  been  selected  which  by  its  wording 
gave  umbrage  to  many  who  hitherto  were  favorably 
disposed  toward  us. 

Had  we,  before  the  ultimatum  and  after  the  assassina- 
tion, secretly  and  confidentially  furnished  proofs  to  the 
great  Powers  who  were  not  inimical  to  us,  and  espe- 
cially to  England,  that  trouble  was  impending  over  a 
political  murder  staged  at  Belgrade,  we  should  have 
evoked  a  very  different  frame  of  mind  in  those  govern- 
ments. Instead,  we  flung  the  ultimatum  at  them  and 
at  the  whole  of  Europe. 

It  was  feared  probably  at  the  Ballplatz  that  any 
communication  to  the  Powers  would  result  in  their 
intervention  in  the  form  of  a  new  conference  of  ambas- 
sadors, and  that  stagnation  would  ensue.  But  in  the 
year  1914  the  case  was  very  different  from  former  days 


16  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

— before  the  ultimatum  right  was  so  undoubtedly  on 
our  side. 

At  all  events,  the  Tschirsky  group  dreaded  such  an 
insipid  solution,  and  had  insisted,  therefore,  on  drastic 
action.  In  1 8  70  Bismarck  was  the  attacking  party,  and 
he  succeeded  in  interchanging  the  parts.  We  also 
succeeded,  but  in  an_opposite  sense. 

IV 

Then  came  our  greatest  disaster — the  German  entry 
into  Belgium. 

Had  England  remained  neutral  we  should  not  have 
lost  the  war.  In  his  book,  Ursachen  und  Ausbruck  des 
Krieges,  page  172,  Jagow  tells  how  on  August  4th,  toward 
the  close  of  the  Reichstag  session,  the  English  Ambas- 
sador appeared  there  and  again  asked  whether  Ger- 
many would  respect  Belgium's  neutrality.  At  that 
time  German  troops  were  already  on  Belgian  soil.  On 
hearing  that,  the  Ambassador  retired,  but,  returning 
in  a  few  hours,  demanded  a  declaration,  to  be  handed 
in  before  midnight,  that  the  further  advance  of  the  Ger- 
man troops  into  Belgium  would  cease,  otherwise  he  was 
instructed  to  ask  for  his  passport  and  England  would 
then  protect  Belgium.  Germany  refused,  and  the 
consequence  was  a  declaration  of  war  by  England. 

That  England  on  the  same  day  sent  word  to  Belgium 
that  she  would  resist  with  her  utmost  strength  any 
violation  of  her  neutrality  is  fully  in  accordance  with 
the  steps  taken  at  Berlin  by  the  English  Ambassador. 

Two  days  before,  on  August  2d,  the  English  Cabi- 
net certainly  gave  France  the  assurance  that,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  protection  of  Belgian  neutrality,  she  had 
demanded  that  there  should  be  no  naval  action  against 
France.  The  contradiction  between  both  points  of 
view  is  clearly  visible.  It  appears  to  me,  however,  that 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  17 

the  only  explanation  is  that  on  August  4th  England  no 
longer  adhered  to  her  standpoint  of  August  26.,  for 
the  German  acceptance  of  the  English  ultimatum 
on  the  evening  of  August  4th  had  wrested  from 
England  the  moral  possibility  of  making  further 
claims.  If  England,  on  August  4th,  had  sought  a  pre- 
text for  war,  she  would  have  put  forward,  besides  the 
Belgian  demand,  also  that  referring  to  the  abstention 
from  naval  action.  But  she  did  not  do  so,  and  con- 
fined her  ultimatum  to  the  Belgian  question,  thereby 
tying  her  own  hands  in  the  event  of  Germany  accepting 
the  ultimatum.  On  the  night  of  August  4th,  between  the 
hours  of  nine  and  midnight,  the  decision  as  to  whether 
England  would  remain  neutral  or  no  lay  with  Germany. 

Germany  kept  to  her  resolve  to  violate  Belgian 
neutrality  in  spite  of  the  certainty  of  the  English 
declaration  of  war  resulting  therefrom.  That  was  the 
first  fateful  victory  of  the  militarists  over  the  diplomats 
in  this  war.  The  former  were  naturally  the  motive 
power. 

The  German  military  plan  was  to  overrun  France 
and  then  make  a  furious  onslaught  on  Russia.  This 
plan  was  shattered  on  the  Marne. 

In  more  respects  than  one,  German  policy  foundered 
on  the  heritage  left  by  Bismarck.  Not  only  was  the 
conquest  of  Alsace-Lorraine  a  lasting  obstacle  to 
friendly  relations  with  France,  perpetually  forcing  the 
latter  into  the  arms  of  every  anti-German  coalition,  but 
Bismarck's  heritage  became  Germany's  curse,  because 
the  Germans,  though  desirous  of  following  in  his  foot- 
steps, had  no  one  sufficiently  competent  to  lead  them 
therein. 

Bismarck  created  the  German  Empire  out  of  Duppel, 
Koniggratz,  and  Sedan.  His  policy  was  one  of  "blood 
and  iron" — and  for  fifty  years  that  policy  of  violence 
and  violent  means  had  been  ingrained  in  the  mind  of 


18  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

every  German  school-boy  as  the  gospel  of  diplomatic 
art — but  Bismarck  was  not  able  to  bequeath  to  the 
German  people  his  genial  efficiency,  wisdom,  and 
prudence  in  the  use  of  his  violent  means.  Bismarck 
carefully  prepared  the  wars  of  1866  and  1870,  and 
struck  when  he  held  good  cards  in  his  hands.  The 
Germany  of  William  II  had  no  desire  for  war,  but  one 
day  plunged  headlong  into  it,  and  during  the  first  week 
had  already  created  political  situations  which  were 
beyond  her  power  to  cope  with.  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg were  treated  on  the  Bismarckian  principle  of 
"might  before  right,"  and  the  world  rose  against 
Germany.  I  say  world,  because  England's  power 
extended  over  the  world. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  England  stood  at  "order 
arms."  It  would  have  been  entirely  true  to  her  tradi- 
tional policy  to  allow  Germany  to  fight  against  France 
and  Russia  and  mutually  weaken  one  another,  then  at  a 
given  moment  to  intervene  and  enjoin  peace.  England 
was  forced  to  join  in  by  Germany  threatening  to 
establish  herself  in  Belgium.  How  far  the  German 
invasion  of  Belgium  can  morally  be  extenuated  owing 
to  a  French  purpose  to  do  likewise  has  still  not  been 
made  clear — but  this  argument  does  not  apply  to 
Luxemburg,  and  the  breach  of  right  remains  the  same 
whether  the  country  where  it  occurs  be  large  or  small. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg  was  a 
stroke  of  the  Bismarckian  policy  of  violence,  not  carried 
out  by  politicians,  but  by  generals,  though  they  were 
devoid  of  Bismarck's  power  of  calculating  the  devas- 
tating consequences. 

Later  on,  during  the  course  of  the  war,  the  German 
Supreme  Command  made  repeated  use  of  violent  means, 
which  were  more  detrimental  than  useful  to  us,  though 
subsequently  these  means  were  morally  justifiable 
and  comprehensible;  in  fact,  were  directly  forced  on 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  19 

us,  seeing  that  Germany  was  fighting  for  her  existence, 
and  her  adversaries,  who  would  not  come  to  an  under- 
standing, left  her  no  choice  of  means.     The  use  of  *   : 
noxious  gas,  aerial  attacks  on  open  towns,  and  the  U- '  t 
boat  war  were  means  used  in  desperation  against  a 
merciless  enemy,  who  left  women  and  children  to  die 
of  starvation  and  declared  day  by  day  that  Germany 
must  be  annihilated. 

When  war  was  declared,  that  murderous  element  was 
lacking,  and  it  was  only  the  entry  into  neutral  territory 
that  fostered  an  atmosphere  of  such  terrible  hatred  and 
vengeance  and  stamped  the  struggle  as  a  war  of  anni- 
hilation. 

England's  policy  concerning  Napoleon  III  had  been 
also  more  of  a  diplomatic  than  a  military  nature,  and 
everything  tends  to  show  that  in  the  present  case 
England  originally  had  no  intention  of  joining  in  the 
conflagration,  but  was  content  to  see  Germany  weak- 
ened by  her  own  confederates. 

So  far  as  I  am  in  a  position  to  review  the  situation 
no  blame  for  the  wrongly  estimated  English  attitude 
can  be  attached  to  our  ambassadors  in  London.  Their 
predictions  and  warnings  were  correct,  and  the  final 
decision  respecting  the  previously  mentioned  English 
ultimatum  was  taken  in  Berlin  and  not  in  London. 
Moreover,  the  German  Foreign  Office  would  never 
voluntarily  have  consented  to  the  act  of  violence, 
but  the  military  party,  who  cared  neither  for  diplo- 
matic reports  nor  political  complications,  carried  every- 
thing before  them. 

It  will  always  be  particularly  difficult  in  a  war  to 
define  the  limits  of  military  and  political  spheres  of 
action.  The  activities  of  both  encroach  to  so  great  an 
extent  on  each  other  as  to  form  one  whole,  and  very 
naturally  in  a  war  precedence  is  given  to  military  needs. 
Nevertheless,  the  complete  displacement  of  politicians 


20  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

into  subordinate  positions  which  was  effected  in  Ger- 
many and  thereby  made  manifest  the  fact  that  the 
German  Supreme  Military  Command  had  possessed 
itself  of  all  state  power  of  command,  was  a  misfortune. 
Had  the  politicians  at  Berlin  obtained  a  hearing  there 
would  never  have  been  any  invasion  of  Belgium,  nor 
yet  the  ruthless  U-boat  war,  the  abstention  from  which 
would  in  both  cases  have  saved  the  life  of  the  Central 
Powers. 

From  the  very  first  day  the  Emperor  William  was  as 
a  prisoner  in  the  hands  of  his  generals. 

The  blind  faith  in  the  invincibility  of  the  army  was, 
like  so  much  else,  an  heirloom  from  Bismarck,  and  the 
"Prussian  lieutenant,  inimitable  save  in  Germany," 
became  her  doom.  The  entire  German  people  believed 
in  victory  and  in  an  Emperor  who  flung  himself  into  the 
arms  of  his  generals  and  took  upon  himself  a  responsi- 
bility far  surpassing  the  normal  limit  of  what  was  bear- 
able. Thus  the  Emperor  William  allowed  his  generals 
full  liberty  of  action,  and,  to  begin  with,  their  tactics 
seemed  to  be  successful.  The  first  battle  of  the  Marne 
was  a  godsend  for  the  Entente  in  their  direst  need. 
Again,  later,  when  the  war  long  since  had  assumed  ~a 
totally  different  character,  when  the  troops  were  made 
stationary  by  the  war  of  position  and  fresh  enemies 
were  constantly  rising  up  against  us,  when  Italy, 
Rumania,  and  finally  America  appeared  on  the  scene, 
then  did  the  German  generals  achieve  miracles  of 
strategy.  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  became  gods 
in  the  eyes  of  the  German  people;  the  whole  of  Ger- 
many looked  up  to  them  and  hoped  for  victory  through 
them  alone.  They  were  more  powerful  than  the 
Emperor,  and  he,  therefore,  less  than  ever  in  a  position 
to  oppose  them. 

Both  the  generals  drew  the  well-nigh  unlimited  meas- 
ure of  their  power  direct  from  the  Entente,  for  the 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  21 

latter  left  the  Germans  in  no  doubt  that  they  either 
must  conquer  or  die.  The  terrified  and  suffering 
people  clung,  therefore,  to  those  who  alone  could  give 
them  victory. 


Anglo-German  competition,  the  increasing  deca- 
dence of  the  Monarchy,  and  the  consequent  growing  lust 
of  conquest  evinced  by  our  neighbors  had  prepared  the 
soil  for  war.  Serbia,  by  the  assassination,  brought 
about  an  acute  state  of  tension,  and  Russia  profited 
thereby  to  fling  herself  on  the  Central  Powers. 

That  appears  to  me  to  be  briefly  an  objective  history 
of  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Faults,  errors,  and 
omissions  from  the  most  varied  sources  may  occur  in  it, 
but  can  neither  alter  nor  affect  the  real  nature  of  the 
case. 

The  victorious  Entente  gives  a  different  interpreta- 
tion of  it.  She  maintains  that  Germany  let  loose  the 
war,  and  the  terrible  peace  of  Versailles  is  the  product 
of  that  conception,  for  it  serves  as  punishment. 

A  neutral  court  of  justice,  as  proposed  by  Germany, 
was  refused.  Her  own  witnesses  and  her  own  judges 
suffice  for  her.  She  is  judge  and  prosecutor  combined 
in  one  person.  In  Doctor  Bauer,  the  German- Austrian 
Secretary  of  State,  she  has  certainly  secured  an  impor- 
tant witness  for  her  view  of  the  case.  In  the  winter 
of  1918  the  latter  openly  declared  that  "three  Austro- 
Hungarian  counts  and  one  general  had  started  the 
war."1 

Were  that  true,  then  Germany  would  also  have  to 
bear  a  vast  amount  of  blame.  For  the  four  "guilty 
ones"  could  not  have  incited  to  war  without  being 
sure  of  having  Germany  at  their  back,  and,  were  it  true, 

1  Supposed  to  be  the  Counts  Berchtold,  Tisza,  and  Stuergkh,  and 
Gen.  Conrad  von  Hohendorf. 
8 


22  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

there  could  only  have  been  a  question  of  some  plot  laid 
by  the  Austro-Hungarian  and  the  German  govern- 
ments, in  which  case  Germany,  being  the  vastly 
superior  military  element,  would  undoubtedly  have 
assumed  the  rdle  of  leader. 

Bauer's  statement  shows  that  they  who  inflicted  the 
punitive  peace  were  right. 

VI 

While  the  war  was  going  on,  a  separate  peace  on  our 
side  that  would  have  delivered  up  Germany  would  have 
been  treachery.  But  had  attempts  at  peace  failed 
owing  to  the  claims  put  forward  by  Germany,  we 
should  have  been  morally  justified  in  breaking  away 
from  them,  as  we  were  united  together  in  a  war  of 
defense  and  not  in  a  war  of  conquest.  Although  the 
German  military  party  both  dreamed  and  talked 
incessantly  of  conquest,  which  doubtless  gave  rise 
to  a  misunderstanding  of  the  situation,  that  was  by 
no  means  the  exclusive  reason  why  peace  could  not  be 
attained.  It  simply  was  because  on  no  consideration 
could  the  Entente  be  induced  to  pardon  Germany.  I 
have  already  mentioned  this  in  my  speech  of  December 
n,  1918, *  in  which  I  discoursed  on  politics  in  the  World 
War:  "Ludendorff  is  exactly  like  the  statesmen  of 
France  and  England.  None  of  them  wishes  to  com- 
promise, they  only  look  for  victory;  in  that  respect 
there  is  no  difference  between  them."  As  long  as  I  was 
in  office  the  Entente  would  never  come  to  an  agreement 
with  Germany  inter  pares,  thereby  directly  forcing  us  to 
assume  the  part  of  a  war  of  defense.  Had  we  suc- 
ceeded in  what  we  so  often  attempted  to  do,  namely,  to 
make  the  Entente  pronounce  the  saving  word;  and 

1  See  Aonendix. 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  23 

had  we  ever  been  able  to  make  the  Entente  state  that  it 
was  ready  to  conclude  a  status  quo  peace  with  Germany, 
we  would  have  been  relieved  of  our  moral  obligations. 
Against  this  may  be  quoted :  ' '  Salus  rei  publicas  supreme 
lex" — in  order  to  save  the  Monarchy  Germany  would 
have  to  be  given  up,  and  therefore  the  other  question 
must  be  inquired  into  as  to  whether  the  "physical  pos- 
sibility" of  a  separate  peace  really  did  exist.  I  also 
mentioned  this  matter  in  the  aforesaid  speech,  and 
expressly  stated  then,  and  withdraw  nothing,  that  after 
the  entry  of  England,  then  of  Italy,  Rumania,  and 
finally  of  America  into  the  war,  I  considered  a  victory 
peace  on  our  side  to  be  a  Utopian  idea.  But  up  to  the 
last  moment  of  my  official  activities  I  cherished  the 
hope  of  a  peace  of  understanding  from  month  to  month, 
from  week  to  week,  even  from  day  to  day,  and  believed 
that  the  possibility  would  arise  of  obtaining  such  a 
peace  of  understanding,  however  great  the  sacrifices. 
Just  as  little  as  anyone  else  could  I  foresee  the  end  which 
practically  has  arrived,  nor  yet  the  present  state  of 
affairs.  A  catastrophe  of  such  magnitude  and  such 
dimensions  was  never  what  I  feared.  This  is  confirmed 
in  the  published  report  of  my  aforesaid  speech,  sent  by 
me  to  the  Emperor  Karl  in  1917  and  reprinted  later,1 
where  I  say:  "A  victory  peace  is  out  of  the  question; 
we  are  therefore  compelled  to  effect  a  peace  with  sacri- 
fice." The  Imperial  offer  to  cede  Galicia  to  Poland, 
and,  indirectly,  to  Germany,  arose  out  of  this  train 
of  thought,  as  did  all  the  peace  proposals  to  the  Entente, 
which  always  clearly  intimated  that  we  were  ready  for 
endurable  sacrifices. 

It  had  always  been  oovious  that  the  Entente  would 
tear  the  Monarchy  in  shreds,  both  in  the  event  of  a 
peace  of  understanding  and  of  a  separate  peace.  It 

1  See  Appendix. 


24  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  quite  in  keeping  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
London  of  April  26,  1915. 

The  resolutions  passed  at  that  Congress,  which  pre- 
pared for  Italy's  entry  into  the  war,  determined  the 
further  course  of  the  war,  for  they  included  the  division 
of  the  Monarchy,  and  forced  us,  therefore,  into  a  desper- 
ate war  of  defense.  I  believe  that  London  and  Paris, 
at  times  when  the  fortune  of  war  was  on  our  side,  both 
regretted  the  resolutions  that  had  been  adopted,  as 
they  prevented  the  dwellers  on  both  the  Seine  and  the 
Thames  from  making  any  temporarily  desired  advances 
to  us. 

As  far  back  as  1915  we  received  vague  news  of  the 
contents  of  this  strictly  secret  London  Agreement ;  but 
only  in  February,  1917,  did  we  obtain  the  authentic 
whole,  when  the  Russian  revolutionary  government 
published  a  protocol  referring  to  it,  which  subsequently 
was  reproduced  in  our  papers. 

I  add  this  protocol  to  the  appendix  of  the  book,1  as, 
in  spite  of  its  being  so  eminently  important,  it  has  not 
received  adequate  attention  on  the  part  of  the  public. 

According  to  the  settlements,  which  were  binding 
for  the  four  states — England,  France,  Russia,  and 
Italy — the  last-named  was  awarded  the  Trentino,  the 
whole  of  South  Tyrol  as  far  as  the  Brenner  Pass,  Trieste, 
Goritz,  Gradisca,  the  whole  of  Istria,  with  a  number  of 
islands,  also  Dalmatia. 

In  the  course  of  the  war  the  Entente  had  further 
made  binding  promises  to  the  Rumanians  and  Serbians, 
hence  the  need  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Monarchy. 

Having  made  these  statements,  I  wish  to  explain  why 
a  separate  peace  was  a  sheer  impossibility  for  us.  In 
other  words,  what  were  the  reasons  that  prevented  us 
from  ending  the  war  and  becoming  neutral — reasons 

1  See  Appendix. 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  25 

which  only  left  one  possibility  open  to  us:  to  change 
our  adversary,  and  instead  of  fighting  the  Entente, 
together  with  Germany,  to  join  the  Entente  and  with  it 
fight  against  Germany?  It  must,  above  all,  be  kept 
in  mind  that  up  to  the  last  days  that  I  held  office  the 
eastern  front  was  manned  by  Austro-Hungarian  and 
German  troops  all  mixed  together,  and  this  entire  army 
was  under  the  Imperial  German  command.  We  had 
no  army  of  our  own  in  the  east — not  in  the  true  sense  of 
the  word,  as  it  had  been  merged  into  the  German  army. 
That  was  a  consequence  of  our  military  inferiority. 
Again  and  again  we  resorted  to  German  aid.  We 
called  repeatedly  for  help  in  Serbia,  Rumania,  Russia, 
and  Italy,  and  were  compelled  to  purchase  it  by  giving 
up  certain  things.  Our  notorious  inferiority  was  only 
in  very  slight  degree  the  fault  of  the  individual  soldier ; 
rather  did  it  emanate  from  the  general  state  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  affairs.  We  entered  the  war  badly  equipped 
and  sadly  lacking  in  artillery ;  the  various  Ministers  of 
War  and  the  Parliaments  were  to  blame  in  that  respect. 
The  Hungarian  Parliament  neglected  the  army  for 
years  because  their  national  claims  were  not  attended  to, 
and  in  Austria  the  Social  Democrats  had  always  been 
opposed  to  any  measures  of  defense,  scenting  therein 
plans  for  attack  and  not  defense. 

Our  General  Staff  was  in  part  very  bad.  There  were, 
of  course,  exceptions,  but  they  only  prove  the  rule. 
What  was  chiefly  wanting  was  contact  with  the  troops. 
These  gentlemen  sat  with  their  backs  turned  and  gave 
their  orders.  Hardly  ever  did  they  see  the  men  at  the 
front  or  where  the  bullets  whistled.  During  the  war 
the  troops  learned  to  hate  the  General  Staff.  It  was 
very  different  in  the  German  army.  The  German  Gen- 
eral Staffs  exacted  much,  but  they  also  achieved  much ; 
above  all,  they  exposed  themselves  freely  and  set  an 
example.  Ludendorff,  sword  in  hand,  took  Liege, 


26  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

accompanied  by  a  couple  of  men!  In  Austria  arch- 
dukes were  put  into  leading  posts  for  which  they  were 
quite  unsuited.  Some  of  them  were  utterly  incompe- 
tent; the  Archdukes  Friedrich,  Eugen,  and  Joseph 
formed  three  exceptions.  The  first  of  these  in  par- 
ticular very  rightly  looked  upon  his  post  not  as  that  of  a 
leader  of  operations,  but  as  a  connecting  link  between 
us  and  Germany,  and  between  the  army  and  the  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph.  He  acted  always  correctly  and 
with  eminent  tact,  and  overcame  many  difficulties. 
What  was  left  of  our  independence  was  lost  after  Luck. 

To  return,  therefore,  to  the  plan  developed  above:  a 
separate  peace  that  would  have  contained  an  order  for 
our  troops  on  the  eastern  front  to  lay  down  their  arms 
or  to  march  back  would  immediately  have  led  to  con- 
flict at  the  front.  Following  on  the  violent  opposition 
that  such  an  order  would  naturally  have  aroused  in  the 
German  leaders,  orders  from  Vienna  and  counter-orders 
from  Berlin  would  have  led  to  a  state  of  complete  dis- 
organization, even  to  anarchy.  Humanly  speaking,  it 
was  out  of  the  question  to  look  for  a  peaceful  and  blood- 
less unravelment  at  the  front.  I  state  this  in  order  to 
explain  my  firm  conviction  that  the  idea  that  such  a 
parting  of  the  two  armies  could  have  been  carried  out 
in  mutual  agreement  is  based  on  utterly  erroneous 
premises,  and  also  to  prove  that  we  have  here  the  first 
factor  showing  that  we  would  not  have  ended  the  war 
by  a  separate  peace,  but  would,  on  the  contrary,  have 
been  entangled  in  a  new  one. 

But  what  would  have  been  enacted  at  the  front 
would  also,  and  in  aggravated  fashion,  have  been 
repeated  throughout  the  entire  country — a  civil  war 
would  have  been  inevitable. 

I  must  here  explain  a  second  misunderstanding, 
resulting  also  from  my  speech  of  December  i  ith,  which 
is  due  to  my  statement  that  "if  we  came  out  Germany 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  27 

could  not  carry  on  the  war."  I  admit  that  this  state- 
ment is  not  clearly  expressed,  and  was  interpreted  as 
though  I  had  intended  to  say  that  if  we  came  out  the 
immediate  collapse  of  Germany  was  a  foregone  con- 
clusion. I  did  not  intend  to  say  that,  nor  did  I  say  or 
mean  it.  I  meant  to  say  that  our  secession  from  Ger- 
many would  render  impossible  a  victorious  ending  of 
the  war,  or  even  a  lasting  successful  continuance  of  the 
war;  that  Germany  through  this  would  be  faced  by  the 
alternative  of  either  submitting  to  the  dictates  of  the 
Entente  or  of  bringing  up  her  supremest  fighting  powers 
and  suppressing  the  Monarchy,  preparing  for  her  the 
same  fate  as  Rumania  met  with.  I  meant  to  say  that 
Austria-Hungary,  if  she  allowed  the  Entente  troops  to 
enter,  would  prove  such  a  terrible  danger  to  Germany 
that  she  would  be  compelled  to  use  every  means  to 
forestall  us  and  paralyze  the  move.  Whoever  imagines 
that  the  German  military  leaders  would  not  have  seized 
the  latter  eventuality  knows  them  but  badly,  and  has  a 
poor  opinion  of  their  spirit.  In  order  to  be  able  to 
form  an  objective  judgment  of  this  train  of  thought  one 
should  be  able  to  enter  into  the  spirit  of  the  situation. 
In  April,  1916,  when  I  sent  in  my  resignation  for  other 
reasons,  Germany's  confidence  in  victory  was  stronger 
than  ever.  The  eastern  front  was  free;  Russia  and 
Rumania  were  out  of  action.  The  troops  were  bound 
westward,  and  no  one  who  knew  the  situation  as  it  was 
then  can  repudiate  my  assertion  that  the  German  mili- 
tary leaders  believed  themselves  then  to  be  nearer  than 
ever  to  a  victory  peace;  that  they  were  persuaded  they 
would  take  both  Paris  and  Calais  and  force  the  Entente 
to  its  knees.  It  is  out  of  the  question  that  at  such  a 
moment  and  under  such  conditions  they  could  have 
replied  to  the  falling  away  of  Austria-Hungary  other- 
wise than  by  violence. 

All  who  will  not  admit  the  argument,  I  would  refer  to 


28  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

a  fact  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  evade.  Six  months 
afterward,  when  there  was  already  clear  evidence  of  the 
German  collapse,  when  Andrassy  declared  a  separate 
peace,  the  Germans,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  threw  troops  into 
the  Tyrol  If  they,  when  utterly  exhausted,  defeated, 
and  ruined,  with  revolution  at  their  back,  still  held 
firmly  to  this  decision  and  endeavored  to  make  a  battle- 
field on  Austrian  territory,  how  much  more  would  they 
have  done  that  six  months  earlier,  when  they  still  stood 
full  of  proud  defiance  and  their  generals  dreamed  of 
victory  and  triumph?  What  I,  secondly,  also  would 
maintain  is  that  the  immediate  consequence  of  a 
separate  peace  would  have  been  the  conversion  of 
Austria-Hungary  into  a  theater  of  war.  The  Tyrol,  as 
well  as  Bohemia,  would  have  become  fields  of  battle. 

If  it  be  maintained  now  that  the  great  exhaustion 
from  the  war  that  prevailed  throughout  the  Monarchy 
before  April,  1917,  had  caused  the  entire  population 
of  the  former  Monarchy  -to  rally  round  the  Minister 
who  had  concluded  the  separate  peace,  it  is  a  conscious 
or  unconscious  untruth.  Certainly  the  Czechs  were 
decidedly  against  Germany,  and  it  would  not  have  been 
reasons  of  political  alliance  that  would  have  prevented 
them  from  agreeing.  But  I  would  like  to  know  what 
the  Czech  people  would  have  said  if  Bohemia  had  been 
turned  into  a  theater  of  war  and  exposed  to  all  the 
sufferings  endured  by  this  and  all  other  peoples,  and 
when  to  it  had  been  added  the  devastation  of  the  father- 
land, for,  let  there  be  no  doubt  about  it,  the  troops 
advancing  with  flying  colors  from  Saxony  would  have 
made  their  way  to  Prague  and  penetrated  even  farther. 
We  had  no  military  forces  in  Bohemia;  we  should  not 
have  been  able  to  check  the  advance,  and  quicker  than 
either  we  or  the  Entente  could  have  sent  troops  worth 
mentioning  to  Bohemia,  the  Germans,  drawing  troops 
from  their  well-nigh  inexhaustible  reserves,  would  have 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  29 

marched  either  against  us  or  against  the  Entente  on 
our  territory.  The  German-Austrian  public  would 
not  have  been  in  agreement  with  such  a  Minister;  but 
the  German  Nationalists  and  the  German  bourgeoisie 
have  no  say  in  the  matter. 

On  October  28th  the  German  Nationalists  published 
their  own  particular  point  of  view  in  the  following 
manner: 

The  members  of  the  German  Nationalist  parties  were  highly 
indignant  at  the  way  in  which  Count  Andrassy  answered  Wilson's 
note.  Count  Andrassy  came  from  Hungary,  and  neither  came  to 
any  agreement  with  the  Imperial  German  government  nor  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Executive  Committee  before  drawing  up  the 
note.  Although  the  peace  negotiations  were  most  warmly  welcomed 
and  considered  most  necessary,  still  the  one-sided  action  of  Count 
Andrassy  in  despatching  the  note  to  Wilson  without  previous 
arrangement  with  the  German  Empire  has  roused  the  greatest  indig- 
nation in  the  German  parties.  A  few  days  ago  a  delegation  from 
the  German  Executive  Committee  was  in  Berlin  and  was  favorably 
received  by  the  German  Imperial  government  in  the  matter  of  pro- 
viding for  German- Austria.  Although  German  soldiers  fought  by 
the  side  of  ours  in  the  Alps  and  the  Carpathians,  the  alliance  has  now 
been  violated  by  this  effort  to  approach  Wilson  without  the  consent 
of  the  German  Empire,  as  is  expressly  stated  in  the  note.  Besides 
which,  no  previous  agreement  with  the  representatives  of  the  Ger- 
man Executive  Committee  was  sought  for.  They  were  ignored  and 
the  answer  was  sent  to  Wilson.  The  German  Nationalist  parties 
strongly  protest  against  such  an  unqualifiable  act  and  will  insist  in 
the  German  Executive  Committee  that  German-Austria's  right  of 
self-determination  be  unconditionally  upheld  and  peace  be  secured 
in  concert  with  the  German  Empire. 

Neither  would  the  German-Austrian  Social  Demo- 
crats have  been  a  party  to  such  a  movement. 

A  conscious  and  intended  misrepresentation  of  fact 
lies  before  us  if  it  be  maintained  to-day  that  either  the 
National  Assembly  or  the  Austrian  Social  Democrats 
would  have  approved  of  and  supported  such  policy.  I 
again  have  in  mind  the  Andrassy  days. 


30  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

On  October  3oth  the  National  Assembly  took  up  its 
position  for  action.  Doctor  Sylvester  drew  up  the 
report  and  pointed  out  the  following: 

It  was,  however,  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  to  make  the 
attempt  in  such  a  way  as  to  create  an  incurable  rupture  between 
German-Austria  and  the  German  Empire  that  would  endanger  the 
future  of  our  people.  The  German-Austrian  National  Assembly 
asserts  that  the  note  of  October  27th  from  the  Royal  and  Imperial 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  drawn  up  and  despatched  to 
President  Wilson  without  in  any  way  coming  to  an  agreement  with 
the  representatives  of  the  German-Austrian  people.  The  National 
Assembly  protests  all  the  more  insistently  against  this  proceeding 
as  the  nation  to  which  the  present  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
belongs  has  expressly  refused  any  joint  dealings.  The  National 
Assembly  states  that  it  and  its  organs  alone  have  the  right  to  repre- 
sent the  German-Austrian  people  in  all  matters  relating  to  foreign 
affairs  and  particularly  in  all  peace  negotiations. 

The  protest  met  with  no  opposition  in  the  National 
Assembly. 

Afterward  the  chairman,  Doctor  Ellenbogen,  the 
Social  Democrat,  spoke  as  follows : 

Instead  of  now  telling  the  German  Emperor  that  his  remaining 
in  office  is  the  greatest  obstacle  to  peace  [loud  applause  from  the 
Social  Democrats],  and  if  there  ever  were  an  object  in  Curtius's 
famous  leap,  it  would  be  comprehensible  now  were  the  German 
Emperor  to  copy  it  to  save  his  people,  this  coalition  now  seizes  the 
present  moment  to  break  away  from  Germany  and  in  doing  so 
attacks  German  democracy  in  the  rear.  Those  gentlemen  arrived 
too  late  to  gain  any  profit  from  the  peace.  What  now  remains  is 
the  bare  and  shameful  breach  of  faith,  the  thanks  of  the  House  of 
Austria,  so  styled  by  a  celebrated  German  poet.  [Applause  from  the 
Social  Democrats  and  the  German  Radicals.] 

It  was  the  attack  on  the  separate  peace  that  furnished 
the  exceptional  opportunity  for  Social  Democrats  and 
German  Radicals  to  unite  in  common  applause,  prob- 
ably the  first  instance  of  such  a  thing  in  all  these  years 
of  war. 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  31 

If  that  could  happen  at  a  moment  when  it  already  was 
obvious  that  there  was  no  longer  a  possibility  of  making 
a  peace  of  understanding  together  with  Germany — 
what  would  have  happened,  I  ask,  at  a  time  when  this 
was  by  no  means  so  clear  to  the  great  majority  of  the 
population;  at  a  time  when  it  was  still  far  from  certain, 
or,  at  least,  not  to  be  proved  mathematically,  that  we 
in  time  and  together  with  Germany  might  still  be  able 
to  conclude  a  peace  of  understanding?  Disbandment 
at  the  front,  where  all  would  be  fighting  against  all,  civil 
war  in  the  interior,  such  would  have  been  the  result  of  a 
separate  peace.  And  all  that  in  order  finally  to  impose 
on  us  the  resolutions  passed  in  London!  For  never — • 
as  I  shall  presently  show — had  the  Entente  given  up  its 
decision,  as  it  was  bound  to  Italy,  and  Italy  would 
allow  of  no  change.  Such  a  policy  would  have  been  as 
suicide  from  the  sheer  fear  of  death. 

In  1917  I  once  discussed  the  whole  question  with  the 
late  Dr.  Victor  Adler,  and  pointed  out  to  him  the  proba- 
bilities ensuing  from  a  separate  peace. 

Doctor  Adler  replied:  "For  God's  sake,  do  not 
plunge  us  into  a  war  with  Germany!"  After  the  entry 
of  Bavarian  troops  into  the  Tyrol  (Adler  was  then  a 
secretary  in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Department)  he  re- 
minded me  of  our  conversation,  and  added:  "The 
catastrophe  we  spoke  of  then  has  arrived.  The  Tyrol 
will  become  a  theater  of  war." 

Every  one  in  Austria  wished  for  peace.  No  one 
wanted  a  new  war — and  a  separate  peace  would  have 
brought  about,  not  peace,  but  a  new  war  with  Germany. 

In  Hungary,  Stephen  Tisza  ruled  with  practically 
unlimited  powers;  he  was  far  more  powerful  than  the 
entire  Wekerle  Ministry  put  together.  As  applied  to 
Hungary,  a  separate  peace  would  also  have  meant  the 
carrying  out  of  the  Entente  aims ;  that  is,  the  loss  of  the 
largest  and  richest  territories  in  the  north  and  south  of 


32  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Czechoslovakia,  Rumania,  and  Serbia.  Is  there  any 
one  who  can  honestly  maintain  that  the  Hungarians  in 
1917  would  have  agreed  to  these  sacrifices  without 
putting  up  the  bitterest  resistance?  Every  one  who 
knows  the  circumstances  must  admit  that  in  this  case 
Tisza  would  have  had  the  whole  of  Hungary  behind  him 
in  a  fierce  attack  on  Vienna.  Soon  after  I  took  office 
I  had  a  long  and  very  serious  conversation  with  him  on 
the  German  and  the  peace  questions.  Tisza  pointed 
out  that  the  Germans  were  difficult  to  deal  with;  they 
were  arrogant  and  despotic;  yet  without  them  we  could 
not  bring  the  war  to  an  end.  The  proposal  to  cede 
Hungarian  territory  (Transylvania)  and  also  the  plan 
to  enforce  an  internal  Hungarian  reform  in  favor  of  the 
subject  nationalities  were  matters  that  were  not  capable 
of  discussion.  The  congress  in  London  in  1915  had 
adopted  resolutions  that  were  quite  mad  and  never 
could  be  realized,  and  the  desire  for  destruction  pre- 
vailing in  the  Entente  could  be  suppressed  only  by 
force.  In  all  circumstances,  we  must  keep  our  place 
by  the  side  of  Germany.  In  Hungary  are  many  differ- 
ent currents  of  feeling — but  the  moment  that  Vienna 
prepared  to  sacrifice  any  part  of  Hungary  the  whole 
country  would  rise  as  one  man  against  such  action.  In 
that  respect  there  was  no  difference  between  him — 
Tisza — and  Karolyi.  Tisza  alluded  to  Karolyi's  atti- 
tude of  Parliament,  and  said  that  if  peace  was  to  be 
made  behind  Hungary's  back  she  would  separate  from 
Austria  and  act  independently. 

I  replied  that  there  was  no  question  either  of  separat- 
ing from  Germany  or  of  ceding  any  Hungarian  territory, 
but  that  we  must  be  quite  clear  as  to  what  we  had  to 
guard  should  we  be  carried  farther  through  the  German 
lust  of  conquest. 

Thereupon  Tisza  pointed  out  that  the  situation  was 
different.  It  was  not  known  for  certain  what  had  been 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  33 

determined  at  the  conference  in  London  (the  protocol 
had  not  then  been  published),  but  that  Hungarian 
territory  was  promised  to  Rumania  was  just  as  certain 
as  that  the  Entente  was  planning  to  intervene  in  Hun- 
garian internal  affairs,  and  both  contingencies  were 
equally  unacceptable.  Were  the  Entente  to  give  Hun- 
gary a  guaranty  for  the  status  quo  ante  and  to  desist 
from  any  internal  interference,  it  would  alter  the  situa- 
tion. Until  then  Tisza  must  declare  against  any 
attempt  at  peace. 

The  conversation  as  it  proceeded  became  more  ani- 
mated, owing  particularly  to  my  accusing  him  of  view- 
ing all  politics  from  a  Hungarian  point  of  view,  which  he 
did  not  deny,  though  he  maintained  that  the  dispute 
was  a  mere  platonic  one,  as  the  Entente  peace  terms 
appeared  to  be  such  that  Austria  would  be  left  with 
much  less  than  Hungary.  I  was  also  first  to  state  the 
terms  under  which  we  could  make  peace;  then  only 
would  it  be  seen  whether  extreme  pressure  brought  to 
bear  on  Germany  were  advisable  or  not.  There  was  no 
sense  in  Germany's  advocating  peace  if  she  intended  to 
continue  fighting.  For  Germany  was  fighting,  above 
all,  for  the  integrity  of  the  Monarchy,  which  would  be 
lost  the  moment  Germany  laid  down  her  arms.  What- 
ever German  politicians  and  generals  said  was  of  little 
consequence.  As  long  as  England  remained  bent  on 
satisfying  her  allies  with  our  territory,  Germany  was 
the  only  protection  against  these  plans. 

Tisza  had  no  desire  for  conquest  beyond  a  frontier 
protection  from  Rumania,  and  he  was  decidedly  opposed 
to  the  dismemberment  of  new  states  (Poland);  that 
would  be  to  weaken,  not  to  strengthen,  Hungary. 

After  a  lengthy  discussion  we  agreed  to  bind  our- 
selves to  the  following  policy : 

(i)  So  long  as  the  determination  made  at  the  conference  in 
London — i.e.*  the  destruction  of  the  Monarchy — continues 


34  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  be  the  Entente's  objective,  we  must  fight  on  in  the  cer- 
tain hope  of  crushing  that  spirit  of  destruction. 

(2)  But  as  our  war  is  purely  a  defensive  war,  it  will  on  no  account 

be  carried  on  for  purposes  of  conquest. 

(3)  Any  semblance  of  the  weakening  of  our  allied  relations  must 

be  avoided. 

(4)  No  concession  of  Hungarian  territory  may  take  place  without 

the  knowledge  of  the  Prime  Minister. 

.(5)  Should  the  Austrian  Ministry  agree  with  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister respecting  a  cession  of  Austrian  territory,  the  Hun- 
garian Prime  Minister  will  naturally  acquiesce. 

When  the  conference  in  London  and  the  destruction 
of  the  Monarchy  came  into  question,  Tisza  was  entirely 
in  the  right,  and  that  he  otherwise  to  the  end  adhered  to 
his  standpoint  is  proved  on  the  occasion  of  his  last  visit 
to  the  Southern  Slavs,  which  he  undertook  at  the  request 
of  the  Emperor  immediately  before  the  collapse,  and 
where  he  in  the  most  marked  manner  showed  himself  to 
be  opposed  to  the  aspirations  of  the  Southern  Slavs. 

Whoever  attempts  to  judge  in  objective  fashion  must 
not,  when  looking  back  from  to-day,  relegate  all  that 
has  since  happened  to  former  discernible  facts,  but 
should  consider  that,  in  spite  of  all  pessimism  and  all 
fears,  the  hopes  of  a  reasonable  peace  of  understanding, 
even  though  involving  sacrifices,  still  existed,  and  that 
it  was  impossible  to  plunge  the  Monarchy  in  a  catas- 
trophe at  once  for  fear  of  its  coming  later. 

If  the  situation  is  described  to-day  as  though  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Monarchy,  and  especially  the  Social 
Democrats,  were  favorably  disposed  for  any  eventual- 
ity, even  for  a  separate  peace,  I  must  again  most  em- 
phatically repudiate  it.  I  bear  in  mind  that  Social 
Democracy  without  doubt  was  the  party  most  strongly 
in  favor  of  peace,  and  also  that  Social  Democracy  in 
Germany,  as  here  with  us,  repeatedly  stated  that  there 
were  certain  limits  to  its  desire  for  peace.  The  German 
Social  Democrats  never  agreed  that  Alsace-Lorraine 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  35 

ought  to  be  given  up,  and  never  have  our  Social  Demo- 
crats voted  for  ceding  Trieste,  Bozen,  and  Meran. 
This  would  in  any  case  have  been  the  price  of  peace — 
and  also  the  price  of  a  separate  peace — for,  as  I  have 
already  pointed  out,  at  the  conference  in  London, 
which  dates  back  to  1915,  binding  obligations  had  been 
entered  into  for  the  partition  of  the  Monarchy,  while 
all  that  had  been  promised  to  Italy. 

The  fall  of  the  Monarchy  was  quite  inevitable, 
whether  through  the  separation  from  Germany  or 
through  the  vacillation  in  the  Entente  ranks — for  the 
claims  of  the  Italians,  the  Rumanians,  the  Serbians, 
and  the  Czechs  had  all  been  granted.  In  any  case  the 
Monarchy  would  have  fallen  and  German-Austria  have 
arisen  as  she  has  done  now;  and  I  doubt  whether  the 
part  played  by  that  country  during  the  proceedings 
would  have  recommended  it  to  the  special  protection  of 
the  Entente.  It  is  a  very  great  mistake,  whether  con- 
scious or  unconscious,  to  believe  and  to  maintain  that 
the  population  of  German-Austria,  and  especially  the 
present  leaders  of  Social  Democracy,  are  devoid  of  any 
strong  national  feeling.  I  refer  to  the  part  played  by 
the  Austrian  Social  Democracy  in  the  question  of  union. 
It  was  the  motive  power  in  the  union  with  Germany, 
and  the  papers  repeated  daily  that  no  material  advan- 
tages which  the  Entente  could  offer  to  Austria  could 
alter  the  decision.  How,  therefore,  can  this  same 
Social  Democracy,  whose  entire  political  views  and  aims 
are  subordinate  to  the  desire  for  a  union  with  Germany 
— how  can  this  Social  Democracy  demand  a  policy 
which,  without  doubt,  must  lead  not  only  to  a  separa- 
tion from  Germany,  but  to  a  fratricidal  war  with  the 
German  nation?  And  why  condemn  the  upholding  of 
allied  relations  when  Andrassy  was  abused  for  doing  the 
opposite? 

But  what  was  the  situation  in  March,  1918,  shortly 


36  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

before  my  resignation?  Germany  stood  at  the  height 
of  her  success.  I  do  not  pretend  to  say  that  her  success 
was  real.  In  this  connection  that  is  of  no  moment; 
but  the  Germans  were  persuaded  that  they  were  quite 
near  a  victorious  end,  that  after  leaving  the  eastern 
front  they  would  throw  themselves  on  to  the  western 
front,  and  that  the  war  would  end  before  America  had 
time  to  come  in.  Their  reckoning  was  at  fault,  as  we 
all  know  to-day.  But  for  the  German  generals  the  will 
to  victory  was  the  leading  spirit,  and  all  decisions 
arrived  at  by  Germany  against  the  defection  of  Austria- 
Hungary  proceeded  from  that  dominant  influence. 

As  already  mentioned,  I  stated  in  my  speech  of 
December  nth,  on  foreign  policy,  that  neither  the 
Entente  nor  Germany  would  conclude  a  peace  of  renun- 
ciation. Since  then  I  have  had  opportunity  to  speak 
with  several  men  of  the  Entente,  and,  consequent  on 
the  views  that  I  obtained,  I  feel  I  must  formulate  my 
previous  opinion  in  still  stronger  terms.  I  came  to  the 
firm  conclusion  that  the  Entente — England  above  all — 
from  the  summer  of  1917,  at  any  rate,  had  formed  an 
unbending  resolve  to  shatter  Germany. 

From  that  time  onward  England,  with  the  obstinacy 
which  is  her  chief  characteristic,  appears  to  have  been 
determined  not  to  treat  with  Germany  any  more,  nor  to 
sheathe  her  sword  until  Germany  lay  crushed  to  earth. 
It  makes  no  difference  in  the  matter  that  the  German 
military  party — though  for  other  reasons — from  a  total 
misconception  of  their  chances  of  victory,  steadily 
refused  a  peace  involving  sacrifice  at  a  time  when  it 
might  have  been  possible.  This  is  a  historical  fact, 
but  as  an  upholder  of  truth  I  must  distinctly  state  that 
I  doubt  whether  concessions  would  have  changed  the 
fate  of  Germany.  We  could  have  gone  over  to  the 
enemy — in  1917  and  also  in  1918 ;  we  could  have  fought 
against  Germany  with  the  Entente  on  Austro-Hunga- 


INTRODUCTORY  REFLECTIONS  37 

rian  soil,  and  would  doubtless  have  hastened  Germany's 
collapse;  but  the  wounds  which  Austria-Hungary 
would  have  received  in  the  fray  would  rot  have  been 
less  serious  than  those  from  which  she  is  now  suffering ; 
she  would  have  perished  in  the  fight  against  Germany,  as 
she  has  as  good  as  perished  in  her  fight  allied  with  Ger- 
many. 

Austria-Hungary's  watch  had  run  down.  Among  the 
few  statesmen  who  in  1914  wished  for  war — like  Tschir- 
sky,  for  instance — there  can  have  been  none  who  after 
a  few  months  had  not  altered  and  regretted  his  views. 
They,  too,  had  not  thought  of  a  world  war.  I  believe  ' 
to-day,  nevertheless,  that  even  without  the  war  the  fall 
of  the  Monarchy  would  have  happened,  and  that  the 
assassination  in  Serbia  was  the  first  sign. 

The  Archduke  Heir  Apparent  was  the  victim  of 
Greater  Serbia's  aspirations;  but  these  aspirations, 
which  led  to  the  breaking  away  of  our  Southern  Slav 
provinces,  would  not  have  been  suppressed,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  would  have  largely  increased  and  asserted 
themselves,  and  would  have  strengthened  the  centrif- 
ugal tendencies  of  other  peoples  within  the  Monarchy. 

Lightning  at  night  reveals  the  country  for  a  second, 
and  the  same  effect  was  produced  by  the  shots  fired  at 
Sarajevo.  It  became  obvious  that  the  signal  for  the 
fall  of  the  Monarchy  had  been  given.  The  bells  of 
Sarajevo,  which  began  to  toll  half  an  hour  after  the 
murder,  sounded  the  death  knell  of  the  Monarchy. 

The  feeling  among  the  Austrian  people,  and  especially 
at  Vienna,  was  very  general  that  the  outrage  at  Sarajevo 
was  a  matter  of  more  importance  than  the  murder  of  an 
Imperial  prince  and  his  wife,  and  that  it  was  the  alarm 
signal  for  the  ruin  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire. 

I  have  been  told  that  during  the  period  between  the 
assassination  and  the  war  warlike  demonstrations 

were  daily  occurrences  in  the  Viennese  restaurants  and 
4 


38  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

people's  parks;  patriotic  and  anti-Serbian  songs  were 
sung,  and  Berchtold  was  scoffed  at  because  he  could  not 
' '  exert  himself  to  take  any  energetic  steps. ' '  This  must 
not  be  taken  as  an  excuse  for  any  eventual  mistakes  on 
the  part  of  the  leaders  of  the  nation,  for  a  leading  states- 
man ought  not  to  allow  himself  to  be  influenced  by  the 
man  in  the  street.  It  is  only  to  prove  that  the  spirit 
developed  in  1914  appears  to  have  been  very  general. 
And  it  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  add  this  comment : 
how  many  of  those  who  then  clamored  for  war  and 
revenge  and* demanded  "energy,"  would,  now  that  the 
experiment  has  totally  failed,  severely  criticize  and  con- 
demn Berchtold's  "criminal  behavior"? 

It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  say  in  what  manner  the 
fall  of  the  Monarchy  would  have  occurred  had  war 
been  averted.  Certainly  in  a  less  terrible  fashion  than 
was  the  case  through  the  war.  Probably  much  more 
slowly,  and  doubtless  without  dragging  the  whole 
world  into  the  whirlpool.  We  were  bound  to  die.  We 
were  at  liberty  to  choose  tn"e  manner  of  our  death,  and 
we  chose  the  most  terrible. 

Without  knowing  it,  we  lost  our  independence  at  the 
outbreak  of  war.  We  were  transformed  from  a  subject 
into  an  object. 

This  unfortunate  war  once  started,  we  were  powerless 
to  end  it.  At  the  conference  in  London  the  death 
sentence  had  been  passed  on  the  Empire  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  and  a  separate  peace  would  have  been  no  easier 
a  form  of  death  than  that  involved  in  holding  out  at 
the  side  of  our  allies. 


CHAPTER  II 

KONOPISCHT 


I^ONOPISCHT  has  become  the  cradle  of  manifold 
A^  legends.  The  lord  of  the  castle  was  the  first  victim 
of  the  terrible  world  conflagration,  and  the  part  that  he 
played  before  the  war  has  been  the  subject  of  much  and 
partly  erroneous  commentary. 

The  Archduke  and  heir  to  the  throne  was  a  man  of  a 
very  peculiar  nature.  The  main  feature  of  his  char- 
acter was  a  great  lack  of  balance.  He  knew  no  middle 
course  and  was  just  as  eager  to  hate  as  to  love.  He  was 
unbalanced  in  everything;  he  did  nothing  like  other 
people,  and  what  he  did  was  done  in  superhuman 
dimensions.  His  passion  for  buying  and  collecting 
antiquities  was  proverbial  and  fabulous.  A  first-rate 
shot,  sport  was  for  him  a  question  of  murdering  en 
masse,  and  the  number  of  game  shot  by  him  reached 
hundreds  of  thousands.  A  few  years  before  his  death 
he  shot  his  five  thousandth  stag. 

His  ability  as  a  good  shot  was  phenomenal.  When  in 
India,  during  his  voyage  round  the  world,  and  while 
staying  with  a  certain  Maharajah,  an  Indian  marks- 
man gave  an  exhibition  of  his  skill.  Coins  were  thrown 
into  the  air  which  the  man  hit  with  bullets.  The  Arch- 
duke tried  the  same  and  beat  the  Indian.  Once  when  I 
was  staying  with  him  at  Eckartsau  he  made  a  coup 
double  at  a  stag  and  a  hare  as  they  ran;  he  had  knocked 


40  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

over  a  fleeing  stag,  and  when,  startled  by  the  shot,  a 
hare  jumped  up,  he  killed  it  with  the  second  bullet. 
He  scorned  all  modern  appliances  for  shooting,  such  as 
telescopes  or  automatic  rifles;  he  invariably  used  a 
short  double-barreled  rifle,  and  his  exceptionally  keen 
sight  rendered  glasses  unnecessary. 

The  artistic  work  of  laying  out  parks  and  gardens 
became  in  latter  years  his  dominating  passion.  He 
knew  every  tree  and  every  bush  at  Konopischt,  and 
loved  his  flowers  above  everything.  He  was  his  own 
gardener.  Every  bed  and  every  group  was  designed 
according  to  his  exact  orders.  He  knew  the  condi- 
tions essential  to  the  life  of  each  individual  plant,  the 
quality  of  the  soil  required;  and  even  the  smallest  spot 
to  be  laid  out  or  altered  was  done  according  to  his 
minute  instructions.  But  here,  too,  everything  was  car- 
ried out  on  the  same  gigantic  lines,  and  the  sums  spent 
on  that  park  must  have  been  enormous.  Few  people 
had  the  artistic  knowledge  possessed  in  many  respects 
by  the  Archduke ;  no  dealer  could  palm  off  on  him  any 
modern  article  as  an  antique,  and  he  had  just  as  good 
taste  as  understanding.  On  the  other  hand,  music  to 
him  was  simply  a  disagreeable  noise,  and  he  had  an 
unspeakable  contempt  for  poets.  He  could  not  bear 
Wagner,  and  Goethe  left  him  quite  cold.  His  lack  of 
any  talent  for  languages  was  peculiar.  He  spoke 
French  tolerably,  but  otherwise  no  other  language, 
though  he  had  a  smattering  of  Italian  and  Czech.  For 
years — indeed,  to  the  end  of  his  life — he  struggled  with 
the  greatest  energy  to  learn  Hungarian.  He  had  a 
priest  living  permanently  in  the  house  to  give  him 
Hungarian  lessons.  This  priest  accompanied  him  on 
his  travels,  and  at  St.  Moritz,  for  instance,  Franz  Fer- 
dinand had  a  Hungarian  lesson  every  day;  but,  in 
spite  of  this,  he  continued  to  suffer  from  the  feeling  that 
he  would  never  be  able  to  learn  the  language,  and  he 


KONOPISCHT  41 

vented  his  annoyance  at  this  on  the  entire  Hungarian 
people.  ' '  Their  very  language  makes  me  feel  antipathy 
for  them,"  was  a  remark  I  constantly  heard  him  make. 
His  judgment  of  people  was  not  a  well-balanced  one; 
he  could  either  love  or  hate,  and,  unfortunately,  the 
number  of  those  included  in  the  latter  category  was 
considerably  the  greater. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  it  that  there  was  a  very 
hard  strain  in  Franz  Ferdinand's  mentality,  and  those 
who  only  knew  him  slightly  felt  that  this  hardness  of 
character  was  the  most  notable  feature  in  him,  and  his 
great  unpopularity  can  doubtless  be  attributed  to  this 
cause.  The  public  never  knew  the  splendid  qualities 
of  the  Archduke,  and  misjudged  him  accordingly. 

Apparently  he  was  not  always  like  that.  He  suf- 
fered in  his  youth  from  severe  lung  trouble,  and  for  long 
was  given  up  by  the  doctors.  He  often  spoke  to  me 
of  that  time  and  all  that  he  had  gone  through,  and 
referred  with  intense  bitterness  to  the  people  who  were 
only  waiting  day  by  day  to  put  him  altogether  on  one 
side.  As  long  as  he  was  looked  upon  as  the  heir  to  the 
throne,  and  people  reckoned  on  him  for  the  future,  he 
was  the  center  of  all  possible  attention;  but  when  he 
fell  ill  and  his  case  was  considered  hopeless,  the  world 
fluctuated  from  hour  to  hour  and  paid  homage  to  his 
younger  brother,  Otto.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  doubt 
that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  truth  in  what  the  late 
Archduke  told  me;  and  no  one  knowing  the  ways  of 
the  world  can  deny  the  wretched,  servile  egotism  that 
is  almost  always  at  the  bottom  of  the  homage  paid  to 
those  in  high  places.  More  deeply  than  in  the  hearts 
of  others  was  this  resentment  implanted  in  the  heart  of 
Franz  Ferdinand,  and  he  never  forgave  the  world  what 
he  suffered  and  went  through  in  those  distressful 
months.  It  was  chiefly  the  ostensible  vacillation  of 
the  then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  Goluchow- 


42  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ski,  that  had  so  deeply  hurt  the  Archduke,  who  always 
imagined  that  Goluchowski  was  personally  attached  to 
him.  According  to  Franz  Ferdinand's  account,  Go- 
luchowski is  supposed  to  have  said  to  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  that  the  Archduke  Otto  ought  now  to 
be  given  the  retinue  and  household  suitable  for  the 
heir  to  the  throne,  as  he — Franz  Ferdinand — "was  in 
any  case  lost."  It  was  not  so  much  the  fact  as  the 
manner  in  which  Goluchowski  tried  "to  bury  him 
while  still  living  "  that  vexed  and  hurt  him  whom  a  long 
illness  had  made  irritable.  But  besides  Goluchowski, 
there  were  numberless  others  whose  behavior  at  that 
time  he  took  greatly  amiss,  and  his  unparalleled  con- 
tempt of  the  world,  which,  when  I  knew  him,  was  one  of 
his  most  characteristic  features,  appears — partly,  at 
any  rate — to  date  from  his  experiences  during  illness. 

In  connection  with  politics,  too,  this  bitterness  exer- 
cised a  lasting  influence  on  his  entire  mental  outlook.  I 
have  been  told  by  an  authentic  witness  that  the  Arch- 
duke, when  suffering  and  combating  his  terrible  disease, 
saw  one  day  an  article  in  a  Hungarian  paper  which,  in 
brutal  and  derisive  tones,  spoke  of  the  Archduke's 
expectations  of  future  government  as  laid  aside,  and 
gloated  openly,  with  malicious  delight,  over  the  prob- 
able event.  The  Archduke,  who  while  reading  the 
article  had  turned  ashen  gray  with  rage  and  indigna- 
tion, remained  silent  for  a  moment  and  then  made  the 
following  characteristic  remark : ' '  Now  I  must  get  better. 
I  shall  live  from  now  only  for  my  health.  I  must  get 
better  in  order  to  show  them  that  their  joy  is  prema- 
ture." And  though  this  may  not  have  been  the  only 
reason  for  his  violent  antipathy  to  everything  Hun- 
garian, there  is  no  doubt  that  the  episode  influenced 
his  mind  considerably.  The  Archduke  was  a  "good 
hater";  he  did  not  easily  forget,  and  woe  betide  those 
upon  whom  he  vented  his  hatred.  On  the  other  hand, 


KONOPISCHT  43 

though  but  few  knew  it,  he  had  an  uncommonly  warm 
corner  in  his  heart;  he  was  an  ideal  husband,  the  best  of 
fathers,  and  a  faithful  friend.  But  the  number  of 
those  he  despised  was  incomparably  greater  than  those 
who  gained  his  affection,  and  he  himself  was  in  no 
doubt  whatever  as  to  his  being  the  most  unpopular  per- 
son in  the  Monarchy.  But  there  was  a  certain  grandeur 
in  this  very  contempt  of  popularity.  He  never  could 
bring  himself  to  make  any  advances  to  newspapers  or 
other  organs  that  are  in  the  habit  of  influencing  public 
opinion  either  favorably  or  unfavorably.  He  Was  too 
proud  to  sue  for  popularity,  and  too  great  a  despiser  of 
men  to  attach  any  importance  to  their  judgment. 

The  Archduke's  antipathy  to  Hungary  runs  like  a 
scarlet  thread  through  the  political  chain  of  his  thoughts. 
I  have  been  told  that  at  the  time  when  the  Crown- 
Prince  Rudolf  was  frequently  in  Hungary  shooting,  the 
Archduke  was  often  with  him,  and  that  the  Hungarian 
gentlemen  took  a  pleasure  in  teasing  and  ridiculing  the 
young  Archduke  in  the  presence  and  to  the  delight  of 
the  considerably  older  Crown  Prince.  Ready  as  I  am 
to  believe  that  the  Crown- Prince  Rudolf  enjoyed  the 
jokes — and  little  do  I  doubt  that  there  were  men  there 
who  would  act  in  such  fashion  so  as  to  curry  favor  with 
the  Crown  Prince— I  still  think  that  these  unpleasant 
incidents  in  his  youth  weighed  less  in  the  balance  with 
Franz  Ferdinand  than  the  already  mentioned  occur- 
rences during  his  illness. 

Apart  from  his  personal  antipathies,  which  he  trans- 
ferred from  a  few  Hungarians  to  the  entire  nation, 
there  were  also  various  far-reaching  and  well-founded 
political  reasons  which  strengthened  the  Archduke  in 
his  antagonistic  relations  with  Hungary.  Franz  Fer- 
dinand possessed  an  exceptionally  fine  political  flair, 
and  this  enabled  him  to  see  that  Hungarian  policy  was 
a  vital  danger  to  the  existence  of  the  whole  Hapsburg 


44  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Empire.  His  desire  to  overthrow  the  predominance  of 
the  Magyars  and  to  help  the  nationalities  to  obtain 
their  rights  was  always  in  his  thoughts,  and  influenced 
his  judgment  on  all  political  questions.  He  was  the 
steady  representative  of  the  Rumanians,  the  Slovaks, 
and  other  nationalities  living  in  Hungary,  and  went  so 
far  in  that  respect  that  he  would  have  treated  every 
question  at  once  from  an  anti-Magyar  point  of  view 
without  inquiring  into  it  in  an  objective  and  expert 
manner.  These  tendencies  of  his  were  no  secret  in 
Hungary,  and  the  result  was  a  strong  reaction  among 
the  Magyar  magnates,  which  he  again  took  as  purely 
personal  antagonism  to  himself,  and  as  the  years  went 
on  existing  differences  increased  automatically,  until 
finally,  under  the  Tisza  regime,  they  led  to  direct 
hostility. 

The  Archduke's  antipathy  to  party  leaders  in  Hun- 
gary was  even  stronger  than  that  he  felt  for  Tisza,  and 
he  showed  it  particularly  to  one  of  the  most  prominent 
figures  of  that  time.  I  do  not  know  for  certain  what 
took  place  between  them ;  I  only  know  that  several  years 
before  the  catastrophe  the  gentleman  was  received  in 
audience  at  the  Belvedere,  and  that  the  interview  came 
to  a  very  unsatisfactory  end.  The  Archduke  told  me 
that  the  gentleman  arrived,  bringing  a  whole  library 
with  him  in  order  to  put  forward  legal  proofs  that  the 
Magyar's  standpoint  was  the  right  one.  He,  the  Arch- 
duke, snapped  his  fingers  at  their  laws,  and  said  so.  It 
came  to  a  violent  scene,  and  the  gentleman,  pale  as 
death,  tottered  from  the  room. 

Certain  it  is  that  Ministers  and  other  officials  rarely 
waited  on  the  Archduke  without  beating  hearts.  He 
was  capable  of  flying  out  at  people  and  terrifying  them 
to  such  a  degree  that  they  lost  their  heads  completely. 
He  often  took  their  fright  to  be  obstinacy  and  passive 
resistance,  and  it  irritated  him  all  the  more, 


KONOPISCHT  45 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  extremely  easy  to  get  on 
with  him  if  one  knew  him  well  and  did  not  stand  in  awe 
of  him.  I  had  many  scenes  with  him,  and  often  lost  my 
temper,  too ;  but  there  was  never  any  lasting  ill-feeling. 
Once  when  at  Konopischt  we  had  a  scene  one  evening 
after  dinner  because,  he  said,  I  always  worked  in  opposi- 
tion to  him  and  rewarded  his  friendship  by  treachery. 
I  broke  off  the  conversation,  remarking  that,  if  he  could 
say  such  things,  any  further  sensible  conversation  would 
be  impossible,  and  I  also  stated  my  intention  of  leaving 
the  next  morning.  We  separated  without  saying  good 
night  to  each  other.  Quite  early  next  morning — I  was 
still  in  bed — he  appeared  in  my  room  and  asked  me  to 
forget  what  he  had  said  the  previous  evening,  that  he 
had  not  meant  it  seriously,  and  thus  completely  dis- 
armed my  still  prevailing  vexation. 

A  despiser  of  men,  with  his  wits  sharpened  by  his  own 
experiences,  he  never  allowed  himself  to  be  fooled  by 
servile  cringing  and  flattery.  He  listened  to  people, 
but  how  often  have  I  heard  him  say:  "He  is  no  good; 
he  is  a  toady."  Such  people  never  found  favor  with 
him,  as  he  always  mistrusted  them  at  the  outset.  He 
was  protected  more  than  others  in  such  high  spheres 
from  the  poison  of  servility  that  attacks  all  monarchs. 

His  best  two  friends,  and  the  men  to  whom — after  his 
own  nearest  relations — he  was  most  attached,  were  his 
brother-in-law  Albrecht  von  Wurttemberg  and  the 
Prince  Karl  of  Schwarzenberg. 

The  former,  a  man  of  charming  personality,  great 
intelligence,  and  equally  efficient  in  political  as  in  mili- 
tary matters,  lived  on  a  footing  of  true  brotherly  unity 
with  Franz  Ferdinand,  and  also,  naturally,  on  terms  of 
perfect  equality. 

Karl  of  Schwarzenberg  was  the  most  sincere,  honor- 
able, and  straightforward  character  I  have  ever  en- 
countered; a  man  who  concealed  the  truth  from  no  one. 


46  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Rich,  independent,  and  devoid  of  personal  ambition,  it 
was  quite  immaterial  to  him  whether  the  Archduke  was 
pleased  with  what  he  asserted  or  no.  He  was  his  friend, 
and  considered  it  his  duty  to  be  honest  and  open — and, 
if  necessary,  disagreeable.  The  Archduke  understood, 
appreciated,  and  valued  this  attitude.  I  do  not  think 
there  are  many  monarchs  or  heirs  to  the  throne  who 
would  have  suffered,  as  the  Archduke  did,  Schwarzen- 
berg's  sayings  and  doings. 

Franz  Ferdinand  was  on  very  bad  terms  with  Aehren- 
thal,  who  easily  became  abrupt  and  repellent.  Still, 
there  was  another  reason  why  two  such  hard  millstones 
could  not  grind  together.  I  do  not  believe  that  the 
many  reproaches  launched  against  Aehrenthal  by  the 
Archduke  were  consequent  on  political  differences;  it 
was  more  Aehrenthal' s  manner  that  invariably  irritated 
the  Archduke.  I  had  occasion  to  read  some  of  Aehren- 
thal's  letters  to  Franz  Ferdinand  which,  perhaps  unin- 
tentionally, had  a  slight  ironical  flavor  which  made  the 
Archduke  feel  he  was  not  being  taken  seriously.  He 
was  particularly  sensitive  in  this  respect. 

When  Aehrenthal  fell  ill  the  Archduke  made  unkind 
remarks  about  the  dying  man,  and  there  was  great  and 
general  indignation  at  the  want  of  feeling  shown  by 
him.  He  represented  the  Emperor  at  the  first  part  of 
the  funeral  service,  and  afterward  received  me  at  Bel- 
vedere. We  were  standing  in  the  courtyard  when  the 
procession,  with  the  hearse,  passed  on  the  way  to  the 
station.  The  Archduke  disappeared  quickly  into  a 
cottage  close  by,  the  windows  of  which  looked  on  to  the 
road,  and  there,  concealed  behind  the  window-curtain, 
he  watched  the  procession  pass.  He  said  not  a  word, 
but  his  eyes  were  full  of  tears.  When  he  saw  that  I 
noticed  his  emotion  he  turned  away  angrily,  vexed  at 
having  given  proof  of  his  weakness.  It  was  just  like 
him.  He  would  rather  be  considered  hard  and  heart- 


KONOPISCHT  47 

less  than  soft  and  weak,  and  nothing  was  more  repug- 
nant to  him  than  the  idea  that  he  had  aroused  suspicion 
of  striving  to  enact  a  touching  scene.  I  have  no  doubt 
that  at  that  moment  he  was  suffering  the  torture  of 
self-reproach,  and  probably  suffered  the  more  through 
being  so  reserved  and  unable  to  give  free  play  to  his 
feelings. 

The  Archduke  could  be  extremely  gay,  and  possessed 
an  exceptionally  strong  sense  of  humor.  In  his  hap- 
piest years  he  could  laugh  like  any  youth,  and  carried 
his  audience  with  him  by  his  unaffected  merriment. 

Some  years  ago  a  German  prince,  who  was  unable  to 
distinguish  between  the  numerous  archdukes,  came  to 
Vienna.  A  dinner  was  given  in  his  honor  at  the  Hof- 
burg,  where  he  was  seated  next  to  Franz  Ferdinand. 
Part  of  the  program  was  that  he  was  to  have  gone 
the  next  morning  with  the  Archduke  to  shoot  in  the 
neighborhood.  The  German  prince,  who  mistook  the 
Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  for  some  one  else,  said  to 
him  during  the  dinner:  "I  am  to  go  out  shooting  to- 
morrow, and  I  hear  it  is  to  be  with  that  tiresome  Franz 
Ferdinand;  I  hope  it  will  be  changed."  As  far  as  I 
know,  the  expedition  did  not  take  place;  but  I  never 
heard  whether  the  prince  discovered  his  mistake.  The 
Archduke,  however,  laughed  heartily  for  days  at  the 
episode. 

The  Archduke  invariably  spoke  of  his  nephew,  the 
present  Emperor  Charles,  with  great  affection.  The 
relations  between  the  two  were,  however,  always 
marked  by  the  absolute  subordination  of  the  nephew 
to  the  uncle.  In  all  political  discussions,  too,  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  was  always  the  listener,  absorbing  the 
precepts  expounded  by  Franz  Ferdinand. 

Charles's  marriage  met  with  the  full  approval  of  his 
uncle.  The  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  too,  entertained 
the  warmest  affection  for  the  young  couple. 


The  Archduke  was  a  firm  partizan  of  the  Great- 
Austrian  program.  His  idea  was  to  convert  the 
Monarchy  into  numerous  more  or  less  independent 
national  states,  having  in  Vienna  a  common  central 
organization  for  all  important  and  absolutely  necessary 
affairs — in  other  words  to  substitute  federalization  for 
dualism.  Now  that,  after  terrible  military  and  revo- 
lutionary struggles,  the  development  of  the  former 
Monarchy  has  been  accomplished  in  a  national  spirit, 
there  cannot  be  many  to  contend  that  the  plan  is 
Utopian.  At  that  time,  however,  it  had  many  oppo- 
nents who  strongly  advised  against  dissecting  the  state 
in  order  to  erect  in  its  place  something  new  and  "pre- 
sumably better,"  and  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  was 
far  too  conservative  and  far  too  old  to  agree  to  his 
nephew's  plans.  This  direct  refusal  of  the  idea  cher- 
ished by  the  Archduke  offended  him  greatly,  and  he 
complained  often  in  bitter  terms  that  the  Emperor 
turned  a  deaf  ear  to  him  as  though  he  were  the  "lowest 
serving-man  at  Schonbrunn." 

The  Archduke  lacked  the  knowledge  of  how  to  deal 
with  people.  He  neither  could  nor  would  control  him- 
self, and,  charming  though  he  could  be  when  his  natural 
heartiness  was  allowed  free  scope,  just  as  little  could  he 
conceal  his  anger  and  ill-humor.  Thus  it  came  about 
that  the  relations  between  him  and  the  aged  Emperor 
grew  more  and  more  strained.  There  were  doubtless 
faults  on  both  sides.  The  standpoint  of  the  old  Em- 
peror, that  as  long  as  he  lived  no  one  else  should  inter- 
fere, was  in  direct  opposition  to  that  of  the  Archduke, 
who  held  that  he  would  one  day  have  to  suffer  for  the 
present  faults  in  the  administration,  and  any  one 
acquainted  with  life  at  court  will  know  that  such  differ- 
ences between  the  highest  individuals  are  quickly  raked 
together  and  exaggerated.  At  every  court  there  are 
men  who  seek  to  gain  their  master's  favor  by  pouring 


KONOPISCHT  49 

oil  on  the  flames,  and  who,  by  gossip  and  stories  of  all 
kinds,  add  to  the  antipathy  that  prevails.  Thus  it 
was  in  this  case,  and,  instead  of  being  drawn  closer 
together,  the  two  became  more  and  more  estranged. 

The  Archduke  had  but  few  friends,  and  under  the 
old  monarch  practically  none  at  all.  That  was  one  of 
the  reasons  for  the  advances  he  made  to  the  Emperor 
William.  In  reality,  they  were  men  of  such  a  different 
type  that  there  could  be  no  question  of  friendship  in 
the  true  sense  of  the  word,  or  any  real  under- 
standing between  him  and  the  Emperor  William, 
and  the  question  was  practically  never  mooted. 
The  only  point  common  to  both  their  characters  was  a 
strongly  defined  autocratic  trait.  The  Archduke  had 
no  sympathy  with  the  speeches  of  the  Emperor  William, 
nor  yet  with  his  obvious  desire  for  popularity,  which  the 
Archduke  could  not  understand.  The  Emperor  Will- 
iam, on  his  part,  undoubtedly  grew  more  attached  to 
the  Archduke  during  his  latter  years  than  he  had  been 
originally.  Franz  Ferdinand  was  not  on  such  good 
terms  with  the  Crown  Prince  of  Germany.  They 
spent  some  weeks  together  at  St.  Moritz  in  Switzer- 
land, without  learning  to  know  each  other  any  better; 
but  this  can  readily  be  explained  by  the  difference  in  age 
and  also  by  the  much  more  serious  views  of  life  held  by 
the  Archduke. 

The  isolation  and  retirement  in  which  the  Archduke 
lived,  and  the  regrettably  restricted  intercourse  he  had 
with  other  circles,  gave  rise  to  the  circulation  of  some 
true,  besides  numerous  false,  rumors.  One  of  these 
rumors,  which  is  still  obstinately  kept  up,  was  to  the 
effect  that  the  Archduke  was  a  fanatic  for  war  and 
looked  upon  war  as  a  necessary  aid  to  the  realization  of 
his  plans  for  the  future.  Nothing  could  be  more  untrue, 
and,  although  the  Archduke  never  openly  admitted 
it  to  me,  I  am  convinced  that  he  had  an  instinctive  feel- 


SO  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ing  that  the  Monarchy  would  never  be  able  to  bear  the 
terrible  test  of  strength  of  a  war,  and  the  fact  is  that, 
instead  of  working  to  encourage  war,  his  activities  lay 
all  in  the  opposite  direction.  I  recollect  an  extremely 
symptomatic  episode.  I  do  not  remember  the  exact 
date,  but  it  was  some  time  before  the  death  of  the 
Archduke.  One  of  the  well-known  Balkan  turmoils 
threw  the  Monarchy  into  a  state  of  agitation,  and  the 
question  whether  to  mobilize  or  not  became  the  order 
of  the  day.  I  chanced  to  be  in  Vienna,  where  I  had  an 
interview  with  Berchtold,  who  spoke  of  the  situation 
with  much  concern  and  complained  that  the  Archduke 
was  acting  in  a  warlike  spirit.  I  offered  to  draw  the 
Archduke's  attention  to  the  danger  of  the  proceeding, 
and  put  myself  in  telegraphic  communication  with  him. 
I  arranged  to  join  his  train  that  same  day  when  he 
passed  through  Wessely  on  his  way  to  Konopischt.  I 
had  only  the  short  time  between  the  two  stations  for 
my  conversation.  I  therefore  at  once  took  the  bull 
by  the  horns  and  told  him  of  the  rumors  current  about 
him  in  Vienna  and  of  the  danger  of  promoting  a.conflict 
with  Russia  by  too  strong  action  in  the  Balkans.  I  did 
not  meet  with  the  slightest  opposition  from  the  Arch- 
duke, and  in  his  usual  expeditious  way  he  wrote,  while 
still  in  the  train,  a  telegram  to  Berchtold  in  which  he 
expressed  his  perfect  agreement  in  maintaining  a 
friendly  attitude  and  repudiated  all  the  reports  of  his 
having  been  opposed  to  it.  It  is  a  fact  that  certain  of 
the  military,  who  were  anxious  for  war,  made  use  of  the 
Archduke,  or  rather  misused  him,  in  order  to  carry  on 
a  military  propaganda  in  his  name  and  thus  to  give  rise 
to  so  wrongful  an  estimate  of  him.  Several  of  these 
military  men  died  a  hero's  death  in  the  war;  others 
have  disappeared  and  are  forgotten.  Conrad,  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  was  never  among  those  who  misused 
the  Archduke.  He  could  never  have  done  such  a 


KONOPISCHT  51 

thing.     He  carried  out  himself  what  he  considered 
necessary  and  did  it  openly  and  in  face  of  everybody. 

In  connection  with  these  reports  about  the  Archduke 
there  is  one  remarkable  detail  that  is  worthy  of  note. 
He  told  me  himself  how  a  fortune-teller  once  predicted 
that  "he  would  one  day  let  loose  a  world  war." 

Although  to  a  certain  extent  this  prophecy  flattered 
him,  containing  as  it  did  the  unspoken  recognition  that 
the  world  would  have  to  reckon  on  him  as  a  powerful 
factor,  still  he  emphatically  pointed  out  how  mad  such 
a  prophecy  was.  It  was  fulfilled,  however,  later, 
though  very  differently  from  what  was  meant  originally, 
and  never  was  prince  more  innocent  of  causing  blood  to 
flow  than  the  unhappy  victim  of  Sarajevo. 

The  Archduke  suffered  most  terribly  under  the  con- 
ditions resulting  from  his  unequal  marriage.  The  sin- 
cere and  true  love  he  felt  for  his  wife  kept  alive  in  him 
the  wish  to  raise  her  to  his  rank  and  privileges,  and  the 
constant  obstacles  that  he  encountered  at  all  court 
ceremonies  embittered  and  angered  him  inexpressibly. 
The  Archduke  was  firmly  resolved  that  when  he  came 
to  the  throne  he  would  give  to  his  wife,  not  the  title  of 
Empress,  but  a  position  which,  though  without  the  **»*+'*' 
title,  would  bestow  upon  her  the  highest  rank.  His  J*J"""r 
argument  was  that,  wherever  he  was  she  would  be 
mistress  of  the  house,  and  as  such  was  entitled  to  the 
highest  position.  "Therefore,  she  will  take  precedence 
of  all  the  archduchesses."  Never  did  the  Archduke 
show  the  slightest  wish  to  alter  the  succession  and  put 
his  son  in  place  of  the  Archduke  Charles.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  was  resolved  that  his  first  official  act  on  coming 
to  the  throne  would  be  to  publish  a  solemn  declaration 
containing  his  intention,  in  order  to  counteract  the 
ever-recurring  false  and  biased  statements.  As  regards 
his  children,  for  whom  he  did  everything  that  a  loving 
father's  heart  could  devise,  his  greatest  wish  was  to  see 


52  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

them  become  wealthy,  independent  private  individuals, 
and  be  able  to  enjoy  life  without  any  material  cares. 
His  plan  was  to  secure  the  title  of  Duke  of  Hohenberg 
for  his  eldest  son.  It  was,  therefore,  in  harmony  with 
this  intention  that  the  Emperor  Charles  conferred  the 
title  on  the  youth. 

One  fine  quality  in  the  Archduke  was  his  fearlessness. 
He  was  quite  clear  that  the  danger  of  an  attempt  to 
take  his  life  would  always  be  present,  and  he  often 
spoke  quite  simply  and  openly  of  such  a  possibility.  A 
year  before  the  outbreak  of  war  he  informed  me  that  the 
Freemasons  had  resolved  to  kill  him.  He  even  gave 
me  the  name  of  the  town  where  the  resolution  was 
passed — it  has  escaped  my  memory  now — and  men- 
tioned the  names  of  several  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
politicians  who  must  have  been  in  the  secret.  He  also 
told  me  that  when  he  went  to  the  coronation  in  Spain 
he  was  to  have  traveled  together  with  a  Russian  grand 
duke,  but  shortly  before  the  train  started  the  news 
came  that  the  grand  duke  had  been  murdered  on  the 
way.  He  did  not  deny  that  it  was  with  mixed  feelings 
that  he  stepped  into  his  compartment.  When  at  St. 
Moritz  news  was  sent  him  that  two  Turkish  anarchists 
had  arrived  in  Switzerland,  intending  to  murder  him, 
that  every  effort  was  being  made  to  capture  them,  but 
that  so  far  no  trace  of  them  had  been  discovered,  and  he 
was  advised  to  be  on  his  guard.  The  Archduke  showed 
me  the  telegram  at  the  time.  He  laid  it  aside  without 
the  slightest  sign  of  fear,  saying  that  such  events,  when 
announced  beforehand,  seldom  were  carried  out.  The 
Duchess  suffered  all  the  more  in  her  fears  for  his  life, 
and  I  think  that  in  imagination  the  poor  lady  often 
went  through  the  catastrophe  of  which  she  and  her 
husband  were  the  victims.  Another  praiseworthy 
feature  in  the  Archduke  was  that,  out  of  consideration 
for  his  wife's  anxiety,  he  tolerated  the  constant  pres- 


KONOPISCHT  53 

ence  of  a  detective,  which  not  only  bored  him  terribly, 
but  in  his  opinion  was  absurd.  He  was  afraid  that  if 
the  fact  became  known  it  would  be  imputed  to  timidity 
on  his  part,  and  he  conceded  the  point  solely  with  the 
view  of  calming  his  wife's  fears. 

But  he  anxiously  concealed  all  his  good  qualities  and 
took  an  obstinate  pleasure  in  being  hard  and  disagree- 
able. I  will  not  endeavor  here  to  excuse  certain  traits 
in  his  character.  His  strongly  pronounced  egotism 
cannot  be  denied  any  more  than  the  hardness  of  char- 
acter which  made  him  insensible  to  the  sufferings  of  all 
who  were  not  closely  connected  with  him.  He  also 
made  himself  hated  by  his  severe  financial  proceedings 
and  his  inexorable  judgment  on  any  subordinate  whom 
he  suspected  of  the  slightest  dishonesty.  In  this  con- 
nection there  are  hundreds  of  anecdotes,  some  true, 
some  false.  These  petty  traits  in  his  character  injured 
him  in  the  eyes  of  the  great  public,  while  the  really  great 
and  manly  qualities  he  possessed  were  unknown  to 
them,  and  were  not  weighed  in  the  balance  in  his  favor. 
For  those  who  knew  him  well  his  great  and  good  quali- 
ties outweighed  the  bad  ones  a  hundredfold. 

The  Emperor  was  always  very  perturbed  concerning 
the  Archduke's  plans  for  the  future.  There  was  also  a 
stern  trait  in  the  old  monarch's  character,  and  in  the 
interests  of  the  Monarchy  he  feared  the  impetuosity 
and  obstinacy  of  his  nephew.  Nevertheless,  he  often 
took  a  very  magnanimous  view  of  the  matter.  For 
instance,  Count  Sturgkh,  the  murdered  Prime  Minister, 
has  given  me  details  respecting  my  nomination  to  the 
Herrenhaus  which  are  very  characteristic  of  the  old 
monarch.  It  was  Franz  Ferdinand's  wish  that  I 
should  be  in  the  Herrenhaus,  as  he  was  anxious  for  me 
to  be  one  of  a  delegation  and  also  to  profit  by  my  ex- 
tensive training  in  the  province  of  foreign  policy.  I 
must  mention  here  that  it  had  been  impressed  on  the 


54  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Emperor  on  all  sides  that  the  Archduke's  friends  and 
trusted  men  were  working  against  him;  a  version  of 
affairs  which  to  a  certain  degree  he  obviously  believed, 
owing  to  his  numerous  disputes  with  Franz  Ferdinand. 
On  Sturgkh  mentioning  my  name  as  a  candidate  for 
the  Herrenhaus,  the  Emperor  hesitated  a  moment 
and  then  said:  "Ah  yes.  That  is  the  man  who  is  to 
be  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  when  I  am  dead.  Let 
him  go  to  the  Herrenhaus  that  he  may  learn  a  little 
more." 

Political  discussions  with  the  Emperor  Francis  Jo- 
seph were  often  very  difficult,  as  he  kept  strictly  to  the 
individual  government  department  and  discussed  only 
what  referred  thereto.  While  I  was  ambassador  the 
Emperor  would  discourse  on  Rumania  and  the  Balkans, 
but  on  nothing  else.  Meanwhile,  the  different  ques- 
tions were  often  so  closely  interwoven  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  separate  them.  I  remember  at  one  audi- 
ence where  I  submitted  to  the  Emperor  the  Rumanian 
plans  for  a  closer  connection  with  the  Monarchy — 
plans  which  I  shall  allude  to  in  a  later  chapter — and  in 
doing  so  I  was  naturally  bound  to  state  what  the 
Rumanians  proposed  respecting  the  closer  connection 
with  Hungary,  and  also  what  changes  would  be  neces- 
sitated thereby  in  the  Hungarian  administration.  The 
Emperor  at  once  broke  off  the  conversation,  saying  that 
it  was  a  matter  of  Hungarian  internal  policy. 

The  old  Emperor  was  almost  invariably  kind  and 
friendly,  and  to  the  very  last  his  knowledge  of  the 
smallest  details  was  astonishing.  He  never  spoke  of 
the  different  Rumanian  Ministers  as  the  Minister  of 
Agriculture,  of  Trade,  or  whatever  it  might  be,  but 
mentioned  them  all  by  name  and  never  made  a 
mistake. 

I  saw  him  for  the  last  time  in  October,  1916,  after 
my  definite  return  from  Rumania,  and  found  him  then 


KONOPISCHT  55 

quite  clear  and  sound  mentally,  though  failing  in  bodily 
health. 

The  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  was  a  "grand  seigneur" 
in  the  true  sense  of  the  word.  He  was  an  Emperor  and 
remained  always  unapproachable.  Every  one  left  his 
presence  feeling  he  had  stood  before  an  Emperor.  His 
dignity  in  representing  the  monarchical  idea  was  unsur- 
passed by  any  sovereign  in  Europe. 

He  was  borne  to  his  grave  at  a  time  of  great  military 
successes  for  the  Central  Powers.  He  lies  now  in  the 
Imperial  vault,  and  a  century  seems  to  have  elapsed 
since  his  death ;  the  world  is  changed. 

Day  by  day  streams  of  people  pass  by  the  little 
church,  but  no  one  probably  gives  a  thought  to  him 
who  lies  in  peace  and  forgotten,  and  yet  he,  through 
many  long  years,  embodied  Austria,  and  his  person 
was  a  common  center  for  the  state  that  so  rapidly  was 
falling  asunder. 

He  is  now  at  rest,  free  from  all  care  and  sorrow;  he 
saw  his  wife,  his  son,  his  friends  all  die,  but  fate  has 
spared  him  the  sight  of  his  expiring  Empire. 

Franz  Ferdinand's  character  held  many  sharply  de- 
fined corners  and  edges;  judging  him  objectively,  no  one 
can  deny  his  great  faults.  Though  the  circumstances  of 
his  death  were  so  tragic,  it  may  well  be  that  for  him  it 
was  a  blessing.  It  is  hardly  conceivable  that,  once  on 
the  throne,  the  Archduke  would  have  been  able  to 
carry  out  his  plans.  The  structure  of  the  Monarchy 
which  he  was  so  anxious  to  strengthen  and  support  was 
already  so  rotten  that  it  could  not  have  stood  any  great 
innovations,  and  if  not  the  war,  then  probably  the 
revolution,  would  have  shattered  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  Archduke, 
with  all  the  vehemence  and  impulsiveness  of  his  char- 
acter, would  have  made  the  attempt  to  rebuild  the 


56  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

entire  structure  of  the  Monarchy.  It  is  futile  to  com- 
ment on  the  chances  of  his  success,  but  according  to 
human  foresight  the  experiment  would  not  have  suc- 
ceeded, and  he  would  have  succumbed  beneath  the  ruins 
of  the  falling  Monarchy. 

It  is  also  futile  to  conjecture  how  the  Archduke  would 
have  acted  had  he  lived  to  see  the  war  and  the  upheaval. 
I  think  that  in  two  respects  his  attitude  would  have 
differed  from  that  taken.  In  the  first  place,  he  never 
would  have  agreed  to  our  army  being  under  German 
control.  It  would  not  have  been  consistent  with  his 
strongly  developed  autocratic  tendencies,  and  he  was 
too  clever  politically  not  to  see  that  we  should  thereby 
lose  all  political  freedom  of  action.  In  the  second 
place,  he  would  not,  like  the  Emperor  Charles,  have 
yielded  to  revolution.  He  would  have  gathered  his 
faithful  followers  round  him  and  would  have  fallen 
fighting,  sword  in  hand.  He  would  have  fallen  as  did 
his  greatest  and  most  dangerous  enemy,  Stephen  Tisza. 

But  he  died  the  death  of  a  hero  on  the  battle-field  of 
honor,  valiantly  and  in  harness.  The  golden  rays  of 
the  martyr's  crown  surrounded  his  dying  head.  Many 
there  were  who  breathed  more  freely  on  hearing  the 
news  of  his  death.  At  the  court  in  Vienna  and  in 
society  at  Budapest  there  was  more  joy  than  sorrow, 
the  former  having  rightly  foreseen  that  he  would  have 
dealt  hardly  with  them.  None  of  them  could  guess 
that  the  fall  of  the  strong  man  would  carry  them  all 
with  it  and  engulf  them  in  a  world  catastrophe. 

Franz  Ferdinand  will  remain  "portrayed  in  history, 
divided  between  two  parties — love  and  hate."  But  his 
tragic  end  at  the  side  of  his  wife,  who  would  not  allow 
death  to  separate  them,  throws  a  mild  and  conciliatory 
light  on  the  whole  life  of  this  extraordinary  man,  whose 
warm  heart  to  the  very  last  was  devoted  to  his  father- 
land and  duty. 


KONOPISCHT  57 

ii 

There  was  a  widely  spread  but  wrongful  idea  in  the 
Monarchy  that  the  Archduke  had  already  drawn  up  a 
program  of  his  future  activities.  This  was  not  the 
case.  He  had  very  definite  and  pronounced  ideas  for  the 
reorganization  of  the  Monarchy,  but  the  ideas  never 
developed  into  a  concrete  plan — they  were  more  like 
the  outline  of  a  program  that  never  was  completed 
in  detail.  The  Archduke  was  in  touch  with  experts 
from  the  different  departments;  he  expounded  the 
fundamental  views  of  his  future  program  to  promi- 
nent military  and  political  officials,  receiving  from  them 
hints  on  how  to  materialize  these  views;  but  a  really 
finished  and  thought-out  program  was  never  actu- 
ally produced.  The  ground  lines  of  his  program 
were,  as  already  mentioned,  the  abolition  of  the  dual- 
ism and  the  reorganization  of  the  Monarchy  to  form  a 
federative  state.  He  was  not  clear  himself  into  how 
many  states  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  would  be  con- 
verted, but  the  principle  was  the  rebuilding  of  the 
Monarchy  on  a  national  basis.  Having  always  in  view 
that  prosperity  depended  on  the  weakening  of  the  Mag- 
yar influence,  the  Archduke  was  in  favor  of  a  strong 
preference  for  the  different  nationalities  living  in  Hun- 
gary, the  Rumanians  in  particular.  Not  until  my 
return  to  Bukharest  and  following  on  my  reports  did  the 
Archduke  conceive  the  plan  of  ceding  Transylvania 
to  Rumania  and  thus  adding  Greater  Rumania  to  the 
Hapsburg  Empire. 

His  idea  was  to  make  of  Austria  separate  German, 
Czech,  Southern  Slav,  and  Polish  states,  which  in  some 
respects  would  be  autonomous;  in  others,  would  be 
dependent  on  Vienna  as  the  center.  But,  so  far  as  I 
know,  his  program  was  never  quite  clearly  defined  and 
was  subject  to  various  modifications. 


S8  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Archduke  had  a  great  dislike  for  the  Germans, 
especially  the  Northern  Bohemians,  who  were  partizans 
of  the  Pan-Germanic  tendencies,  and  he  never  forgave 
the  attitude  of  the  Deputy  Schonerer.  He  had  a 
decided  preference  for  all  Germans  in  the  Alpine  coun- 
tries, and  altogether  his  views  were  very  similar  to  those 
of  the  Christian  Socialists.  His  political  ideal  was 
Lueger.  When  Lueger  was  lying  ill  the  Archduke  said 
to  me:  "If  God  will  only  spare  this  man,  no  better 
Prime  Minister  could  be  found. ' '  Franz  Ferdinand  had 
a  keen  desire  for  a  more  centralized  army.  He  was  a 
violent  opponent  of  the  endeavors  of  the  Magyars, 
whose  aim  was  an  independent  Hungarian  army,  and 
the  question  of  rank,  word  of  command,  and  other 
incidental  matters  could  never  be  settled  so  long  as 
he  lived,  because  he  violently  resisted  all  Hungarian 
advances. 

The  Archduke  had  a  special  fondness  for  the  navy. 
His  frequent  visits  to  Brioni  brought  him  into  close 
touch  with  our  navy.  He  was  always  anxious  to  trans- 
form the  Austrian  navy  into  one  worthy  of  a  great 
Power.  In  regard  to  foreign  policy,  the  Archduke  was 
always  in  favor  of  a  Triple  Alliance  of  the  three  Em- 
perors. The  chief  motive  of  this  idea  must  have  been 
that,  in  the  three  then  apparently  so  powerful  mon- 
archs  at  Petersburg,  Berlin,  and  Vienna,  he  saw  the 
strongest  support  against  revolution,  and  wished 
thereby  to  build  up  a  strong  barrier  against  disorgan- 
ization. He  saw  great  danger  to  the  friendly  relations 
between  Russia  and  ourselves  in  the  rivalry  between 
Vienna  and  Petersburg  in  the  Balkans,  and,  contrary  to 
the  reports  that  have  been  spread  about  him,  he  was 
rather  a  partizan  than  an  opposer  of  Serbia.  He  was 
in  favor  of  the  Serbians  because  he  felt  assured  that  the 
petty  agrarian  policy  of  the  Magyars  was  responsible 
for  the  constant  annoyance  of  the  Serbians.  He  favored 


KONOPISCHT  59 

meeting  Serbia  half-way,  because  he  considered  that 
the  Serbian  question  was  a  source  of  discord  between 
Vienna  and  Petersburg.  Another  reason  was  that  he 
was  no  friend  of  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  who  con- 
stantly pursued  an  anti-Serbian  policy.  I  believe  that 
if  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  organization  of  the 
assassination  of  the  Archduke  had  known  what  little 
justification  there  was  for  supposing  him  to  be  the  man 
they  thought  him,  they  would  have  desisted. 

Franz  Ferdinand  had  a  very  pronounced  feeling  that 
in  spite  of  all  alliances  the  Monarchy  must  remain  inde- 
pendent. He  was  opposed  to  any  closer  combine  with 
Germany,  not  wishing  to  be  bound  to  Germany  more 
than  to  Russia,  and  the  plan  that  was  formulated  later 
as  "Central  Europe"  was  always  far  removed  from 
his  wishes  and  endeavors. 

His  plans  for  the  future  were  not  worked  out,  not 
complete,  but  they  were  sound.  This,  however,  is  not 
sufficient  to  enable  one  to  say  that  they  could  have  been 
successfully  carried  out.  Under  certain  circumstances 
more  harm  than  good  will  result  from  energy  devoid  of 
the  necessary  calm,  prudence,  wisdom,  and,  above  all, 
patience. 


CHAPTER  III 

WILLIAM   II 


THE  Emperor  William  .has  been  for  so  long  the  center 
of  historic  events,  so  much  has  been  written  about 
him,  that  he  appears  to  be  known  to  all  the  world ;  and 
yet  I  believe  he  has  often  been  misrepresented. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  scarlet  thread  running 
through  the  whole  character  of  William  II  was  his  firm 
conviction  that  he  was  the  "elect  of  God,"  and  that  the 
dynasty  was  inextricably  bound  to  the  German  people. 
Bismarck  also  believed  in  the  dynastic  fidelity  of  the 
Germans.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  just  as  little 
dynastic  as  republican  spirit  in  nations — just  as  little  in 
the  Germans  as  in  others.  There  is  merely  a  feeling  of 
content  or  discontent  which  manifests  itself  either  for  or 
against  the  dynasty  and  the  form  of  government.  Bis- 
marck himself  was  a  proof  of  the  justice  of  this  argument. 
As  he  himself  always  maintained,  he  was  thoroughly 
dynastic — but  only  during  the  lifetime  of  the  Emperor 
William  I.  He  had  no  love  for  William  II,  who  had 
treated  him  badly,  and  made  no  secret  of  his  feelings. 
He  hung  the  picture  of  the  "young  man  "  in  the  scullery 
and  wrote  a  book  about  him  which,  owing  to  its  con- 
tents, could  not  be  published. 

The  monarchists  who  derive  benefit  from  their 
attachment  to  the  reigning  monarch  deceive  them- 
selves as  to  their  true  feelings.  They  are  monarchists 


WILLIAM  II  61 

because  they  consider  that  form  of  government  the 
most  satisfactory  one.  The  republicans,  who  appar- 
ently glorify  the  majesty  of  the  people,  really  mean 
themselves.  But  in  the  long  run  a  people  will  always 
recognize  that  form  of  government  which  soonest  can 
give  it  order,  work,  prosperity,  and  contentment.  In  99 
per  cent,  of  the  population,  the  patriotism  and  enthu- 
siasm for  one  or  other  form  of  government  is  nothing 
but  a  matter  of  material  considerations.  They  prefer  a 
good  king  to  a  bad  republic,  and  vice  versa;  the  form  of 
government  is  the  means  to  the  end,  but  the  end  is  the 
contentment  of  the  people  governed.  Nor  has  the 
liberty  of  those  governed  anything  to  do  with  the  form 
of  government.  Monarchical  England  is  just  as  free  as 
republican  America,  and  the  Bolshevists  have  demon- 
strated ad  oculus  to  the  whole  world  that  the  proletariat 
exercises  the  greatest  tyranny. 

The  war  that  was  lost  swept  away  the  monarchs,  but 
the  republic  will  be  maintained  only  if  it  can  convince 
the  people  that  it  is  more  successful  in  satisfying  the 
masses  than  the  monarchs  were,  a  proof  which — it 
seems  to  me — the  German-Austrian  Republic  has  hith- 
erto failed  to  give. 

The  conviction  that  these  questionable  statements 
not  only  are  false  but  also  objectionable  and  criminal 
errors,  that  the  divine  will  has  placed  the  monarch  at 
his  post  and  keeps  him  there — this  conviction  was  sys- 
tematically imprinted  in  the  German  people  and 
formed  an  integral  part  of  the  views  attributed  to  the 
Emperor.  All  his  pretensions  are  based  on  this;  they 
all  breathe  the  same  idea.  Every  individual,  however, 
is  the  product  of  his  birth,  his  education,  and  his  ex- 
perience. In  judging  William  II  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  from  his  youth  upward  he  was  deceived  and 
shown  a  world  which  never  existed.  All  monarchs 
should  be  taught  that  their  people  do  not  love  them; 


62  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  they  are  quite  indifferent  to  them;  that  it  is  not 
love  that  makes  them  follow  them  and  look  up  to  them, 
but  merely  curiosity;  that  they  do  not  acclaim  them 
from  enthusiasm,  but  for  their  own  amusement,  and 
would  as  soon  hiss  at  them  as  cheer  them.  The  loyalty 
of  subjects  can  never  be  depended  on;  it  is  not  their 
intention  to  bg^lov.al^  but  only  contented;  they  only 
tolerate  the  monarchs  as  long  as  they  themselves  are 
contented,  or  as  long  as  they  have  not  enough  strength 
to  abolish  them.  That  is  the  truth,  a  knowledge  of 
which  would  prevent  the  monarchs  from  arriving  at 
unavoidably  false  conclusions. 

The  Emperor  William  is  an  example  of  this.  I  do 
not  think  there  is  another  regent  who  had  better  inten- 
tions than  he  had.  He  lived  only  for  his  calling — as  he 
viewed  it.  All  his  thoughts  and  longings  were  centered 
round  Germany.  His  relations,  pleasures,  and  amuse- 
ments were  all  subservient  to  the  one  idea  of  making 
and  keeping  the  German  people  great  and  happy,  and  if 


good-will  were  sufficient  to  achieve  great  things  the 
Emperor  William  would  have  done  it.  From  the 
very  beginning  he  was  misunderstood.  He  made 
statements  and  gestures  intended  to  win  not  only  his 
listeners,  but  the  whole  world,  which  had  just  the  con- 
trary effect.  But  he  never  was  conscious  of  the 
practical  effect  of  his  actions,  because  he  was  system- 
atically misled,  not  by  those  in  his  immediate  presence, 
but  by  the  entire  German  people.  How  many  millions, 
who  to-day  only  fling  curses  at  him,  could  not  bow  low 
enough  when  he  appeared  on  the  horizon  in  all  his 
splendor;  how  many  felt  overjoyed  if  the  Imperial 
glance  fell  on  them? — and  none  of  them  realize  that 
they  themselves  are  to  blame  for  having  shown  the 
Emperor  a  world  which  never  existed,  and  driven  him 
into  a  course  which  he  otherwise  would  never  have 
taken.  It  certainly  cannot  be  denied  that  the  whole 


•  WILLIAM  II  63 

nature  of  the  Emperor  was  peculiarly  susceptible  to 
this  characteristically  German  attitude,  and  that  mon- 
archs  less  talented,  less  keen,  less  ready,  and,  above  all, 
less  impregnated  with  the  idea  of  self-sufficiency,  are  not 
so  exposed  to  the  poison  of  popularity  as  he  was. 

I  once  had  a  chance  of  studying  the  Emperor  William 
in  a  very  important  phase  of  his  life.  I  met  him  at  the 
house  of  a  friend  in  the  celebrated  days  of  November, 
1908,  when  great  demonstrations  against  the  Emperor 
occurred  in  the  Reichstag,  and  when  the  then  Imperial 
Chancellor,  Prince  Bulow,  exposed  him.  Although  he 
did  not  allude  to  the  matter  to  us  with  whom  he  was 
not  familiar,  the  powerful  impression  made  upon  him 
by  these  events  in  Berlin  was  very  obvious,  and  I  felt 
that  in  William  II  I  saw  a  man  who,  for  the  first  time 
in  his  life,  with  horror-stricken  eyes,  looked  upon  the 
world  as  it  really  was.  He  saw  brutal  reality  show  its 
countenance  on  the  horizon.  For  the  first  time  in  his 
life,  perhaps,  he  felt  his  position  on  his  throne  to  be  a 
little  insecure.  He  forgot  his  lesson  too  quickly.  Had 
the  overwhelming  impression  which  prevailed  for  sev- 
eral days  been  a  lasting  one  it  might  perhaps  have 
induced  him  to  descend  from  the  clouds  to  which  his 
courtiers  and  his  people  had  raised  him,  and  once  more 
feel  firm  ground  beneath  his  feet.  On  the  other  hand, 
had  the  German  people  often  treated  the  German  Em- 
peror as  they  did  then,  it  might  have  cured  him. 

A  remarkable  incident  which  occurred  on  this  occasion 
is  characteristic  of  the  way  in  which  the  Emperor  was 
treated  by  many  of  the  gentlemen  of  his  suite.  I  had 
opportunity,  while  waiting  at  a  German  station  restau- 
rant for  the  arrival  of  the  next  train,  to  watch  and  study 
the  excitement  of  the  population  at  the  events  in  Berlin, 
which  bore  signs  of  a  revolutionary  character.  The 
densely  crowded  restaurant  re-echoed  with  discussion 
and  criticisms  of  the  Emperor,  when  suddenly  one  of  the 


64  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

men  stood  up  on  a  table  and  delivered  a  fiery  speech 
against  the  head  of  the  government.  With  the  im- 
pression of  this  scene  fresh  in  my  mind,  I  described  it  to 
the  members  of  the  Emperor's  suite,  who  were  just  as 
disagreeably  affected  by  the  episode,  and  it  was  sug- 
gested that  nothing  should  be  said  about  it  to  the  Em- 
peror. One  of  them,  however,  protested  most  energetic- 
ally and  declared  that,  on  the  contrary,  every  detail 
should  be  told  to  the  Emperor,  and,  as  far  as  I  know,  he 
himself  probably  undertook  this  disagreeable  task. 
This  case  is  characteristic  of  the  desire  to  keep  all  un- 
pleasantness from  the  Emperor  and  to  spare  him  even 
the  most  well-founded  criticisms;  to  praise  and  exalt 
him,  but  never  to  show  that  he  was  being  blamed. 
This  systematic  putting  forward  of  the  Emperor's  divine 
attributes,  which  in  reality  was  neither  due  to  love  of 
his  personality  not  any  other  dynastic  cause,  but  to  the 
purely  egotistical  wish  not  to  get  into  disfavor  them- 
selves or  expose  themselves  to  unpleasantness ;  this  un- 
wholesome state  must  in  the  long  run  act  on  mind  and 
body  as  an  enervating  poison.  I  readily  believe  that 
the  Emperor  William,  unaccustomed  to  so  great  an 
extent  to  all  criticism,  did  not  make  it  easy  for  those 
about  him  to  be  open  and  frank.  It  was,  nevertheless, 
true  that  the  enervating  atmosphere  by  which  he  was 
surrounded  was  the  cause  of  all  the  evil  at  his  court.  In 
his  youth  the  Emperor  William  did  not  always  adhere 
strictly  to  the  laws  of  the  Constitution ;  he  subsequently 
cured  himself  of  this  failing  and  never  acted  indepen- 
dently of  his  counselors.  At  the  time  when  I  had  official 
dealings  with  him  he  might  have  served  as  a  model  of 
constitutional  conduct. 

In  the  case  of  so  young  and  inexperienced  a  man  as 
the  Emperor  Charles  it  was  doubly  necessary  to  uphold 
the  principle  of  ministerial  responsibility  to  the  fullest 
extent.  As  according  to  our  Constitution  the  Emperor 


WILLIAM  II  65 

is  not  responsible  to  the  law,  it  was  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  carry  out  the  principle  that  he  could  under- 
take no  administrative  act  without  the  cognizance  and 
sanction  of  the  responsible  Ministers,  and  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  adhered  to  this  principle  as  though  it 
were  gospel. 

The  Emperor  Charles,  though  full  of  good  intentions, 
was  devoid  of  all  political  training  and  experience,  and 
ought  to  have  been  brought  up  to  understand  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Constitution.  This,  however,  had  never 
been  taken  into  consideration. 

After  my  resignation  in  April,  1918,  a  deputation  from 
the  Constitutional  and  Central  party  in  the  Herrenhaus 
waited  on  the  Prime  Minister,  Doctor  von  Seidler,  and 
pointed  out  the  importance  of  a  severely  constitutional 
regime,  whereupon  Doctor  von  Seidler  declared  that 
he  took  upon  himself  the  full  responsibility  of  the 
"letter  incident." 

This  was  quite  preposterous.  Doctor  von  Seidler 
could  not  be  responsible  for  events  that  had  occurred  a 
year  before — at  a  time  when  he  was  not  Minister — 
apart  from  its  being  an  established  fact  that  during  his 
tenure  of  office  he  was  not  aware  of  what  had  happened, 
and  not  until  after  my  resignation  did  he  learn  the  Im- 
perial views  on  the  situation.  He  might  just  as  well 
have  accepted  responsibility  for  the  Seven  Years'  War 
or  for  the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 

In  1917  and  1918,  when  I  had  certain  official  dealings 
with  the  Emperor  William,  his  horror  of  an  unpleasant 
discussion  was  so  great  that  it  was  a  matter  of  extreme 
difficulty  to  impart  the  necessary  information  to  him. 
I  recollect  how  once,  at  the  cost  of  the  consideration  due 
to  an  Emperor,  I  was  compelled  to  extract  a  direct 
statement  from  him.  I  was  with  the  Emperor  Charles 
on  the  eastern  front,  but  left  him  at  Lemberg,  and, 
joining  the  Emperor  William  in  his  train,  traveled  with 


66  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

him  for  a  couple  of  hours.  I  had  certain  things  to  sub- 
mit to  him,  none  of  which  was  of  an  unpleasant  nature. 
I  do  not  know  why  it  was,  but  it  was  obvious  that  the 
Emperor  was  expecting  to  hear  some  disagreeable  state- 
ments, and  offered  a  passive  resistance  to  the  request 
for  a  private  interview.  He  invited  me  to  breakfast 
with  him  in  his  dining-car,  where  he  sat  in  the  company 
of  ten  other  gentlemen,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of 
beginning  the  desired  conversation.  Breakfast  had 
been  over  some  time,  but  the  Emperor  made  no  sign  of 
moving.  I  was  several  times  obliged  to  request  him  to 
grant  me  a  private  interview  before  he  rose  from  the 
table,  and  even  then  he  took  with  him  another  official 
from  the  Foreign  Ministry  to  be  present  at  our  conver- 
sation, as  though  to  have  some  protection  against 
anticipated  troubles.  The  Emperor  William  was  never 
rude  to  strangers,  though  he  often  was  so  to  his  own 
people. 

With  regard  to  the  Emperor  Charles,  the  situation 
was  very  different.  He  was  never  anything  but 
friendly;  in  fact  I  never  saw  him  angry  or  vexed. 
There  was  no  need  for  any  special  courage  im  making 
an  unpleasant  statement  to  him,  as  there  was  no  danger 
of  receiving  a  violent  answer  or  any  other  disagreeable 
consequences.  And  yet  the  desire  to  believe  only 
what  was  agreeable  and  to  put  from  him  anything  dis- 
agreeable was  very  strong  in  the  Emperor  Charles,  and 
neither  criticism  nor  blame  made  any  lasting  impression 
on  him.  But  in  his  case,  too,  the  atmosphere  that 
surrounded  him  rendered  it  impossible  to  convince  him 
of  the  brutal  realities  prevailing.  On  one  occasion, 
when  I  returned  from  the  front,  I  had  a  long  conversa- 
tion with  him.  I  reproached  him  for  some  act  of 
administration  and  asserted  that  not  only  on  me  but  on 
the  whole  Monarchy  his  action  had  made  a  most  un- 
favorable impression.  I  told  him  in  the  course  of  the 


WILLIAM  II  67 

conversation  that  he  must  remember  how,  when  he 
came  to  the  throne,  the  whole  Monarchy  had  looked 
to  him  with  great  hopes,  but  that  now  he  had  already 
lost  80  per  cent,  of  his  popularity.  The  interview 
ended  without  incident;  the  Emperor  preserved,  as 
usual,  a  friendly  demeanor,  though  my  remarks  must 
have  affected  him  unpleasantly.  Some  hours  later  we 
passed  through  a  town  where  not  only  the  station,  but 
all  buildings,  were  black  with  people,  standing  even  on 
the  roofs,  waving  handkerchiefs  and  loudly  welcoming 
the  Imperial  train  as  it  passed  through.  The  same 
scenes  were  repeated  again  and  again  at  other  stations 
that  we  passed.  The  Emperor  turned  to  me  with  a 
smile  and  a  look  that  showed  me  he  was  firmly  con- 
vinced everything  I  had  told  him  as  to  his  dwindling 
popularity  was  false,  the  living  picture  before  our  eyes 
proving  the  contrary. 

When  I  was  at  Brest-Litovsk  disturbances  began  in 
Vienna,  owing  to  the  lack  of  food.  In  view  of  the  whole 
situation,  we  did  not  know  what  dimensions  they  would 
assume,  and  it  was  considered  that  they  were  of  a 
threatening  nature.  When  discussing  the  situation 
with  the  Emperor,  he  remarked,  with  a  smile :  ' '  The  only 
person  who  has  nothing  to  fear  is  myself.  If  it  happens 
again  I  will  go  out  among  the  people  and  you  will  see  the 
welcome  they  will  give  me."  Some  few  months  later 
this  same  Emperor  disappeared  silently  and  utterly  out 
of  the  picture,  and  among  all  the  thousands  who  had 
acclaimed  him,  and  whose  enthusiasm  he  had  thought 
genuine,  not  one  would  have  lifted  a  little  finger  on  his 
behalf.  I  have  witnessed  scenes  of  enthusiasm  which 
would  have  deceived  the  boldest  and  most  skeptical 
judge  of  the  populace.  I  saw  the  Emperor  and  the 
Empress  surrounded  by  weeping  women  and  men  well- 
nigh  smothered  in  a  rain  of  flowers ;  I  saw  the  people  on 
their  knees  with  uplifted  hands,  as  though  worshiping 


68  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

a  Divinity;  and  I  cannot  wonder  that  the  objects  of 
such  enthusiastic  homage  should  have  taken  dross  for 
pure  gold  in  the  firm  belief  that  they  personally  were 
beloved  of  the  people,  even  as  children  love  their  own 
parents.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that  after  such 
scenes  the  Emperor  and  Empress  looked  upon  all  the 
criticism  of  themselves  and  the  discontent  among  the 
people  as  idle  talk,  and  held  firmly  to  the  belief  that 
grave  disturbances  might  occur  elsewhere,  but  not  in 
their  own  country.  Any  simple  citizen  who  has  held 
for  a  time  a  higher  position  experiences  something  of  the 
kind,  but  in  a  lesser  degree.  I  could  mention  names 
of  many  men  who  could  not  bow  low  enough  as  long  as 
I  was  in  power,  but  after  my  resignation  would  cross  the 
street  to  avoid  a  bow,  fearing  that  Imperial  disfavor 
might  react  on  them.  But  years  before  his  rise  the 
simple  citizen  has  an  opportunity  of  learning  to  know 
the  world,  and,  if  he  be  a  man  of  normal  temperament, 
will  feel  the  same  contempt  for  the  servility  shown 
during  his  time  in  office  as  for  the  behavior  he  meets 
with  afterward.  Monarchs  are  without  training  in  the 
school  of  life,  and  therefore  usually  make  a  false  esti- 
mate of  the  psychology  of  humanity.  But  in  this  tragi- 
comedy it  is  they  who  are  led  astray. 

It  is  less  easy,  however,  to  understand  that  respon- 
sible advisers,  who  are  bound  to  distinguish  between 
reality  and  comedy,  should  also  allow  themselves  to  be 
deceived  and  draw  false  political  conclusions  from  such 
events.  In  1918  the  Emperor,  accompanied  by  the 
Prime  Minister,  Doctor  von  Seidler,  went  to  the 
Southern  Slav  provinces  to  investigate  matters  there. 
He  found,  of  course,  the  same  welcome  there  as  every- 
where, curiosity  brought  the  people  out  to  see  him;  pres- 
sure from  the  authorities,  on  the  one  hand,  and  hope 
of  Imperial  favors,  on  the  other,  brought  about  ovations 
similar  to  those  in  the  undoubtedly  dynastic  provinces. 


WILLIAM  II  69 

And  not  only  the  Emperor,  but  Von  Seidler,  returned  in 
triumph,  firmly  convinced  that  everything  stated  in 
Parliament  or  written  in  the  papers  respecting  the 
separatist  tendencies  of  the  Southern  Slavs  was  pure 
invention  and  nonsense,  and  that  they  would  never 
agree  to  a  separation  from  the  Hapsburg  Empire. 

The  objects  of  these  demonstrations  of  enthusiasm 
and  dynastic  loyalty  were  deceived  by  them,  but  I 
repeat  those  who  were  to  blame  were  not  the  monarchs, 
but  those  who  themselves  were  the  instigators  and 
organizers  of  such  scenes  and  who  omitted  to  enlighten 
the  monarchs  on  the  matter.  But  any  such  explana- 
tion could  only  be  effectual  if  all  those  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  ruler  concurred  in  a  similar  reck- 
less disregard  of  truth.  For  if  one  out  of  ten  people 
declares  such  scenes  to  be  not  genuine,  and  the  others 
contradict  him  and  assert  that  the  demonstrations  of 
the  "love  of  the  people"  are  overwhelming,  the  mon- 
arch will  always  be  more  inclined  to  listen  to  the  many 
pleasant  rather  than  to  the  few  unpleasant  counsels. 
Willingly  or  unwillingly,  all  monarchs  try,  very  hu- 
manly, to  resist  awakening  out  of  this  hypnotic  com- 
placency. Naturally,  there  were  men  in  the  entourage 
of  the  German  Emperor  whose  pride  kept  them  from 
making  too  large  an  offering  to  the  throne,  but  as  a  rule 
their  suffering  in  the  Byzantine  atmosphere  of  Ger- 
many was  greater  than  their  enjoyment.  I  always 
considered  that  the  greatest  sycophants  were  not  those 
living  at  court,  but  generals,  admirals,  professors, 
officials,  representatives  of  the  people,  and  men  of 
learning — people  whom  the  Emperor  met  infrequently. 

During  the  second  half  of  the  war,  however,  the 
leading  men  around  the  Kaiser  were  not  Byzantine — 
Ludendorff  certainly  was  not.  His  whole  nature  was 
devoid  of  Byzantine  characteristics.  Energetic,  brave, 
sure  of  himself  and  his  aims,  he  brooked  no  opposition 

6 


70  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  was  not  fastidious  in  his  choice  of  language.  To 
him  it  was  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  he  was  con- 
fronted by  his  Emperor  or  any  one  else — he  spoke 
unrestrainedly  to  all  who  came  in  his  way. 

The  numerous  burgomasters,  town  councilors,  pro- 
fessors of  the  universities,  deputies — in  short,  men  of 
the  people  and  of  science — had  for  years  prostrated 
themselves  before  the  Emperor  William;  a  word  from 
him  intoxicated  them — but  how  many  of  them  are 
there  now  among  those  who  condemn  the  former 
regime  with  its  abuses  and,  above  all,  the  Emperor 
himself ! 

His  political  advisers  experienced  great  difficulty  in 
their  business  dealings  with  the  Emperor  William  dur- 
ing the  war,  as  he  was  always  at  headquarters  and 
seldom  in  Berlin.  The  Emperor  Charles's  absence 
from  Vienna  was  also  at  times  most  inconvenient. 

In  the  summer  of  1917,  for  instance,  he  was  at 
Reichenau,  which  necessitated  a  two  hours'  motor 
drive;  I  had  to  go  there  twice  or  three  times  a  week, 
thus  losing  five  or  six  hours  which  had  to  be  made  good 
by  prolonged  night-work.  On  no  account  would  he 
come  to  Vienna,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  made  by  his 
advisers  to  persuade  him  to  do  so.  From  certain 
remarks  the  Emperor  let  fall  I  gathered  that  the  reason 
of  this  persistent  refusal  was  anxiety  concerning  the 
health  of  the  children.  He  himself  was  so  entirely  free 
from  pretensions  that  it  cannot  have  been  a  question  of 
his  own  comfort  that  prevented  his  coming. 

The  Emperor's  desire  to  restore  the  Archduke  Joseph 
Ferdinand  to  a  post  of  command  was  for  me  a  source  of 
much  unpleasantness.  The  Archduke  is  said  to  have 
been  to  blame  for  the  Luck  episode.  I  cannot  judge 
whether  wrongly — as  the  Emperor  maintained — or 
rightly ;  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  public  no  longer 
had  confidence  in  him.  Quite  accidentally  I  learned 


WILLIAM  II  71 

that  his  reinstatement  was  imminent.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  this  purely  military  proceeding  in  no  way  con- 
cerned me,  but  I  had  to  reckon  with  the  feeling  of  the 
populace,  who  were  in  no  mood  for  further  burdens,  and 
also  with  the  fact  that,  since  Conrad  had  gone,  none  of 
those  in  the  Emperor's  entourage  showed  the  slightest 
disposition  to  acquaint  him  with  the  truth.  The  only 
general  who,  to  my  personal  knowledge,  was  in  the 
habit  of  speaking  frankly  to  the  Emperor  was  Alvis 
Schonburg,  and  he  was  at  this  time  somewhere  on  the 
Italian  front.  I  therefore  told  the  Emperor  that  the 
reinstatement  was  an  impossibility,  giving  as  my  reason 
the  fact  that  the  Archduke  had  forfeited  the  confidence 
of  the  country,  and  that  no  mother  could  be  expected  to 
give  up  her  son  to  serve  under  a  general  whom  every  one 
held  to  be  guilty  of  the  Luck  catastrophe.  The  Em- 
peror insisted  that  this  view  was  unjust,  and  that  the 
Archduke  was  not  culpable.  I  replied  that,  even  so, 
the  Archduke  would  have  to  submit.  Every  one  had 
lost  confidence  in  him,  and  the  most  strenuous  exertions 
of  the  people  could  neither  be  expected  nor  obtained  if 
the  command  were  handed  to  generals  who  were  unani- 
mously regarded  as  unworthy  of  the  confidence  placed 
in  them. 

My  efforts  were  vain. 

I  then  adopted  another  course.  I  sent  an  official 
from  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Arch- 
duke with  the  request  that  he  would  resign  voluntarily. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Joseph  Ferdinand  took  both 
a  loyal  and  a  dignified  attitude,  as  he  himself  notified 
the  Emperor  that  he  would  relinquish  his  command  at 
the  front.  A  short  correspondence  followed  between 
the  Archduke  and  myself,  which  on  his  side  was  couched 
in  an  indignant  and  not  over-polite  tone;  this,  however, 
I  did  not  take  amiss,  as  my  interference  had  been  suc- 
cessful in  preventing  his  resuming  the  command. 


72  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

His  subsequent  appointment  as  chief  of  the  Air  Force 
was  made  without  my  knowledge;  but  this  was  of  no 
importance  when  compared  with  the  previous  plans. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Byzantine  atmosphere  of 
Berlin  took  a  more  objectionable  form  than  ever  was  the 
case  in  Vienna.  The  very  idea  of  high  dignitaries  kiss- 
ing the  Emperor's  hand,  as  they  did  in  Berlin,  would 
have  been  impossible  in  Vienna.  I  never  heard  of  any 
one,  even  among  the  keenest  sycophants,  who  demeaned 
himself  by  such  an  act,  which  in  Berlin,  as  I  know 
from  personal  observation,  was  an  every-day  occur- 
rence. For  instance,  after  a  trip  on  the  Meteor,  during 
the  "Kiel  Week,"  the  Emperor  presented  two  German 
gentlemen  with  scarf-pins  as  a  souvenir.  He  handed 
the  pins  to  them  himself,  and  great  was  my  surprise  to 
see  them  kiss  his  hand  as  they  thanked  him. 

Many  foreigners  were  in  the  habit  of  coming  for  the 
Kiel  Week — Americans,  French,  and  English.  The 
Emperor  paid  them  much  attention,  and  they  nearly 
always  succumbed  to  the  charm  of  his  personality. 
Apparently  William  II  had  a  preference  for  America; 
on  the  subject  of  his  feelings  regarding  England  it  is 
difficult  to  express  an  opinion.  My  impression  always 
was  that  the  Emperor  resented  the  scant  sympathy 
shown  him  in  England;  he  strove  to  make  himself 
beloved,  and  the  failure  of  his  efforts  caused  him  a  cer- 
tain annoyance.  He  was  quite  aware  that  the  extent 
of  his  popularity  in  England  would  proportionately 
influence  Anglo-German  relations,  and  his  desire  to 
find  favor  in  England  did  not  proceed  from  personal 
vanity,  but  from  political  interests. 

King  Edward  was  known  to  be  one  of  the  best  judges 
of  men  in  all  Europe,  and  his  interest  in  foreign  policy 
was  predominant.  He  would  have  been  an  ideal  am- 
bassador. There  was  never  a  very  good  understanding 


WILLIAM  II  73 

between  uncle  and  nephew.  When  the  nephew  was 
already  Emperor,  and  his  much-older  uncle  still  only  a 
prince,  the  difference  in  their  positions  was  character- 
ized by  the  satirical  Kiderlen-Wachter  in  the  following 
terms :  ' '  The  Prince  of  Wales  cannot  forgive  his  nephew, 
eighteen  years  younger  than  himself,  for  making  a  more 
brilliant  career  than  has  fallen  to  his  lot." 

Personal  sympathy  and  personal  differences  in  lead- 
ing circles  are  capable  of  influencing  the  world's  his- 
tory. Politics  are,  and  always  will  be,  made  by  men, 
and  individual  personal  relations  will  always  play  a 
certain  part  in  their  development.  WTio  can  to-day 
assert  that  the  course  of  the  world  might  not  have  been 
different  had  the  monarchs  of  Germany  and  England 
been  more  alike  in  temperament?  The  encircling 
policy  of  King  Edward  was  not  brought  into  play  until 
he  was  persuaded  that  an  understanding  with  the  Em- 
peror William  was  impossible. 

The  difficulty  the  Emperor  experienced  in  adapting 
himself  to  the  ideas  and  views  of  others  increased  as  the 
years  went  by;  a  state  of  things  largely  the  fault  of  his 
entourage. 

The  atmosphere  in  which  he  lived  would  have  killed 
the  hardiest  plant.  Whatever  the  Emperor  said  or  did, 
whether  it  was  right  or  wrong,  was  received  with  en- 
thusiastic praise  and  admiration.  Dozens  of  people 
were  always  at  hand  to  laud  him  to  the  skies. 

For  instance,  a  book  was  published  during  the  war 
entitled  Der  Kaiser  im  Felde,  by  Dr.  Bogdan  Kriegen. 
The  Emperor  presented  me  with  a  copy  when  at 
Kreuznach  in  May,  1917,  and  wrote  a  suitable  inscrip- 
tion inside.  The  book  contained  an  accurate  account 
of  all  the  Emperor  had  done  during  the  campaign — but 
it  was  entirely  superficial  matter;  where  he  had  driven 
to,  where  breakfasted,  with  whom  he  had  spoken,  the 
jokes  he  had  made,  what  clothes  he  wore,  the  shining 


74  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

light  in  his  eyes,  etc.,  etc.  It  also  recorded  his  speeches 
to  the  troops,  dull  and  uninteresting  words  that  he 
addressed  to  individual  soldiers,  and  much  more  in  the 
same  strain.  The  whole  book  is  impregnated  and  per- 
meated with  boundless  admiration  and  unqualified 
praise.  The  Emperor  gave  me  the  book  when  I  was 
leaving,  and  I  read  it  through  when  in  the  train. 

I  was  asked  a  few  weeks  later  by  a  German  officer 
what  I  thought  of  the  book.  I  replied  that  it  was  trash 
and  could  only  harm  the  Emperor,  and  that  it  should  be 
confiscated.  The  officer  shared  my  opinion,  but  said 
that  the  Emperor  had  been  assured  on  all  sides  that  the 
book  was  a  splendid  work  and  helped  to  fire  the  spirit 
of  the  army;  he  therefore  had  it  widely  distributed. 
Once,  at  a  dinner  at  Count  Hertling's,  I  called  his 
attention  to  the  book  and  advised  him  to  suppress  it,  as 
such  a  production  could  only  be  detrimental  to  the  Em- 
peror. The  old  gentleman  was  very  angry,  and 
declared:  "That  was  always  the  way;  people  who 
wished  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  the  Emperor  in- 
variably presented  him  with  such  things."  A  pro- 
fessor from  the  university  had  warmly  praised  the  book 
to  me,  but  he  went  on  to  say,  "The  Emperor  had,  of 
course,  no  time  to  read  such  stuff  and  repudiate  the 
flattery;  neither  had  he  himself  found  time  to  read  it, 
but  would  make  a  point  of  doing  so  now."  I  did  not 
know  much  of  that  professor,  but  he  certainly  was  not 
in  frequent  touch  with  the  Emperor,  nor  was  the  author 
of  the  book. 

In  this  instance,  as  in  many  others,  I  concluded  that 
many  of  the  gentlemen  in  the  Emperor's  suite  were  far 
from  being  in  sympathy  with  such  tendencies.  The 
court  was  not  the  principal  offender,  but  was  carried 
away  by  the  current  of  sycophancy. 

During  my  period  of  office  Prince  Hohenlohe,  the 
Ambassador,  had  numerous  interviews  with  the 


WILLIAM  II  75 

peror  William,  and  invariably  spoke  most  freely  and 
openly  to  him,  and  yet  always  was  on  the  best  footing 
with  him.  This  was,  of  course,  an  easier  matter  for  a 
foreign  ambassador  than  for  a  German  of  the  Imperial 
Empire,  but  it  proves  that  the  Emperor  accepted  it 
when  done  in  proper  form. 

In  his  own  country  the  Emperor  was  either  glorified 
and  exalted  to  the  skies  or  else  scorned  and  scoffed  at  by 
a  minority  of  the  press  in  a  prejudicial  manner.  In  the 
latter  case  it  bore  so  evidently  the  stamp  of  personal 
enmity  that  it  was  discredited  a  priori.  Had  there 
existed  earnest  papers  and  organs  that  would,  in  digni- 
fied fashion,  have  discussed  and  criticized  the  Em- 
peror's faults  and  failings,  while  recognizing  all  his 
great  and  good  qualities,  it  would  have  been  much  more 
satisfactory.  Had  there  been  more  books  written 
about  him  showing  that  the  real  man  is  quite  different 
from  what  he  is  made  to  appear  to  be;  that  he  is  full  of 
the  best  intentions  and  inspired  with  a  passionate  love 
of  Germany;  that  in  a  true  and  profound  religious 
sense  he  often  wrestles  with  himself  and  his  God,  asking 
himself  if  he  has  chosen  the  right  way ;  that  his  love  for 
his  people  is  far  more  genuine  than  that  of  many  of  the 
Germans  for  him;  that  he  never  has  deceived  them,  but 
was  constantly  deceived  by  them — such  literature 
would  have  been  more  efficacious  and,  above  all,  nearer 
the  truth. 

Undoubtedly  the  German  Emperor's  gifts  and  talents 
were  above  the  average,  and  had  he  been  an  ordinary 
mortal  would  certainly  have  become  a  very  competent 
officer,  architect,  engineer,  or  politician.  But  for  lack 
of  criticism  he  lost  his  bearings,  and  it  caused  his  undo- 
ing. According  to  all  the  records  of  the  Emperor, 
William  I  was  of  a  very  different  nature.  Yet  Bis- 
marck often  had  a  hard  task  in  dealing  with  him, 
though  Bismarck's  loyalty  and  subservience  to  the 


76  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

dynastic  idea  made  him  curb  his  characteristically  ruth- 
less frankness.  But  William  I  was  a  self-made  man. 
When  he  came  to  the  throne  and  began  to  govern,  his 
kingdom  was  tottering.  Assisted  by  the  very  capable 
men  he  was  able  to  find  and  to  retain,  he  upheld  it,  and 
by  means  of  Koniggratz  and  Sedan  created  the  great 
German  Empire.  William  II  came  to  the  throne  when 
Germany  had  reached  the  zenith  of  her  power.  He  had 
not  acquired  what  he  possessed  by  his  own  work,  as  his 
grandfather  had;  it  came  to  him  without  any  effort  on 
his  part,  a  fact  which  had  a  great  and  far  from  favor- 
able influence  on  his  whole  mental  development. 

The  Emperor  William  was  an  entertaining  and  inter- 
esting causeur.  One  could  listen  to  him  for  hours  with- 
out wearying.  Emperors  usually  enjoy  the  privilege  of 
finding  a  ready  audience,  but  even  had  the  Emperor 
William  been  an  ordinary  citizen  he  would  always  have 
spoken  to  a  crowded  house.  He  could  discourse  on  art, 
science,  politics,  music,  religion,  and  astronomy  in  a 
most  animated  manner.  What  he  said  was  not  always 
quite  correct;  indeed,  he  often  lost  himself  in  very 
questionable  conclusions ;  but  the  fault  of  boring  others, 
the  greatest  of  social  faults,  was  not  his. 

Although  the  Emperor  was  always  very  powerful  in 
speech  and  gesture,  still,  during  the  war  he  was  much 
less  independent  in  his  actions  than  is  usually  assumed, 
and,  in  my  opinion,  this  is  one  of  the  principal  reasons 
that  gave  rise  to  a  mistaken  understanding  of  all  the  Em- 
peror'  s  administrative  activities.  Far  more  than  the  pub- 
lic imagine  he  was  a  driven  rather  than  a  driving  factor, 
and  if  the  Entente  to-day  claims  the  right  of  being  prose- 
cutor and  judge  in  one  person  in  order  to  bring  the  Em- 
peror to  his  trial,  it  is  unjust  and  an  error,  as,  both  pre- 
ceding and  during  the  war,  the  Emperor  William  never 
played  the  part  attributed  to  him  by  the  Entente. 

The  unfortunate  man  has  gone  through  much,  and 


WILLIAM  II  77 

more  is,  perhaps,  in  store  for  him.  He  has  been  carried 
too  high  and  cannot  escape  a  terrible  fall.  Fate  seems 
to  have  chosen  him  to  expiate  a  sin  which,  if  it  exists  at 
all,  is  not  so  much  his  as  that  of  his  country  and  his 
times.  The  Byzantine  atmosphere  in  Germany  was 
the  ruin  of  Emperor  William;  it  enveloped  him  and 
clung  to  him  like  a  creeper  to  a  tree;  a  vast  crowd  of 
flatterers  and  fortune-seekers  who  deserted  him  in  the 
hour  of  trial.  The  Emperor  William  was  merely  a 
particularly  distinctive  representative  of  his  class.  All 
modern  monarchs  suffer  from  the  disease;  but  it  was 
more  highly  developed  in  the  Emperor  William  and, 
therefore,  more  obvious  than  in  others.  Accustomed 
from  his  youth  to  the  subtle  poison  of  flattery,  at  the 
head  of  one  of  the  greatest  and  mightiest  states  in  the 
world,  possessing  almost  unlimited  power,  he  succumbed 
to  the  fatal  lot  that  awaits  men  who  feel  the  earth  recede 
from  under  their  feet  and  who  begin  to  believe  in  their 
divine  semblance. 

He  is  expiating  a  crime  which  was  not  of  his  making. 
He  can  take  with  him  in  his  solitude  the  consolation 
that  his  only  desire  was  for  the  best.  And  notwith- 
standing all  that  is  said  and  written  about  William  II  in 
these  days,  the  beautiful  words  of  the  text  may  be 
applied  to  him,  "Peace  on  earth  to  men  of  good  will."  1 

When  he  retires  from  the  world  his  good  conscience 
will  be  his  most  precious  possession. 

Perhaps  in  the  evening  of  his  days  William  II  will 
acknowledge  that  there  is  neither  happiness  nor  unhap- 
piness  in  mortal  life,  but  only  a  difference  in  the  strength 
to  endure  one's  fate. 

ii 

War  was  never  in  William  II's  program.  I  am 
not  able  to  say  where,  in  his  own  mind,  he  had  fixed  the 

1  This  is  a  literal  rendering  of  the  famous  text  from  the  German, 


78  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

limits  he  proposed  for  Germany  and  whether  it  was 
justifiable  to  reproach  him  with  having  gone  too  far  in 
his  ambition  for  the  fatherland.  He  certainly  never 
thought  of  a  unified  German  world-dominion;  he  was 
not  so  simple  as  to  think  he  could  achieve  that  without 
a  war,  but  his  plan  undoubtedly  was  permanently  to 
establish  Germany  among  the  first  Powers  of  the  world. 
I  know  for  certain  that  the  Emperor's  ideal  plan  was  to 
come  to  a  world  agreement  with  England  and,  in  a  cer- 
tain sense,  to  divide  the  world  with  her.  In  this  pro- 
jected division  of  the  world  a  certain  part  was  to  be 
played  by  Russia  and  Japan,  but  he  paid  little  heed  to 
the  other  states,  especially  to  France,  convinced  that 
they  were  all  nations  of  declining  power.  To  maintain 
that  William  intentionally  prepared  and  started  this 
war  is  in  direct  opposition  to  his  long  years  of  peaceful 
government.  Helrlerich,  in  his  work  Die  Vorgeschichte 
des  Weltkrieges,  speaks  of  the  Emperor's  attitude  during 
the  Balkan  troubles,  and  says : 

A  telegram  sent  by  William  II  at  that  time  to  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  explains  the  attitude  of  the  German  Emperor  in  this 
critical  position  for  German  politics,  being  similar  to  the  situation 
in  July,  1914.  The  contents  of  the  telegram  are  as  follows:  "The 
Alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  compels  us  to  take  action  should 
Austria-Hungary  be  attacked  by  Russia.  In  that  case  France  would 
also  be  involved,  and  in  those  circumstances  England  would  not 
long  remain  quiescent.  The  present  prevailing  questions  of  dispute 
cannot  be  compared  with  that  danger.  It  cannot  be  the  intention 
of  the  Alliance  that  we,  the  life  interest  of  our  ally  not  being  endan- 
gered, should  enter  upon  a  life-and-death  conflict  for  a  caprice  of 
that  ally.  Should  it  become  evident  that  the  other  side  intend  to 
attack,  the  danger  must  then  be  faced." 

This  calm  and  decided  standpoint,  which  alone  could  maintain 
peace,  was  also  the  German  policy  observed  in  further  developments. 
It  was  upheld  when  confronted  by  strong  pressure  from  Russia,  as 
also  against  other  tendencies  and  a  certain  transitory  ill-feeling  in 
Vienna. 


WILLIAM  II  79 

Whether  such  feeling  did  exist  in  Vienna  or  not  I 
cannot  say,  but  I  believe  the  account  is  correct. 

It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  all  the  warlike 
speeches  flung  into  the  world  by  the  Emperor  were  due 
to  a  mistaken  understanding  of  their  effect.  I  allow 
that  the  Emperor  wished  to  create  a  sensation,  even  to 
terrify  people,  but  he  also  wished  to  act  on  the  principle 
of  si  vis  pacem  para  bellum,  and  by  emphasizing  the 
military  power  of  Germany  he  endeavored  to  prevent 
the  many  envious  enemies  of  his  Empire  from  declaring 
war  on  him. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  attitude  was  often  both 
unfortunate  and  mistaken,  and  that  it  contributed  to 
the  outbreak  of  war;  but  it  is  asserted  that  the  Em- 
peror was  devoid  of  the  dolus  of  making  war;  that  he 
said  and  did  things  by  which  he  unintentionally  stirred 
up  war. 

Had  there  been  men  in  Germany  ready  to  point  out 
to  the  Emperor  the  injurious  effects  of  his  behavior  and 
to  make  him  feel  the  growing  mistrust  of  him  through- 
out the  world,  had  there  been  not  one  or  two,  but  dozens 
of  such  men,  it  would  assuredly  have  made  an  impres- 
sion on  the  Emperor.  It  is  quite  true  that  of  all  the 
inhabitants  of  the  earth,  the  German  is  the  one  the 
least  capable  of  adapting  himself  to  the  mentality  of 
other  people,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  per- 
haps but  few  in  the  immediate  entourage  of  the  Em- 
peror who  recognized  the  growing  anxiety  of  the  world. 
Perhaps  many  of  them  who  so  continuously  extolled  the 
Emperor  were  really  honestly  of  opinion  that  his 
behavior  was  quite  correct.  It  is,  nevertheless,  impos- 
sible not  to  believe  that  among  the  many  clever  Ger- 
man politicians  of  the  last  decade  there  were  some  who 
had  a  clear  grasp  of  the  situation,  and  the  fact  remains 
that,  in  order  to  spare  the  Emperor  and  themselves, 
they  had  not  the  courage  to  be  harsh  with  him  and  tell 


80  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

him  the  truth  to  his  face.  These  are  not  reproaches, 
but  reminiscences  which  should  not  be  superfluous  at  a 
time  when  the  Emperor  is  to  be  made  the  scapegoat  of 
the  whole  world.  Certainly  the  Emperor,  being  such 
as  he  is,  the  experiment  would  not  have  passed  off  with- 
out there  being  opposition  to  encounter  and  overcome. 
The  first  among  his  subjects  to  attempt  the  task  of 
enlightening  the  Emperor  would  have  been  looked  upon 
with  the  greatest  surprise;  hence  no  one  would  under- 
take it.  Had  there,  however,  been  men  who,  regardless 
of  themselves,  would  have  undertaken  to  do  it,  it  would 
certainly  have  succeeded,  as  not  only  was  the  Emperor 
full  of  good  intentions,  but  he  was  also  impressionable, 
and  consistent  purposeful  work  on  a  basis  of  fearless 
honesty  would  have  impressed  him.  Besides,  the  Em- 
peror was  a  thoroughly  kind  and  good  man.  It  was  a 
genuine  pleasure  for  him  to  be  able  to  do  good ;  neither 
did  he  hate  his  enemies.  In  the  summer  of  1917  he 
spoke  to  me  about  the  fate  of  the  deposed  Tsar  and  of 
his  desire  to  help  him  and  subsequently  bring  him  to 
Germany,  a  desire  due  not  to  dynastic  but  to  human 
motives.  He  stated  repeatedly  that  he  had  no  desire 
for  revenge,  but  "only  to  succor  his  fallen  adversary." 

I  firmly  believe  that  the  Emperor  clearly  saw  the 
clouds  grow  blacker  and  blacker  on  the  political  hori- 
zon, but  he  was  sincerely  and  honestly  persuaded  that 
it  was  not  through  any  fault  of  his  that  they  had  accu- 
mulated, that  they  were  caused  by  envy  and  jealousy, 
and  that  there  was  no  other  way  of  keeping  the  threat- 
ening war  danger  at  bay  than  by  an  ostentatious  atti- 
tude of  strength  and  fearlessness.  ' '  Germany's  power 
and  might  must  daily  be  proclaimed  to  the  world,  for  as 
long  as  they  fear  us  they  will  do  us  no  harm  " — that  was 
the  doctrine  that  obtained  on  the  Spree.  And  the  echo 
came  back  from  the  world,  "This  continued  boasting 
of  German  power  and  the  perpetual  attempts  at  intimi- 


WILLIAM  II  8 1 

dation  prove  that  Germany  seeks  to  tyrannize  the 
world." 

When  war  broke  out  the  Emperor  was  firmly  con- 
vinced that  a  "war  of  defense  was  being  forced  on  him, 
which  conviction  was  shared  by  the  great  majority  of 
the  German  people.  I  draw  these  conclusions  solely 
from  my  knowledge  of  the  Emperor  and  his  entourage 
and  from  other  information  obtained  indirectly.  As  I 
have  already  mentioned,  I  had  not  had  the  slightest  con- 
nection with  Berlin  for  some  years  previous  to  the  war, 
and  certainly  not  for  two  years  after  it  broke  out. 

In  the  winter  of  1917,  when  I  met  the  Emperor  again 
in  my  capacity  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  I  thought 
he  had  aged  but  was  still  full  of  his  former  vivacity.  In 
spite  of  marked  demonstrations  of  the  certainty  of  vic- 
tory, I  believe  that  William  II  even  then  had  begun  to 
doubt  the  result  of  the  war  and  that  his  earnest  wish 
was  to  bring  it  to  an  honorable  end.  When  in  the 
course  of  one  of  our  first  conversations  I  urged  him  to 
spare  no  sacrifice  to  bring  it  to  an  end,  he  interrupted 
me,  exclaiming:  "What  would  you  have  me  do?  No- 
body longs  for  peace  more  intensely  than  I  do.  But 
every  day  we  are  told  the  others  will  not  hear  a  word 
about  peace  until  Germany  has  been  crushed."  It  was 
a  true  answer,  for  all  statements  made  by  England  cul- 
minated in  the  one  sentence  Germaniam  esse  delendam. 
I  endeavored,  nevertheless,  to  induce  the  Emperor  to 
consent  to  the  sacrifice  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  persuaded 
that  if  France  had  obtained  all  that  she  looked  upon  in 
the  light  of  a  national  idea  she  would  not  be  inclined  to 
continue  the  war.  I  think  that,  had  the  Emperor  been 
positively  certain  that  it  would  have  ended  the  war,  and 
had  he  not  been  afraid  that  so  distressing  an  offer 
would  have  been  considered  unbearable  by  Germany, 
he  would  personally  have  agreed  to  it.  But  he  was 
dominated  by  the  fear  that  a  peace  involving  such  a  loss, 


82  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  after  the  sacrifices  already  made,  would  have  driven 
the  German  people  to  despair.  Whether  he  was  justi- 
fied in  this  fear  or  not  cannot  now  be  confirmed.  In 
1917,  and  1918  as  well,  the  belief  in  a  victorious  end  was 
still  so  strong  in  Germany  that  it  is  at  least  doubtful 
whether  the  German  people  would  have  consented 
to  give  up  Alsace-Lorraine.  All  the  parties  in  the 
Reichstag  were  opposed  to  it,  including  the  Social 
Democrats. 

A  German  official  of  high  standing  said  to  me  in  the 
spring  of  1 9 1 8 :  "I  had  two  sons ;  one  of  them  fell  on  the 
field  of  battle,  but  I  would  rather  part  with  the  other 
one,  too,  than  give  up  Alsace-Lorraine,"  and  many  were 
of  the  same  opinion. 

In  the  course  of  the  year  and  a  half  when  I  had  fre- 
quent opportunities  of  meeting  the  Emperor,  his  frame 
of  mind  had  naturally  gone  through  many  different 
phases.  Following  on  any  great  military  success,  and 
after  the  collapse  of  Russia  and  Rumania,  his  generals 
were  always  able  to  enroll  him  on  their  program  of 
victory,  and  it  is  quite  a  mistake  to  imagine  that 
William  II  unceasingly  clung  to  the  idea  of  "Peace 
above  all."  He  wavered,  was  sometimes  pessimistic, 
sometimes  optimistic,  and  his  peace  aims  changed  in 
like  manner.  Humanly  speaking,  it  is  very  compre- 
hensible that  the  varying  situation  at  the  theater  of 
war  must  have  influenced  the  individual  mind,  and 
every  one  in  Europe  experienced  such  fluctuations. 

Early  in  September,  1917,  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor 
Charles  on  the  subject  of  an  impending  attack  on  the 
Italian  front,  and  in  this  letter  was  the  following  pas- 
sage: "I  trust  that  the  possibility  of  a  common  offen- 
sive of  our  allied  armies  will  raise  the  spirits  of  your 
Foreign  Minister.  In  my  opinion,  and  in  view  of  the 
general  situation,  there  is  no  reason  to  be  anything  but 
confident."  Other  letters  and  statements  prove  the 


WILLIAM  II  83 

Emperor's  fluctuating  frame  of  mind.  He,  as  well  as 
the  diplomats  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  made  use,  with 
regard  to  the  "war- weary  Austria-Hungary,"  of  such 
tactics  as  demonstrated  a  pronounced  certainty  of 
victory  in  order  to  strengthen  our  powers  of  resistance. 

The  Archduke  Friedrich  deserves  the  greatest  praise 
for  having  kept  up  the  friendly  relations  between  Vienna 
and  Berlin.  It  was  not  always  easy  to  settle  the  delicate 
questions  relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  without 
giving  offense.  The  honest  and  straightforward  nature 
of  the  Archduke  and  his  ever  friendly  and  modest 
behavior  saved  many  a  difficult  situation. 

After  our  collapse  and  overthrow,  and  when  the  Im- 
perial family  could  be  abused  with  impunity,  certain 
newspapers  took  a  delight  in  covering  the  Archduke 
Friedrich  with  contumely.  It  left  him  quite  indifferent. 
The  Prince  is  a  distinguished  character,  of  faultless 
integrity,  and  always  ready  to  put  down  abuse.  He  pre- 
vented many  disasters,  and  it  was  not  his  fault  if  he  did 
not  succeed  every  time. 

When  I  saw  the  Crown-Prince  Wilhelm  again  after 
several  years,  it  was  the  summer  of  1917,  I  found  him 
very  tired  of  war  and  most  anxious  for  peace.  I  had 
gone  to  the  French  front  on  purpose  to  meet  him  and  to 
try  if  it  were  possible  through  him  to  exercise  some  con- 
ciliatory pressure,  above  all,  on  the  military  leaders.  A 
long  conversation  that  I  had  with  him  showed  me  very 
clearly  that  he — if  he  had  ever  been  of  warlike  nature — 
was  now  a  pronounced  pacifist. 

Extract  from  My  Diary 

On  the  Western  front,  1917. — We  drove  to  the  Camp  des  Remains, 
but  in  detachments,  in  order  not  to  attract  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  artillery  to  our  cars,  for  in  some  places  the  road  was  visible 
to  the  enemy.  I  drove  together  with  Bethmann.  When  dis- 


84  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cussing  the  military  leaders,  he  remarked,  "The  generals  will 
probably  throw  hand-grenades  at  me  when  they  see  me." 

An  enemy  flier  cruised  high  up  in  the  clouds  over  our  heads. 
He  circled  around,  paying  little  heed  to  the  shrapnel  bursting  on 
all  sides.  The  firing  ceased,  and  the  human  bird  soared  into 
unapproachable  heights.  The  artillery  fire  a  long  way  off  sounded 
like  distant  thunder. 

The  French  lines  are  not  more  than  a  couple  of  hundred  meters 
distant  from  the  camp.  A  shot  fell  here  and  there  and  a  shell 
was  heard  to  whistle;  otherwise  all  was  quiet.  It  was  still  early. 
The  firing  usually  begins  at  ten  and  cease  sat  noon — interval  for 
lunch — and  begins  again  in  the  afternoon. 

Poincare's  villa  is  visible  on  the  horizon  in  the  green  landscape. 
A  gun  has  been  brought  to  bear  on  the  house — they  mean  to  destroy 
it  before  leaving — they  call  this  the  extreme  unction. 

The  daily  artillery  duel  began  on  our  return  drive,  and  kept  up 
an  incessant  roar. 

St.-Mihid. — We  stopped  at  St.-Mihiel,  where  many  French  peo- 
ple still  remain.  They  were  detained  as  hostages  to  prevent  the 
town  from  being  fired  at.  People  were  standing  about  in  the 
streets,  watching  the  cars  go  by. 

I  spoke  to  an  old  woman,  who  sat  by  herself  on  her  house  steps. 
She  said:  "This  disaster  can  never  be  made  good,  and  it  cannot 
well  be  worse  than  it  is  now.  It  is  quite  the  same  to  me  what 
happens.  I  do  not  belong  here;  my  only  son  has  been  killed  and 
my  house  is  burned.  Nothing  is  left  me  but  my  hatred  of  the 
Germans,  and  I  bequeath  that  to  France."  And  she  gazed  past 
me  into  vacancy.  She  spoke  quite  without  passion,  but  was  terribly 
sad. 

This  terrible  hatred!  Generations  will  go  to  their  graves  before 
the  flood  of  hatred  is  abated.  Would  a  settlement,  a  peace  of 
understanding,  be  possible  with  this  spirit  of  the  nations?  Will 
it  end  by  one  of  them  being  felled  to  earth  and  annihilated? 

St.-Privat. — We  passed  through  St.-Privat  on  our  way  to  Metz. 
Monuments  that  tell  the  tale  of  1870  stand  along  the  road.  Every- 
where the  soil  is  historic,  soaked  in  blood.  Every  spot,  every 
stone,  is  reminiscent  of  past  great  times.  It  was  here  that  the  seed 
was  sown  that  brought  forth  the  plan  of  revenge  that  is  being 
fought  for  now. 

Bethmann  seemed  to  divine  my  thoughts.  "Yes,"  he  said, 
"that  sacrifice  would  be  easier  for  Germany  to  bear  than  to  part 
with  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  would  close  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
episodes  in  her  history." 


WILLIAM  II  85 

Sedan. — On  the  way  to  the  Crown  Prince's  quarters.  There 
stands  the  little  house  where  the  historic  meeting  between  Napoleon 
III  and  Bismarck  took  place.  The  woman  who  lived  there  at  the 
time  died  only  a  few  weeks  ago.  For  the  second  time  she  saw  the 
Germans  arrive,  bringing  a  Moltke,  but  no  Bismarck,  with  them,  a 
detail,  however,  that  cannot  deeply  have  interested  the  old  lady. 

With  the  Crown  Prince. — A  pretty  little  house  outside  the  town. 
I  found  a  message  from  the  Crown  Prince  asking  me  to  proceed 
there  immediately,  where  I  had  almost  an  hour's  private  conversa- 
tion with  him  before  supper. 

I  do  not  know  if  the  Crown  Prince  ever  was  of  a  warlike  dis- 
position, as  people  say,  but  he  is  so  no  longer.  He  longs  for  peace, 
but  does  not  know  how  to  secure  it.  He  spoke  very  quietly  and 
sensibly.  He  was  also  in  favor  of  territorial  sacrifices,  but  seemed 
to  think  that  Germany  would  not  allow  it.  The  great  difficulty 
lay  in  the  contrast  between  the  actual  military  situation,  the 
confident  expectations  of  the  generals,  and  the  fears  entertained 
by  the  military  laymen.  Besides,  it  is  not  only  Alsace-Lorraine. 
The  suppression  of  German  militarism  spoken  of  in  London  means 
the  one-sided  disarmament  of  Germany.  Can  an  army  far  advanced 
on  enemy  soil  whose  generals  are  confident  of  final  victory,  can  a 
people  still  undefeated,  tolerate  that? 

I  advised  the  Crown  Prince  to  speak  to  his  father  on  the  question 
of  abdication,  in  which  he  fully  agreed.  I  then  invited  him  to  come 
to  Vienna  on  behalf  of  the  Emperor,  which  he  promised  to  do  as 
soon  as  he  could  get  leave. 

On  my  return  the  Emperor  wrote  him  a  letter,  drawn 
up  by  me,  which  contained  the  following  passage : 

My  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  me  of  the  interesting 
conversation  he  had  the  honor  to  have  with  you,  and  it  has  been 
a  great  pleasure  to  me  to  hear  all  your  statements,  which  so  exactly 
reflect  my  own  views  of  the  situation.  Notwithstanding  the  super- 
human exertions  of  our  troops,  the  situation  throughout  the  country 
demands  that  a  stop  be  put  to  the  war  before  winter,  in  Germany  as 
well  as  here.  Turkey  will  not  be  with  us  much  longer,  and  with  her 
we  shall  also  lose  Bulgaria;  we  two  will  then  be  alone,  and  next 
spring  will  bring  America  and  a  still  stronger  Entente.  From  other 
sources  there  are  distinct  signs  that  we  could  win  over  France  if  Ger- 
many could  make  up  her  mind  to  certain  territorial  sacrifices  in 
Alsace-Lorraine.  With  France  secured  to  us  we  are  the  conquerors, 

7 


86  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  Germany  will  obtain  elsewhere  ample  compensation.  But  I 
cannot  allow  Germany  to  be  the  only  one  to  make  a  sacrifice.  I  too 
will  take  the  lion's  share  of  sacrifice,  and  have  informed  His  Majesty 
your  father  that  under  the  above  conditions  I  am  prepared  not  only 
to  dispense  with  the  whole  of  Poland,  but  to  cede  Galicia  to  her 
and  to  assist  in  combining  that  state  with  Germany,  who  would 
thus  acquire  a  state  in  the  east  while  yielding  up  a  portion  of  her 
soil  in  the  west.  In  1915,  at  the  request  of  Germany  and  in  the 
interests  of  our  Alliance,  we  offered  the  Trentino  to  faithless  Italy 
without  asking  for  compensation  in  order  to  avert  war.  Germany 
is  now  in  a  similar  situation,  though  with  far  better  prospects.  You, 
as  heir  to  the  German  Imperial  crown,  are  privileged  to  have  a  say 
in  the  matter,  and  I  know  that  His  Majesty  your  father  entirely 
shares  this  view  respecting  your  co-operation.  I  beg  of  you,  there- 
fore, in  this  decisive  hour  for  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  to 
consider  the  whole  situation  and  to  unite  your  efforts  with  mine  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  rapid  and  honorable  end.  If  Germany  persists 
in  her  standpoint  of  refusal  and  thus  wrecks  the  hope  of  a  possible 
peace  the  situation  in  Austria-Hungary  will  become  extremely 
critical. 

I  should  be  very  glad  to  have  a  talk  with  you  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  your  promise  conveyed  through  Count  Czernin  soon  to  pay  us  a 
visit  gives  me  the  greatest  pleasure. 

The  Crown  Prince's  answer  was  very  friendly  and  full 
of  anxiety  to  help,  though  it  was  also  obvious  that  the 
German  military  leaders  had  succeeded  in  nipping  his 
efforts  in  the  bud.  When  I  met  Ludendorff  some  time 
afterward  in  Berlin  this  was  fully  confirmed  by  the 
words  he  flung  at  me:  "What  have  you  been  doing  to 
our  Crown  Prince?  He  had  turned  so  slack,  but  we 
have  stiffened  him  up  again." 

The  game  remained  the  same.  The  last  war  period 
in  Germany  was  controlled  by  one  will  only,  and  that 
was  Ludendorff's.  His  thoughts  were  centered  on 
fighting,  his  soul  on  victory. 


CHAPTER  IV 

RUMANIA 


MY  appointment  as  Ambassador  to  Bukharest  in  the 
autumn  of  1913  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  me, 
and  was  much  against  my  wishes.  The  initiative  in  the 
matter  came  from  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand.  I 
had  never  had  any  doubt  that  sooner  or  later  the  Arch- 
duke would  take  part  in  politics,  but  it  took  me  by  sur- 
prise that  he  should  do  so  in  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph's  lifetime. 

A  great  difference  of  opinion  prevailed  then  in  Vienna 
on  the  Rumanian  question,  a  pro-Rumanian  spirit  fight- 
ing against  an  anti-Rumanian  one.  The  head  of  the 
former  party  was  the  Archduke  Franz,  and  with  him, 
though  in  less  marked  degree,  was  Berchtold.  Tisza 
was  the  leader  on  the  other  side,  and  carried  with  him 
almost  the  entire  Hungarian  Parliament.  The  pro- 
Rumanians  wished  Rumania  to  be  more  closely  linked 
to  the  Monarchy;  the  others,  to  replace  that  alliance 
by  one  with  Bulgaria;  but  both  were  unanimous  in 
seeking  for  a  clear  knowledge  of  how  matters  stood 
with  the  alliance,  and  whether  we  had  a  friend  or  a  foe 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Carpathians.  My  predecessor, 
Karl  Furstenberg,  had  sent  in  a  very  clear  and  correct 
report  on  the  subject,  but  he  shared  the  fate  of  so  many 
ambassadors — his  word  was  not  believed. 

The  actual  task  assigned  to  me  was,  first  of  all,  to  find 


88  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

out  whether  this  alliance  was  of  any  practical  value,  and, 
if  I  thought  not,  to  suggest  ways  and  means  of  justify- 
ing its  existence. 

I  must  mention  in  this  connection  that  my  appoint- 
ment as  Ambassador  to  Bukharest  had  raised  a  perfect 
storm  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament.  The  reason  for 
this  widely  spread  indignation  in  Hungary  at  my 
selection  for  the  post  was  owing  to  a  pamphlet  I  had 
written  some  years  previously,  in  which  I  certainly 
had  attacked  the  Magyar  policy  somewhat  vehemently. 
I  maintained  the  standpoint  that  a  policy  of  suppression 
of  the  nations  was  not  tenable  in  the  long  run,  and  that 
no  future  was  in  store  for  Hungary  unless  she  definitely 
abolished  that  policy  and  allowed  the  nations  equal 
rights.  This  pamphlet  gave  serious  displeasure  in 
Budapest,  and  representatives  in  the  Hungarian  Parlia- 
ment were  afraid  I  should  introduce  that  policy  in 
Rumania,  which,  following  the  spirit  of  the  pamphlet, 
was  directed  against  the  official  policy  of  Vienna  and 
Budapest.  It  was  at  this  period  that  I  made  Tisza's 
acquaintance.  I  had  a  long  and  very  frank  conversa- 
tion with  him  on  the  whole  subject,  and  explained  to 
him  that  I  must  uphold  the  standpoint  I  put  forward  in 
my  pamphlet,  as  it  tallied  with  my  convictions,  but  that 
I  clearly  saw  that  from  the  moment  I  accepted  the  post 
of  ambassador  I  was  bound  to  consider  myself  as  a  part 
of  the  great  state  machinery,  and  loyally  support  the 
policy  emanating  from  the  Ballplatz.  I  still  maintain 
that  my  standpoint  is  perfectly  justifiable.  A  unified 
policy  would  be  utterly  impossible  if  every  subordinate 
official  were  to  publish  his  own  views,  whether  right  or 
wrong,  and  I  for  my  part  would  never,  as  Minister,  have 
tolerated  an  ambassador  who  attempted  to  pursue  an 
independent  policy  of  his  own.  Tisza  begged  me  to 
give  my  word  of  honor  'that  I  would  make  no  attempt 
to  introduce  a  policy  opposed  to  that  of  Vienna  and 


RUMANIA  89 

Budapest,  to  which  I  readily  agreed,  provided  that  the 
Archduke  was  agreeable  to  such  decision.  I  then  had  a 
conversation  with  the  latter,  and  found  that  he  quite 
agreed  with  my  action,  his  argument  being  that  as  long 
as  he  was  the  heir  to  the  throne  he  would  never  attempt 
to  introduce  a  policy  opposed  to  that  of  the  Emperor; 
consequently  he  would  not  expect  it  from  me,  either. 
But  should  he  come  to  the  throne  he  would  certainly 
make  an  effort  to  carry  out  his  own  views,  in  which 
case  I  should  no  longer  be  at  Bukharest,  but  probably 
in  some  post  where  I  would  be  in  a  position  to  support 
his  efforts.  The  Archduke  begged  me  for  the  sake  of 
my  friendship  for  him  to  accept  the  post,  which  I 
finally  decided  to  do  after  I  obtained  a  promise  from 
Berchtold  that,  at  the  end  of  two  years  as  the  longest 
term,  he  would  put  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  my  retire- 
ment. 

The  Archduke  Franz  drew  his  pro-Rumanian  pro- 
clivities from  a  very  unreliable  source.  He  hardly 
knew  Rumania  at  all.  So  far  as  I  know,  he  had  been 
only  once  in  the  country,  and  paid  a  short  visit  to  King 
Carol  at  Sinaia;  but  the  friendly  welcome  accorded  to 
himself  and  his  wife  by  the  old  King  and  Queen  entirely 
took  his  warm  heart  by  storm,  and  he  mistook  King 
Carol  for  Rumania.  This  is  again  a  proof  how  greatly 
the  individual  relations  of  great  personalities  can  influ- 
ence the  policy  of  nations.  The  royal  couple  met  the 
Archduke  at  the  station;  the  Queen  embraced  and 
kissed  the  Duchess  and,  placing  her  at  her  right  side, 
drove  with  her  to  the  castle.  In  short,  it  was  the  first 
time  that  the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg  had  been  treated 
as  enjoying  equal  privileges  with  her  husband.  During 
his  short  stay  in  Rumania  the  Archduke  had  the  pleas- 
ure of  seeing  his  wife  treated  as  his  equal  and  not  as  a 
person  of  slight  importance,  always  relegated  to  the 
background.  At  the  court  balls  in  Vienna  the  Duchess 


90  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  always  obliged  to  walk  behind  all  the  archduchesses, 
and  never  had  any  gentleman  allotted  to  her  whose  arm 
she  could  take.  In  Rumania  she  was  his  wife,  and 
etiquette  was  not  concerned  with  her  birth.  The 
Archduke  valued  this  proof  of  friendly  tactfulness  on 
the  part  of  the  King  very  highly,  and  always  afterward 
Rumania,  in  his  eyes,  was  endowed  with  a  special 
charm.  Besides  which  he  very  correctly  estimated 
that  a  change  in  certain  political  relations  would  effect 
a  closer  alliance  between  Rumania  and  ourselves.  He 
felt,  rather  than  knew,  that  the  Transylvanian  question 
lay  like  a  huge  obstacle  between  Vienna  and  Bukha- 
rest,  and  that  this  obstacle  once  removed  would  alter 
the  entire  situation. 

To  find  out  the  real  condition  of  the  alliance  was  my 
first  task,  and  it  was  not  difficult,  as  the  first  lengthy 
conferences  I  had  with  King  Carol  left  no  doubt  in  my 
mind  that  the  old  King  himself  considered  the  alliance 
very  unsafe.  King  Carol  was  an  exceptionally  clever 
man,  very  cautious  and  deliberate,  and  it  was  not  easy 
to  make  him  talk  if  he  intended  to  be  silent.  The 
question  of  the  vitality  of  the  alliance  was  settled  by 
my  suggesting  to  the  King  that  the  alliance  should  re- 
ceive pragmatic  sanction — i.e.,  be  ratified  by  the  Par- 
liaments at  Vienna,  Budapest,  and  Bukharest.  The 
alarm  evinced  by  the  King  at  the  suggestion,  the  very 
idea  that  the  carefully  guarded  secret  of  the  existence 
of  an  alliance  should  be  divulged,  proved  to  me  how 
totally  impossible  it  would  be,  in  the  circumstances,  to 
infuse  fresh  life  into  such  dead  matter. 

My  reports  sent  to  the  Ballplatz  leave  no  doubt  that  I 
answered  this  first  question  by  declaring  in  categorical 
fashion  that  the  alliance  with  Rumania  was,  under  the 
existing  conditions,  nothing  but  a  scrap  of  paper. 

The  second  question,  as  to  whether  there  were  ways 
and  means  of  restoring  vitality  to  the  alliance,  and  what 


RUMANIA  91 

they  were,  was  theoretically  just  as  easy  to  answer  as 
difficult  to  carry  out  in  practice.  As  already  men- 
tioned, the  real  obstacle  in  the  way  of  closer  relations 
between  Bukharest  and  Vienna  was  the  question  of 
Great  Rumania;  in  other  words,  the  Rumanian  desire 
for  national  union  with  her  "brothers  in  Transylvania." 
This  was  naturally  quite  opposed  to  the  Hungarian 
standpoint.  It  is  interesting,  as  well  as  characteristic 
of  the  then  situation,  that  shortly  after  my  taking  up 
office  in  Rumania,  Nikolai  Filippescu  (known  later  as  a 
war  fanatic)  proposed  that  Rumania  should  join  with 
Transylvania,  and  the  whole  of  united  Great  Rumania 
enter  into  relations  with  the  Monarchy  similar  to  the 
relation  of  Bavaria  to  the  German  Empire.  I  admit 
that  I  welcomed  the  idea  warmly,  for  if  it  were  launched 
by  a  party  which  justly  was  held  to  be  antagonistic  to 
the  Monarchy  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  moderate 
element  in  Rumania  would  have  accepted  it  with  still 
greater  satisfaction.  I  still  believe  that  had  this  plan 
been  carried  out  it  would  have  led  to  a  real  linking  of 
Rumania  to  the  Monarchy,  that  the  notification  would 
have  met  with  no  opposition,  and  consequently  the  out- 
break of  war  would  have  found  us  very  differently 
situated.  Unfortunately,  the  plan  failed  at  its  very 
first  stage,  owing  to  Tisza's  strong  and  obstinate  resist- 
ance. The  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  held  the  same 
standpoint  as  Tisza,  and  it  was  out  of  the  question  to 
achieve  anything  by  arguing.  On  the  other  hand,  no- 
body had  any  idea  then  that  the  great  war,  and  with  it 
the  testing  of  the  alliance,  was  so  imminent,  and  I  con- 
soled myself  for  my  unsuccessful  efforts  in  the  firm  hope 
that  this  grand  plan,  as  it  seemed  to  me  both  then  and 
now,  would  be  realized  one  day  under  the  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand. 

When  I  arrived  in  Rumania  a  change  was  proceeding 
in  the  government.  _  Majorescu's  Conservative  Minis- 


92  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

try  gave  way  to  the  Liberal  Ministry  of  Bratianu. 
King  Carol's  policy  of  government  was  very  peculiar. 
From  the  very  first  his  principle  was  never  to  proceed 
with  violence  or  even  much  energy  against  injurious 
tendencies  in  his  own  country;  but,  on  the  contrary, 
always  to  yield  to  the  numerous  claims  made  by  extor- 
tioners. He  knew  his  people  thoroughly,  and  knew 
that  both  parties,  Conservatives  and  Liberals,  must 
alternately  have  access  to  the  manger  until  thoroughly 
satisfied  and  ready  to  make  room  the  one  for  the  other. 
Almost  every  change  in  government  was  accomplished 
in  that  manner — the  Opposition,  desirous  of  coming 
into  power,  began  with  threats  and  hints  at  revolution. 
Some  highly  unreasonable  claim  would  be  put  forward 
and  vehemently  insisted  upon  and  the  people  incited  to 
follow  it  up;  the  government  would  retire,  unable  to 
accede  to  the  demands,  and  the  Opposition,  once  in 
power,  would  show  no  further  signs  of  keeping  their 
promise.  The  old  King  was  well  versed  in  the  game; 
he  allowed  the  opposition  tide  to  rise  to  the  highest  pos- 
sible limit,  when  he  effected  the  necessary  change  of 
individuals  and  looked  on  until  the  game  began  again. 
It  is  the  custom  in  Rumania,  when  a  new  party  comes 
into  power,  to  change  the  whole  personnel,  even  down 
to  the  lowest  officials.  This  arrangement,  obviously, 
has  its  drawbacks,  though  on  the  other  hand  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  it  is  a  practical  one. 

In  this  manner  the  Bratianu  Ministry  came  into 
office  in  1913.  Majorescu's  government  gave  entire 
satisfaction  to  the  King  and  the  moderate  elements  in 
the  country.  In  the  eyes  of  the  Rumanians  he  had 
just  achieved  a  great  diplomatic  success  by  the  Peace 
of  Bukharest  and  the  acquisition  of  the  Dobrudja, 
when  Bratianu  came  forward  with  a  demand  for  vast 
agrarian  reforms.  These  reforms  are  one  of  the  hobby- 
horses of  Rumanian  policy  which  are  always  mounted 


RUMANIA  93 

when  it  is  a  question  of  making  use  of  the  poor  unfor- 
tunate peasants,  and  the  maneuver  invariably  succeeds, 
largely  owing  to  the  lack  of  intelligence  prevailing 
among  the  peasant  population  of  Rumania,  who  are 
constantly  made  the  tools  of  one  or  other  party,  and 
simply  pushed  on  one  side  when  the  object  has  been 
obtained.  Bratianu  also,  once  he  was  in  office,  gave 
no  thought  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  promises,  but  calmly 
proceeded  on  the  lines  Majorescu  had  laid  down  in  his 
time. 

Still,  it  was  more  difficult  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory 
settlement  in  foreign  affairs  with  Bratianu  than  it  had 
been  with  Majorescu,  as  the  former  was  thoroughly 
conversant  with  all  West  European  matters,  and  at  the 
bottom  of  his  heart  was  anti-German.  One  of  the  dis- 
tinctions to  be  made  between  Liberals  and  Conserva- 
tives was  that  the  Liberals  had  enjoyed  a  Parisian  edu- 
cation— they  spoke  no  German,  only  French;  while  the 
Conservatives,  taking  Carp  and  Majorescu  as  models, 
were  offshoots  of  Berlin.  As  it  was  impossible  to  carry 
out  the  plan  of  firmly  and  definitely  linking  Rumania  to 
us  by  a  change  of  Hungarian  internal  policy,  the  idea 
naturally,  almost  automatically,  arose  to  substitute 
Bulgaria  for  Rumania.  This  idea,  which  found  special 
favor  with  Count  Tisza,  could  be  carried  out,  both 
because,  since  the  Bukharest  peace  of  1913,  it  was  out 
of  the  question  to  bring  Rumania  and  Bulgaria  under 
one  roof,  and  because  an  alliance  with  Sofia  would  have 
driven  Rumania  straight  into  the  enemy  camp.  But 
Berchtold,  as  well  as  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand, 
was  opposed  to  this  latter  eventuality,  nor  would  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  have  approved  of  such  pro- 
ceedings. Hence  no  change  was  made;  Rumania  was 
not  won,  nor  was  Bulgaria  substituted  for  her,  and  they 
were  content  in  Vienna  to  leave  everything  to  the  future. 

In  a  social  sense  the  year  that  I  spent  in  Rumania 


94  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

before  the  war  was  not  an  unpleasant  one.  The  rela- 
tions of  an  Austrian-Hungarian  ambassador  with  the 
court,  as  with  the  numerous  Bojars,  were  pleasant  and 
friendly,  and  nobody  could  then  have  imagined  what 
torrents  of  hatred  were  so  soon  to  be  launched  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  frontiers. 

Social  life  became  less  pleasant  during  the  war,  as  will 
be  seen  from  the  following  instance.  There  lived  at 
Bukharest  a  certain  Lieut. -Col.  Prince  Sturdza,  who 
was  a  noted  braggart  and  brawler  and  an  inveterate 
enemy  of  Austria-Hungary.  I  did  not  know  him  per- 
sonally, and  there  was  no  personal  reason  for  him  to 
begin  one  day  to  abuse  me  publicly  in  the  papers  as 
being  an  advocate  of  the  Monarchy.  I  naturally  took 
not  the  slightest  notice  of  his  article,  whereupon  he 
addressed  an  open  letter  to  me  in  the  Adeverul,  in  which 
he  informed  me  that  he  would  box  my  ears  at  the  first 
opportunity.  I  telegraphed  to  Berchtold  and  asked 
the  Emperor's  permission  to  challenge  this  individual, 
as,  being  an  officer,  he  was,  according  to  our  ideas, 
entitled  to  satisfaction.  The  Emperor  sent  word  that 
it  was  out  of  the  question  for  an  ambassador  to  fight  a 
duel  in  the  country  to  which  he  was  accredited,  and 
that  I  was  to  complain  to  the  Rumanian  government. 
I  accordingly  went  to  Bratianu,  who  declared  that  he 
was  totally  unable  to  move  in  the  matter.  According 
to  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  country  it 'was  impos- 
sible to  protect  a  foreign  ambassador  against  such 
abuse.  If  Sturdza  carried  out  his  threats  he  would  be 
arrested.  Until  then  nothing  could  be  done. 

Upon  this  I  assured  Bratianu  that  if  such  were  the 
case  I  would  in  future  arm  myself  with  a  revolver  and, 
if  he  attacked  me,  shoot  the  man ;  if  one  lived  in  a  coun- 
try where  the  habits  of  the  Wild  West  obtained,  one 
must  act  accordingly.  I  sent  word  to  the  lieutenant- 
colonel  that  each  day,  at  one  o'clock,  I  could  be  found 


RUMANIA  95 

at  the  Hotel  Boulevard,  where  he  would  find  a  bullet 
awaiting  him. 

The  next  time  I  saw  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  he 
asked  for  further  information  concerning  the  episode, 
and  I  told  him  of  my  conversation  with  Bratianu  and  of 
my  firm  intention  to  be  my  own  helper.  The  Emperor 
rejoined:  "Naturally  you  cannot  allow  yourself  to  be 
beaten.  You  are  quite  right;  if  he  lays  hands  on  you, 
shoot  him." 

I  afterward  met  Sturdza  several  times  in  restaurants 
and  drawing-rooms  without  his  attempting  to  carry  out 
his  threats.  This  man,  whose  nature  was  that  of  a 
daring  adventurer,  afterward  deserted  to  the  Russian 
army  and  fought  against  us  at  a  time  when  Rumania 
still  was  neutral.  I  then  completely  lost  sight  of  him. 

The  absolute  freedom  of  the  press,  combined  with  the 
brutality  of  the  prevailing  customs,  produced  the  most 
varied  results,  even  going  so  far  as  abuse  of  their  own 
kings.  In  this  connection  King  Carol  gave  me  many 
drastic  instances.  While  King  Ferdinand  was  still 
neutral,  one  of  the  comic  papers  contained  a  picture  of 
the  King  taking  aim  at  a  hare,  while  underneath  these 
words  were  supposed  to  come  from  the  hare:  "My 
friend,  you  have  long  ears,  I  have  long  ears;  you  are  a 
coward,  I  am  a  coward.  Wherefore  would  my  brother 
shoot  me?" 

On  the  day  when  war  broke  out  this  freedom  of  the 
press  was  diverted  into  a  different  channel  and  replaced 
by  the  severest  control  and  censorship. 

Rumania  is  a  land  of  contrasts,  as  regards  the 
landscape,  the  climate,  and  social  conditions.  The 
mountainous  north,  with  the  wonderful  Carpathians,  is 
one  of  the  most  beautiful  districts.  Then  there  are  the 
endless,  unspeakably  monotonous,  but  fertile  plains  of 
Wallachia,  leading  into  the  valley  of  the  Danube,  which 
is  a  very  paradise.  In  spring  particularly,  when  the 


96  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Danube  each  year  overflows  its  banks,  the  beauty  of 
the  landscape  baffles  description.  It  is  reminiscent  of 
the  tropics,  with  virgin  forests  standing  in  the  water, 
and  islands  covered  with  luxuriant  growth  scattered 
here  and  there.  It  is  an  ideal  country  for  the  sports- 
man. All  kinds  of  birds,  herons,  ducks,  pelicans,  and 
others,  are  to  be  met  with,  besides  wolves  and  wildcats, 
and  days  may  be  spent  in  rowing  and  walking  in  this 
paradise  without  wearying  of  it. 

The  Rumanians  usually  care  but  little  for  sport,  being 
averse  to  physical  exertion.  Whenever  they  can  they 
leave  the  country  and  spend  their  time  in  Paris  or  on 
the  Riviera.  This  love  of  travel  is  so  strong  in  them 
that  a  law  was  passed  compelling  them  to  spend  a  cer- 
tain portion  of  the  year  in  their  own  country  or  else  pay 
the  penalty  of  a  higher  tax.  The  country  people,  in 
their  sad  poverty,  form  a  great  contrast  to  the  enor- 
mously wealthy  Bojars.  Although  very  backward  in 
everything  relating  to  culture,  the  Rumanian  peasant 
is  a  busy,  quiet,  and  easily  satisfied  type,  unpretentious 
to  a  touching  degree  when  compared  with  the  upper 
classes. 

Social  conditions  among  the  upper  ten  thousand  have 
been  greatly  complicated,  owing  to  the  abolition  of 
nobility,  whereby  the  question  of  titles  plays  a  part  un- 
equaled  anywhere  else  in  the  world.  Almost  every 
Rumanian  has  a  title  derived  from  one  or  other  source ; 
he  values  it  highly,  and  takes  it  much  amiss  when  a 
foreigner  betrays  his  ignorance  on  the  subject.  As  a 
rule,  it  is  safer  to  adopt  the  plan  of  addressing  every  one 
as  "Mon  prince."  Another  matter  difficult  for  a  for- 
eigner to  grasp  is  the  inner  status  of  Rumanian  society, 
owing  to  the  incessant  divorce  and  subsequent  re- 
marriages. Nearly  every  woman  has  been  divorced  at 
least  once  and  married  again,  the  result  being,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  most  complicated  questions  of  rela- 


RUMANIA  97 

tionship,  and,  on  the  other,  so  many  breaches  of  per- 
sonal relations  as  to  make  it  the  most  difficult  task  to 
invite  twenty  Rumanians,  particularly  ladies,  to  dinner 
without  giving  offense  in  some  quarter. 

In  the  days  of  the  old  regime  it  was  one  of  the  duties 
of  the  younger  members  of  the  Embassy  to  develop 
their  budding  diplomatic  talents  by  a  clever  compila- 
tion of  the  list  for  such  a  dinner  and  a  wise  avoidance 
of  any  dangerous  rock  ahead.  But  as  the  question  of 
rank  in  Rumania  is  taken  just  as  seriously  as  though  it 
were  authorized,  every  lady  claims  to  have  first  rank — 
the  correct  allotment  of  places  at  a  dinner  is  really  a 
question  for  the  most  efficient  diplomatic  capacities. 
There  were  about  a  dozen  ladies  in  Bukharest  who 
would  actually  not  accept  an  invitation  unless  they 
were  quite  sure  the  place  of  honor  would  be  given  to 
them. 

My  predecessor  cut  the  Gordian  knot  of  these  diffi- 
culties by  arranging  to  have  dinner  served  at  small 
separate  tables,  thus  securing  several  places  of  honor, 
but  not  even  by  these  means  could  he  satisfy  the  am- 
bition of  all. 

ii 

While  at  Sinaia  I  received  the  news  of  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Archduke  from  Bratianu.  I  was  confined  to 
bed,  suffering  from  influenza,  when  Bratianu  tele- 
phoned to  ask  if  I  had  heard  that  there  had  been  an 
accident  to  the  Archduke's  train  in  Bosnia,  and  that 
both  he  and  the  Duchess  were  killed.  Soon  after  this 
first  alarm  came  further  news,  leaving  no  doubt  as  to 
the  gravity  of  the  catastrophe.  The  first  impression  in 
Rumania  was  one  of  profound  and  sincere  sympathy 
and  genuine  consternation.  Rumania  never  expected 
by  means  of  war  to  succeed  in  realizing  her  national 
ambitions ;  she  only  indulged  in  the  hope  that  a  friendly 


98  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

agreement  with  the  Monarchy  would  lead  to  the  union 
of  all  Rumanians,  and  in  that  connection  Bukharest 
centered  all  its  hopes  in  the  Archduke  and  heir  to  the 
throne.  His  death  seemed  to  end  the  dream  of  a 
Greater  Rumania,  and  the  genuine  grief  displayed  in  all 
circles  in  Rumania  was  the  outcome  of  that  feeling. 
Take  Jonescu,  on  learning  the  news  while  in  my  wife's 
drawing-room,  wept  bitterly;  and  the  condolences  that 
I  received  were  not  of  the  usual  nature  of  such  messages, 
but  were  expressions  of  the  most  genuine  sorrow. 
Poklewski,  the  Russian  Ambassador,  is  said  to  have 
remarked  very  brutally  that  there  was  no  reason  to 
make  so  much  out  of  the  event,  and  the  general  indig- 
nation that  his  words  aroused  proved  how  strong  was 
the  sympathy  felt  for  the  murdered  Archduke  in  the 
country. 

When  the  ultimatum  was  made  known  the  entire  situ- 
ation changed  at  once.  I  never  had  any  illusions 
respecting  the  Rumanian  psychology,  and  was  quite 
clear  in  my  own  mind  that  the  sincere  regret  at  the 
Archduke's  death  was  due  to  egotistical  motives  and  to 
the  fear  of  being  compelled  now  to  abandon  the  national 
ambition.  The  ultimatum  and  the  danger  of  war 
threatening  on  the  horizon  completely  altered  the 
Rumanian  attitude,  and  it  was  suddenly  recognized 
that  Rumania  could  achieve  its  object  by  other  means, 
not  by  peace,  but  by  war — not  with,  but  against  the 
Monarchy.  I  would  never  have  believed  it  possible 
that  such  a  rapid  and  total  change  could  have  occurred 
practically  within  a  few  hours.  Genuine  and  simulated 
indignation  at  the  tone  of  the  ultimatum  was  the  order 
of  the  day,  and  the  universal  conclusion  arrived  at  was : 
UAutriche  est  devenue  folle.  Men  and  women  with 
whom  I  had  been  on  a  perfectly  friendly  footing  for  the 
last  year  suddenly  became  bitter  enemies.  Every- 
where I  noticed  a  mixture  of  indignation  and  growing 


RUMANIA  99 

eagerness  to  realize  at  last  their  heart's  dearest  wish. 
The  feeling  in  certain  circles  fluctuated  for  some  days. 
Rumanians  had  a  great  respect  for  Germany's  military 
power,  and  the  year  1870  was  still  fresh  in  the  memory 
of  many  of  them.  When  England,  however,  joined  the 
ranks  of  our  adversaries  their  fears  vanished,  and  from 
that  moment  it  became  obvious  to  the  large  majority 
of  the  Rumanians  that  the  realization  of  their  aspira- 
tions was  merely  a  question  of  time  and  of  diplomatic 
efficiency.  The  wave  of  hatred  and  lust  of  conquest 
that  broke  over  us  in  the  first  stage  of  the  war  was  much 
stronger  than  in  later  stages,  because  the  Rumanians 
made  the  mistake  we  all  have  committed  of  reckoning 
on  too  short  a  duration  of  the  war,  and  therefore  im- 
agined the  decision  to  be  nearer  at  hand  than  it  actu- 
ally was.  After  the  great  German  successes  in  the 
west,  after  Gorlitz  and  the  downfall  of  Serbia,  certain 
tendencies  pointing  to  a  policy  of  delay  became  notice- 
able among  the  Rumanians.  With  the  exceptions  of 
Carp  and  his  little  group  all  were  more  or  less  ready  at 
the  very  first  to  fling  themselves  upon  us. 

Like  a  rock  standing  in  the  angry  sea  of  hatred,  poor 
old  King  Carol  was  alone  with  his  German  sympathies. 
I  had  been  instructed  to  read  the  ultimatum  to  him  the 
moment  it  was  sent  to  Belgrade,  and  never  shall  I  for- 
get the  impression  it  made  on  the  old  King  when  he 
heard  it.  He,  wise  old  politician  that  he  was,  recog- 
nized at  once  the  immeasurable  possibilities  of  such  a 
step,  and  before  I  had  finished  reading  the  document 
he  interrupted  me,  exclaiming,  "It  will  be  a  world  war." 
It  was  long  before  he  could  collect  himself  and  begin  to 
devise  ways  and  means  by  which  a  peaceful  solution 
might  still  be  found.  I  may  mention  here  that  a  short 
time  previously  the  Tsar,  with  Sassonoff,  had  been  in 
Constanza  for  a  meeting  with  the  Rumanian  royal 
family.  The  day  after  the  Tsar  left  I  went  to  Con- 


ioo  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

stanza  myself  to  thank  the  King  for  having  conferred 
the  Grand  Cross  of  one  of  the  Rumanian  orders  on  me, 
obviously  as  a  proof  that  the  Russian  visit  had  not 
made  him  forget  our  alliance,  and  he  gave  me  some 
interesting  details  of  the  said  visit.  Most  interesting 
of  all  was  his  account  of  the  conversations  with  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  On  asking  whether 
Sassonoff  considered  the  situation  in  Europe  to  be  as 
safe  as  he  (the  King)  did,  Sassonoff  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  "Pourvu  que  VAutricke  ne  louche  pas  a  la 
Serbie."  I  at  once,  of  course,  reported  this  momentous 
statement  to  Vienna;  but  neither  by  the  King  nor  by 
myself,  nor  yet  in  Vienna,  was  the  train  of  thought 
then  fully  understood.  The  relations  between  Serbia 
and  the  Monarchy  were  at  that  time  no  worse  than 
usual;  indeed,  they  were  rather  better,  and  there  was 
not  the  slightest  intention  on  our  part  to  injure  the 
Serbians.  But  the  suspicion  that  Sassonoff  already 
then  was  aware  that  the  Serbians  were  planning  some- 
thing against  us  cannot  be  got  rid  of. 

When  the  King  asked  me  whether  I  had  reported 
Sassonoff's  important  remark  to  Vienna,  I  replied  that 
I  had  done  so,  and  added  that  this  remark  was  another 
reason  to  make  me  believe  that  the  assassination  was  a 
crime  long  since  prepared  and  carried  out  under 
Russian  patronage. 

The  crime  that  was  enacted  at  Debruzin,  which  made 
such  a  sensation  at  the  time,  gave  rise  to  suspicions  of  a 
Russo-Rumanian  attempt  at  assassination. 

On  February  24,  1914,  the  Hungarian  Correspond- 
ence Bureau  published  the  following  piece  of  news: 

A  terrible  explosion  took  place  this  morning  in  the  official 
premises  of  the  newly  instituted  Greek-Catholic-Hungarian  bishop- 
ric, which  are  on  the  second  floor  of  the  Ministry  of  Trade  and  Com- 
merce in  the  Franz  Deak  Street.  It  occurred  in  the  office  of  the 
bishop's  representative,  the  Vicar  Michael  Jaczkovics,  whose  secre- 


RUMANIA  101 

tary,  Johann  Slapowszky,  was  also  present  in  the  room.  Both  of 
them  were  blown  to  pieces.  The  Greek-Catholic  bishop,  Stephan 
Miklossy,  was  in  a  neighboring  room,  but  had  a  most  marvelous 
escape.  Alexander  Csatth,  advocate  and  solicitor  to  the  bishopric, 
who  was  in  another  room,  was  mortally  wounded  by  the  explosion. 
In  a  third  room  the  bishop's  servant  with  his  wife  were  both  killed. 
All  the  walls  in  the  office  premises  fell  in,  and  the  whole  building  is 
very  much  damaged.  The  explosion  caused  such  a  panic  in  the 
house  that  all  the  inhabitants  took  flight  and  vanished.  All  the 
windows  of  the  neighboring  Town  Hall  in  the  Verboczy  Street  were 
shattered  by  the  concussion.  Loose  tiles  were  hurled  into  the  street 
and  many  passers-by  were  injured.  The  four  dead  bodies  and  the 
wounded  were  taken  to  the  hospital.  The  bishop,  greatly  distressed, 
left  the  building  and  went  to  a  friend's  house.  The  daughter  of  the 
Vicar  Jaczkovics  went  out  of  her  mind  on  hearing  of  her  father's 
tragic  death.  The  cause  of  the  explosion  has  not  yet  been  discovered. 

I  soon  became  involved  in  the  affair  when  Hungary 
and  Rumania  began  mutually  to  blame  one  another  as 
originators  of  the  outrage.  This  led  to  numerous  inter- 
ventions and  adjustments,  and  my  task  was  intensified 
because  a  presumed  accomplice  of  the  murderer  Catarau 
was  arrested  in  Bukharest,  and  his  extradition  to  Hun- 
gary had  to  be  effected  by  me.  This  man,  of  the  name 
of  Mandazescu,  was  accused  of  having  obtained  a  false 
passport  for  Catarau. 

Catarau,  who  was  a  Rumanian-Russian  from  Bessara- 
bia, vanished  completely  after  the  murder  and  left  no 
trace.  News  came,  now  from  Serbia,  then  from  Albania, 
that  he  had  been  found,  but  the  rumors  were  always 
false.  I  chanced  to  hear  something  about  the  matter 
in  this  way.  I  was  on  board  a  Rumanian  vessel  bound 
from  Constanza  to  Constantinople,  when  I  accidentally 
overheard  two  Rumanian  naval  officers  talking  to- 
gether. One  of  them  said,  "That  was  on  the  day 
when  the  police  brought  Catarau  on  board  to  help 
him  to  get  away  secretly." 

Catarau  was  heard  of  later  at  Cairo,  which  he  ap- 
pears to  have  reached  with  the  aid  of  Rumanian  friends. 
8 


102  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

It  cannot  be  asserted  that  the  Rumanian  govern- 
ment was  implicated  in  the  plot — but  the  Rumanian 
authorities  certainly  were,  for  in  the  Balkans,  as  in 
Russia,  there  are  many  bands  like  the  cerna  ruka,  the 
narodna  odbrena,  etc.,  etc.,  who  carry  on  their  activities 
alongside  the  government. 

It  was  a  crime  committed  by  some  Russian  or  Ru- 
manian secret  society,  and  the  governments  of  both 
countries  showed  surprisingly  little  interest  in  investi- 
gating the  matter  and  delivering  the  culprits  up  to 
justice. 

On  June  i$th  I  heard  from  a  reliable  source  that 
Catarau  had  been  seen  in  Bukharest.  He  walked 
about  the  streets  quite  openly  in  broad  daylight,  and 
no  one  interfered  with  him ;  then  he  disappeared. 

To  return,  however,  to  my  interview  with  the  old 
King.  Filled  with  alarm,  he  despatched  that  same 
evening  two  telegrams,  one  to  Belgrade  and  one  to 
Petersburg,  urging  that  the  ultimatum  be  accepted 
without  fail. 

The  terrible  distress  of  mind  felt  by  the  King  when, 
like  a  sudden  flash  of  lightning  from  the  clouds,  he  saw 
before  him  a  picture  of  the  World  War  may  be  accounted 
for  because  he  felt  certain  that  the  conflict  between  his 
personal  convictions  and  his  people's  attitude  would 
suddenly  be  known  to  all.  The  poor  old  King  fought 
the  fight  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  but  it  killed  him. 
King  Carol's  death  was  caused  by  the  war.  The  last 
weeks  of  his  life  were  a  torture  to  him;  each  message 
that  I  had  to  deliver  he  felt  as  the  lash  of  a  whip.  I  was 
enjoined  to  do  all  I  could  to  secure  Rumania's  prompt 
co-operation,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  alliance, 
and  I  was  even  obliged  to  go  so  far  as  to  remind  him 
that ' '  a  promise  given  allows  of  no  prevarication :  that  a 
treaty  is  a  treaty,  and  his  honor  obliged  him  to  un- 
^sheathe,  his  sword.''  I  recollect  one  particularly  pain- 


RUMANIA.  103 

ful  scene,  where  the  King,  weeping  bitterly,  flung  him- 
self across  his  writing-table  and  with  trembling  hands 
tried  to  wrench  from  his  neck  his  order  Pour  la  M£rite. 
I  can  affirm  without  any  exaggeration  that  I  could  see 
him  wasting  away  under  the  ceaseless  moral  blows 
dealt  to  him,  and  that  the  mental  torment  he  went 
through  undoubtedly  shortened  his  life. 

Queen  Elizabeth  was  well  aware  of  all,  but  she  never 
took  my  action  amiss;  she  understood  that  I  had  to 
deliver  the  messages,  but  that  it  was  not  I  who  com- 
posed them. 

Queen  Elizabeth  was  a  good,  clever,  and  touchingly 
simple  woman,  not  a  poet  qui  court  aprds  V esprit,  but  a 
woman  who  looked  at  the  world  through  conciliatory 
and  political  glasses.  She  was  a  good  conversational- 
ist, and  there  was  always  a  poetic  charm  in  all  she  did. 
There  hung  on  the  staircase  a  most  beautiful  sea  picture, 
which  I  greatly  admired  while  the  Queen  talked  to  me 
about  the  sea,  about  her  little  villa  at  Constanza,  which, 
built  on  the  extreme  end  of  the  quay,  seems  almost  to 
lie  in  the  sea.  She  spoke,  too,  of  her  travels  and  im- 
pressions when  on  the  high  seas,  and  as  she  spoke  the 
great  longing  for  all  that  is  good  and  beautiful  made 
itself  felt,  and  this  is  what  she  said  to  me:  "The  sea 
lives.  If  there  could  be  found  any  symbol  of  eternity  it 
would  be  the  sea,  endless  in  greatness  and  everlasting  in 
movement.  The  day  is  dull  and  stormy.  One  after 
another  the  glassy  billows  come  rolling  in  and  break 
with  a  roar  on  the  rocky  shore.  The  small  white  crests 
of  the  waves  look  as  if  covered  with  snow.  And  the  sea 
breathes  and  draws  its  breath  with  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
the  tide.  The  tide  is  the  driving  power  that  forces  the 
mighty  waters  from  equator  to  North  Pole.  And  thus 
it  works,  day  and  night,  year  by  year,  century  by  cen- 
tury. It  takes  no  heed  of  the  perishable  beings  who 
call  themselves  lords  of  the  world,  who  only  live  for  a 


io4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

day,  coming  and  going  and  vanishing  almost  as  they 
come.  The  sea  remains  to  work.  It  works  for  all,  for 
men,  for  animals,  for  plants,  for  without  the  sea  there 
could  be  no  organic  life  in  the  world.  The  sea  is  like  a 
great  filter,  which  alone  can  produce  the  change  of 
matter  that  is  necessary  for  life.  In  the  course  of  a 
century  numberless  rivers  carry  earth  to  the  sea.  Each 
river  carries  without  ceasing  its  burden  of  earth  and 
sand  to  the  ocean ;  and  the  sea  receives  the  load  which 
is  carried  by  the  current  far  out  to  sea,  and  slowly  and 
by  degrees  in  the  course  of  time  the  sea  dissolves  or 
crushes  all  it  has  received.  No  matter  to  the  sea  if  the 
process  lasts  a  thousand  years  or  more — it  may  even 
last  for  ages.  Who  can  tell  ? 

"But  one  day,  quite  suddenly,  the  sea  begins  to 
wander.  Once  there  was  sea  everywhere,  and  all  con- 
tinents are  born  from  the  sea.  One  day  land  arose  out 
of  the  sea.  The  birth  was  of  a  revolutionary  nature; 
there  were  earthquakes,  volcanic  craters,  falling  cities, 
and  dying  men — but  new  land  was  there.  Or  else  it 
moves  slowly,  invisibly,  a  meter  or  two  in  a  century, 
and  returns  to  the  land  it  used  to  possess.  Thus  it 
restores  the  soil  it  stole  from  it,  but  cleaner,  refined,  and 
full  of  vitality  to  live  and  to  create.  Such  is  the  sea 
and  its  work." 

These  are  the  words  of  the  old,  half -blind  Queen  who 
can  never  look  upon  the  beloved  picture  again,  but  she 
told  me  how  she  always  idolized  the  sea  and  how  her 
grandnephews  and  grandnieces  shared  her  feelings  and 
how  she  grew  young  again  with  them  when  she  told 
them  tales  of  olden  times. 

One  could  listen  to  her  for  hours  without  growing 
weary,  and  always  there  was  some  beautiful  thought  or 
word  to  carry  away  and  think  over. 

Doubtless  such  knowledge  would  be  more  correct 
were  it  taken  from  some  geological  work.  But  Carmen 


RUMANIA  105 

Sylva's  words  invariably  seemed  to  strike  some  poetic 
chord ;  that  is  what  made  her  so  attractive. 

She  loved  to  discourse  on  politics,  which  for  her 
meant  King  Carol.  He  was  her  all  in  all.  After  his 
death,  when  it  was  said  that  all  states  in  the  world  were 
losing  in  the  terrible  war,  she  remarked,  "Rumania  has 
already  lost  her  most  precious  possession."  She  never 
spoke  of  her  own  poems  and  writings.  In  politics  her 
one  thought  besides  King  Carol  was  Albania.  She  was 
deeply  attached  to  the  Princess  of  Wied,  and  showed 
her  strong  interest  in  the  country  where  she  lived. 
Talking  about  the  Wieds  one  day  afforded  me  an  op- 
portunity of  seeing  the  King  vexed  with  his  wife;  it  was 
the  only  time  I  ever  noticed  it.  It  was  when  we  were 
at  Sinaia,  and  I  was,  as  often  occurred,  sitting  with  the 
King.  The  Queen  came  into  the  room,  which  she  was 
otherwise  not  in  the  habit  of  entering,  bringing  with  her 
a  telegram  from  the  Princess  of  Wied  in  which  she 
asked  for  something — I  cannot  now  remember  what — • 
for  Albania.  The  King  refused,  but  the  Queen  insisted, 
until  he  at  last  told  her  very  crossly  to  leave  him  in 
peace  as  he  had  other  things  to  think  of  than  Albania. 

After  King  Carol's  death  she  lost  all  her  vital  energy 
and  the  change  in  the  political  situation  troubled  her. 
She  was  very  fond  of  her  nephew  Ferdinand — hers  was 
a  truly  loving  heart — and  she  trembled  lest  he  should 
commit  some  act  of  treachery.  I  remember  once  how, 
through  her  tears,  she  said  to  me:  "Calm  my  fears. 
Tell  me  that  he  will  never  be  guilty  of  such  an  act."  I 
was  unable  to  reassure  her,  but  a  kind  Fate  spared  her 
from  hearing  the  declaration  of  war. 

Later,  not  long  before  her  death,  the  old  Queen  was 
threatened  with  total  blindness.  She  was  anxious  to 
put  herself  in  the  hands  of  a  French  oculist  for  an  opera- 
tion for  cataract,  who  would  naturally  be  obliged  to 
travel  through  the  Monarchy  in  order  to  reach  Bukha- 


io6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

rest.  At  her  desire  I  mentioned  the  matter  in  Vienna, 
and  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  at  once  gave  the 
requisite  permission  for  the  journey. 

After  a  successful  operation  the  Queen  sent  a  short 
autograph  poem  to  one  of  my  children,  adding  that  it 
was  her  first  letter  on  recovering  her  sight.  At  the 
same  time  she  was  again  very  uneasy  concerning 
politics. 

I  wrote  her  the  following  letter: 

YOUR  MAJESTY, — My  warmest  thanks  for  the  beautiful  little  poem 
you  have  sent  to  my  boy.  That  it  was  granted  to  me  to  contribute 
something  toward  the  recovery  of  your  sight  is  in  itself  a  sufficient 
reward,  and  no  thanks  are  needed.  That  your  Majesty  has  ad- 
dressed the  first  written  lines  to  my  children  delights  and  touches  me. 

Meanwhile  your  Majesty  must  not  be  troubled  regarding  politics. 
It  is  of  no  avail.  For  the  moment  Rumania  will  retain  the  policy  of 
the  late  King, and  God  alone  knows  what  the  future  will  bring  forth. 

We  are  all  like  dust  in  this  terrible  hurricane  sweeping  through 
the  world.  We  are  tossed  helplessly  hither  and  thither  and  know  not 
whether  we  are  to  face  disaster  or  success.  The  point  is  not  whether 
we  live  or  die,  but  how  it  is  done.  In  that  respect  King  Carol  set 
an  example  to  us  all. 

I  hope  King  Ferdinand  may  never  forget  that,  together  with 
the  throne,  his  uncle  bequeathed  to  him  a  political  creed,  a  creed 
of  honor  and  loyalty,  and  I  am  persuaded  that  your  Majesty  is  the 
best  guardian  of  the  bequest. 

Your  Majesty's  grateful  and  devoted 

CZERNIN. 

When  I  said  that  King  Carol  fought  the  fight  to  the 
best  of  his  ability  I  intended  to  convey  that  no  one 
could  expect  him  to  be  different  from  what  he  always 
was.  The  King  never  possessed  in  any  special  degree 
either  energy,  strength  of  action,  or  adventurous  cour- 
age, and  at  the  time  I  knew  him,  as  an  old  man,  he 
had  none  of  those  attributes.  He  was  a  clever  diplomat, 
a  conciliatory  power,  a  safe  mediator,  and  one  who 
avoided  trouble,  but  not  of  a  nature  to  risk  all  and 


RUMANIA  107 

weather  the  storm.  That  was  known  to  all,  and  no  one, 
therefore,  could  think  that  the  King  would  try  to  put 
himself  on  our  side  against  the  clearly  expressed  views 
of  all  Rumania.  My  idea  is  that  if  he  had  been  dif- 
ferently constituted  he  could  successfully  have  risked 
the  experiment.  The  King  possessed  in  Carp  a  man 
of  quite  unusual,  even  reckless,  activity  and  energy, 
and  from  the  first  moment  he  placed  himself  and  his 
activities  at  the  King's  disposal.  If  the  King,  without 
asking,  had  ordered  mobilization,  Carp's  great  energy 
would  have  certainly  carried  it  through.  But,  in  the 
military  situation  as  it  was  then,  the  Rumanian  army 
would  have  been  forced  to  the  rear  of  the  Russian,  and 
in  all  probability  the  first  result  of  the  battle-fields 
would  have  changed  the  situation  entirely,  and  the 
blood  that  was  shed  mutually  in  victorious  battles 
would  have  brought  forth  the  unity  that  the  spirit  of 
our  alliance  never  succeeded  in  evolving.  But  the 
King  was  not  a  man  of  such  caliber.  He  could  not 
change  his  nature,  and  what  he  did  do  entirely  con- 
curred with  his  methods  from  the  time  he  ascended  the 
throne. 

As  long  as  the  King  lived  there  was  the  positive 
assurance  that  Rumania  would  not  side  against  us, 
for  he  would  have  prevented  any  mobilization  against 
us  with  the  same  firm  wisdom  which  had  always  enabled 
him  to  avert  any  agitation  in  the  land.  He  would  then 
have  seen  that  the  Rumanians  are  not  a  warlike  peo- 
ple like  the  Bulgarians,  and  that  Rumania  had  not  the 
slightest  intention  of  risking  anything  in  the  campaign. 
A  policy  of  procrastination  in  the  wise  hands  of  the 
King  would  have  delayed  hostilities  against  us  indefi- 
nitely. 

Immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  war  Bratianu 
began  his  game,  which  consisted  of  intrenching  the 
Rumanian  government  firmly  and  willingly  in  a  posi- 


io8  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion  between  the  two  groups  of  Powers,  and  bandying 
favors  about  from  one  to  the  other,  reaping  equal 
profits  from  each  until  the  moment  when  the  stronger 
of  the  two  should  be  recognized  as  such  and  the  weaker 
then  attacked. 

Even  from  1914  to  1916  Rumania  was  never  really 
neutral.  She  always  favored  our  enemies,  and  as  far 
as  lay  in  her  power  hindered  all  our  actions. 

The  transport  of  horses  and  ammunition  to  Turkey 
in  the  summer  of  1915  that  was  exacted  from  us  was 
an  important  episode.  Turkey  was  then  in  great 
danger  and  was  asking  anxiously  for  munitions.  Had 
the  Rumanian  government  adopted  the  standpoint 
not  to  favor  any  of  the  belligerent  Powers,  it  would  have 
been  a  perfectly  correct  attitude,  viewed  from  a  neutral 
standpoint,  but  she  never  did  adopt  such  standpoint, 
as  is  shown  by  her  allowing  the  Serbians  to  receive 
transports  of  Russian  ammunition  via  the  Danube, 
thus  showing  great  partiality.  When  all  attempts 
failed,  the  munitions  were  transmitted,  partially,  at  any 
rate,  through  other  means. 

At  that  time,  too,  Russian  soldiers  were  allowed  in 
Rumania  and  were  not  molested,  whereas  ours  were 
invariably  interned. 

Two  Austrian  airmen  once  landed  by  mistake  in 
Rumania,  and  were,  of  course,  interned  immediately. 
The  one  was  a  cadet  of  the  name  of  Berthold  and  a 
pilot  whose  name  I  have  forgotten.  From  their  prison 
they  appealed  to  me  to  help  them,  and  I  sent  word  that 
they  must  endeavor  to  obtain  permission  to  pay  me  a 
visit.  A  few  days  later  the  cadet  appeared,  escorted 
by  a  Rumanian  officer  as  guard.  This  officer,  not 
being  allowed  without  special  permission  to  set  foot 
on  Austro-Hungarian  soil,  was  obliged  to  remain  in  the 
street  outside  the  house.  I  had  the  gates  closed,  put  the 
cadet  into  one  of  my  cars,  sent  him  out  through  the 


RUMANIA  109 

back  entrance,  and  had  him  driven  to  Giurgui,  where 
he  got  across  the  Danube,  and  in  two  hours  was  again 
at  liberty.  After  a  lengthy  and  futile  wait  the  officer 
departed.  His  protests  came  too  late. 

The  unfortunate  pilot  who  was  left  behind  was  not 
allowed  to  come  to  the  Embassy.  One  night,  however, 
he  made  his  escape  through  the  window  and  arrived. 
I  kept  him  concealed  for  some  time,  and  he  eventually 
crossed  the  frontier  safely  and  got  away  by  rail  to 
Hungary. 

Bratianu  reproached  me  later  for  what  I  had  done, 
but  I  told  him  it  was  in  consequence  of  his  not  having 
strictly  adhered  to  his  neutrality.  Had  our  soldiers 
been  left  unmolested,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Russians, 
I  should  not  have  been  compelled  to  act  as  I  had  done. 

Bratianu  can  never  seriously  have  doubted  that  the 
Central  Powers  would  succumb,  and  his  sympathies 
were  always  with  the  Entente,  not  only  on  account 
of  his  bringing  up,  but  also  because  of  that  political 
speculation.  During  the  course  of  subsequent  events 
there  were  times  when  Bratianu  to  a  certain  extent 
seemed  to  vacillate,  especially  at  the  time  of  our  great 
offensive  against  Russia.  The  break  through  at 
Gorlitz  and  the  irresistible  advance  into  the  interior 
of  Russia  had  an  astounding  effect  in  Rumania. 
Bratianu,  who  obviously  knew  very  little  about 
strategy,  could  simply  not  understand  that  the  Russian 
millions,  whom  he  imagined  to  be  in  a  fair  way  to 
Vienna  and  Berlin,  should  suddenly  begin  to  rush 
back,  and  a  fortress  like  Warsaw  be  demolished  like  a 
house  of  cards.  He  was  evidently  very  anxious  then 
and  must  have  had  many  a  disturbed  night.  On  the 
other  hand,  those  who,  to  begin  with,  though  not  for, 
still  were  not  against  Austria  began  to  raise  their  heads 
and  breathe  more  freely.  The  victory  of  the  Central 
Powers  appeared  on  the  horizon  like  a  fresh  event. 


i  io  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

That  was  the  historic  moment  when  Rumania  might 
have  been  coerced  into  active  co-operation,  but  not 
the  Bratianu  Ministry.  Bratianu  himself  would  never 
in  any  case  have  ranged  himself  on  our  side,  but  if  we 
could  have  made  up  our  minds  then  to  install  a  Ma- 
jorescu  or  a  Marghiloman  Ministry  in  office,  we  could 
have  had  the  Rumanian  army  with  us.  In  connection 
with  this  were  several  concrete  proposals.  In  order  to 
carry  out  the  plan  we  should  have  been  compelled 
to  make  territorial  concessions  in  Hungary  to  a  Majo- 
rescu  Ministry — Majorescu  demanded  it  as  a  primary 
condition  to  his  undertaking  the  conduct  of  affairs, 
and  this  proposal  failed,  owing  to  Hungary's  obstinate 
resistance.  It  is  a  terrible  but  a  just  punishment  that 
poor  Hungary,  who  contributed  so  much  to  our  definite 
defeat,  should  be  the  one  to  suffer  the  most  from  the 
consequences  thereof,  and  that  the  Rumanians,  so 
despised  and  persecuted  by  Hungary,  should  gain  the 
greatest  triumphs  on  her  plains. 

One  of  the  many  reproaches  that  have  been  brought 
against  me  is  to  the  effect  that  I,  as  Ambassador  at 
Bukharest,  should  have  resigned  if  my  proposals  were 
not  accepted  in  Vienna.  These  reproaches  are  dictated 
by  quite  mistaken  ideas  of  competency  and  responsi- 
bility. It  is  the  duty  of  a  subordinate  official  to  describe 
the  situation  as  he  sees  it  and  to  make  such  proposals 
as  he  considers  right,  but  the  responsibility  for  the 
policy  is  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  it 
would  lead  to  the  most  impossible  and  absurd  state 
of  things  if  every  ambassador  whose  proposals  were 
rejected  were  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  his  resigna- 
tion was  a  necessary  consequence  thereof.  If  officials 
were  to  resign  because  they  did  not  agree  with  the 
view  of  their  chief,  it  would  mean  that  almost  all  of 
them  would  send  in  their  resignations. 

Espionage  and  counter-espionage  have  greatly  flour- 


RUMANIA  in 

ished  during  the  war.  In  that  connection  Russia 
showed  great  activity  in  Rumania. 

In  October,  1914,  an  event  occurred  which  was  very 
unfortunate  for  me.  I  drove  from  Bukharest  to 
Sinaia,  carrying  certain  political  documents  with  me 
in  a  despatch-case,  which,  by  mistake,  was  tied  on 
behind  instead  of  being  laid  in  the  car.  On  the  way  the 
case  was  unstrapped  and  stolen.  I  made  every  effort 
to  get  it  back,  and  eventually  recovered  it  after  a 
search  of  three  weeks,  involving  much  expense.  It 
was  found  at  last  in  some  peasant's  barn,  but  nothing 
had  apparently  been  abstracted  save  the  cigarettes 
that  were  in  it. 

Nevertheless,  after  the  occupation  of  Bukharest, 
copies  and  photos  of  all  my  papers  were  found  in 
Bratianu's  house. 

After  the  loss  of  the  despatch-case  I  at  once  tendered 
my  resignation  in  Vienna,  but  it  was  not  accepted  by 
the  Emperor. 

The  Red  Book  on  Rumania,  published  by  Burian, 
which  contains  a  summary  of  my  most  important 
reports,  gives  a  very  clear  picture  of  the  several  phases 
of  that  period  and  the  approaching  danger  of  war. 
The  passing  defeats  that  Rumania  suffered  justified 
the  fears  of  all  those  who  warned  her  against  premature 
intervention.  In  order  to  render  the  situation  quite 
clear,  it  must  here  be  explained  that  during  the  time 
immediately  preceding  Rumania's  entry  into  war  there 
were  really  only  two  parties  in  the  country:  the  one 
was  hostile  to  us  and  wished  for  an  immediate  declara- 
tion of  war,  and  the  other  was  the  "friendly"  one  that 
did  not  consider  the  situation  ripe  for  action  and 
advised  waiting  until  we  were  weakened  still  more. 
During  the  time  of  our  successes  the  "friendly"  party 
carried  the  day.  Queen  Marie,  I  believe,  belonged  to 
the  latter.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  she  was 


in  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

always  in  favor  of  "fighting  by  the  side  of  England," 
as  she  always  looked  upon  herself  as  an  Englishwoman, 
but  at  the  last  moment,  at  any  rate,  she  appears  to 
have  thought  the  time  for  action  premature.  A  few 
days  before  the  declaration  of  war  she  invited  me  to  a 
farewell  lunch,  which  was  somewhat  remarkable,  as 
we  both  knew  that  in  a  very  few  days  we  should  be 
enemies.  After  lunch  I  took  the  opportunity  of  telling 
her  that  I  likewise  was  aware  of  the  situation,  but  that 
"the  Bulgarians  would  be  in  Bukharest  before  the 
Rumanians  reached  Budapest."  She  entered  into  the 
conversation  very  calmly,  being  of  a  very  frank  nature 
and  not  afraid  of  hearing  the  truth.  A  few  days  later 
a  letter  was  opened  at  the  censor's  office  from  a  lady- 
in-waiting  who  had  been  present  at  the  lunch.  It 
was  evidently  not  intended  for  our  eyes ;  it  contained  a 
description  of  the  dejeuner  fort  embetant,  with  some 
unflattering  remarks  about  me. 

Queen  Marie  never  lost  her  hope  in  a  final  victory. 
She  did  not,  perhaps,  agree  with  Bratianu  in  all  his 
tactics,  but  a  declaration  of  war  on  us  was  always  an 
item  on  her  program.  Even  in  the  distressing  days 
of  their  disastrous  defeat  she  always  kept  her  head 
above  water.  One  of  the  Queen's  friends  told  me 
afterward  that  when  our  armies,  from  south,  north,  and 
west,  were  nearing  Bukharest,  when  day  and  night 
the  earth  shook  with  the  ceaseless  thunder  of  the  guns, 
the  Queen  quietly  went  on  with  her  preparations  for 
departure,  and  was  firmly  persuaded  that  she  would 
return  as  "Empress  of  all  the  Rumanians."  I  have 
been  told  that  after  the  taking  of  Bukharest  Bratianu 
collapsed  altogether,  and  it  was  Queen  Marie  who 
comforted  and  encouraged  him.  Her  English  blood 
always  asserted  itself.  After  we  had  occupied  Walla- 
chia  I  received  absolutely  reliable  information  from 
England,  according  to  which  she  had  telegraphed  to 


RUMANIA  113 

King  George  from  Jassy,  recommending  "her  little 
but  courageous  people"  to  his  further  protection. 
After  the  Peace  of  Bukharest  strong  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  on  me  to  effect  the  abdication  of  the 
King  and  Queen.  It  would  not  in  any  way  have 
altered  the  situation,  as  the  Entente  would  naturally 
have  reinstated  them  when  victory  was  gained;  but  I 
opposed  all  such  efforts,  not  for  the  above  reason, 
which  I  could  not  foresee,  but  from  other  motives, 
to  be  mentioned  later,  although  I  was  perfectly  certain 
that  Queen  Marie  would  always  remain  our  enemy. 

The  declaration  of  war  created  a  very  uncomfortable 
situation  for  all  Austro-Hungarians  and  Germans.  I 
came  across  several  friends  in  the  Austro-Hungarian 
colony  who  had  been  beaten  by  the  Rumanian  soldiers 
with  the  butt  ends  of  their  rifles  on  their  way  to  prison. 
I  saw  wild  scenes  of  panic  and  flight  that  were  both  gro- 
tesque and  revolting,  and  the  cruel  sport  lasted  for  days. 

In  Vienna  all  subjects  of  an  enemy  state  were  ex- 
empt from  deportation.  In  my  capacity  as  Minister  I 
ordered  reprisals  on  Rumanian  citizens,  as  there  was 
no  other  means  to  relieve  the  fate  of  our  poor  refugees. 
As  soon  as  the  neutral  Powers  notified  that  the  treat- 
ment had  become  more  humane,  they  were  set  free. 

If  we  showed  ourselves  at  the  windows  or  in  the 
garden  of  the  Embassy  the  crowd  scoffed  and  jeered 
at  us,  and  at  the  station,  when  we  left,  a  young  official 
whom  I  asked  for  information  simply  turned  his  back 
on  me. 

A  year  and  a  half  later  I  was  again  in  Bukharest. 
The  tide  of  victory  had  carried  us  far  and  we  came  to 
make  peace.  We  were  again  subjects  of  interest  to 
the  crowds  in  the  streets,  but  in  very  different  fashion. 
A  tremendous  ovation  awaited  us  when  we  appeared  in 
the  theater,  and  I  could  not  show  myself  in  the  street 
without  having  a  crowd  of  admirers  in  my  wake. 


ii4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Before  all  this  occurred,  and  when  war  was  first 
declared,  the  members  of  the  embassy,  together  with 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  persons  belonging  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  colony,  including  many  children, 
were  interned,  and  spent  ten  very  unpleasant  days, 
as  we  were  not  sure  whether  we  should  be  released  or 
not.  We  had  occasion  during  that  time  to  witness 
three  Zeppelin  raids  over  Bukharest,  which,  seen  in  the 
wonderful  moonlit,  cloudless  nights  under  the  tropi- 
cal sky,  made  an  unforgetable  impression  on  us. 

I  find  the  following  noted  in  my  diary : 

"Bukharest,  August,  1916. 

"The  Rumanians  have  declared  war  on  my  wife  and 
daughter,  too.  A  deputation  composed  of  two  officials 
from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  frock-coats 
and  top  hats,  appeared  last  night  at  eleven  o'clock  in 
my  villa  at  Sinaia.  My  wife  was  roused  out  of  her 
sleep,  and  by  the  light  of  a  single  candle — more  is  for- 
bidden on  account  of  the  Zeppelin  raids — they  informed 
her  that  Rumania  had  declared  war  on  us. 

"As  the  speaker  put  it,  'Vous  avez  declar^  la  guerre.1 
He  then  read  the  whole  declaration  of  war  aloud  to 
them  both.  Bratianu  sent  word  to  me  that  he  would 
have  a  special  train  sent  to  take  my  wife  and  daughter 
and  the  whole  personnel  of  the  embassy  to  Bukharest. 

"Bukharest,  September,  1916. 

"The  Rumanians  really  expected  a  Zeppelin  attack 
at  once.  So  far  it  has  not  occurred,  and  they  begin 
to  feel  more  at  ease,  and  say  that  it  is  too  far  for  the 
Zeppelins  to  come  all  the  way  from  Germany.  They 
seem  not  to  be  aware  that  Mackensen  has  Zeppelins 
in  Bulgaria.  But  who  can  tell  whether  they  really 
will  come? 


RUMANIA  115 

"Bukharest,  September,  igi6. 

"Last  night  a  Zeppelin  did  come.  About  three 
o'clock  we  were  roused  by  the  shrill  police  whistles 
giving  the  alarm.  The  telephone  notified  us  that  a 
Zeppelin  had  crossed  the  Danube,  and  all  the  church- 
bells  began  to  peal.  Suddenly  darkness  and  silence 
reigned,  and  the  whole  town,  like  some  great  angry 
animal,  sullen  and  morose,  prepared  for  the  enemy 
attack.  Nowhere  was  there  light  or  sound.  The 
town,  with  a  wonderful  starry  firmament  overhead, 
waited  in  expectation.  Fifteen,  twenty  minutes  went 
by,  when  suddenly  a  shot  was  fired  and,  as  though  it 
were  a  signal,  firing  broke  out  in  every  direction.  The 
anti-aircraft  guns  fired  incessantly,  and  the  police,  too, 
did  their  best,  firing  in  the  air.  But  what  were  they 
firing  at?  There  was  absolutely  nothing  to  be  seen. 
The  searchlights  then  came  into  play.  Sweeping  the 
heavens  from  east  to  west,  from  north  to  south,  they 
search  the  firmament,  but  cannot  find  the  Zeppelin. 
Is  it  really  there,  or  is  the  whole  thing  due  to  excited 
Rumanian  nerves? 

"Suddenly  a  sound  was  heard — the  noise  of  the  pro- 
peller overhead.  It  sounded  so  near  in  the  clear, 
starry  night,  we  felt  we  must  be  able  to  see  it.  But 
the  noise  died  away  in  the  direction  of  Colbroceni. 
Then  we  heard  the  first  bomb.  Like  a  gust  of  wind  it 
whistled  through  the  air,  followed  by  a  crash  and  an 
explosion.  A  second  and  third  came  quickly  after. 
The  firing  became  fiercfer,  but  they  can  see  nothing 
and  seem  to  aim  at  where  the  sound  comes  from.  The 
searchlights  sway  backward  and  forward.  Now  one  of 
them  has  caught  the  airship,  which  looks  like  a  small 
golden  cigar.  Both  the  gondolas  can  be  seen  quite 
distinctly,  and  the  searchlight  keeps  it  well  in  view, 
and  now  a  second  one  has  caught  it.  It  looks  as  though 


ii6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

this  air  cruiser  is  hanging  motionless  in  the  sky,  bril- 
liantly lit  up  by  the  searchlights  right  and  left.  Then 
the  guns  begin  in  good  earnest.  Shrapnel  bursts  all 
around,  a  wonderful  display  of  fireworks,  but  it  is 
impossible  to  say  if  the  aim  is  good  and  if  the  monster 
is  in  danger.  Smaller  and  smaller  grows  the  Zeppelin, 
climbing  rapidly  higher  and  higher,  until  suddenly 
the  miniature  cigar  disappears.  Still  the  searchlights 
sweep  the  skies,  hoping  to  find  their  prey  again. 

"Suddenly  utter  silence  reigns.  Have  they  gone? 
Is  the  attack  over?  Has  one  been  hit?  Forced  to 
land?  The  minutes  go  by.  We  are  all  now  on  the 
balcony — the  women,  too — watching  the  scene.  Again 
comes  the  well-known  sound — once  heard  never  for- 
gotten— as  though  the  wind  were  getting  up,  then  a 
dull  thud  and  explosion.  This  time  it  is  farther  away 
toward  the  forts.  Again  the  firing  breaks  out  and 
machine-guns  bark  at  the  friendly  moon;  searchlights 
career  across  the  heavens,  but  find  nothing.  Again 
there  falls  a  bomb — much  nearer  this  time — and  again 
conies  the  noise  of  the  propellers  louder  and  louder. 
Shrapnel  bursts  just  over  the  Embassy,  and  the  Zep- 
pelin is  over  our  heads.  We  hear  the  noise  very  dis- 
tinctly, but  can  see  nothing.  Again  a  sudden  silence 
everywhere,  which  has  a  curious  effect  after  the  terrible 
noise.  Time  passes,  but  nothing  more  is  heard.  The 
first  rays  of  dawn  are  seen  in  the  east ;  the  stars  slowly 
pale. 

"A  child  is  heard  to  cry  somewhere,  far  away; 
strange  how  clearly  it  sounds  in  the  silent  night.  There 
is  a  feeling  as  though  the  terrified  town  hardly  dared 
breathe  or  move  for  fear  the  monster  might  return. 
And  how  many  more  such  nights  are  there  in  prospect  ? 
In  the  calm  of  this  fairy-like  dawn,  slowly  rising,  the 
crying  of  the  child  strikes  a  note  of  discord,  infinitely 
sad.  But  the  crying  of  the  child,  does  it  not  find  an 


RUMANIA  117 

echo  in  the  millions  whom  this  terrible  war  has  driven 
to  desperation? 

"The  sun  rises  like  a  blood-red  ball.  For  some 
hours  the  Rumanians  can  take  to  sleep  and  gather 
fresh  strength,  but  they  know  that  the  Zeppelin's  visit 
will  not  be  the  last. 

"Bukharest,  September,  igi6. 

"The  press  is  indignant  about  the  nocturnal  attack. 
Bukharest  is  certainly  a  fortress,  but  it  should  be  known 
that  the  guns  no  longer  are  in  the  forts.  It  was  stated 
in  the  Adeverul  that  the  heroic  resistance  put  up  in 
defense  was  most  successful.  That  the  airship,  badly 
damaged,  was  brought  down  near  Bukharest,  and  that 
a  commission  started  off  at  once  to  make  sure  whether 
it  was  an  airplane  or  a  Zeppelin ! 

11  Bukharest,  September,  1916. 

"The  Zeppelin  returned  again  this  evening  and  took 
us  by  surprise.  It  seemed  to  come  from  the  other  side 
of  Plojest,  and  the  sentries  on  the  Danube  must  have 
missed  it.  Toward  morning  the  night  watch  at  the 
Embassy,  whose  duty  it  is  to  see  that  there  is  no  light 
in  the  house,  saw  a  huge  mass  descending  slowly  on  the 
Embassy  till  it  almost  touched  the  roof.  It  hovered 
there  a  few  minutes,  making  observations.  No  one 
noticed  it  until  suddenly  the  engines  started  again, 
and  it  dropped  the  first  bomb  close  to  the  Embassy. 
A  direct  hit  was  made  on  the  house  of  the  Ambassador 
Jresnea  Crecianu,  and  twenty  gendarmes  who  were 
there  were  killed.  The  royal  palace  was  also  damaged. 
The  government  is  apparently  not  satisfied  with  the 
anti-aircraft  forces,  but  concludes  that  practice  will 
make  them  perfect.  Opportunity  for  practice  will  cer- 
tainly not  be  lacking. 

"Our  departure  is  being  delayed  by  every  sort  of 


ii8  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

pretext.  One  moment  it  seems  as  though  we  should 
reach  home  via  Bulgaria.  This  idea  suited  Bratianu 
extremely  well,  as  the  Bulgarian  willingness  to  grant 
permission  was  a  guaranty  that  they  had  no  plans  of 
attack.  But  he  reckoned  in  this  without  his  host. 
E.  and  W.  are  greatly  alarmed  because  the  Rumanians 
intend  to  detain  them,  and  will  probably  hang  them  as 
spies.  I  have  told  them,  'Either  we  all  stay  here  or 
we  all  start  together.  No  one  will  be  given  up.'  That 
appears  to  have  somewhat  quieted  their  fears. 

"As  might  be  expected,  these  nocturnal  visits  had 
disagreeable  consequences  for  us.  The  Rumanians 
apparently  thought  that  it  was  not  a  question  of  Zep- 
pelins, but  of  Austro-Hungarian  airships,  and  that  my 
presence  in  the  town  would  afford  a  certain  protection 
against  the  attacks;  after  the  first  one  they  declared 
that  for  every  Rumanian  killed  ten  Austrians  or  Bul- 
garians would  be  executed,  and  the  hostile  treatment 
to  which  we  were  subjected  grew  worse  and  worse. 
The  food  was  cut  down  and  was  terribly  bad,  and 
finally  the  water-supply  was  cut  off.  With  the  tropical 
temperature  that  prevailed  and  the  overcrowding  of  a 
house  that  normally  was  destined  to  hold  twenty 
and  now  housed  one  hundred  and  seventy  persons,  the 
conditions  within  the  space  of  twenty-four  hours  became 
unbearable,  and  the  atmosphere  so  bad  that  several 
people  fell  ill  with  fever,  and  neither  doctor  nor  medicine 
was  obtainable.  Thanks  to  the  energetic  intervention 
of  the  Dutch  Ambassador,  Herr  von  Vredenburch,  who 
had  undertaken  to  take  charge  of  our  state  interests, 
it  was  finally  possible  to  alter  the  conditions  and  to 
avert  the  outbreak  of  an  epidemic." 

It  was  just  about  that  time  that  our  military  attache, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Baron  Randa,  made  a  telling 
remark.  One  of  our  Rumanian  slave-drivers  was  in  the 


RUMANIA  119 

habit  of  paying  us  a  daily  visit  and  talking  in  the 
bombastic  fashion  the  Rumanians  adopted  when  boast- 
ing of  their  impending  victories.  The  word  ' '  Macken- 
sen"  occurred  in  Randa's  answer.  The  Rumanian 
was  surprised  to  hear  the  name,  unknown  to  him, 
and  said : 

"Qu'est-ce  que  c'est  que  ce  Mackensen?  Je  connais 
beaucoup  d'Allemands,  mais  je  n'ai  jamais  fait  la  con- 
naissance  de  M.  Mackensen." 

"Eh  bien,"  replied  Randa,  patting  him  on  the 
shoulder,  "vous  la  ferez  cette  connaissance,  je  vous  en 
guarantie." 

Three  months  after  that  Mackensen  had  occupied 
all  Wallachia  and  had  his  headquarters  at  Bukharest. 
By  that  time,  therefore,  his  name  must  have  been 
more  familiar  to  our  Rumanian  friend. 

At  last  we  set  off  for  home  via  Russia  and  had  a  very 
interesting  journey  lasting  three  weeks,  via  Kieff, 
Petersburg,  Sweden,  and  Germany.  To  spend  three 
weeks  in  a  train  would  seem  very  wearisome  to  many; 
but  as  everything  in  this  life  is  a  matter  of  habit,  we 
soon  grew  so  accustomed  to  it  that  when  we  arrived  in 
Vienna  there  were  many  of  us  who  could  not  sleep 
the  first  few  nights  in  a  proper  bed,  as  we  missed  the 
shaking  of  the  train.  Meanwhile,  we  had  every  com- 
fort on  the  special  train,  and  variety  as  well,  especially 
when,  on  Bratianu's  orders,  we  were  detained  at  a 
little  station  called  Baratinskaja,  •  near  Kieff.  The 
reason  of  this  was  never  properly  explained,  but  it  was 
probably  owing  to  difficulties  over  the  departure  of  the 
Rumanian  Ambassador  in  Sofia  and  to  the  wish  to 
treat  us  as  hostages.  The  journey  right  through  the 
enemy  country  was  remarkable.  Fierce  battles  were 
just  then  being  fought  in  Galicia,  and  day  and  night 
we  passed  endless  trains  conveying  gay  and  smiling 
soldiers  to  the  front,  and  others  returning  full  of  pale, 


120  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

bandaged,  wounded  men,  whose  groans  we  heard  as  we 
passed  them.  We  were  greeted  everywhere  in  friendly 
fashion  by  the  population,  and  there  was  not  a  trace 
of  the  hatred  we  had  experienced  in  Rumania.  Every- 
thing that  we  saw  bore  evidence  of  the  strictest  order 
and  discipline.  None  of  us  could  think  it  possible  that 
the  Empire  was  on  the  eve  of  a  revolution,  and  when  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  questioned  me  on  my  return 
as  to  whether  I  had  reason  to  believe  that  a  revolution 
would  occur,  I  discountenanced  the  idea  most  em- 
phatically. 

This  did  not  please  the  old  Emperor.  He  said  after- 
ward to  one  of  his  suite,  "Czernin  has  given  a  correct 
account  of  Rumania,  but  he  must  have  been  asleep 
when  he  passed  through  Russia." 

ill 

The  development  of  Rumanian  affairs  during  the  war 
occurs  in  three  phases,  the  first  of  which  was  in  King 
Carol's  reign.  Then  neutrality  was  guaranteed.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  not  possible  during  those  months 
to  secure  Rumania's  co-operation,  because  we,  in  the 
first  period  of  the  war,  were  so  unfavorably  situated 
in  a  military  sense  that  public  opinion  in  Rumania 
would  not  voluntarily  have  consented  to  a  war  at  our 
side,  and,  as  already  mentioned,  such  forcible  action 
would  not  have  met  with  the  King's  approval. 

In  the  second  phase  of  the  war,  dating  from  King 
Carol's  death  to  our  defeat  at  Luck,  conditions  were 
quite  different.  In  this  second  phase  were  included 
the  greatest  military  successes  the  Central  Powers 
obtained  altogether.  The  downfall  of  Serbia  and  the 
conquest  of  the  whole  of  Poland  occurred  during  this 
period,  and,  I  repeat,  in  those  months  we  could  have 
secured  the  active  co-operation  of  Rumania.  Never- 


RUMANIA  tit 

• 

theless,  I  must  make  it  clearly  understood  here  that 
if  the  political  preliminaries  for  a  like  intervention 
on  the  part  of  Rumania  were  not  undertaken,  the  fault 
must  not  be  ascribed  to  the  then  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  but  to  the  vis  major  which  opposed  the  project 
under  the  form  of  a  Hungarian  veto.  As  previously 
stated,  Majorescu,  as  well  as  Marghiloman,  would  only 
have  given  his  consent  to  co-operation  if  Rumania 
had  been  given  a  slice  of  the  Hungarian  state.  Thanks 
to  the  attitude  of  absolute  refusal  observed  at  the 
Ballplatz,  the  territory  in  question  was  never  definitely 
decided  on,  but  the  idea  probably  was  Transylvania 
and  a  portion  of  the  Bukowina.  I  cannot  say  whether 
Count  Burian,  if  he  had  escaped  other  influences, 
would  have  adopted  the  plan,  but  certain  it  is  that, 
however  ready  and  willing  he  was  to  act,  he  would  never 
have  carried  out  the  plan  against  the  Hungarian 
Parliament.  According  to  the  Constitution,  the  Hun- 
garian Parliament  is  sovereign  in  the  Hungarian  state, 
and  without  the  use  of  armed  means  Hungary  could 
never  have  been*  induced  to  cede  any  part  of  her 
territory. 

It  is  obvious,  however,  that  it  would  have  been 
impossible  during  the  World  War  to  have  stirred  up  an 
armed  conflict  between  Vienna  and  Budapest.  My 
then  German  colleague,  von  dem  Busche,  entirely 
agreed  with  me  that  Hungary  ought  to  make  some 
territorial  sacrifices  in  order  to  encourage  Rumania's 
intervention.  I  firmly  believe  that  then,  and  similarly 
before  the  Italian  declaration  of  war,  a  certain  pressure 
was  brought  to  bear  direct  on  Vienna  by  Berlin  to  this 
end — a  pressure  which  merely  contributed  to  strengthen 
and  intensify  Tisza's  opposition.  For  Germany,  the 
question  was  far  simpler;  she  had  drawn  payment  for 
her  great  gains  from  a  foreign  source.  The  cession  of 
the  Bukowina  might  possibly  have  been  effected,  as 


122  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Sturgkh  did  not  object,  but  that  alone  would  not  have 
satisfied  Rumania. 

It  was  quite  clear  that  the  opposition  to  the  ceding  of 
Transylvania  originated  in  Hungary.  But  this  opposi- 
tion was  not  specially  Tisza's,  for  whichever  of  the 
Hungarian  politicians  might  have  been  at  the  head  of 
the  Cabinet  would  have  adopted  the  same  standpoint. 

I  sent  at  the  time  a  confidential  messenger  to  Tisza, 
enjoining  him  to  explain  the  situation  and  begging 
him  in  my  name  to  make  the  concession.  Tisza  treated 
the  messenger  with  great  reserve,  and  wrote  me  a  letter 
stating  once  for  all  that  the  voluntary  session  of  Hun- 
garian territory  was  out  of  the  question — "Whoever 
attempts  to  seize  even  one  square  meter  of  Hungarian 
soil  will  be  shot." 

There  was  nothing  to  be  done.  And  still  I  think 
that  this  was  one  of  the  most  important  phases  of  the 
war,  which,  had  it  been  properly  managed,  might  have 
influenced  the  final  result.  The  military  advance  on 
the  flank  of  the  Russian  army  would  have  been,  in  the 
opinion  of  our  military  chiefs,  an  advantage  not  to  be 
despised,  and  through  it  the  clever  break  through  at 
Gorlitz  would  have  had  some  results;  but  as  it  was 
Gorlitz  was  a  strategical  trial  of  strength  without  any 
lasting  effect. 

The  repellent  attitude  adopted  by  Hungary  may  be 
accounted  for  in  two  ways:  the  Hungarians,  to  begin 
with,  were  averse  to  giving  up  any  of  their  own  ter- 
ritory, and,  secondly,  they  did  not  believe — even  to 
the  very  last — that  Rumania  would  remain  permanently 
neutral  or  that  sooner  or  later  we  would  be  forced  to 
fight  against  Rumania  unless  we  in  good  time  had 
carried  her  with  us.  In  this  connection  Tisza  always 
maintained  his  optimism,  and  to  the  very  last  moment 
held  to  the  belief  that  Rumania  would  not  dare  take 
it  upon  herself  to  attack  us.  This  is  the  only  reason 


RUMANIA  123 

that  explains  why  the  Rumanians  surprised  us  so  much 
by  their  invasion  of  Transylvania  and  by  being  able 
to  carry  off  so  much  rich  booty.  I  would  have  been 
able  to  take  much  better  care  of  the  many  Austrians 
and  Hungarians  living  in  Rumania — whose  fate  was 
terrible  after  the  declaration  of  war,  which  took  them 
also  by  surprise — if  I  had  been  permitted  to  draw  their 
attention  more  openly  and  generally  to  the  coming 
catastrophe;  but  in  several  of  his  letters  Tisza  implored 
me  not  to  create  a  panic,  "which  would  bring  incal- 
culable consequences  with  it."  As  I  neither  did,  nor 
could,  know  how  far  this  secrecy  was  in  agreement 
with  our  military  counter-preparations,  I  was  bound  to 
observe  it.  Apparently,  Burian  believed  my  reports 
to  a  certain  extent;  at  any  rate,  for  some  time  before 
the  declaration  of  war  he  ordered  all  the  secret  docu- 
ments and  the  available  money  to  be  conveyed  to 
Vienna,  and  intrusted  to  Holland  the  care  of  our 
citizens ;  but  Tisza  told  me  long  after  that  he  considered 
my  reports  of  too  pessimistic  a  tendency,  and  was  afraid 
to  give  orders  for  the  superfluous  evacuation  of  Tran- 
sylvania. 

After  the  unexpected  invasion,  the  waves  of  panic 
and  rage  ran  high  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament.  The 
severest  criticism  was  heaped  upon  me,  as  no  one 
doubted  that  the  lack  of  preparation  was  due  to  my 
false  reports.  Here  Tisza  was  again  himself  when, 
in  a  loud  voice,  he  shouted  out  that  it  was  untrue; 
my  reports  were  correct;  I  had  warned  them  in  time 
and  no  blame  could  be  attached  to  me,  and  thus  took 
upon  himself  the  just  blame.  Fear  was  unknown  to 
him,  and  he  never  tried  to  shield  himself  behind  any 
one.  When  I  arrived  back  in  Vienna  after  a  journey 
of  some  weeks  in  Russia,  and  only  then  heard  of  the 
incident,  I  took  the  opportunity  to  thank  Tisza  for  the 
honorable  and  loyal  manner  in  which  he  had  defended 


124  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

my  cause.  He  replied  with  the  ironical  smile  char- 
acteristic of  him  that  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  course. 

But  for  an  Austro-Hungarian  official  it  was  by  no 
means  such  a  matter  of  course.  We  have  had  so  many 
cowards  on  the  Ministerial  benches,  so  many  men  who 
were  brave  when  dealing  with  their  subordinates, 
but  toadied  to  their  superiors,  and  were  intimidated 
by  strong  opposition,  that  a  man  like  Tisza,  who  was 
such  a  contrast  to  these  others,  has  a  most  refreshing 
and  invigorating  effect.  The  Rumanians  attempted 
several  times  to  make  the  maintenance  of  their  neu- 
trality contingent  on  territorial  concessions.  I  was 
always  opposed  to  this,  and  at  the  Ballplatz  they  were 
of  the  same  opinion.  The  Rumanians  would  have 
appropriated  these  concessions  and  simply  attacked 
us  later  to  obtain  more.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seemed 
to  me  that  to  gain  military  co-operation  a  cession  of 
territory  would  be  quite  in  order,  since,  once  in  the  field, 
the  Rumanians  could  not  draw  back  and  their  fate 
would  be  permanently  bound  up  with  ours. 

Finally,  the  third  phase  comprises  the  comparatively 
short  period  between  our  defeat  at  Luck  and  the  out- 
break of  the  war  in  Rumania,  and  was  simply  the 
death  throes  of  neutrality. 

War  was  in  the  air  and  could  be  foreseen  with  cer- 
tainty. 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  inefficient  diplomacy 
displayed  in  the  preparations  for  the  World  War  brought 
down  severe  criticism  of  our  diplomatic  abilities,  and 
if  the  intention  at  the  Ballplatz  was  to  bring  about  a 
war,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  preparations  for  it 
were  most  inadequate. 

Criticism  was  not  directed  toward  the  Ballplatz  only, 
but  entered  into  further  matters,  such  as  the  qualifi- 
cations of  the  individual  representatives  in  foreign 
countries.  I  remember  an  article  in  one  of  the 


RUMANIA  125 

most  widely  read  Viennese  papers,  which  drew  a 
comparison  between  the  "excellent"  Ambassador  at 
Sofia  and  almost  all  of  the  others;  that  is,  all  those 
whose  posts  were  in  countries  that  either  refused  their 
co-operation  or  even  already  were  in  the  field  against  us. 

In  order  to  prevent  any  misunderstanding,  I  wish 
to  state  here  that  in  my  opinion  our  then  Ambassador 
to  Sofia,  Count  Tarnowski,  was  one  of  the  best  and 
most  competent  diplomats  in  Austria-Hungary,  but 
that  the  point  of  view  from  which  such  praise  was 
awarded  to  him  was  in  itself  totally  false.  Had  Count 
Tarnowski  been  in  Paris,  London,  or  Rome,  these  states, 
in  spite  of  his  undeniable  capabilities,  would  not  have 
adopted  a  different  attitude;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  are  numbers  of  distinguished  members  of  the 
diplomatic  corps  who  would  have  carried  out  his  task 
at  Sofia  just  as  well  as  Count  Tarnowski. 

In  other  words,  I  consider  it  is  making  an  unwarrant- 
able demand  to  expect  that  a  representative  in  a 
foreign  land  should  have  a  leading  influence  on  the 
policy  of  the  state  to  which  he  is  accredited.  -  What 
may  be  demanded  of  a  diplomatic  representative  is  a 
correct  estimate  of  the  situation.  The  ambassador 
must  know  what  the  government  of  the  state  where 
he  is  will  do.  A  false  diagnosis  is  discreditable.  But 
it  is  impossible  for  a  representative,  whoever  he  may  be, 
to  obtain  such  power  over  a  foreign  state  as  to  be  able 
to  guide  the  policy  of  that  state  into  the  course  desired 
by  him.  The  policy  of  a  state  will  invariably  be  sub- 
servient to  such  objects  as  the  government  of  that  period 
deems  vital,  and  will  always  be  influenced  by  factors 
which  are  quite  outside  the  range  of  the  foreign  repre- 
sentative. 

In  what  manner  a  diplomatic  representative  obtains 
his  information  is  his  own  affair.  He  should  endeavor 
to  establish  intercourse,  not  only  with  a  certain  class 


126  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  society,  but  also  with  the  press,  and  also  to  keep 
in  touch  with  other  classes  of  the  population. 

One  of  the  reproaches  made  to  the  "old  regime" 
was  the  assumed  preference  for  aristocrats  in  diplomacy. 
This  was  quite  a  mistake.  No  preference  was  shown 
for  the  aristocracy,  but  it  lay  in  the  nature  of  the  career 
that  wealth  and  social  polish  were  assets  in  the  exercise 
of  its  duties.  An  attache  had  no  salary.  He  was, 
therefore,  expected  to  have  a  tolerably  good  income 
at  home  in  order  to  be  able  to  live  conformably  to  his 
rank  when  abroad.  This  system  arose  out  of  necessity, 
and  was  also  due  to  the  unwillingness  of  the  authorities 
to  raise  salaries  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
The  consequence  was  that  only  sons  of  wealthy  parents 
could  adopt  such  a  career.  I  once  told  some  delegates 
who  interviewed  me  in  connection  with  the  subject 
that  a  change  of  the  system  depended  entirely  on 
themselves  and  their  increased  munificence. 

A  certain  amount  of  social  polish  was  just  as  necessary 
for  diplomats  of  the  old  regime  as  was  the  requisite 
allowance  for  their  household  and  a  knowledge  of 
foreign  languages.  So  long  as  courts  exist  in  Europe, 
court  life  will  always  be  the  center  of  all  social  life, 
and  diplomats  must  have  the  entry  of  such  circles. 
A  young  man  who  does  not  know  whether  to  eat  with  his 
fork  or  his  knife  would  play  a  sorry  part  there — his 
social  training  is  not  an  indifferent  matter.  Preference 
is,  therefore,  not  given  to  the  aristocracy,  but  to  young 
men  of  wealth  familiar  with  European  social  form. 

That  does  not  mean  that  a  diplomat  is  to  consider 
it  his  duty  only  to  show  himself  at  all  the  parties 
and  fe*tes  given  by  the  upper  ten  thousand,  but  it  is 
one  of  his  duties,  as  at  such  places  he  might  gain  infor- 
mation unobtainable  elsewhere.  A  diplomat  must  be 
in  touch  with  all  sources  from  which  he  can  glean 
information. 


RUMANIA  127 

Individual  capabilities  and  zeal  will  naturally  play  a 
great  part;  but  the  means  that  a  government  places 
at  the  disposition  of  its  foreign  missions  are  also  of  the 
highest  importance. 

There  are  people  in  the  East — I  do  not  know  whether 
to  say  in  contradistinction  to  the  West — who  are  not 
immune  to  the  influence  of  gold.  In  Rumania,  for 
instance,  Russia,  before  the  war,  had  completely  under- 
mined the  whole  country  and  had  lavished  millions 
long  before  the  war  in  the  hope  of  an  understanding 
with  that  country.  Most  of  the  newspapers  were 
financed  by  Russians,  and  numbers  of  the  leading 
politicians  were  bound  by  Russian  interests,  whereas 
neither  Germany  nor  Austria-Hungary  had  made  any 
such  preparations.  Thus  it  happened  that,  on  the 
outbreak  of  war,  Russia  was  greatly  in  advance  of 
the  Central  Powers,  an  advance  that  was  all  the  more 
difficult  to  overtake  as  from  the  first  day  of  war  Russia 
opened  still  wider  the  flood-gates  of  her  gold  and 
inundated  Rumania  with  rubles. 

If  the  fact  that  the  scanty  preparation  for  war  is  a 
proof  of  how  little  the  Central  Powers  reckoned  on 
such  a  contingency,  it  may,  on  the  other  hand,  explain 
away  much  apparent  inactivity  on  the  part  of  their 
representatives.  Karl  Furstenberg,  my  predecessor 
at  Bukharest,  whose  estimate  of  the  situation  was  a 
just  one,  demanded  to  have  more  funds  at  his  disposal, 
which  was  refused  at  Vienna  on  the  plea  that  there  was 
no  money.  After  the  war  began  the  Ministry  stinted 
us  no  longer,  but  it  was  too  late  then  for  much  to  be 
done. 

Whether  official  Russia,  four  weeks  in  advance,  had 
really  counted  on  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke 
and  the  outbreak  of  a  war  ensuing  therefrom  remains 
an  open  question.  I  will  not  go  so  far  as  to  assert  it 
for  a  fact,  but  one  thing  is  certain,  that  Russia  within  a 


128  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

measurable  space  of  time  had  prepared  for  war  as 
being  inevitable  and  had  endeavored  to  secure  Ru- 
mania's co-operation.  When  the  Tsar  was  at  Con- 
stanza  a  month  before  the  drama  at  Sarajevo,  his 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sassonoff,  paid  a  visit  to 
Bukharest.  When  there,  he  and  Bratianu  went  on  a 
walking  tour  together  to  Transylvania.  I  did  not 
hear  of  this  tactless  excursion  until  it  was  over,  but  I 
shared  Berchtold's  surprise  at  such  a  proceeding  on 
the  part  of  both  Ministers. 

I  once,  in  1914,  overheard  by  chance  a  conversation 
between  two  Russians.  It  was  at  the  Hotel  Capsa, 
known  later  as  a  resort  for  anti-Austrians.  They  were 
sitting  at  the  table  next  to  mine  in  the  restaurant  and 
were  speaking  French  quite  freely  and  openly.  They 
appeared  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador and  were  discussing  the  impending  visit  of  the 
Tsar  to  Constanza.  I  discovered  later  that  they  were 
officers  in  mufti.  They  agreed  that  the  Emperor  Fran- 
cis Joseph  could  not  live  very  much  longer,  and  that 
when  his  death  occurred  and  a  new  ruler  came  to  the 
throne  it  would  be  a  favorable  moment  for  Russia  to 
declare  war  on  us. 

They  were  evidently  exponents  of  the  "loyal" 
tendency  that  aimed  at  declaring  war  on  us  without 
a  preceding  murder;  and  I  readily  believe  that  the 
majority  of  men  in  Petersburg  who  were  eager  for  war 
held  the  same  view. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   U-BOAT  WARFARE 


MY  appointment  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was 
thought  by  many  to  indicate  that  the  Emperor 
Charles  was  carrying  out  the  political  wishes  of  his 
uncle  Ferdinand.  Although  it  had  been  the  Arch- 
duke's intention  to  have  made  me  his  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  my  appointment  to  the  post  by  the 
Emperor  Charles  had  nothing  to  do  with  that  plan. 
It  was  due,  above  all,  to  his  strong  desire  to  get  rid  of 
Count  Burian  and  to  the  lack  of  other  candidates  whom 
he  considered  suitable.  The  Red  Book  that  was  pub- 
lished by  Count  Burian  after  the  outbreak  of  war  with 
Rumania  may  have  attracted  the  Emperor's  attention 
to  me. 

Although  the  Emperor,  while  still  Archduke,  was  for 
several  years  my  nearest  neighbor  in  Bohemia — he  was 
stationed  at  Brandeis,  on  the  Elbe — we  never  became 
more  closely  acquainted.  In  all  those  years  he  was 
not  more  than  once  or  twice  at  my  house,  and  they 
were  visits  of  no  political  significance.  It  was  not 
until  the  first  winter  of  the  war,  when  I  went  from 
Rumania  to  the  headquarters  of  Teschen,  that  the 
then  Archduke  invited  me  to  make  the  return  jour- 
ney with  him.  During  this  railway  journey  that 
lasted  several  hours  politics  formed  the  chief  subject 
of  conversation,  though  chiefly  concerning  Rumania 


i3o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  the  Balkan  questions.  In  any  case  I  was  never 
one  of  those  who  were  in  the  Archduke's  confidence, 
and  my  call  to  the  Ballplatz  came  as  a  complete 
surprise. 

At  my  first  audience,  too,  we  conversed  at  great 
length  on  Rumania  and  on  the  question  whether  the 
war  with  Bukharest  could  have  been  averted  or  not. 

The  Emperor  was  then  still  under  the  influence  of 
our  first  peace  offer  so  curtly  rejected  by  the  Entente. 
At  the  German  headquarters  at  Pless,  where  I  arrived 
a  few  days  later,  I  found  the  prevailing  atmosphere 
largely  influenced  by  the  Entente's  answer.  Hinden- 
burg  and  Ludendorff,  who  were  apparently  opposed  to 
Burian's  demarche  for  peace,  merely  remarked  to  me 
that  a  definite  victory  presented  a  possibility  of  ending 
the  war,  and  the  Emperor  William  said  that  he  had 
offered  his  hand  in  peace,  but  that  the  Entente  had 
given  him  a  slap  in  the  face,  and  there  was  nothing  for 
it  now  but  war  to  the  uttermost. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  question  of  the  unre- 
stricted U-boat  warfare  began  to  be  mooted.  At 
first  it  was  the  German  navy  only,  and  Tirpitz  in  par- 
ticular, who  untiringly  advocated  the  plan.  Hohen- 
lohe,1  who,  thanks  to  his  excellent  connections,  was 
always  very  well  informed,  wrote,  several  weeks  before 
the  fateful  decision  was  taken,  that  the  German  navy 
was  determined  and  bent  on  that  aim.  Bethmann 
and  Zimmermann  were  both  decidedly  against  it.  It 
was  entirely  in  keeping  with  the  prudent  wisdom  of  the 
former  not  to  risk  such  experiments;  Bethmann  was 
an  absolutely  dependable,  honorable,  and  capable 
partner,  but  the  unbounded  growth  of  the  military 
autocracy  must  be  imputed  to  his  natural  tendency  to 
conciliate.  He  was  powerless  against  Ludendorff  and 

1  The  Ambassador,  Gottfried,  Prince  Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst. 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  131 

little  by  little  was  turned  aside  by  him.  My  first 
visit  to  Berlin  afforded  me  the  opportunity  of  thor- 
oughly discussing  the  U-boat  question  with  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor,  and  we  were  quite  agreed  in  our 
disapproval  of  that  method  of  warfare.  At  all  events, 
Bethmann  pointed  out  that  such  essentially  military 
matters  should  in  the  first  instance  be  left  to  military 
decision,  as  they  alone  were  able  to  form  a  correct 
estimate  of  the  result,  and  these  reflections  made  me 
fear  from  the  very  first  that  all  reasonable  political 
scruples  would  be  upset  by  military  arguments.  On 
this  my  first  visit  to  Berlin,  when  this  question  naturally 
was  the  dominating  one,  the  Chancellor  explained  to  me 
how  difficult  his  position  was,  because  the  military 
parties,  both  on  land  and  at  sea,  declared  that  if  the 
unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  were  not  carried  out  they 
would  not  be  able  to  guarantee  the  western  front. 
They  thus  brought  an  iron  pressure  to  bear  on  him, 
for  how  could  he,  the  Chancellor,  undertake  to  guaran- 
tee that  the  western  front  could  hold  out  ?  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  danger  of  introducing  the  unrestricted 
U-boat  campaign  became  greater  and  greater,  and  the 
reports  sent  by  Hohenlohe  left  no  doubt  as  to  the 
further  development  of  affairs  in  Berlin. 
On  January  1 2th  he  reported  as  follows: 

The  question  of  the  extension  of  the  U-boat  warfare,  as  your 
Excellency  is  aware  from  the  last  discussions  in  Berlin,  becomes 
daily  more  acute. 

On  the  one  hand,  all  leading  military  and  naval  authorities 
insist  on  making  use  of  this  means  as  speedily  as  possible,  as  they 
declare  it  will  end  the  war  much  more  rapidly ;  on  the  other  hand, 
all  statesmen  have  grave  fears  as  to  what  effect  it  will  have  on 
America  and  other  neutrals. 

The  Supreme  Military  Command  declares  that  a  new  offensive  on 
a  very  large  scale  is  imminent  in  the  west  and  that  the  armies  which 
are  to  resist  this  attack  will  not  be  able  to  understand  why  the  navy 
should  not  do  all  that  lies  in  its  power  to  prevent,  or  at  any  rate  to 


132  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

decrease,  the  reserves  and  ammunition  being  sent  to  our  adversaries. 
The  absence  of  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the  navy  in  the  terrible 
battles  the  troops  on  the  western  front  will  again  have  to  face  will 
have  a  most  injurious  effect  on  the  morale. 

The  objections  put  forward  as  to  the  effect  the  proceeding  might 
have  on  America  are  met  in  military  circles  by  the  assumption 
that  America  will  take  good  care  not  to  go  to  war;  that  she,  in  fact, 
would  not  be  able  to  do  so.  The  unfortunate  failure  of  the  United 
States  military  machine  in  the  conflict  with  Mexico  clearly  proves 
what  is  to  be  expected  from  America  in  that  respect.  Even  a  possible 
breaking  off  relations  with  America  does  not  necessarily  signify  war. 

Meanwhile  all  the  leading  naval  authorities  reassert  that  they 
may  be  relied  on,  even  though  they  are  not  considered  capable  of 
crushing  England,  at  least  to  be  able,  before  America  can  come  in, 
so  to  weaken  the  British  Island  Empire  that  only  one  desire  will  be 
left  to  English  politicians,  that  of  seating  themselves  with  us  at  the 
Conference  table. 

To  this  the  Chancellor  asked  who  would  give  him  a  guaranty 
that  the  navy  were  right  and  in  what  position  should  we  find  our- 
selves in  case  the  admirals  were  mistaken,  whereupon  the  Admiralty 
promptly  asked  what  sort  of  position  the  Chancellor  expected  to 
find  when  autumn  arrived  without  having  made  a  proper  use  of  the 
U-boats  and  we  found  ourselves,  through  exhaustion,  compelled  to 
beg  for  peace. 

And  thus  the  scales  went  up  and  down,  weighing  the  chances 
for  or  against  the  U-boat  war,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of 
positively  determining  which  decision  was  the  right  one. 

Doubtless  the  German  government  in  the  near  future  will  be 
constrained  to  take  up  a  definite  standpoint  respecting  the  question, 
and  it  is  obvious — whatever  the  decision  may  be — that  we  also  shall 
be  largely  involved.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  to  me  that  when  the 
German  government  does  approach  us  in  that  connection  we  should 
act  with  all  possible  reserve.  As  the  matter  now  stands,  a  positive 
decision  as  to  which  course  is  the  right  one  is  not  possible.  I  have 
therefore  thought  it  inadvisable  to  take  side  definitely  with  either 
party  and  thus  remove  much  of  the  responsibility  from  the  German 
government  and  render  it  possible  for  them  to  lay  it  upon  us. 
The  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassador, 

G.  HOHENLOHE,  M.P. 

The  concluding  passage  of  the  above-cited  report  had 
already  been  anticipated  by  me  in  a  telegraphic  com- 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  133 

munication  in  which  I  begged  the  Ambassador  with  all 
possible  energy  to  urge  the  political  arguments  opposed 
to  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare,  which  is  proved  by 
a  telegram  from  Hohenlohe  on  January  1 3th  as  follows: 

Reply  to  yesterday's  telegram  No.  15. 

In  accordance  with  the  telegram  mentioned,  and  after  discussing 
it  with  Baron  Flotow,  I  went  to  the  Secretary  of  State — not  being 
able  to  see  the  Chancellor  to-day — and  in  conformity  with  your 
Excellency's  intentions  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  we  should 
participate  in  the  results  of  the  U-boat  war  just  as  much  as  Ger- 
many, and  that,  therefore,  the  German  government  is  bound  to 
listen  to  us  also.  All  the  leading  German  statesmen  know  that  your 
Excellency,  during  your  stay  here,  expressed  yourself  as  opposed 
to  the  movement,  but  that  I  had  come  once  more  as  your  Excel- 
lency's representative  to  repeat  the  warning  against  too  hasty  action. 
I  further  emphasized  all  the  arguments  against  the  U-boat  war- 
fare, but  will  not  trouble  your  Excellency  with  a  repetition  of  them, 
nor  yet  with  the  counter-arguments,  already  known  to  your  Ex- 
cellency, that  were  put  forward  by  the  Secretary.  I  gave  a 
brief  summary  of  both  these  standpoints  in  my  yesterday's  report 
No.  6  P. 

Herr  Zimmermann,  however,  laid  special  stress  on  the  fact  that 
the  information  he  was  receiving  convinced  him  more  and  more  that 
America,  especially  after  the  Entente's  answer  to  Mr.  Wilson,  which 
was  in  the  nature  of  an  insult,  would  very  probably  not  allow  it  to 
come  to  a  breach  with  the  Central  Powers. 

I  did  all  I  possibly  could  to  impress  upon  him  the  responsibility 
Germany  was  taking  for  herself  and  for  us  by  her  decision  in  this 
question,  pointing  out  very  particularly  that  before  any  decision  was 
arrived  at  our  opinion  from  a  nautical-technical  standpoint  must  also 
be  heard,  in  which  the  Secretary  of  State  fully  concurred. 

I  have  the  feeling  that  the  idea  of  carrying  out  the  U-boat  warfare 
is  more  and  more  favorably  received,  and  your  Excellency  had  the 
same  impression  also  when  in  Berlin.  The  last  word  as  to  the  final 
attitude  to  be  adopted  by  the  German  government  will  no  doubt 
come  from  the  military  side. 

In  conformity  with  the  instructions  received,  /  will  nevertheless 
uphold  with  all  firmness  the  political  arguments  against  the  U-boat 
warfare. 

Baron  Flotow  will  have  occasion  to  meet  the  Secretary  of  State 
this  afternoon. 
10 


134  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I  had  sent  Baron  Flotow,  a  chief  of  department,  to 
Berlin  at  the  same  time,  in  order  that  he  might  support 
all  Hohenlohe's  efforts  and  spare  no  pains  to  induce 
Germany  to  desist  from  her  purpose. 

Flotow  sent  me  the  following  report  on  January 


After  a  two  days'  stay  in  Berlin  my  impression  is  that  the  question 
of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  has  again  been  brought  to  the 
front  by  the  leading  men  in  the  German  Empire.  This  question  — 
according  to  Herr  Zimmermann  —  under  conditions  of  the  greatest 
secrecy  where  the  public  is  concerned,  is  now  under  debate  between 
the  heads  of  the  army  and  navy  and  the  Foreign  Office;  they  insist 
on  a  decision.  For  if  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  is  to  be  opened 
it  must  be  at  a  time  when,  in  view  of  the  vast  impending  Anglo- 
French  offensive  on  the  western  front,  it  will  make  itself  felt.  The 
Secretary  of  State  mentioned  the  month  of  February. 

I  wish  in  the  following  account  to  summarize  the  reasons  put 
forward  by  the  Germans  for  the  justification  of  the  unrestricted 
U-boat  warfare: 

Time  is  against  us  and  favors  the  Entente;  if,  therefore,  the 
Entente  can  keep  up  the  desire  for  war  there  will  be  still  less  prospect 
of  our  obtaining  a  peace  on  our  own  terms.  The  enemy's  last  note 
to  Wilson  is  again  a  striking  example  of  their  war  energy. 

It  will  be  impossible  for  the  Central  Powers  to  continue  the  war 
after  1917  with  any  prospect  of  success.  Peace  must,  therefore, 
unless  it  finally  has  to  be  proposed  by  the  enemy,  be  secured  in  the 
course  of  this  year,  which  means  that  we  must  enforce  it. 

The  military  situation  is  unfavorable  owing  to  the  impending 
Anglo-French  offensive,  which,  it  is  presumed,  will  open  with  great 
force,  as  in  the  case  of  the  last  offensive  on  the  Somme.  To  meet 
the  attack,  troops  will  have  to  be  withdrawn  from  other  fronts. 
Consequently,  an  offensive  against  Russia  with  intent  to  bring  that 
enemy  to  his  knees,  which  perhaps  a  year  ago  would  have  been 
possible,  can  no  longer  be  reckoned  on. 

If,  therefore,  the  possibility  of  enforcing  a  decision  in  the  east 
becomes  less  and  less,  an  effort  must  be  made  to  bring  it  about  in 
the  west,  and  to  do  it  at  a  time  when  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare  would  affect  the  coming  Anglo-French  offensive  by  impeding 
the  transport  of  troops  and  munitions  sailing  under  a  neutral  flag. 

In  estimating  the  effect  on  England  of  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare,  there  will  be  not  only  the  question  of  hindering  the  trans- 
port of  provisions,  but  also  of  curtailing  the  traffic  to  such  a  degree 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  135 

as  would  render  it  impossible  for  the  English  to  continue  the  war. 
In  Italy  and  in  France  this  will  be  felt  no  less  severely.  The  neutrals, 
too,  will  be  made  to  suffer,  which,  however,  might  serve  as  a  pretext 
to  bring  about  peace. 

America  will  hardly  push  matters  further  than  breaking  off 
diplomatic  relations;  we  need  not,  therefore,  count  for  certain  on 
a  war  with  the  United  States. 

It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  United  States — as  was  the 
case  in  regard  to  Mexico — are  not  well  prepared  for  war,  that  their 
one  anxiety  is  Japan.  Japan  would  not  allow  a  European  war  with 
America  to  pass  unheeded. 

But  even  if  America  were  to  enter  the  war  it  would  be  three  to 
four  months  before  she  could  be  ready,  and  in  that  space  of  time 
peace  must  have  been  secured  in  Europe.  According  to  the  estimate 
of  certain  experts  (among  others,  some  Dutch  corn  merchants), 
England  has  provisions  sufficient  for  only  six  weeks,  or  three  months 
at  the  outside. 

It  would  be  possible  to  carry  on  the  U-boat  warfare  on  England 
from  fifteen  bases  in  the  North  Sea,  so  that  the  passage  of  a  large 
vessel  through  to  England  would  be  hardly  conceivable.  Traffic  in  the 
Channel,  even  if  not  entirely  stopped,  would  be  very  limited,  as 
traveling  conditions  in  France  exclude  the  possibility  of  suitable 
connection. 

And  if  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  once  were  started,  the 
terror  caused  by  it  (the  sinking  of  the  vessels  without  warning) 
would  have  such  an  effect. that  most  vessels  would  not  dare  to 
put  to  sea. 

The  above  already  hints  at  the  rejoinder  to  be  put  forward  to  the 
arguments  advanced  by  us  against  the  opening  of  the  unrestricted 
U-boat  warfare,  and  also  combats  the  view  that  the  corn-supply  from 
the  Argentine  is  not  at  the  present  moment  so  important  for  the 
United  States  as  would  be  a  prompt  opening  of  the  U-boat  campaign, 
which  would  mean  a  general  stoppage  of  all  traffic. 

The  fact  that  America  would  not  be  ready  for  war  before  the  end 
of  three  months  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  it  might  even 
be  as  long  as  six  or  eight  months,  and  that  she  therefore  might  join 
in  the  European  war  at  a  time  when,  without  playing  our  last  card, 
it  might  be  possible  to  end  it  in  a  manner  that  we  could  accept.  It 
must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  in  America  we  have  to  do  with 
an  Anglo-Saxon  race,  which — once  it  had  decided  on  war — will  enter 
on  it  with  energy  and  tenacity,  as  England  did,  who,  though  unpre- 
pared for  war  as  to  military  matters,  can  confront  to-day  the  Ger-  , 
mans  with  an  army  of  millions  that  commands  respect.  I  cannot 


I36  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  certainty  make  any  statement  as  to  the  Japanese  danger  to 
America  at  a  time  when  Japan  is  bound  up  with  Russia  and  England 
through  profitable  treaties  and  Germany  is  shut  out  from  that  part 
of  the  world. 

Among  other  things  I  referred  to  the  great  hopes  entertained  of 
the  Zeppelins  as  an  efficient  weapon  of  war. 

Herr  Zimmermann  said  to  me:  "Believe  me,  our  fears  are  no 
less  than  yours;  they  have  given  me  many  sleepless  nights.  There 
is  no  positive  certainty  as  to  the  result;  we  can  only  make  our 
calculations.  We  have  not  yet  arrived  at  any  decision.  Show  me  a 
way  to  obtain  a  reasonable  peace  and  I  would  be  the  first  to  reject 
the  idea  of  the  U-boat  warfare.  As  matters  now  stand,  both  I  and 
several  others  have  almost  been  converted  to  it." 

But  whether,  in  the  event  of  the  ruthless  U-boat  warfare  being  de- 
cided on,  it  would  be  notified  in  some  way,  has  not  yet  been  decided. 

Zimmermann  told  me  he  was  considering  the  advisability  of 
approaching  Wilson,  and,  while  referring  to  the  contemptuous 
attitude  of  the  Entente  in  the  peace  question,  give  the  President 
an  explanation  of  the  behavior  of  the  German  government,  and 
request  him,  for  the  safety  of  the  life  and  property  of  American 
citizens,  to  indicate  the  steamers  and  shipping  lines  by  which  traffic 
between  America  and  other  neutrals  could  be  maintained. 


FLOTOW,  M.P. 
VIENNA,  January  15,  1917. 


On  January  2oth  Zimmermann  and  Admiral  Holtzen- 
aorff  arrived  in  Vienna,  and  a  council  was  held,  presided 
over  by  the  Emperor.  Besides  the  three  above-men- 
tioned, Count  Tisza,  Count  Clam-Martinic,  Admiral 
Haus,  and  I  were  also  present.  Holtzendorff  expounded 
his  reasons,  which  I  recapitulate  below.  With  the 
exception  of  Admiral  Haus,  no  one  gave  unqualified 
consent.  All  the  arguments  which  appear  in  the  official 
documents  and  ministerial  protocols  were  advanced, 
but  did  not  make  the  slightest  impression  on  the 
German  representatives.  The  Emperor,  who  took  no 
part  in  the  debate,  finally  declared  that  he  would  decide 
later.  Under  his  auspices  a  further  conference  was 
held  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  two  o'clock; 
the  report  is  as  follows: 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  137 

Report  of  a  conference  held  January  20, 1917,  in  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Ministry  of  Home  and  Foreign  Affairs.  Members:  Doctor 
Zimmermann,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  German  Foreign  Affairs 
Department;  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff,  Chief  of  the  German  Naval 
Staff;  Count  Czernin,  Imperial  and  Royal  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs;  Count  Tisza,  Royal  Hungarian  Prime  Minister;  Count 
Clam-Martinic,  Imperial  and  Royal  Prime  Minister;  Admiral  Haus, 
the  German  naval  attache  in  Vienna;  Baron  von  Freyburg,  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  naval  attache  ir  Berlin;  Count  B.  Colloredo- 
Mannsfeld. 

On  January  2oth  a  discussion  took  place  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  on  the  question  of  establishing  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare. 

As  evidenced  by  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff 's  statements,  the  Ger- 
man naval  authorities  hold  the  standpoint  that  there  exists  an 
absolute  necessity  for  the  quickest  possible  inauguration  of  an 
unrestricted  U-boat  campaign.  The  arguments  employed  in  sup- 
port of  this  thesis  are  known  from  the  reports  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Ambassador  in  Berlin  (report  of  1/12/17  No.  6/P  and  tele- 
gram of  1/13  No.  22),  and  may  be  summarized  in  the  following 
sentences:  Lack  of  time,  decreasing  human  material  in  the  Central 
Powers,  progressive  deterioration  of  the  harvest,  impending  Anglo- 
French  offensive  on  the  western  front  with  improved  and  increased 
means  for  fighting,  and  the  necessity  arising  therefrom  to  prevent 
or  at  least  check  the  reinforcements  required  for  such  undertaking, 
the  impossibility  of  obtaining  a  decision  on  land,  the  necessity  of 
raising  the  morale  of  the  troops  by  ruthlessly  obtained  results,  and 
the  use  of  every  available  means  in  war,  certainty  of  the  success 
of  an  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  in  view  of  provisions  in  England 
being  sufficient  for  only  two  to  three  months,  as  well  as  the  stoppage 
of  the  munitions  output  and  industrial  production  owing  to  the 
lack  of  raw  material,  the  impossibility  of  supplying  coal  to  France 
and  Italy,  etc.,  etc. 

Concerning  the  carrying  out  of  the  plan,  the  German  navy  owns 
at  present  for  that  purpose  1 20  U-boats  of  the  latest  type.  In  view 
of  the  great  success  achieved  by  the  U-boats  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  when  there  were  only  nineteen  of  an  antiquated  type,  the 
present  increased  numbers  of  the  vessels  offer  a  safe  guaranty  of 
success. 

February  ist  is  suggested  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  as  the  date 
on  which  to  start  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  and  also  to 
announce  the  blockade  of  the  English  coast  and  the  west  coast 
of  France.  Every  vessel  disobeying  the  order  will  be  torpedoed 
without  warning.  In  this  manner  it  is  hoped  to  bring  England  to 


t 


138  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

reason  within  four  months,  and  it  must  here  be  added  that  Admiral 
von  Holtzendorff  expresses  verbis  guaranteed  the  results. 

As  regards  the  attitude  to  be  taken  by  the  neutrals,  leading 
German  circles,  although  aware  of  the  danger,  hold  optimistic  views. 
>  It  is  not  thought  that  either  the  Scandinavian  countries  or  Holland 
will  interfere  with  us,  although,  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  such 
happening,  military  precautions  have  been  taken.  The  measures 
taken  on  the  Dutch  and  Danish  frontiers  will,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Germans,  hold  those  countries  in  check,  and  the  possibility  of 
sharing  the  fate  of  Rumania  will  frighten  them.  Indeed,  it  is 
expected  that  there  will  be  a  complete  stoppage  of  all  neutral 
shipping,  which  in  the  matter  of  supplies  for  England  amounts  to 
39  per  cent,  of  the  cargo  space.  Meanwhile  concessions  will  be 
granted  to  the  neutrals  by  fixing  a  time  limit  for  the  withdrawal 
of  such  of  their  vessels  as  may  be  at  sea  on  the  opening  day  of  the 
U-boat  warfare. 

With  regard  to  America,  the  Germans  are  determined,  if  at  all 
possible,  to  prevent  the  United  States  from  attacking  the  Central 
Powers  by  adopting  a  friendly  attitude  toward  America  (acting 
upon  the  proposals  made  at  the  time  of  the  Lusitania  incident), 
but  they  are  prepared  for  and  await  with  calmness  whatever  attitude 
America  may  adopt.  The  Germans  are,  nevertheless,  of  the  opinion 
that  the  United  States  will  not  go  so  far  as  making  a  breach  with 
the  Central  Powers.  If  that  should  occur,  America  would  be  too 
late  and  could  only  come  into  action  after  England  had  been  beaten. 
America  is  not  prepared  for  war,  which  was  clearly  shown  at  the 
time  of  the  Mexican  crisis;  she  lives  in  fear  of  Japan  and  has  to 
fight  against  agricultural  and  social  difficulties.  Besides  which, 
Mr.  Wilson  is  a  pacifist,  and  the  Germans  presume  that  after  his 
election  will  adopt  a  still  more  decided  tendency  that  way,  for 
his  election  will  not  be  due  to  the  anti-German  Eastern  States, 
but  to  the  co-operation  of  the  Central  and  Western  States  that  are 
opposed  to  war,  and  to  the  Irish  and  Germans.  These  considera- 
tions, together  with  the  Entente's  insulting  answer  to  President 
Wilson's  peace  proposal,  do  not  point  to  the  probability  of  America 
plunging  readily  into  war. 

These,  in  brief,  are  the  points  of  view  on  which  the  German 
demand  for  the  immediate  start  of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare 
is  based,  and  which  caused  the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Department  to  revise  their  hitherto  objective  views. 

Both  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Hungarian 
Prime  Minister  pointed  out  what  disastrous  consequences  would 
ensue  from  America's  intervention,  in  a  military,  moral,  agricultural, 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  139 

and  financial  sense,  and  great  doubt  was  expressed  of  the  success 
of  a  blockade  of  England.  Count  Czernin  held  that  the  Germans 
overlooked  the  possibility  of  lowering  the  consumption  in  England, 
taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that  since  the  war  consumption 
in  the  countries  of  the  Central  Powers  had  been  reduced  by  half. 
Further,  Count  Czernin  referred  to  the  very  vague  and  by  no  means 
convincing  data  of  the  German  naval  authorities.  It  was  also 
debated  whether  a  continuation  of  the  U-boat  war  to  the  present 
extent  (the  destruction  on  an  average  of  400,000  tons  per  month) 
would  not  be  more  likely  to  achieve  the  desired  end,  and  if  it  were 
not  more  advisable  not  to  play  our  last  and  best  card  until  all  other 
means  had  been  tried.  The  possibility  of  being  able  to  start  a  ruth- 
less U-boat  warfare  hung  like  a  Damocles 's  sword  over  the  heads  of 
our  adversaries,  and  would  perhaps  be  a  more  effectual  means  of 
ending  the  war  than  the  reckless  use  of  the  U-boat  as  a  weapon  of 
war,  carrying  with  it  the  danger  of  an  attack  by  the  neutrals.  If  the 
effect  expected  by  Germany  was  not  realized,  which  was  within  the 
bounds  of  possibility,  we  must  be  prepared  to  see  the  desire  for  war 
in  the  enemy  greatly  intensified.  However  that  may  be,  the  vanish- 
ing of  the  desire  for  peace  must  be  accepted  as  an  established  fact. 
Finally,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  arguments  recently  put  forward 
by  the  Germans  show  a  complete  novum,  namely,  the  danger  on  the 
western  front  in  view  of  the  great  Anglo-French  offensive  that  is 
expected.  Whereas  formerly  it  was  always  said  that  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy  would  be  repulsed,  it  is  now  considered  necessary  to 
relieve  the  land  army  by  recklessly  bringing  the  navy  into  the  line  of 
action.  If  these  fears  are  justified,  then  most  certainly  should  all 
other  considerations  be  put  on  one  side  and  the  risk  ensuing  from  the 
ruthless  employment  of  the  U-boats  be  accepted.  Both  Count 
Czernin  and  Count  Tisza  expressed  their  grave  doubts  in  this 
connection. 

To  meet  the  case,  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  pointed  out 
the  necessity  of  immediately  starting  propagandist  activities  in  the 
neutral  countries  and  particularly  in  America,  by  which  the  Central 
Powers'  political  methods  and  aims  would  be  presented  to  them  in 
a  proper  light ;  and  then  later,  after  introducing  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare,  it  would  be  seen  that  no  other  choice  was  left  to  the  peaceful 
tendencies  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  as  the  means  for  a  speedy 
ending  of  the  struggle  between  the  nations. 

The  leaders  of  the  foreign  policy  agreed  to  take  the  necessary 
steps  in  that  direction,  and  remarked  that  certain  arrangements  had 
already  been  made. 

Admiral  Haus  agreed  unreservedly  with  the  arguments  of  the 


i4o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

German  navy,  as  he  declared  that  no  great  anxiety  need  be  felt 
as  to  the  likelihood  of  America's  joining  in  with  military  force, 
and  finally  pointed  out  that,  on  the  part  of  the  Entente,  a  ruthless 
torpedoing  of  hospital  and  transport  ships  had  been  practised  for 
some  time  past  in  the  Adriatic.  The  admiral  urged  that  this  fact 
be  properly  recognized  and  dealt  with,  to  which  the  Foreign  Affairs 
leaders  on  both  sides  gave  their  consent. 

The  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  conclusion,  said 
that  the  definite  decision  to  be  made  must  be  left  to  the  conclusions 
arrived  at  by  both  sovereigns,  whereupon  the  2 6th  inst.  was  fixed 
for  a  meeting  to  be  held  for  that  purpose. 

After  the  general  discussion,  I  had  a  private  talk 
with  the  Emperor,  and  found  that  he  still  had  the  same 
aversion  to  that  means  of  warfare  and  the  same  fears 
as  to  the  result.  We  knew,  however,  that  Germany 
had  definitely  made  up  her  mind  to  start  the  campaign 
in  any  case,  and  that  all  our  arguments  would  be  of  no 
practical  value.  It  remained  to  be  decided  whether 
we  should  join  them  or  not.  Owing  to  the  small  num- 
ber of  our  U-boats,  our  holding  aside  would  not  have 
had  any  great  effect  on  the  final  issue  of  the  experiment, 
and  for  a  moment  I  entertained  the  idea  of  proposing 
to  the  Emperor  that  we  should  separate  from  Germany 
on  that  one  point,  although  I  was  aware  that  it  might 
lead  to  the  ending  of  our  alliance.  But  the.  difficulty 
was  that  the  U-boat  effort  would  also  have  to  be  car- 
ried on  in  the  Mediterranean  in  order  that  it  should 
not  lose  its  effect  in  the  North  Sea.  If  the  Mediter- 
ranean remained  exempt,  the  transports  would  take 
that  route  and  proceed  by  land  ma  Italy,  France,  and 
Dover,  and  thus  render  the  northern  U-boat  warfare 
of  no  effect.  But  in  order  to  carry  it  on  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, Germany  would  need  our  support  in  the 
Adriatic  from  Trieste,  Pola,  and  Cattaro.  If  we  allowed 
her  at  those  places  it  involved  us  in  the  campaign, 
and  if  we  refused  to  let  our  few  U-boats  go  out,  it  would 
be  attacking  Germany  in  the  rear  and  we  should 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  141 

become  embroiled  with  her,  which  would  lead  to  the 
definite  severance  of  the  alliance. 

This  was  again  one  of  those  instances  that  prove 
that  when  a  strong  and  a  weak  nation  concert  in  war, 
the  weak  one  cannot  desist  unless  it  changes  sides 
entirely  and  enters  into  war  with  its  former  ally. 
None  who  were  in  the  government  would  hear  of  that, 
and  with  a  heavy  heart  we  gave  our  consent.  Bul- 
garia, who  was  not  in  this  phase  of  the  war,  and  who 
had  kept  up  diplomatic  relations  with  America,  was 
differently  situated,  being  able  to  stand  aside  without 
paralyzing  the  German  plans.  Apart  from  this,  I 
was  already  persuaded  then  that  Bulgaria's  not  joining 
in  would  make  a  bad  impression  on  the  outside  world, 
and  would  not  help  her  in  any  way.  Although  her 
relations  with  America  were  maintained  up  to  the 
last,  they  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  make  her  fate 
easier. 

Had  we  been  able  to  make  Germany  desist  from 
the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare,  the  advantage  would 
have  been  very  great;  whether  we  joined  in  or  not 
was  a  matter  of  indifference  viewed  from  the  stand- 
point of  our  treatment  by  the  Entente,  as  it  proved 
by  the  instance  of  Bulgaria.  As  soon  as  America 
had  declared  war  on  Germany,  a  conflict  with  us  was 
inevitable  in  any  case,  as  Austro-Hungarian  troops  and 
artillery  were  then  on  the  western  front,  facing  Ameri- 
cans. We  were  compelled  to  go  to  war  with  America, 
seeing  that  Germany  was  already  at  war  with  her. 

It  was  not  possible,  therefore,  for  us  to  remain  in  a 
state  of  even  nominally  peaceful  relations  with  America, 
such  as  existed  between  her  and  Bulgaria  to  the  very 
end  of  the  war. 

It  is  not  quite  clear  when  Germany  really  recognized 
the  fact  that  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  had  no 
effect  and  was  thus  a  terrible  mistake.  To  the  public, 


142  IN  THE  WORLD 

as  well  as  to  the  allied  Cabinets,  the  German  military 
authorities  continued  to  profess  the  greatest  optimism, 
and  when  I  left  my  post  in  April,  1918,  the  standpoint 
held  in  Berlin  was  still  that  England  would  be  defeated 
by  the  naval  war.  Writing  on  December  14,  1917, 
Hohenlohe  reported  that  in  competent  German  circles 
the  feeling  was  thoroughly  optimistic.  I,  however, 
certainly  perceived  certain  signs  of  doubt  beginning 
in  some  German  minds,  and  Ludendorff  in  replying  to 
the  reproaches  I  made  to  him  said:  "Everything  is 
dangerous  in  war;  it  is  impossible  before  an  operation 
to  be  sure  of  the  results.  I  admit  that  the  time  limit 
was  a  mistake,  but  the  final  result  will  show  that  I 
was  right."  In  order  to  exculpate  themselves  all  the 
leaders  in  Germany  declared  that  America  would, 
in  any  case,  have  gone  to  war,  and  that  the  U-boat  had 
merely  given  the  last  impetus.  Whether  this  is  quite 
true  appears  doubtful;  it  cannot  either  be  asserted  or 
denied  positively. 

The  world  has  become  used  to  looking  upon  Hinden- 
burg  and  Ludendorff  as  one;  they  belonged  together. 
Together  they  rose  to  the  highest  power,  to  be  forcibly 
separated  in  their  fall.  In  all  business  transactions 
Ludendorff  was  in  the  foreground.  He  was  a  great 
speaker,  but  always  in  a  sharp  tone,  suggestive  of  the 
Prussian  military  system.  It  usually  aroused  a  scene, 
but  he  seemed  to  take  nothing  amiss,  and  his  anger 
vanished  as  rapidly  as  it  broke  out.  Hindenburg's 
retiring  modesty  made  him  attractive.  Once  when 
we  were  speaking  of  the  photographers  who  besieged 
every  conference  in  Berlin,  the  old  gentleman  remarked : 
"I  have  lived  to  be  seventy  and  nobody  ever  thought 
there  was  anything  wonderful  about  me;  now  they 
seem  all  at  once  to  have  discovered  that  I  have  such  an 
interesting  head."  He  was  much  more  staid  and  quiet 
than  Ludendorff,  nor  was  he  so  sensitive  to  public 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  143 

opinion  as  the  latter.  I  remember  once  how  Luden- 
dorff ,  when  I  exhorted  him  to  yield  on  the  peace  ques- 
tion, rejoined  with  vigor:  "The  German  people  wish 
for  no  peace  of  renunciation,  and  I  do  not  intend  to 
end  by  being  pelted  with  stones.  The  dynasty  would 
never  survive  such  a  peace."  The  dynasty  has 
departed,  the  stones  have  been  thrown,  and  the  peace 
of  renunciation  has  become  a  reality,  and  is  certainly 
more  terrible  than  the  gloomiest  pessimist  could  ever 
have  believed ! 

ii 

The  rupture  between  America  and  Germany  occurred 
on  February  3,  1917. 

The  Ambassador,  Count  Tarnowski,  remained  in 
Washington,  but  was  not  received  by  Wilson,  and  had 
intercourse  with  Lansing  only.  I  still  hoped  to  main- 
tain these  semi-official  relations  with  America,  in  case 
America,  in  breaking  off  relations  with  Germany, 
might  be  content  with  that  and  not  declare  war  on  her. 
The  German  government  would  have  preferred  our 
breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  simultaneously  with 
them. 

On  February  i2th  Count  Wedel  called  on  me,  and  his 
request  and  my  settlement  of  it  appear  in  the  following 
telegram  to  Hohenlohe: 

VIENNA,  February  12, 1917. 

To  notify  Your  Excellency. 

Count  Wedel  has  been  instructed  to  submit  to  me  the  following 
three  requests  from  his  government: 

(1)  Count  Tarnowski  is  not  to  hand  over  his  credentials  until  the 
situation  between  Germany  and  America  is  clear. 

(2)  Count  Tarnowski  must  protest  to  Mr.  Wilson  against  his 
having  tried  to  make  the  neutrals  turn  against  Germany. 

(3)  On  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Germany  Count  Tarnowski  must 
be  recalled. 

I  have  refused  the  first  two  items  and  accepted  the  last. 


144  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

As  we  should  not  have  been  able  to  prevent  Germany 
from  beginning  the  U-boat  warfare,  the  only  alternative 
for  us  was  to  use  all  means  in  our  power  to  maintain 
our  relations  with  America,  and  thus  enable  us  later 
to  play  the  part  of  mediator,  although  this  could  be  for 
only  that  period  during  which  America,  having  broken 
off  relations,  had  not  yet  declared  war.  My  answer 
of  March  5,  1917,  to  America's  request  for  an  explana- 
tion of  our  standpoint  was  sent  with  the  object  of  pre- 
venting America  from  breaking  off  relations  with  us, 
and  also  to  keep  from  the  public  the  knowledge  of  our 
divergence  from  Germany.  This  will  be  found  noted 
in  the  appendix.  It  met  with  success  so  far  that 
America  for  a  time  continued  diplomatic  relations  with 
us;  they  were  not  broken  off  until  April  9,  1917. 

I  had  a  very  lively  correspondence  with  Stephen 
Tisza  in  consequence  of  my  answer.  I  received  the 
following  letter  on  March  3d: 

DEAR  FRIEND, — In  the  interests  of  the  cause  I  can  only  greatly 
regret  that  I  had  no  opportunity  of  appreciating  the  definite  sense 
of  our  aide-memoire  before  it  was  despatched.  Apart  from  other 
less  important  matters,  I  cannot  conceal  my  painful  surprise  that 
we  repeatedly  and  expressly  admit  having  given  a  promise  in  our 
Ancona  note.  I  am  afraid  that  we  have  placed  ourselves  in  a  very 
awkward  position  with  Wilson,  which  so  easily  could  have  been 
avoided,  as  it  was  not  in  accordance  with  my  views  that  we  had 
given  a  promise. 

An  expression  of  opinion  is  not  a  promise.  Without  wishing  to 
detract  from  its  moral  value,  it  has  nevertheless  a  different  legal 
character,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  third  person  has  no 
legal  authority  in  favor  of  that  person  as  a  promise. 

By  unnecessarily  having  admitted  that  we  gave  the  Americans 
a  promise  we  admit  the  existence  of  obligations  on  our  side  to  them. 
In  spite  of  the  fine  and  clever  argument  in  our  note,  it  will  be  easy 
for  the  Americans  to  prove  that  our  present  procedure  cannot  be 
reconciled  with  the  previous  statement;  if  the  statement  was  a 
promise,  then  the  American  government  has  the  right  to  look  for 
the  fulfilment  of  it,  and  we  will  then  be  in  an  awkward  predicament. 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  145 

I  remarked  in  my  notification  that  I  would  prefer  to  omit  the  admis- 
sion that  we  had  made  any  promise;  there  would  have  been  the 
possibility  of  recurring  to  it.  By  placing  this  weapon  in  their  hands 
we  have  exposed  ourselves  to  the  danger  of  a  checkmate,  and  I  very 
much  fear  that  we  shall  greatly  regret  it. 

Naturally  this  remains  between  us.  But  I  was  constrained  to 
pour  out  my  heart  to  you  and  justify  my  request  that  the  text  of 
all  such  important  state  documents  which  involve  such  far-reaching 
consequences  may  be  sent  to  me  in  time  for  me  to  study  and  com- 
ment on  them.  Believe  me,  it  is  really  in  the  interest  of  the  cause 
and  in  every  respect  can  only  be  for  the  best. 

In  sincere  friendship,  your  devoted  TISZA. 

Inclosure. 

It  may  be  presumed  with  some  semblance  of  truth  that  the  peace 
wave  in  America  is  progressing,  and  that  President  Wilson,  influ- 
enced thereby,  may  perhaps  be  able  at  any  rate  to  postpone  a 
decision  of  a  warlike  nature.  Even  though  I  may  be  wrong  in  my 
presumption,  ft  lies  in  our  interests  to  avoid  for  as  long  as  possible 
the  rupture  of  our  diplomatic  relations  with  America. 

Therefore  the  answer  to  the  American  aide-memoire,  to  be  de- 
spatched as  late  as  possible,  should  be  so  composed  as  to  give  it  the 
appearance  of  a  meritorious  handling  of  the  theme  put  forward 
on  the  American  side  without  falling  into  the  trap  of  the  question 
put  forward  in  the  aide-memoire. 

If  we  answer  yes,  then  President  Wilson  will  hardly  be  able  to 
avoid  a  breach  with  the  Monarchy.  If  we  give  a  negative  answer 
we  shall  abandon  Germany  and  the  standpoint  we  took  up  on 
January  3ist. 

The  handle  wherewith  to  grasp  evasion  of  a  clear  answer  is 
provided  by  the  aide-memoire  itself,  as  it  identifies  our  statements 
in  the  Ancona  and  Persia  question  with  the  attitude  of  the  German 
note  of  May  4,  1916.  We  should,  therefore,  be  quite  consistent 
if  we,  as  we  did  in  our  note  of  December  14,  1915,  were  to  declare 
that  we  should  be  governed  by  our  own  ideas  of  justice. 

In  our  correspondence  with  the  American  government  respecting 
the  Ancona,  Persia,  and  Petrolike  questions  we  treated  the  concrete 
case  always  without  going  deeper  into  the  individual  principles  of 
legal  questions.  In  our  note  of  December  29,  1915,  which  con- 
tains the  expression  of  opinion  cited  in  the  aide-memoire  (it  may  also 
be  noted  that  our  expression  of  opinion  was  no  pledge,  as  we  had 
promised  nothing  nor  taken  any  obligation  upon  ourselves),  the 


146  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Austrian  government  distinctly  stated  that  they  would  refer  later 
to  the  difficult  international  questions  connected  with  the  U-boat 
warfare. 

Present  war  conditions  did  not  appear  suited  to  such  a  discussion. 
In  consequence,  however,  of  the  dealings  of  our  enemies,  events  have 
occurred  and  a  state  of  things  been  brought  about  which,  on  our  side 
also,  renders  a  more  intense  application  of  the  U-boat  question 
unavoidable.  Our  merchantmen  in  the  Adriatic,  whenever  attain- 
able, were  constantly  torpedoed  without  warning  by  the  enemy. 
Our  adversaries  have  thus  adopted  the  standard  of  the  most  aggra- 
vated and  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  without  the  neutrals  offering 
any  assistance. 

The  Entente  when  laying  its  mine-fields  displayed  the  same 
ruthlessness  toward  the  free  shipping  and  the  lives  of  neutrals. 

Mines  are  considered  as  a  recognized  weapon  for  the  definite 
protection  of  the  home  coast  and  ports,  also  as  a  means  of  blockading 
an  enemy  port.  But  the  use  made  of  them  as  an  aggressive  factor 
in  this  war  is  quite  a  new  feature,  for  vast  areas  of  open  sea  on 
the  route  of  the  world's  traffic  were  converted  into  mine-fields 
impassable  for  the  neutrals  except  at  the  greatest  danger  of  their 
lives. 

There  is  no  question  but  that  that  is  a  far  greater  check  to  the 
freedom  of  movement  and  a  greater  obstacle  to  neutral  interests 
than  establishing  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  within  a  limited 
and  clearly  marked  out  zone,  leaving  open  channels  for  neutral 
shipping,  and  by  other  measures  giving  due  consideration  to  the 
interests  of  the  neutrals. 

Just  at  the  moment  when  the  President's  appeal  to  the  entire 
belligerent  world  coincided  with  the  spontaneous  statement  of  our 
group,  in  which  we  gave  a  solemn  proof  of  our  willingness  to  con- 
clude a  just  peace  and  one  acceptable  by  our  enemies,  a  fresh 
and  larger  mine-field  was  laid  down  in  the  North  Sea  on  the  route 
of  the  world's  traffic,  and,  casting  ridicule  on  the  noble  initiative 
of  the  United  States,  a  war  of  destruction  against  our  groups  of 
Powers  was  announced  by  the  Entente. 

We  urge  the  great  aims  that  inspired  the  action  of  the  American 
government:  the  quickest  possible  cessation  of  the  fearful  slaughter 
of  men  and  the  founding  of  an  honorable,  lasting,  and  blessed  peace 
by  combating  with  the  greatest  energy  our  enemies'  furious  war  for 
conquest.  The  course  we  pursue  leads  to  the  common  aims  of  our- 
selves and  the  American  government,  and  we  cannot  give  up  the 
hope  of  finding  understanding  in  the  people  and  the  government  of 
the  United  States.  TISZA. 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  147 

I  answered  as  follows: 

March  5th. 

DEAR  FRIEND, — I  cannot  agree  with  you.  After  the  first  Ancona 
note  you  veered  round  and  declared  in  a  second  note  that  ''we 
agreed  with  the  German  standpoint  in  the  main" — that  was  an 
obvious  yielding  and  contained  a  hidden  promise. 

I  do  not  think  that  any  legal  wiles  will  dupe  the  Americans,  and 
if  we  were  to  deny  the  promise  it  would  not  advance  us  any  farther. 

But,  secondly  and  principally,  it  is  altogether  impossible  with 
words  to  make  the  Americans  desist  from  war  if  they  wish  it;  either 
they  will  make  straight  for  war  and  then  no  notes  will  avail,  or  they 
will  seek  a  pretext  to  escape  the  war  danger  and  will  find  it  in  our 
note. 

So  much  for  the  merits  of  the  matter. 

What  you  demand  is  technically  impossible.  The  note  was  not 
easy  to  compile.  I  had  to  alter  it  entirely  as  time  went  on;  his 
Majesty  then  wished  to  see  it,  made  some  alterations,  and  sanctioned 
it.  Meanwhile  Penfield1  importuned  me  and  telegraphed  even  a 
week  ago  to  America  to  reassure  his  people;  the  Germans,  too,  had 
to  be  won  over  for  that  particular  passage. 

You  know  how  ready  I  am  to  discuss  important  matters  with  you, 
but  ultra  posse  nemo  tenetur — it  was  physically  impossible  to  upset 
everything  again  and  to  expect  his  Majesty  to  alter  his  views. 

In  true  friendship,  your  CZERNIN. 

I  thereupon,  on  March  i4th,  received  the  following 
answer  from  Tisza: 

DEAR  FRIEND, — I  also  note  with  genuine  pleasure  the  success  of 
your  American  aide-memoire  (meaning  thereby  America's  resolve 
not  to  break  off  relations  with  us).  But  it  does  not  alter  my  opinion 
that  it  was  a  pity  to  admit  that  a  pledge  had  been  given.  It  may  be 
requited  at  a  later  stage  of  the  controversy,  and  it  would  have  been 
easy  not  to  broach  the  subject  for  the  moment. 

Do  you  think  me  very  obstinate?  I  have  not  suppressed  the  final 
word  in  our  retrospective  controversy  so  that  you  should  not  think 
me  better  than  I  am. 

Au  revoir,  in  true  friendship,  yourj  TISZA. 

Tis^a  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  U-boat  warfare, 
and  tolerated  it  only  from  reasons  of  vis  major,  because 

1  Mr.  Penfield,  American  Ambassador  to  Vienna. 


i48  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

we  could  not  prevent  the  German  military  leaders  from 
adopting  the  measure,  and  because  he,  and  I,  too,  were 
convinced  that  "not  joining  in"  would  have  been  of 
no  advantage  to  us. 

Not  until  very  much  later — in  fact,  not  until  after 
the  war — did  I  learn  from  a  reliable  source  that  Ger- 
many, with  an  incomprehensible  misunderstanding  of 
the  situation,  had  restricted  the  building  of  more 
U-boats  during  the  war.  The  Secretary  of  State, 
Capelle,  was  approached  by  competent  naval  technical 
experts,  who  told  him  that,  by  stopping  the  building 
,of  all  other  vessels,  a  fivefold  number  of  U-boats  could 
be  built.  Capelle  rejected  the  proposal  on  the  pretext 
"that  nobody  would  know  what  to  do  with  so  many 
U-boats  when  the  war  was  at  an  end."  Germany  had, 
as  mentioned,  one  hundred  submarines;  had  she  pos- 
sessed five  hundred  she  might  have  achieved  her  aims. 

I  only  heard  this  in  the  winter  of  1918,  but  it  was 
from  a  source  from  which  I  invariably  gleaned  correct 
information. 

Seldom  has  any  military  action  called  forth  such 
indignation  as  the  sinking,  without  warning,  of  enemy 
ships.  And  yet  the  observer  who  judges  from  an 
objective  point  of  view  must  admit  that  the  waging 
4^  war  on  women  and  children  was  not  begun  by  us,  but 

by  our  enemies  when  they  enforced  the  blockade. 
Millions  have  perished  in  the  domains  of  the  Central 
Powers  through  the  blockade,  and  chiefly  the  poorest 
and  weakest  people — the  greater  part  women  and 
children — were  the  victims.  If,  to  meet  the  argument, 
it  be  asserted  that  the  Central  Powers  were  as  a 
besieged  fortress,  and  that  in  1870  the  Germans  starved 
Paris  in  similar  fashion,  there  is  certainly  some  truth 
in  the  argument.  But  it  is  just  as  true — as  stated  in 
the  note  of  March  5th — that  in  a  war  on  land  no  regard 
is  ever  paid  to  civilians  who  venture  into  the  war  zone, 


THE  U-BOAT  WARFARE  149 

} 

and  that  no  reason  is  apparent  why  a  war  at  sea  should 
be  subject  to  different  moral  conditions.  When  a 
town  or  village  is  within  the  range  of  battle,  the  fact 
has  never  prevented  the  artillery  from  acting  in  spite 
of  the  danger  to  the  women  and  children.  But  in 
the  present  instance,  the  non-combatants  of  the  enemy 
states  who  are  in  danger  can  easily  escape  it  by  not 
undertaking  a  sea  voyage. 

Since  the  debacle  in  the  winter  of  1918,  I  have 
thoroughly  discussed  the  matter  with  English  friends 
of  long  standing,  and  found  that  their  standpoint  was — 
that  it  was  not  the  U-boat  warfare  in  itself  that  had 
roused  the  greatest  indignation,  but  the  cruel  nature 
of  the  proceedings  so  opposed  to  international  law. 
Also,  the  torpedoing  of  hospital-ships  by  the  Germans, 
and  the  firing  on  passengers  seeking  to  escape,  and  so  on. 
These  accounts  are  flatly  contradicted  by  the  Germans, 
who,  on  their  part,  have  terrible  tales  to  tell  of  English 
brutality,  as  instanced  by  the  Baralong  episode. 

There  have,  of  course,  been  individual  cases  of 
shameful  brutality  in  all  the  armies;  but  that  such 
deeds  were  sanctioned  or  ordered  by  the  German  or 
English  Supreme  Commands  I  do  not  believe. 

An  inquiry  by  an  international,  but  neutral,  court 
would  be  the  only  means  of  bringing  light  to  bear  on 
the  matter. 

Atrocities  such  as  mentioned  are  highly  to  be  con- 
demned, no  matter  who  the  perpetrators  are;  but  in 
itself  the  U-boat  warfare  was  an  allowable  means  of 
defense. 

The  blockade  is  now  admitted  to  be  a  permissible 
and  necessary  proceeding;  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare  is  stigmatized  as  a  crime  against  international 
law.  That  is  the  sentence  passed  by  might,  but  not 
by  right.  In  days  to  come  history  will  judge  otherwise. 
11 


CHAPTER  VI 

ATTEMPTS   AT   PEACE 


THE  constitutional  procedure  which  prevails  in 
every  parliamentary  state  is  ordered  so  that  the 
Minister  is  responsible  to  a  body  of  representatives. 
He  is  obliged  to  account  for  what  he  has  done.  His 
action  is  subject  to  the  judgment  and  criticism  of  the 
body  of  representatives.  If  the  majority  of  that  body 
are  against  the  Minister,  he  must  go. 

The  control  of  foreign  policy  in  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  was  in  the  hands  of  the  delegations. 

Besides  which,  however,  there  existed  in  the  Hun- 
garian Constitution  a  regulation  to  the  effect  that  the 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister  was  responsible  to  the 
country  for  the  foreign  policy,  and,  consequently,  the 
"foreign  policy  of  the  Monarchy  had  to  be  carried  out, 
in  conjunction,  by  the  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
in  office  and  the  Prime  Minister." 

It  depended  entirely  on  the  personality  of  the  Hun- 
garian Prime  Minister  how  he  observed  the  regulation. 
Already,  under  Burian,  it  had  become  the  custom  for 
all  telegrams  and  news,  even  of  the  most  secret  nature, 
to  be  communicated  at  once  to  Count  Tisza,  who  then 
brought  his  influence  to  bear  on  all  decisions  and  tacti- 
cal events.  Tisza  possessed  a  most  extraordinary 
capacity  for  work.  He  always  found  time  to  occupy 
himself  very  thoroughly  with  foreign  policy,  notwith- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  151 

standing  his  own  numerous  departmental  duties,  and  it 
was  necessary,  therefore,  to  gain  his  consent  to  every 
step  taken.  The  control  of  our  foreign  policy  was, 
therefore,  twofold — both  by  the  delegation  and  the 
Prime  Minister. 

Great  as  was  my  esteem  and  respect  for  Count 
Tisza  and  close  the  friendship  between  us,  still  his 
constant  supervision  and  intervention  put  boundless 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  discharge  of  business. 
It  was  not  easy,  even  in  normal  times,  to  contend  with, 
on  top  of  all  the  existing  difficulties  that  confront  a 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  in  war,  it  became  an 
impossibility.  The  unqualified  presumption  behind 
such  twofold  government  would  have  been  that  the 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister  should  consider  all  questions 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  entire  Monarchy,  and  not 
from  that  of  the  Magyar  center,  a  presumption  which 
Tisza  ignored  like  all  other  Hungarians.  He  did  not 
deny  it.  He  has  often  told  me  that  he  knew  no  patriot- 
ism save  the  Hungarian,  but  that  it  was  in  the  inter- 
ests of  Hungary  to  keep  together  with  Austria;  there- 
fore he  saw  most  things  with  a  crooked  vision.  Never 
would  he  have  ceded  one  single  square  meter  of  Hun- 
garian  territory;  but  he  raised  no  objection  to  the 
projected  cession  of  Galicia.  He  would  rather  have 
let  the  whole  world  be  ruined  than  give  up  Transyl- 
vania; but  he  took  no  interest  whatever  in  the  Tyrol. 

Apart  from  that,  he  applied  different  rules  for  Austria 
than  for  Hungary.  He  would  not  allow  of  the  slightest 
alteration  in  Hungary's  internal  conditions,  as  they 
must  not  be  effected  through  external  pressure.  When 
I,  forced  thereto  by  the  distress  due  to  lack  of  provi- 
sions, yielded  to  Ukrainian  wishes  and  notified  the 
Austrian  Ministry  of  the  Ukrainian  desire  to  divide 
Galicia  in  two,  Tisza  was  fully  in  accordance  there- 
with. He  went  even  farther.  He  opposed  any  expan- 


152  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

sion  of  the  Monarchy,  as  it  might  weaken  Hungary's 
influence.  All  his  life  he  was  an  opponent  of  the  Austro- 
Polish  solution,  and  a  mortal  enemy  of  the  tripartist 
project;  he  intended  that  Poland  at  most  should  rank 
as  an  Austrian  province,  but  would  prefer  to  make  her 
over  to  Germany.  He  did  not  even  wish  Rumania 
to  be  joined  with  Hungary,  as  that  would  weaken  the 
Magyar  influence  in  Hungary.  He  looked  upon  it 
as  out  of  the  question  to  grant  the  Serbians  access  to 
the  sea,  because  he  wanted  the  Serbian  agricultural 
products  when  he  was  in  need  of  them;  nor  would  he 
leave  an  open  door  for  the  Serbian  pigs,  as  he  did 
not  wish  the  price  of  the  Hungarian  to  be  lowered. 
Tisza  went  still  farther.  He  was  a  great  stickler  for 
equality  in  making  appointments  to  foreign  diplo- 
matic posts,  but  I  could  not  pay  much  heed  to  that. 
If  I  considered  the  Austrian  X  better  fitted  for  the  post 
of  ambassador  than  the  Hungarian  Y,  I  selected  him 
in  spite  of  eventual  disagreement. 

This  trait  in  the  Hungarian,  though  legally  well- 
founded,  was  unbearable  and  not  to  be  maintained  in 
war,  and  led  to  various  disputes  between  Tisza  and 
myself;  and  now  that  he  is  dead,  these  scenes  leave  me 
only  a  feeling  of  the  deepest  regret  for  many  a  hasty 
word  that  escaped  me.  We  afterward  made  a  com- 
promise. Tisza  promised  never  to  interfere  except 
in  cases  of  the  greatest  urgency,  and  I  promised  to 
take  no  important  step  without  his  sanction.  Soon 
after  this  arrangement  he  was  dismissed  by  the  Em- 
peror for  very  different  reasons. 

I  greatly  regretted  his  dismissal,  in  spite  of  the  dif- 
ficulties he  had  caused  me.  To  begin  with,  the  Magyar- 
Central  standpoint  was  not  a  specialty  of  Tisza's; 
all  Magyar  politicians  upheld  it.  Secondly,  Tisza 
had  one  great  point  in  his  favor;  he  had  no  wish  to 
prolong  the  war  for  the  purpose  of  conquest;  he  wished 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  153 

for  a  rectification  of  the  Rumanian  frontier  and  nothing 
beyond  that.  If  it  had  come  to  peace  negotiations,  he 
would  have  supported  me  in  taking  as  a  basis  the 
status  quo  ante.  His  support — and  that  was  the  third 
reason — was  of  great  value,  for  he  was  a  man  who  knew 
how  to  fight.  He  had  become  hard  and  old  on  the 
battle-field  of  parliamentary  controversy.  He  stood 
in  awe  of  nothing  and  nobody — and  he  was  true  as 
gold.  Fourthly,  this  upright  man  was  one  of  the  few 
who  openly  told  the  Emperor  the  truth,  and  the  Em- 
peror made  use  of  this,  as  we  all  did. 

I  was,  therefore,  convinced  beforehand  that  a  change 
would  not  improve  the  situation  for  me.  Esterhazy, 
who  succeeded  Tisza,  certainly  never  put  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  my  policy.  At  the  same  time,  I  missed 
the  strong  hand  that  had  kept  order  in  Hungary,  and 
the  stern  voice  that  warned  the  Emperor,  and  I  did 
not  place  the  same  reliance  on  Wekerle  as  on  Tisza, 
perhaps  because  I  was  not  on  the  same  terms  of  friend- 
ship with  him  as  with  Tisza.  . 

Although  I  had  many  disputes  with  Tisza,  it  is  one 
of  the  dearest  reminiscences  of  my  time  of  office  that, 
up  to  the  death  of  this  remarkable  man,  our  friendship 
remained  unchanged.  For  many  years  Hungary  and 
Stephan  Tisza  were  as  one.  Tisza  was  a  man  whose 
brave  and  manly  character,  stern  and  resolute  nature, 
fearlessness  and  integrity,  raised  him  high  above  the 
average  man.  He  was  a  thorough  man,  with  brilliant 
qualities  and  great  faults;  a  man  whose  like  is  rare 
in  Europe,  in  spite  of  those  faults.  Great  bodies  cast 
long  shadows;  but  he  was  great,  and  modeled  out  of 
the  stuff  from  which  the  heroes  of  old  were  made — 
heroes  who  understood  how  to  fight  and  die.  How 
often  did  I  reproach  him  with  his  unhappy  "puszta" 
— patriotism, — that  was  digging  a  grave  for  him  and  all 
of  us.  It  was  impossible  to  change  him;  he  was 


i54  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

obstinate  and  unbending,  and  his  greatest  fault  was 
that  all  his  life  he  was  under  the  ban  of  a  petty  ecclesi- 
astical policy.  Not  a  single  square  meter  would  he 
yield  either  to  Rumania  in  her  day,  or  to  the  Czechs 
or  the  Southern  Slavs.  The  career  of  this  wonderful 
man  contains  a  terrible  tragedy.  He  fought  and  strove 
like  none  other  for  his  people  and  his  country;  for  years 
he  filled  the  breach  and  protected  his  people  and  his 
Hungary  with  his  powerful  personality,  and  yet  it  was 
his  obstinate,  unyielding  policy  that  was  one  of  the 
chief  reasons  of  Hungary's  fall;  the  Hungary  he  so 
dearly  loved;  the  fall  that  he  saw  when  he  died,  killed 
by  the  accursed  hand  of  some  cowardly  assassin. 

Tisza  once  told  me,  with  a  laugh,  that  some  one  had 
said  to  him  that  his  greatest  fault  was  that  he  had  come 
into  the  world  as  a  Hungarian. 

I  consider  this  a  most  pertinent  remark.  As  a 
human  being  and  as  a  man,  he  was  prominent;  but  all 
the  prejudices  and  faults  of  the  Magyar  way  of  think- 
ing spoiled  him. 

Hungary  and  her  Constitution — dualism — were  one 
of  our  misfortunes  in  the  war. 

Had  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  had  no  other 
plan  but  that  of  doing  away  with  dualism,  he  would 
on  that  account  alone  have  merited  love  and  admira- 
tion. In  Aehrenthal  and  Berchtold's  time  Hungarian 
policy  settled  the  Serbian  disputes ;  it  made  an  alliance 
with  Rumania  an  impossibility;  it  accomplished  the 
food  blockade  in  Austria  during  the  war;  prevented 
all  internal  reforms;  and,  finally,  at  the  last  moment, 
through  Karolyi's  petty  short-sighted  selfishness,  the 
front  was  beaten.  This  severe  judgment  on  Hungary's 
influence  on  the  war  remains  true,  in  spite  of  the  un- 
doubtedly splendid  deeds  of  the  Magyar  troops.  The 
Hungarian  is  of  a  strong,  courageous,  and  manly  dis- 
position; therefore,  almost  always  an  excellent  soldier; 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  155 

but,  unfortunately,  in  the  course  of  the  last  fifty  years, 
Hungarian  policy  has  done  more  injury  than  the  Hun- 
garian soldier  possibly  could  make  good  in  the  war. 
Once,  during  the  war,  a  Hungarian  met  my  reproaches 
with  the  rejoinder  that  we  could  be  quite  sure  about 
the  Hungarians,  they  were  so  firmly  linked  to  Austria. 
"Yes,"  said  I,  "Hungary  is  firmly  linked  to  us,  but  like 
a  stone  a  drowning  man  has  tied  round  his  own  neck." 

If  we  had  not  lost  the  war  a  fight  to  the  death  with 
the  Magyars  would  have  been  inevitable,  because  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  that  any  sensible  European 
consortium  would  consent  to  be  brought  into  partner- 
ship with  Magyar  aspirations  and  plans  for  dominion. 

But,  of  course,  during  the  war  an  open  fight  with 
Budapest  was  impossible. 

Whether  the  nations  that  once  composed  the  Haps- 
burg  Empire  will  ever  be  reunited  is  an  open  question ; 
should  it  come  to  pass,  may  a  kind  fate  preserve  us 
from  a  return  of  dualism. 

ii 

On  December  26,  1916 — four  days  after  entering  upon 
office — I  received  a  letter  from  Tisza  in  which  he  im- 
parted to  me  his  views  on  the  tactics  to  be  observed: 

All  the  European  neutrals  feel  that  they  are  more  seriously 
threatened  by  England  than  by  us.  The  events  in  Greece,  Rumania, 
etc.,  as  well  as  England's  commercial  tyranny,  act  in  our  favor, 
and  the  difference  of  our  attitude  to  the  peace  plans  as  compared 
with  that  of  the  Entente — if  consistently  and  cleverly  carried  out — 
will  secure  neutral  sympathy  for  our  group  of  Powers. 

From  this  point  of  view  I  see  that  the  chief  danger  will  be  that 
our  necessarily  cautious  attitude  as  regards  revealing  our  war  aims 
may  give  rise  to  the  idea  that  we  are  merely  trifling  with  a  plan  for 
peace  for  tactical  reasons  and  do  not  really  earnestly  desire  peace. 

We  must,  therefore,  furnish  our  representatives  accredited  to 
neutrals  (the  most  important  being  Spain  and  Holland)  with  the 
necessary  instructions,  so  that  they  may  be  able  to  account  for  our 


i  $6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cautious  attitude  and  explian  the  reasons  that  keep  us  from  making 
a  premature  or  one-sided  announcement  of  our  conditions. 

An  announcement  of  the  conditions  on  both  sides  would  expose 
the  belligerent  parties  in  both  camps  to  unfavorable  criticism  and 
might  easily  make  the  situation  more  strained ;  a  one-sided  announce- 
ment of  the  war  aims  would  simply  afford  the  leader  of  the  belligerent 
enemy  group  the  opportunity  of  undoing  everything. 

It  is  therefore  in  the  interests  of  peace  that  a  communication  oj 
the  peace  terms  should  only  be  made  mutually  and  confidentially, 
but  we  might  be  able  to  give  the  individual  neutral  various  hints 
concerning  it,  to  show  that  our  war  aims  coincide  with  the  lasting 
interests  of  humanity  and  the  peace  of  the  world,  that  our  chief 
aim,  the  prevention  of  Russian  world  dominion  on  land  and  of  the 
English  at  sea,  is  in  the  interests  of  the  entire  world,  and  that  our 
peace  terms  would  not  include  anything  that  would  endanger  the 
future  peace  of  the  world  or  could  be  objected  to  on  the  neutral  side. 

I  offer  these  views  for  your  consideration,  and  remain  in  truest 
friendship,  your  devoted  TISZA. 

My  predecessor,  Burian,  shortly  before  he  left,  had 
drawn  up  a  peace  proposal  together  with  Bethmann. 
The  Entente's  scornful  refusal  is  still  fresh  in  every 
one's  memory.  Since  hostilities  have  ceased  and  there 
have  been  opportunities  of  talking  to  members  of  the 
Entente,  I  have  often  heard  the  reproach  made  that 
the  offer  of  peace  could  not  have  been  accepted  by  the 
Entente,  as  it  was  couched  in  the  terms  of  a  conqueror 
who  "grants"  peace  terms  to  the  enemy.  Although 
I  will  not  attempt  to  deny  that  the  tone  of  the  peace 
proposal  was  very  arrogant — an  impression  which 
must  have  been  enhanced  by  Tisza's  speeches  in  the 
Hungarian  Parliament — I  think,  nevertheless,  that 
even  had  it  been  differently  worded  it  had  small  pros- 
pect of  success.  However  that  may  be,  the  stern 
refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Entente  only  strengthened 
the  situation  for  the  war-keen  military  party,  who, 
with  increased  vehemence,  maintained  the  point  that 
all  talk  of  peace  was  a  mistake,  and  that  the  fighting 
must  go  on  to  the  end, 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  157 

In  the  winter  of  1917  Italy  made  a  slight  advance. 
What  territorial  concessions  was  the  Monarchy  pre- 
pared to  make?  This  did  not  proceed  from  the  Italian 
government,  but  was  a  step  taken  by  a  private  individ- 
ual which  was  communicated  to  me  through  a  friendly 
government.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  judge  of  the 
true  value  of  such  a  step.  A  government  can  make 
use  of  a  private  individual  to  take  the  first  step — it  will 
probably  do  so  when  intercourse  is  desired;  but  it 
may  also  be  that  a  private  person,  without  instructions 
from,  or  the  knowledge  of,  his  government,  might  do 
the  same.  Cases  similar  to  the  last -mentioned  occurred 
frequently  during  my  term  of  office. 

I  always  held  the  standpoint  that  any  such  tentative 
steps  for  peace,  even  when  a  ministerial  source  could 
not  be  proved  a  priori,  should  be  treated  with  prudence, 
but  in  a  friendly  spirit.  In  the  above-mentioned  case, 
however,  the  fact  was  that  Italy  neither  could  sepa- 
rate from  her  allies,  not  did  she  wish  to  do  so.  Had 
that  been  her  purpose,  it  would  have  involved  her 
in  a  conflict  with  England,  whose  aim  in  war  was 
the  conquest  of  Germany  and  not  any  Italian  aspira- 
tions. A  separate  peace  with  Italy — her  separation 
from  her  allies — was  entirely  out  of  the  question,  but 
a  general  peace  would  only  be  possible  if  the  West- 
ern Powers  could  come  to  an  understanding  with 
Germany. 

The  only  object  gained  by  that  appeal  would  have 
been  to  confirm  the  extent  of  our  exhaustion  from  the 
war.  Had  I  answered  that  I  was  ready  to  give  up 
this  or  that  province,  it  would  have  been  interpreted 
as  a  conclusive  symptom  of  our  increasing  weakness, 
and  would  not  have  brought  peace  any  nearer,  but 
rather  kept  it  at  a  greater  distance. 

I  answered,  therefore,  in  friendly  tone  that  the 
Monarchy  did  not  aim  at  conquests,  and  that  I  was 


158  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ready  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  pre-war  conditions 
of  possession.  No  answer  was  sent. 

After  the  downfall  I  was  told  by  a  person,  certainly 
not  competent  to  judge,  that  my  tactics  had  been  mis- 
taken, as  Italy  would  have  separated  from  her  allies 
and  concluded  a  separate  peace.  Further  accounts 
given  in  this  chapter  prove  the  injustice  of  the  reproof. 
But  it  is  easy  now  to  confirm  the  impression  that  there 
was  not  a  single  moment  while  the  war  lasted  when 
Italy  ever  thought  of  leaving  her  allies. 

An  extraordinary  incident  occurred  at  the  end  of 
February,  1917.  A  person  came  to  me  on  February 
26th  who  was  in  a  position  to  give  credentials  show- 
ing him  to  be  a  recognized  representative  of  a 
neutral  Power,  and  informed  me  on  behalf  of  his 
government  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  let  me  know 
that  our  enemies — or  at  least  one  of  them — were  ready 
to  conclude  peace  with  us,  and  that  the  conditions 
would  be  favorable  for  us.  In  particular,  there  was 
to  be  no  question  of  separating  Hungary  or  Bohemia 
from  the  empire.  I  was  asked,  if  agreeable  to  the 
proposition,  to  communicate  my  conditions  through 
the  same  agency,  my  attention  being  called,  however, 
to  the  proviso  that  these  proposals  nade  by  the  enemy 
government  would  become  null  and  void  from  the  moment 
that  another  government  friendly  to  us  or  to  the  hostile 
country  heard  of  the  step. 

The  bearer  of  this  message  knew  nothing  beyond  its 
contents.  The  final  sentence  made  it  obvious  that 
one  of  the  enemy  Powers  was  anxious  to  negotiate 
unknown  to  the  others. 

I  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt  that  it  was  a  question 
of  Russia,  and  my  authority  confirmed  my  conviction 
by  stating  distinctly  that  he  could  not  say  so  positively. 
I  answered  at  once  by  telegram  on  February  27th 
through  the  agency  of  the  intervening  neutral  Power 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  159 

that  Austria-Hungary  was,  of  course,  ready  to  put  an 
end  to  further  bloodshed,  and  did  not  look  for  any 
gains  from  the  peace,  because,  as  stated  several  times, 
we  were  engaged  in  a  war  of  defense  only.  But  I  drew 
attention  to  the  rather  obscure  sense  of  the  application, 
not  being  able  to  understand  whether  the  state  apply- 
ing to  us  wished  for  peace  with  us  only,  or  with  the 
entire  group  of  Powers,  and  I  was  constrained  to  em- 
phasize the  fact  that  we  did  not  intend  to  separate 
from  our  allies.  I  was  ready,  however,  to  offer  my 
services  as  mediator  if,  as  presumed,  the  state  making 
the  advance  was  ready  to  conclude  peace  with  our 
entire  group  of  Powers.  I  would  guarantee  secrecy, 
as  I,  first  of  all,  considered  it  superfluous  to  notify 
our  allies.  The  moment  for  that  would  only  be  when 
the  situation  was  made  clear. 

This  was  followed  on  March  gth  by  a  reply  accepting, 
though  not  giving  a  direct  answer  to  the  point  of 
whether  the  proposal  was  for  a  peace  with  us  alone  or 
together  with  our  allies.  In  order  to  have  it  made 
clear  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  not  to  lose  further 
time,  I  answered  at  once,  requesting  the  hostile  Power 
to  send  a  confidential  person  to  a  neutral  country, 
whither  I  also  would  send  a  delegate,  adding  that  I 
hoped  that  the  meeting  would  have  a  favorable  result. 

I  never  received  any  answer  to  this  second  telegram. 
A  week  later,  on  March  i6th,  the  Tsar  abdicated.  Ob- 
viously, it  was  a  last  attempt  on  his  part  to  save  the 
situation,  which,  had  it  occurred  a  few  weeks  earlier, 
would  not  only  have  altered  the  fate  of  Russia,  but 
that  of  the  whole  world. 

The  Russian  revolution  placed  us  in  an  entirely  new 
situation.  After  all,  there  was  no  doubt  that  the  East 
presented  an  obvious  possibility  of  concluding  peace, 
and  all  our  efforts  were  turned  in  that  direction,  for 
we  were  anxious  to  seize  the  first  available  moment 


160  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  make  peace  with  the  Russian  Revolutionary  party, 
a  peace  which  the  Tsar,  faced  by  his  coming  downfall, 
had  not  been  able  to  achieve. 

If  the  spring  of  1917  was  noted  for  the  beginning 
of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  and  all  the  hopes 
centered  on  its  success  and  the  altered  situation 
anticipated  on  the  part  of  the  Germans,  the  summer 
of  the  same  year  proved  that  the  proceeding  did  not 
fulfil  all  expectations,  though  causing  great  anxiety 
to  England.  At  that  time  there  were  great  fears  in 
England  as  to  whether,  and  how,  the  U-boat  could  be 
paralyzed.  No  one  in  London  knew  whether  the  new 
means  to  counteract  it  would  suffice  before  they  had 
been  tried,  and  it  was  only  in  the  course  of  the  summer 
that  the  success  of  the  anti-submarine  weapons  and 
the  convoy  principle  was  confirmed. 

In  the  early  summer  of  1917  very  favorable  news  was 
received  relative  to  English  and  French  conditions. 
Information  was  sent  from  Madrid,  which  was  always 
a  reliable  source,  that  some  Spanish  officers  returning 
to  Madrid  from  England  reported  that  the  situation 
there  during  the  last  few  weeks  had  become  very  much 
worse  and  that  there  was  no  longer  any  confidence  in 
victory.  The  authorities  seized  all  the  provisions 
that  arrived  for  the  troops  and  the  munition-workers; 
potatoes  and  flour  were  not  to  be  obtained  by  the 
poorer  classes;  the  majority  of  sailors  fit  for  service 
had  been  enrolled  in  the  navy,  so  that  only  inefficient 
crews  were  left  in  the  merchant  service,  and  they 
were  difficult  to  secure,  owing  to  their  dread  of  U-boats, 
and,  therefore,  many  British  merchantmen  were  lying 
idle,  as  there  was  no  one  to  man  them. 

This  was  the  tenor  of  the  Spanish  reports  coming 
from  different  sources.  Similar  accounts,  though  in 
slightly  different  form,  came  from  France.  It  was 
stated  that  in  Paris  great  war-weariness  was  noticeable. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  i6r 

All  hope  of  definite  victory  was  as  good  as  given  up; 
an  end  must  certainly  come  before  the  beginning  of 
winter,  and  many  of  the  leading  authorities  were 
convinced  that  if  war  were  carried  on  into  the  winter 
the  result  would  be  as  in  Russia — a,  revolution. 

At  the  same  time  news  came  from  Constantinople 
that  one  of  the  enemy  Powers  in  that  quarter  had  made 
advances  for  a  separate  peace.  The  Turkish  govern- 
ment replied  that  it  would  not  separate  from  its  allies, 
but  was  prepared  to  discuss  a  general  peace  on  a  basis 
of  non-annexation.  Talaat  Pasha  notified  me  at  once 
of  the  request  and  his  answer.  Thereupon  nothing 
more  was  heard  from  the  enemy  Power.  At  the  same 
time  news  came  from  Rumania  evincing  great  anxiety 
concerning  the  increasing  break-up  in  Russia,  and 
acknowledging  that  she  considered  the  game  was  lost. 
The  revolution  and  the  collapse  of  the  army  in  Russia 
still  continued. 

Taken  altogether,  the  outlook  presented  a  more 
hopeful  picture  for  us,  and  justified  the  views  of  those 
who  had  always  held  that  a  little  more  "endurance" — 
to  use  a  word  since  become  ominous — would  lead  to  a 
decision. 

During  a  war  every  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  must 
attach  an  important  and  adequately  estimated  signif- 
icance to  confidential  reports.  The  hermetic  isolation 
which  during  the  World  War  divided  Europe  into  two 
separate  worlds  made  this  doubly  urgent.  But  it  is 
inevitable  in  regard  to  confidential  reports  that  they 
must  be  accepted,  for  various  reasons,  with  a  certain 
amount  of  skepticism.  Those  persons  who  write  and 
talk,  not  from  any  material,  but  from  political  interests, 
from  political  devotion  and  sympathy,  are,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  above  suspicion  of  reporting,  for 
their  own  personal  reasons,  more  optimistically  than 
is  justified.  But  they  are  apt  to  be  deceived.  Nations, 


i6a  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

too,  are  subject,  to  feelings,  and  the  feelings  of  the  masses 
must  not  be  taken  as  expressing  the  tendencies  of  the 
leading  influences.  France  was  tired  of  war,  but  how 
far  the  leading  statesmen  were  influenced  by  that  con- 
dition, not  to  be  compared  to  our  own  war-weariness, 
was  not  proved. 

In  persons  who  make  this  wittier  their  profession,  the 
wish  is  often  present,  alongside  the  comprehensible 
mistakes  they  make,  to  give  pleasure  and  satisfaction 
by  their  reports,  and  not  run  any  risk  of  losing  a 
lucrative  post.  I  think  it  will  be  always  well  to  esti- 
mate confidential  reports,  no  matter  from  what  source 
they  proceed,  as  being  50  per  cent,  less  optimistic 
than  they  appear.  The  more  pessimistic  opinion  that 
prevailed  in  Vienna,  compared  with  Berlin,  was  due, 
first  and  foremost,  to  the  reliance  placed  on  news 
coming  from  the  enemy  countries.  Berlin,  too,  was 
quite  certain  that  we  were  losing  time,  although  Beth- 
mann  once  thought  fit  in  the  Reichstag  to  assert  the 
contrary;  but  the  German  military  leaders  and  the 
politicians  looked  at  the  situation  among  our  opponents 
differently  from  us. 

When  the  Emperor  William  was  at  Laxenburg  in  the 
summer  of  1917  he  related  to  me  some  instances  of  the 
rapidly  increasing  food  trouble  in  England,  and  was 
genuinely  surprised  when  I  replied  that,  though  I  was 
convinced  that  the  U-boats  were  causing  great  distress, 
there  was  no  question  of  a  famine.  I  told  the  Emperor 
that  the  great  problem  was  whether  the  U-boats  would 
actually  interfere  with  the  transport  of  American  troops, 
as  the  German  military  authorities  asserted,  or  not, 
but  counseled  him  not  to  accept  as  very  serious  facts 
a  few  passing  incidents  that  might  have  occurred. 

After  the  beginning  of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  war- 
fare, I  repeat  that  many  grave  fears  were  entertained 
in  England.  It  is  a  well-known  fact.  But  it  was  a 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  163 

question  of  fears,  not  deeds.  A  person  who  knew  how 
matters  stood,  and  who  came  to  me  from  a  neutral 
country  in  the  summer  of  1917,  said:  "If  the  half 
only  of  the  fears  entertained  in  England  be  realized, 
then  the  war  will  be  over  in  the  autumn";  but  a  wide 
difference  existed  between  London's  fears  and  Berlin's 
hopes,  on  the  one  hand,  and  subsequent  events,  on  the 
other,  which  had  not  been  taken  into  account  by 
German  opinion. 

However  that  may  be,  I  consider  there  is  no  doubt 
that,  in  spite  of  the  announced  intervention  of  America, 
the  summer  of  1917  represented  a  more  hopeful  phase 
for  us.  We  were  carried  along  by  the  tide,  and  it  was 
essential  to  make  the  most  of  the  situation.  Germany 
must  be  brought  to  see  that  peace  must  be  made, 
in  case  the  peace  wave  became  stronger. 

I  resolved,  therefore,  to  propose  to  the  Emperor 
that  he  should  make  the  first  sacrifice  and  prove  to 
Berlin  that  it  was  not  only  by  words  that  he  sought 
for  peace.  I  asked  him  to  authorize  me  to  state  in 
Berlin  that,  in  the  event  of  Germany  coming  to  an 
agreement  with  France  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ques- 
tion, Austria  would  be  ready  to  cede  Galicia  to  Poland, 
which  was  about  to  be  reorganized,  and  to  make  efforts 
to  insure  that  this  Great-Polish  state  should  be  attached 
to  Germany — not  incorporated,  but,  say,  some  form  of 
personal  union. 

The  Emperor  and  I  went  to  Kreuznach,  where  T  first 
of  all  made  the  proposal  to  Bethmann  and  Zimmer- 
mann,  and  subsequently,  in  the  presence  of  the  Em- 
peror Charles  and  Bethmann,  laid  it  before  the  Em- 
peror William.  It  was  not  accepted  unconditionally, 
nor  yet  refused,  and  the  conference  terminated  with  a 
request  from  the  Germans  for  consideration  of  the 
question. 

In  making  this  proposal,  I  was  fully  aware  of  all  that 


i64  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

it  involved.  If  Germany  accepted  the  offer,  and  we  in 
our  consequent  negotiations  with  the  Entente  did  not 
secure  any  noteworthy  alterations  in  the  Treaty  of 
London,  we  could  count  on  war  only.  In  that  case, 
we  should  have  to  satisfy  not  only  Italy,  Rumania, 
and  Serbia,  but  would  also  lose  the  hoped-for  com- 
pensation in  the  annexation  of  Poland.  The  Emperor 
Charles  saw  the  situation  very  clearly,  but  resolved  at 
once,  nevertheless,  to  take  the  proposed  step. 

I,  however,  thoroughly  believed  then — though  wrong- 
fully— that  in  the  circumstances  London  and  Paris 
would  have  been  able  to  effect  an  amendment  in  the 
Treaty  of  London.  It  was  not  until  much  later  that  a 
definite  refusal  of  our  offer  was  sent  by  Germany. 

In  April,  before  a  decision  had  been  arrived  at,  I 
sent  a  report  to  the  Emperor  Charles  explaining  the 
situation  to  him,  and  requesting  that  he  would  submit 
it  to  the  Emperor  William. 

The  report  was  as  follows: 

Will  your  Majesty  permit  me,  with  the  frankness  granted  me 
from  the  first  day  of  my  appointment,  to  submit  to  your  Majesty 
my  responsible  opinion  of  the  situation? 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  our  military  strength  is  coming  to  an 
end.  To  enter  into  lengthy  details  in  this  connection  would  be  to 
take  up  your  Majesty's  time  needlessly. 

I  allude  only  to  the  decrease  in  raw  materials  for  the  production 
of  munitions,  to  the  thoroughly  exhausted  human  material,  and, 
above  all,  to  the  dull  despair  that  pervades  all  classes  owing  to 
under-nourishment  and  renders  impossible  any  further  endurance  of 
the  sufferings  from  the  war. 

Though  I  trust  we  shall  succeed  in  holding  out  during  the  next 
few  months  and  carry  out  a  successful  defense,  I  am  nevertheless 
quite  convinced  that  another  winter  campaign  would  be  absolutely 
out  of  the  question;  in  other  words,  that  in  the  late  summer  or  in 
the  autumn  an  end  must  be  put  to  the  war  at  all  costs. 

Without  a  doubt,  it  will  be  most  important  to  begin  peace  negotia- 
tions at  a  moment  when  the  enemy  has  not  yet  grasped  the  fact  of 
our  waning  strength.  If  we  approach  the  Entente  at  a  moment 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  165 

when  disturbances  in  the  interior  of  the  Empire  reveal  the  coming 
breakdown,  every  step  will  have  been  in  vain,  and  the  Entente  will 
agree  to  no  terms  except  such  as  would  mean  the  absolute  destruc- 
tion of  the  Central  Powers.  To  begin  at  the  right  time  is,  therefore, 
of  extreme  importance. 

I  cannot  here  ignore  the  subject  on  which  lies  the  crux  of  the 
whole  argument.  That  is,  the  danger  of  revolution  which  is  rising 
on  the  horizon  of  all  Europe  and  which,  supported  by  England,  is 
demonstrating  a  new  mode  of  fighting.  Five  monarchs  have  been 
dethroned  in  this  war,  and  the  amazing  facility  with  which  the 
strongest  Monarchy  in  the  world  was  overthrown  may  help  to  make 
us  feel  anxious  and  call  to  our  memory  the  saying,  exempla  trahunt. 
Let  it  not  be  said  that  in  Germany  or  Austria -Hungary  the  conditions 
are  different;  let  it  not  be  contested  that  the  firmly  rooted  mon- 
archist tendencies  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  exclude  the  possibility  of 
such  an  event.  This  war  has  opened  a  new  era  in  the  history  of 
the  world;  it  is  without  example  and  without  precedent.  The 
world  is  no  longer  what  it  was  three  years  ago,  and  it  will  be  vain 
to  seek  in  the  history  of  the  world  a  parallel  to  the  happenings 
that  have  now  become  daily  occurrences. 

The  statesman  who  is  neither  blind  nor  deaf  must  be  aware  how 
the  dull  despair  of  the  population  increases  day  by  day;  he  is  bound 
to  hear  the  sullen  grumbling  of  the  great  masses,  and  if  he  be  con- 
scious of  his  own  responsibility  he  must  pay  due  regard  to  that  factor. 

Your  Majesty  has  seen  the  secret  reports  from  the  governor  of 
the  town.  Two  things  are  obvious.  The  Russian  revolution  affects 
our  Slavs  more  than  it  does  the  Germans,  and  the  responsibility  for 
the  continuation  of  the  war  is  a  far  greater  one  for  the  monarch 
whose  country  is  united  only  through  the  dynasty  than  for  the  one 
where  the  people  themselves  are  fighting  for  their  national  inde- 
pendence. Your  Majesty  knows  that  the  burden  laid  upon  the 
population  has  assumed  proportions  that  are  unbearable;  your 
Majesty  knows  that  the  bow  is  strained  to  such  a  point  that  any 
day  it  may  be  expected  to  snap.  But  should  serious  disturbances 
occur,  either  here  or  in  Germany,  it  will  be  impossible  to  conceal 
the  fact  from  the  Entente,  and  from  that  moment  all  further  efforts 
to  secure  peace  will  be  defeated. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  internal  situation  in  Germany  is  widely 
different  from  what  it  is  here.  I  am  only  afraid  that  the  military 
circles  in  Berlin  are  deceiving  themselves  in  certain  matters.  I  am 
firmly  convinced  that  Germany,  too,  like  ourselves,  has  reached  the 
limit  of  her  strength,  and  the  responsible  political  leaders  in  Berlin 
do  not  seek  to  deny  it. 

12 


166  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I  am  firmly  persuaded  that,  if  Germany  were  to  attempt  to 
embark  on  another  winter  campaign,  there  would  be  an  upheaval 
in  the  interior  of  the  country  which,  to  my  mind,  would  be  far  worse 
than  a  peace  concluded  by  the  monarchs.  If  the  monarchs  of  the 
Central  Powers  are  not  able  to  conclude  peace  within  the  next  few 
months,  it  will  be  done  for  them  by  their  people,  and  then  will  the 
tide  of  revolution  sweep  away  all  that  for  which  our  sons  and 
brothers  fought  and  died. 

I  do  not  wish  to  make  any  oratio  pro  dotno,  but  I  beg  your  Majesty 
graciously  to  remember  that  I,  the  only  one  to  predict  the  Rumanian 
war  two  years  before,  spoke  to  deaf  ears,  and  that  when  I,  two 
months  before  the  war  broke  out,  prophesied  almost  the  very 
day  when  it  would  begin,  nobody  would  believe  me.  I  am  just  as 
convinced  of  my  present  diagnosis  as  I  was  of  the  former  one,  and 
I  cannot  too  insistently  urge  you  not  to  estimate  too  lightly  the 
dangers  that  I  see  ahead. 

Without  a  doubt,  the  American  declaration  of  war  has  greatly 
aggravated  the  situation.  It  may  be  many  months  before  America 
can  throw  any  noteworthy  forces  into  the  field,  but  the  moral  fact, 
the  fact  that  the  Entente  has  the  hope  of  fresh  forces,  brings  the 
situation  to  an  unfavorable  stage  for  us,  because  our  enemies  have 
more  time  before  them  than  we  have  and  can  afford  to  wait  longer 
than  we,  unfortunately,  are  able  to  do.  It  cannot  yet  be  said  what 
course  events  will  take  in  Russia.  I  hope — and  this  is  the  vital 
point  of  my  whole  argument — that  Russia  has  lost  her  motive 
power  for  a  long  time  to  come,  perhaps  forever,  and  that  this  im- 
portant factor  will  be  made  use  of.  I  expect,  nevertheless,  that  a 
Franco-English,  probably  also  an  Italian,  offensive  will  be  launched 
at  the  first  opportunity,  though  I  hope  and  trust  that  we  shall  be 
able  to  repulse  both  attacks.  If  this  succeeds — and  I  reckon  it 
can  be  done  in  two  or  three  months — we  must  then,  before  America 
takes  any  further  military  action  to  our  disadvantage,  make  a  more 
comprehensive  and  detailed  peace  proposal  and  not  shrink  from 
the  probably  great  and  heavy  sacrifices  we  may  have  to  make. 

Germany  places  great  hopes  on  the  U-boat  warfare.  I  consider 
such  hopes  are  deceptive.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  disparage  the 
fabulous  deeds  of  the  German  sea  heroes;  I  admit  admiringly  that 
the  tonnage  sunk  per  month  is  phenomenal,  but  I  assert  that  the 
success  anticipated  and  predicted  by  the  Germans  has  not  been 
achieved. 

Your  Majesty  will  remember  that  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff , 
when  last  in  Vienna,  told  us  positively  that  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare  would  bring  England  to  her  knees  within  six  months.! 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  167 

Your  Majesty  will  also  remember  how  we  combated  the  prediction 
and  declared  that,  though  we  did  not  doubt  the  U-boat  campaign 
would  seriously  affect  England,  yet  the  looked-for  success  would  be 
discounted  by  the  anticipated  entry  of  America  into  the  war.  It  is 
now  two  and  a  half  months  (almost  half  the  time  stated)  since  the 
U-boat  warfare  started,  and  all  the  information  that  we  get  from 
England  is  to  the  effect  that  the  downfall  of  this,  our  most  powerful 
and  most  dangerous  adversary,  is  not  to  be  thought  of.  If,  in  spite 
of  many  scruples,  your  Majesty  yielded  to  Germany's  wish  and 
consented  to  allow  the  Austro-Hungarian  navy  to  take  part  in  the 
U-boat  warfare,  it  was  not  because  we  were  converted  by  the  Ger- 
man arguments,  but  because  your  Majesty  deemed  it  to  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  act  with  Germany  in  loyal  concert  in  all  quarters 
and  because  we  were  firmly  persuaded  that  Germany,  unfortunately, 
would  never  desist  from  her  resolve  to  begin  the  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare. 

To-day,  however,  in  Germany  the  most  enthusiastic  advocates 
of  the  U-boat  warfare  are  beginning  to  see  that  this  means  to  victory 
will  not  be  decisive,  and  I  trust  that  the  mistaken  idea  that  England 
within  a  few  months  will  be  forced  to  sue  for  peace  will  lose  ground 
in  Berlin  too.  Nothing  is  more  dangerous  in  politics  than  to  believe 
the  things  one  wishes  to  believe;  nothing  is  more  fatal  than  the 
principle  not  to  wish  to  see  the  truth  and  to  fall  a  prey  to  Utopian 
illusions  from  which  sooner  or  later  a  terrible  awakening  will  follow. 

England,  the  motive  power  in  the  war,  will  not  be  compelled  to 
lay  down  her  arms  in  a  few  months'  time,  but  perhaps — and  here 
I  concede  a  limited  success  to  the  U-boat  scheme — perhaps  England 
in  a  few  months  will  ask  herself  whether  it  is  wise  and  sensible  to 
continue  this  war  d  I'outrance,  or  whether  it  would  not  be  more 
statesman-like  to  set  foot  upon  the  golden  bridges  the  Central 
Powers  must  build  for  her,  and  then  the  moment  will  have  come 
for  great  and  painful  sacrifices  on  the  part  of  the  Central  Powers. 

Your  Majesty  has  rejected  the  repeated  attempts  of  our  enemies 
to  separate  us  from  our  allies,  in  which  step  I  took  the  responsibility 
because  your  Majesty  is  incapable  of  any  dishonorable  action.  But 
at  the  same  time,  your  Majesty  instructed  me  to  notify  the  states- 
men of  the  German  Empire  that  our  strength  is  at  an  end  and  that 
after  the  close  of  the  summer  Germany  must  not  reckon  on  us  any 
longer.  I  carried  out  these  commands  and  the  German  statesmen 
left  me  in  no  doubt  that  for  Germany,  too,  another  winter  campaign 
would  be  impossible.  In  this  one  sentence  may  be  summed  up 
all  that  I  have  to  say: 

We  can  still  wait  some  weeks  and  try  if  there  is  any  possibility 


168  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  dealing  with  Paris  or  Petersburg.  If  that  does  not  succeed,  then 
we  must — and  at  the  right  time — play  our  last  card  and  make  the 
extreme  proposals  I  have  already  hinted  at.  Your  Majesty  has 
proved  that  you  have  no  selfish  plans  and  that  you  do  not  expect 
from  your  German  ally  sacrifices  that  your  Majesty  would  not  be 
ready  to  make  yourself.  More  than  that  cannot  be  expected. 

Your  Majesty,  nevertheless,  owes  it  to  God  and  to  your  peoples 
to  make  very  effort  to  avert  the  catastrophe  of  a  collapse  of  the 
Monarchy;  it  is  your  sacred  duty  to  God  and  to  your  peoples  to 
defend  those  peoples,  the  dynastic  principle,  and  your  throne  with 
all  the  means  in  your  power  and  to  your  very  last  breath. 

On  May  nth  there  came  the  following  official  answer 
from  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  which  was  sent  by  the 
German  Emperor  to  the  Emperor  Charles,  and  then 
to  me: 

In  accordance  with  your  Majesty's  commands  I  beg  most  humbly 
to  submit  the  following  in  answer  to  the  inclosed  expose  from  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  1 2th  ult. 

Since  the  expose  was  drawn  up,  the  French  and  English  on  the 
western  front  have  carried  out  the  predicted  great  offensive  on  a 
wide  front,  ruthlessly  sacrificing  masses  of  men  and  an  enormous 
quantity  of  war  material.  The  German  army  checked  the  advance 
of  the  numerically  superior  enemy;  further  attacks,  as  we  have 
every  reason  to  believe,  will  also  be  shattered  by  the  heroism  of  the 
men  and  the  iron  will  of  their  leaders. 

Judging  from  all  our  experiences  hitherto  in  the  war,  we  may 
consider  the  situation  of  the  allied  armies  on  the  Isonzo  with  the 
same  confidence. 

The  eastern  front  has  been  greatly  reduced,  owing  to  the  political 
unheaval  in  Russia.  There  can  be  no  question  of  an  offensive  on  a 
large  scale  on  the  part  of  Russia.  A  further  easing  of  the  situation 
would  release  more  men  even  if  it  were  considered  necessary  to  have 
a  strong  barrier  on  the  Russian  frontier  to  guard  against  local  dis- 
turbances owing  to  the  revolutionary  movement.  With  the  addi- 
tional forces,  the  conditions  in  the  west  would  become  more  favor- 
able for  us.  The  withdrawal  of  men  would  also  provide  more  troops 
for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  for  the  successful  carrying 
out  of  the  fighting  on  the  Italian  front  until  the  end  of  the  war  is 
reached. 

In  both  allied  monarchies  there  is  an  ample  supply  of  raw  ma- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  169 

terial  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions.  Our  situation  as  regards 
provisions  is  such  that  with  the  greatest  economy  we  can  hold  out 
until  the  new  harvest.  The  same  applies  to  Austria-Hungary, 
especially  if  her  share  of  supplies  from  Rumania  is  taken  into 
consideration. 

The  deeds  of  our  navy  rank  beside  the  successes  of  the  army. 
When  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff  was  permitted  to  lay  before  his 
Apostolic  Majesty  the  plans  for  the  U-boat  warfare,  the  prospects 
of  success  for  this  stringent  measure  had  been  thoroughly  tested 
here  and  the  expected  military  advantages  weighed  against  the 
political  risk.  We  did  not  conceal  from  ourselves  that  the  infliction 
of  a  blockade  of  the  coasts  of  England  and  France  would  bring 
about  the  entry  into  war  of  the  United  States  and,  consequently,  a 
falling  off  of  other  neutral  states.  We  were  fully  aware  that  our 
enemies  would  thus  gain  a  moral  and  economic  renewal  of  strength, 
but  we  were,  and  still  are,  convinced  that  the  disadvantages  of  the 
U-boat  warfare  are  far  surpassed  by  its  advantages.  The  largest 
share  in  the  world  struggle  which  began  in  the  east  has  now  been 
transferred  to  the  west  in  ever  increasing  dimensions,  where  English 
tenacity  and  endurance  promote  and  strengthen  the  resistance  of 
our  enemies  by  varied  means.  A  definite  and  favorable  result  for 
us  could  be  achieved  only  by  a  determined  attack  on  the  vital  spot 
in  the  hostile  forces;  that  is,  England. 

The  success  obtained  and  the  effect  already  produced  by  the 
U-boat  warfare  exceed  all  calculations  and  expectations.  The  latest 
statements  of  leading  men  in  England  concerning  the  increasing 
difficulty  in  obtaining  provisions  and  the  stoppage  of  supplies,  as 
well  as  corresponding  comments  in  the  press,  not  only  include  urgent 
appeals  to  the  people  to  put  forth  their  utmost  strength,  but  bear 
also  the  stamp  of  grave  anxiety  and  testify  to  the  distress  that 
England  is  suffering. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Helfferich,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Head 
Committee  of  the  Reichstag  on  the  28th  ult.,  gave  a  detailed  account 
of  the  effects  of  the  U-boat  warfare  on  England.  The  review  was 
published  in  the  Norddeutsche  Allgetneine  Zeitung  of  the  ist  inst. 
I  beg  herewith  to  refer  to  the  inclosed.1 

According  to  the  latest  news  the  Food  Controller,  Lord  Rhondda, 
owing  to  the  inadequate  supply  of  corn,  has  been  compelled  to 
specify  a  new  allotment  of  cargo  space.  This  is  already  so  restricted 
that  more  room  for  corn  can  be  secured  only  by  hindering  the  con- 
duct of  the  war  in  other  ways.  Apart  from  abandoning  overseas 

1  Helfferich's  expose  is  reproduced  in  the  Appendix. 


i7o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

traffic,  vessels  could  be  released  only  by  cutting  down  such  imports  as 
absorbed  much  space.  England  requires  not  only  great  transport 
facilities  for  provisions,  but  also  for  the  import  of  ore  to  keep  up 
war  industries,  and  also  pit  props  to  enable  the  coal  output  to  be 
kept  at  a  high  level.  In  the  case  of  the  ore  needed  for  England 
and  the  wood  available  in  the  country,  it  is  not  possible  to  restrict 
the  cargo  space  in  these  two  instances.  Already,  after  three  months 
of  the  U-boat  warfare,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  shortage  of  cargo  space 
caused  by  the  U-boats  reduces  the  living  conditions  of  the  popula- 
tion to  an  unbearable  extent,  and  paralyzes  all  war  industries,  so 
much  so  that  the  hope  of  defeating  Germany  by  superior  stores  of 
munitions  and  a  greater  number  of  guns  has  had  to  be  given  up. 
The  lack  of  transport  facilities  will  also  prevent  the  larger  output  of 
war  industries  hi  America  making  up  for  the  lesser  output  in  Eng- 
land. The  speed  with  which  the  U-boat  warfare  has  destroyed 
vessels  excludes  the  possibility  of  building  new  vessels  to  furnish  ade- 
quate cargo  space.  More  vessels  have  been  destroyed  in  a  month 
of  U-boat  warfare  than  the  English  dockyards  have  turned  out  in 
the  last  year.  Even  the  thousand  much-talked-of  American  wooden 
vessels,  if  they  were  there,  would  cover  the  losses  of  only  four 
months.  But  they  will  not  come  before  it  is  too  late.  English 
experts  on  the  subject  have  already  said  cjuite  openly  that  there 
are  only  two  ways  of  counteracting  the  effect  of  the  U-boats: 
either  to  build  vessels  quicker  than  the  Germans  destroy  them,  or 
else  to  destroy  the  U-boats  quicker  than  the  Germans  can  build 
them.  The  first  has  proved  to  be  impossible,  and  the  U-boat  losses 
are  far  less  than  the  new  vessels  building. 

England  will  also  have  to  reckon  on  a  progressive  rise  in  the  loss 
of  tonnage. 

The  effects  of  the  U-boat  warfare  on  the  peoples'  provisions  and 
on  all  private  and  government  activities  will  be  felt  more  and  more. 

I  anticipate,  therefore,  the  final  results  of  the  U-boat  warfare  with 
the  greatest  confidence. 

According  to  secret  and  reliable  information,  the  Prime  Minister 
Ribot  recently  stated  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  Paris  that  France 
was  faced  with  exhaustion.  This  opinion  was  expressed  before  the 
beginning  of  the  last  Franco-English  offensive.  Since  then,  France 
has  sacrificed  life  to  a  terrible  extent  by  keeping  up  the  intensity  of 
the  fighting  until  the  offensive  ceased. 

The  French  nation  is  certainly  doing  marvelous  things  in  this 
war,  but  the  government  cannot  sustain  the  enormous  burden  after 
it  reaches  a  certain  limit.  A  reaction  in  the  temper  of  France,  which 
is  kept  up  by  artificial  means,  is  inevitable. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  171 

As  regards  our  own  internal  situation,  I  do  not  underestimate 
the  difficulties  presented  by  the  inevitable  results  of  the  severe  fight- 
ing and  the  exclusion  from  the  seas.  But  I  firmly  believe  that  we 
shall  succeed  in  overcoming  these  difficulties  without  permanently 
endangering  the  nation's  strength  and  general  welfare,  without  any 
further  crises  and  without  menace  to  government  organization. 

Although  we  are  justified  in  viewing  the  total  situation  in  a 
favorable  light,  I  am  nevertheless  in  complete  agreement  with 
Count  Czernin  in  pursuing  the  aim  of  bringing  about  as  speedily 
as  possible  an  honorable  and,  in  the  interests  of  the  Empire  and 
of  our  allies,  just  peace.  I  also  share  his  opinion  that  the  important 
factor  of  the  weakening  of  Russia  must  be  exploited,  and  that  a 
fresh  tentative  offer  for  peace  must  be  put  forward  at  a  time  when 
both  political  and  military  initiative  are  still  in  our  hands.  Count 
Czernin  estimates  a  suitable  time  will  be  in  two  or  three  months, 
when  the  enemy  offensive  will  be  at  an  end.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
in  view  of  the  French  and  English  expectations  of  the  decisive  suc- 
cess for  their  offensive,  and  the  Entente  not  having  lost  all  hopes  of 
Russia  resuming  her  activities,  any  too  pronounced  preparations 
for  peace  would  not  only  be  doomed  to  failure,  but  would  put  new 
life  into  the  enemy  by  revealing  the  hopeless  exhaustion  of  the 
Central  Powers'  forces.  At  the  present  moment  a  general  peace 
could  be  bought  only  by  our  submission  to  the  will  of  the  enemy. 
A  peace  of  that  nature  would  not  be  tolerated  by  the  people  and 
would  lead  to  fatal  dangers  for  the  Monarchy.  It  appears  to  me 
that  quiet,  determination,  and  caution  as  regards  the  outer  world 
are  more  than  ever  an  imperative  necessity.  The  development  of 
affairs  in  Russia  has  hitherto  been  favorable  for  us.  Party  disputes 
are  kept  more  and  more  within  the  narrow  limits  of  peace  and  war 
questions  by  political,  economic,  and  social  exigencies,  and  the 
impression  grows  every  day  that  the  party  which  makes  for  peace 
with  the  Central  Powers  will  be  the  one  to  remain  in  power.  It  is 
our  solemn  duty  carefully  to  follow  and  encourage  the  process  of 
development  and  disruption  in  Russia,  and  to  sound  the  country, 
not  with  too  obvious  haste,  but  yet  with  sufficient  expert  skill  to 
lead  to  practical  peace  negotiations.  The  probability  is  that  Russia 
will  avoid  any  appearance  of  treachery  toward  her  allies,  and  will 
endeavor  to  find  a  method  which  will  practically  lead  to  a  state  of 
peace  between  herself  and  the  Central  Powers,  but  outwardly  will 
have  the  appearance  of  the  union  of  both  parties  as  a  prelude  to  the 
general  peace. 

As  in  July,  1914,  we  entered  regardlessly  into  a  loyal  alliance 
with  Austria-Hungary,  in  like  manner  when  the  World  War  is  at  an 


i72  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

end  will  a  basis  be  found  for  terms  which  will  guarantee  a  prosperous 
peace  to  the  two  closely  united  monarchies. 

This  optimistic  reply  of  Bethmann's  was  obviously 
not  only  based  on  the  idea  of  infusing  more  confidence 
in  the  future  in  us,  but  was  also  the  true  expression 
of  a  more  favorable  atmosphere  prevailing,  as  Berlin 
naturally  received  the  same  reports  from  the  enemy 
countries  as  we  did. 

I  received  about  that  time  a  letter  from  Tisza  which 
contained  the  following  passage: 

The  varied  information  received  from  the  enemy  countries  leaves 
no  doubt  that  the  war  is  drawing  to  a  close.  It  is  now  above  all 
essential  to  keep  a  steady  nerve  and  play  the  game  to  the  end  with 
sang-froid.  Let  there  be  no  signs  of  weakness.  It  is  not  from  a  love 
of  humanity  in  general  that  our  enemies  have  become  more  peace- 
fully inclined,  but  because  they  realize  that  we  cannot  be  crushed. 

I  beg  of  you  no  longer  to  give  vent  to  the  sentiments  in  your 
report  of  April  i2th.  A  pessimistic  tendency  evinced  now  by  the 
leader  of  our  foreign  affairs  would  ruin  everything.  I  know  that 
you  are  prudent,  but  I  beg  you  to  use  your  influence  so  that  both 
his  Majesty  and  his  entourage  may  show  a  confident  front  to  the 
world.  And  again,  no  one  will  have  anything  to  say  to  us  if  they 
cease  to  believe  in  our  powers  of  resistance — and  are  not  persuaded 
that  our  alliance  rests  on  a  solid  foundation. 

It  was  evident  that  the  only  right  tactics  were  to 
make  the  supremest  efforts  at  the  front  and  throughout 
the  country,  on  the  one  hand,  in  order  to  hold  the 
situation  a  little  longer,  and,  on  the  other,  to  persuade 
the  enemy  that,  in  spite  of  the  favorable  situation, 
we  were  prepared  for  peace  without  conquest.  To 
appoint  Hebel  to  the  German  Military  Commission  to 
carry  out  this  last  procedure  seemed  devoid  of  sense. 
Neither  did  I  expect  to  gain  much  from  recent  inter- 
vention in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  and  endeavored,  there- 
fore, to  put  myself  in  direct  touch  with  the  German 
Reichstag. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  173 

One  of  my  political  friends  who  had  numerous  and 
excellent  connections  with  the  German  Reichstag  put 
himself  into  communication  with  different  leaders  in 
Berlin  and  explained  to  them  the  situation  in  the 
Monarchy.  It  was  understood  that  this  gentleman 
was  not  acting  for  the  Ministry,  but  presenting  his  own 
impressions  and  views.  He  was  enjoined  to  be  very 
cautious,  as  any  indiscretion  might  have  incalculable 
consequences.  If  the  Entente  were  to  imagine  that 
we  were  thinking  of  ending  the  war,  not  for  love  of 
peace,  but  because  we  simply  could  not  hold  out  any 
longer,  all  efforts  would  have  been  vain.  In  that 
respect,  Tisza  was  perfectly  right.  It  was,  therefore, 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  person  to  whom  this 
delicate  mission  had  been  intrusted  should  act  in  such 
a  manner  as  would  keep  it  a  secret  from  the  Entente, 
a  manner  devoid  of  weakness  and  uniting  confidence 
with  reasonable  war  aims,  but  also  in  a  manner  which 
would  enable  the  Ministry  eventually  to  disavow  the 
advances. 

My  friend  undertook  the  task  with  just  as  great 
zeal  as  efficiency,  and,  in  brief,  this  is  what  he  told  the 
Berlin  leaders,  Erzberger1  and  Sudekum  in  particular. 
As  far  as  he  could  judge,  we  had  now  reached  a  turning- 
point.  The  next  few  weeks  would  decide  whether  it 
was  to  be  peace  or  war  d  I'outrance.  France  was  tired 
and  not  anxious  for  America's  entry  into  the  war  if 
it  was  not  to  be.  If  Germany  forced  the  Entente  to 
continue  the  war  the  situation  would  be  very  grave. 
Neither  Austria-Hungary  nor  Turkey  could  do  more. 
Germany  by  herself  could  not  bring  the  war  to  a 
successful  end.  Austria-Hungary's  position  was  obvi- 
ous to  the  whole  world.  She  was  ready  to  make  peace 

1  At  this  time  I  did  not  know  that  my  secret  report  to  the  Emperor 
was  handed  over  to  Herr  Erzberger  and  not  kept  secret  by  him.  (Later 
it  was  made  public  through  the  revelations  of  Count  Wedel.) 


174  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

without  annexations  and  without  war  compensation, 
and  to  devote  all  her  energies  to  preventing  the  recur- 
rence of  a  war.  (Austria-Hungary's  standpoint  was 
that  a  universal,  equal,  but  extensive  disarmament  on 
sea  and  on  land  offered  the  only  means  to  restore  the 
financial  situation  in  Europe  after  the  war.) 

Germany  must  publicly  notify  her  position  just  as 
clearly  as  Austria-Hungary  had  done  and  must  declare 
the  following : 

(1)  No  annexations,  no  indemnities. 

(2)  Particularly  the  unconditional  and  total  release 

of  Belgium  (politically  and  economically). 

(3)  All  territories  occupied  by  Germany  and  Austria- 

Hungary  to  be  evacuated  as  soon  as  both  those 
states  had  had  their  territories  restored  to 
them  (including  the  German  colonies). 

(4)  Germany,  as  well  as  Austria-Hungary,  to  work 

for  a  general  disarmament  and  guaranty  that 
no  further  war  be  possible. 

Such  declaration  to  be  a  joint  one  from  the  Ger- 
man government  and  the  Reichstag,  and  to  be  made 
public. 

The  peace  resolution  of  July  19,  1917,  was  the  result 
of  this  step.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  Bethmann  was 
the  first  victim.  The  Supreme  Military  Command, 
by  whom  he  always  had  been  persecuted,  now  trying 
to  secure  his  dismissal,  declared  such  resolution  to  be 
unacceptable.  When  Bethmann  had  gone  and  Mi- 
chaelis  had  been  appointed,  they  were  satisfied. 

Although  the  resolution  in  itself  was  satisfactory, 
it  had  one  fault  at  the  start.  It  was  no  secret  that 
every  one  connected  with  Pan-Germanism,  especially 
the  German  generals,  disagreed  with  the  decision, 
and  would  not  accept  the  resolution  as  an  admission 
from  the  entire  country.  Certainly  the  great  majority 
in  Germany,  counting  them  per  head,  supported  the 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  175 

resolution,  but  the  leading  men,  together  with  a  con- 
siderable following,  were  opposed  to  it.  The  "Starva- 
tion Peace,"  the  "Peace  of  Renunciation,"  and  the 
"Scheidemann  Peace"  were  the  subjects  of  articles  in 
the  papers  expressing  the-,greatest  disapproval  of  the 
resolution.  Neither  did  the  German  government  take 
up  any  decided  attitude.  On  July  igth  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  Michaelis  made  a  speech  approving  the 
resolution,  but  adding,  "as  I  understand  it." 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  wrote  a  letter  to  me  in 
August  confirming  his  very  optimistic  views  of  the 
situation,  and  defining  Germany's  views  regarding 
Belgium.  The  phrase,  "as  I  understand  it,"  above 
alluded  to  in  his  approval  of  the  resolution,  was  ex- 
plained in  his  letter,  at  any  rate,  as  to  the  Belgium 
question:  "As  Germany  wishes  to  reserve  to  herself 
the  right  to  exercise  a  far-reaching  military  and  eco- 
nomic influence  on  Belgium."  He  wrote  as  follows : 

BERLIN,  August  17,  1917. 

DEAR  COUNT  CZERNIN, — According  to  our  agreement,  I  take  the 
liberty  briefly  to  lay  before  you  my  views  of  our  discussions  of  the 
1 4th  and  isth  inst.,  and  would  be  extremely  grateful  if  your  Excel- 
lency would  be  so  kind  as  to  advise  me  of  your  views  on  my  activities. 

The  internal  economic  and  political  situation  in  Germany  justifies 
me  in  the  firm  belief  that  Germany  herself  would  be  able  to  stand 
a  fourth  year  of  war.  The  bread-corn  harvest  promises  better  than 
we  thought  five  or  six  weeks  ago,  and  will  be  better  than  that  of  the 
previous  year.  The  potato  harvest  promises  a  considerably  higher 
yield  than  in  1916-17.  Fodder  is  estimated  to  be  much  less  than 
last  year;  by  observing  a  unified  and  well-thought-out  economic 
plan  for  Germany  herself  and  the  occupied  territories,  including 
Rumania,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  hold  out  in  regard  to  fodder, 
as  was  also  possible  in  the  very  dry  year  1915. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  political  situation  is  grave.  The 
people  are  suffering  from  the  war,  and  the  longing  for  peace  is  very 
great;  however,  there  is  no  trace  of  any  general  and  really  morbid 
exhaustion,  and  when  food  is  controlled  any  work  done  will  be  no 
worse  than  it  was  last  year. 


176  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

This  economic  and  political  prospect  can  only  be  altered  if  the 
condition  of  the  allies,  or  of  the  neutrals,  under  pressure  from  the 
Entente,  should  become  very  much  worse.  It  would  be  a  change 
for  the  worse  for  us  if  our  allies  or  the  neutral  states,  contrary  to 
our  expectations  and  hopes,  were  to  experience  such  shortage  as 
would  cause  them  to  turn  to  us.  To  a  certain  extent,  this  is  already 
the  case;  a  further  increase  of  their  claims  would  greatly  prejudice 
our  economic  position  and  in  certain  cases  endanger  it.  It  must 
be  admitted  that  the  situation  in  the  fourth  year  of  war  in  general 
is  more  difficult  than  in  the  third  year.  The  most  earnest  endeavors, 
therefore,  will  be  made  to  bring  about  a  peace  as  soon  as  possible. 

Nevertheless,  our  genuine  desire  for  peace  must  not  lead  us  to 
come  forward  with  a  fresh  peace  proposal.  That,  in  my  opinion, 
would  be  a  great  tactical  error.  Our  demarche  for  peace  last  Decem- 
ber found  sympathy  in  the  neutral  states,  but  it  was  answered  by 
our  adversaries  raising  their  demands.  A  fresh  step  of  the  kind 
would  be  put  down  to  our  weakness  and  would  prolong  the  war; 
any  peace  advances  must  come  now  from  the  enemy. 

The  leading  motive  in  my  foreign  policy  will  always  be  the 
watchful  care  of  our  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  that  the  storm 
of  war  has  made  still  stronger,  and  a  trusting,  friendly  and  loyal 
co-operation  with  the  leading  men  of  the  allied  Monarchy.  If  the 
spirit  of  the  alliance — and  in  this  I  know  your  Excellency  agrees — 
remains  on  the  same  high  level  as  heretofore,  even  our  enemies 
would  see  that  it  was  impossible  for  one  of  the  allies  to  agree  to 
any  separate  negotiations  offered  to  him,  unless  he  states  beforehand 
that  the  discussion  would  be  entered  into  only  if  the  object  were  a 
general  peace.  If  this  were  clearly  laid  down  there  could  be  no 
reason  why  one  of  the  allies  should  not  listen  to  such  proposal  from 
the  enemy  and  with  him  discuss  preparations  for  peace. 

At  present  no  decided  line  of  action  can  be  specified  for  such  a 
proceeding.  Your  Excellency  was  good  enough  to  ask  me  whether 
the  reinstatement  of  the  status  quo  would  be  a  suitable  basis  on 
which  to  start  negotiations.  My  standpoint  in  this  matter  is  as 
follows:  I  have  already  stated  in  the  Reichstag  that  Germany  is  not 
striving  for  any  great  changes  in  power  after  the  war,  and  is  ready 
to  negotiate  provided  the  enemy  does  not  demand  the  cession  of  any 
German  territory;  with  such  a  conception  of  the  term  "reinstate- 
ment of  the  status  quo"  that  form  would  be  a  very  suitable  basis  for 
negotiations.  This  would  not  exclude  the  desired  possibility  of 
retaining  the  present  frontiers,  and  by  negotiating  bring  former 
enemy  economic  territory  into  close  economic  and  military  conjunc- 
tion with  Germany — this  would  refer  to  Courland,  Lithuania,  and 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  177 

Poland — and  thus  secure  Germany's  frontiers  and  give  a  guaranty 
for  her  vital  needs  on  the  continent  and  overseas. 

Germany  is  ready  to  evacuate  the  occupied  French  territory,  but 
must  reserve  to  herself  the  right,  by  means  of  the  peace  negotiations, 
to  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  territory  of  Longwy  and  Briey, 
if  not  through  direct  incorporation,  by  a  legal  grant  to  exploit.  We 
are  not  in  a  position  to  cede  to  France  any  noteworthy  districts  in 
Alsace-Lorraine. 

I  should  wish  to  have  a  free  hand  in  the  negotiations  in  the  matter 
of  connecting  Belgium  with  Germany  in  a  military  and  economic 
sense.  The  terms  that  I  read  out,  taken  from  notes  at  the  Kreuznach 
negotiations — the  military  control  of  Belgium  until  the  conclusion 
of  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance  with  Germany,  the  acquisition 
of  Liege  (or  a  long-term  rental  thereof) — were  the  maximum  claims 
of  the  Supreme  Military  and  Naval  Command.  The  Supreme  Mili- 
tary Command  agrees  with  me  that  these  terms  or  similar  ones  can 
be  secured  only  if  peace  can  be  enforced  on  England.  But  we  are 
of  opinion  that  a  vast  amount  of  economic  and  military  influence 
must  be  brought  to  bear  in  Belgium  in  the  matter  of  the  negotiations 
and  would  perhaps  not  meet  with  much  resistance,  because  Belgium, 
from  economic  distress,  will  come  to  see  that  her  being  joined  to 
Germany  is  the  best  guaranty  for  a  prosperous  future. 

As  regards  Poland,  I  note  that  the  confidential  hint  from  your 
Excellency  to  give  up  Galicia  and  enroll  it  in  the  new  Polish  state 
is  subject  to  the  ceding  of  portions  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France, 
which  was  to  be  as  a  counter-sacrifice,  but  must  be  considered  as  out 
of  the  question.  The  development  of  Poland  as  an  independent 
state  must  be  carried  out  in  the  sense  of  the  proclamation  of  No- 
vember 5,  1916.  Whether  this  development  will  prove  to  be  an 
actual  advantage  for  Germany  or  will  become  a  great  danger  for 
the  future  will  be  tested  later.  There  are  already  many  signs  of 
danger,  and  what  is  particularly  to  be  feared  is  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  cannot  notify  us  now  during  the  war  of  her 
complete  indifference  to  Poland  and  leave  us  a  free  hand  in  the 
administration  of  the  whole  state. 

It  will  also  remain  to  be  seen  whether,  in  view  of  the  danger 
caused  to  Germany  and  also  to  her  relations  with  Austria-Hungary 
through  Poland's  unwillingness  to  accept  the  situation,  it  would 
not  be  more  desirable  politically  for  Germany,  while  retaining  the 
frontier  territory  as  being  necessary  for  military  protection,  to  grant 
to  Poland  full  right  of  self-determination,  also  with  the  possibility 
of  being  joined  to  Russia. 

The  question  of  the  annexation  of  Rumania,  according  to  the 


i78  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Kreuznach  debate  of  May  ist,  must  be  treated  further  and  solved 
in  connection  with  the  questions  that  are  of  interest  to  Germany 
respecting  Courland,  Lithuania,  and  Poland. 

It  was  a  special  pleasure  to  me  to  meet  you,  dear  Count  Czernin, 
here  in  Berlin  and  to  discuss  openly  and  frankly  with  you  the 
questions  that  occupy  us  at  present.  I  hope  in  days  to  come  there 
may  be  an  opportunity  for  a  further  exchange  of  thoughts  enabling 
us  to  solve  problems  that  may  arise,  and  carry  them  out  in  full 
agreement. 

With  the  expression  of  my  highest  esteem,  I  remain  your  very 
devoted  MICHAELIS. 

I  replied  to  the  Chancellor  that  I  welcomed,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  the  agreement  to  maintain  complete 
frankness,  but  remarked  that  I  could  not  share  his 
optimism.  I  explained  that  the  increasing  war-weari- 
ness, both  in  Germany  and  in  Austria-Hungary,  ren- 
dered it  imperative  to  secure  peace  in  good  time,  that 
is,  before  any  revolutionary  signs  appeared,  for  any 
beginning  of  disturbances  would  spoil  the  chance  of 
peace.  The  German  point  of  view  in  the  case  of  Bel- 
gium seemed  to  me  quite  mistaken,  as  neither  the 
Entente  nor  Belgium  would  ever  consent  to  the  terms. 
I  could  not, -therefore,  conceal  from  him  that  his  point 
of  view  was  a  serious  obstacle  to  peace ;  that  it  was  also 
in  direct  opposition  to  the  Reichstag  view,  and  I  failed 
to  understand  it. 

I  then  spoke  of  the  necessity  of  coming  to  an  under- 
standing as  to  the  minimum  of  the  war  aims  in  which 
an  important  part  is  played  by  the  question  whether 
and  how  we  can  achieve  a  voluntary  and  peaceable  an- 
nexation of  Poland  and  Rumania  by  the  Central  Powers. 

I  finally  again  pointed  out  that  I  interpreted  the 
views  of  the  German  Reichstag  as  demanding  a  peace 
without  annexation  or  indemnity,  and  that  it  would 
be  out  of  the  question  for  the  German  government  to 
ignore  the  unanimous  decision  of  the  Reichstag.  It 
was  not  a  question  of  whether  we  wished  to  go  on 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  179 

fighting,  but  whether  we  could,  and  it  was  my  duty 
to  impress  upon  him  in  time  that  we  were  bound  to 
end  the  war. 

Doctor  Michaelis  was  more  given  to  Pan-Germanism 
than  his  predecessor. 

It  was  astonishing  to  what  degree  the  Pan-Germans 
misunderstood  the  situation.  They  disliked  me  so 
intensely  that  they  avoided  me,  and  I  had  very  few 
dealings  with  them.  They  were  not  to  be  converted. 
I  remember  one  instance  when  a  representative  of  that 
party  called  on  me  in  Vienna  to  explain  to  me  the  con- 
ditions under  which  his  group  was  prepared  to  conclude 
peace:  the  annexation  of  Belgium,  of  a  part  of  east 
France  (Longueville  and  Briey),  of  Courland  and 
Lithuania,  the  cession  of  the  English  fleet  to  Germany, 
and  I  forget  how  many  milliards  in  war  indemnity,  etc. 
I  received  the  gentleman  in  the  presence  of  the  Ambas- 
sador von  Wiesner,  and  we  both  agreed  that  it  was 
purely  a  case  for  a  doctor. 

There  was  a  wide  breach  between  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor Michaelis's  ideas  and  our  own.  It  was  impos- 
ible  to  bridge  it  over.  Soon  after  he  left  office  to 
make  way  for  the  statesman-like  Count  Hertling. 

About  this  time  very  far-reaching  events  were  being 
enacted  behind  the  scenes  which  had  a  very  pronounced 
influence  on  the  course  of  affairs. 

Acts  of  great  indiscretion  and  interference  occurred 
on  the  part  of  persons  who,  without  being  in  any  im- 
portant position,  had  access  to  diplomatic  affairs. 
There  is  no  object  here  in  mentioning  names,  especially 
as  the  responsible  political  leaders  themselves  heard 
only  the  details  of  what  happened  much  later,  and  then 
in  a  very  unsatisfactory  way — at  a  time  when  the 
pacifist  tendencies  of  the  Entente  were  slackening.1 

1  The  disclosures  made  by  Count  Wcdcl  and  Helffcrich  concerning 
Erzbergcr  are  only  a  link  in  the  chain. 


X8o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

It  was  impossible  then  to  see  clearly  in  such  a 
labyrinth  of  confused  and  contradictory  facts.  The 
truth  is  that  in  the  spring  or  early  summer  of  1917 
leading  statesmen  in  the  countries  of  the  allies  and  of 
the  Entente  gathered  the  impression  that  the  existence 
of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  was  at  an  end.  At  the  very 
moment  when  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  main- 
tain secrecy  concerning  the  conditions  of  our  alliance 
the  impression  prevailed,  and,  naturally,  the  Entente 
welcomed  the  first  signs  of  disruption  in  the  Quadruple 
Alliance. 

I  do  not  know  if  the  opportunity  will  ever  occur  of 
throwing  a  clear  light  on  all  the  proceedings  of  those 
days.  To  explain  the  further  development  it  will 
suffice  to  confirm  what  follows  here.  This  is  what 
happened.  In  the  spring  of  1917  connecting  links  were 
established  between  Paris  and  London.  The  first 
impressions  received  were  that  the  Western  Powers 
were  ready  to  make  use  of  us  as  a  bridge  to  Germany 
and  to  a  general  peace.  At  a  somewhat  later  stage 
the  wind  veered  and  the  Entente  endeavored  to  make 
a  separate  peace  with  us. 

Several  important  details  only  came  to  my  knowledge 
later,  some  at  the  time  of  my  resignation  in  the  spring 
of  1918,  and  some  not  until  the  collapse  in  the  winter 
of  1919.  There  was  no  lack  of  voices  to  blame  me  for  a 
supposed  double  policy,  which  the  public  also  sus- 
pected, and  to  accuse  me  of  having  made  different 
statements  to  Berlin  from  those  I  made  in  Paris. 
These  charges  were  brought  by  personal  enemies  who 
deliberately  slandered  me,  which  tales  were  repeated 
by  others  who  knew  nothing  about  the  affair.  The 
fact  is  that  when  I  heard  of  the  episode  I  immediately 
possessed  myself  of  documents  proving  that  not  only  did  I 
know  nothing  whatever  about  the  affair,  but  could  not 
i  possibly  have  known. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  181 

Astronomical  causes  sometimes  give  rise  to  dis- 
turbances in  the  universe,  the  reason  for  which  cannot 
be  understood  by  the  observer.  I  felt  in  the  same  way, 
without  being  able  to  prove  anything  definite,  from 
certain  signs  that  I  noticed,  that  in  those  worlds  on  the 
other  side  of  the  trenches  events  were  happening  that 
were  inexplicable  to  me.  I  felt  the  effect,  but  could 
not  discover  the  cause.  In  the  spirit  of  the  Entente, 
now  more  favorably  disposed  for  peace,  an  undertone 
was  distinctly  audible.  There  was  anxiety  and  a 
greater  inclination  for  peace  than  formerly,  but  again 
probably  only  in  view  of  the  alleged  laxity  of  our 
alliance  conditions  and  the  hopes  of  the  downfall  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance.  A  friend  of  mine,  a  subject  to  a 
neutral  state,  wrote  to  me  from  Paris  in  the  summer 
and  told  me  he  had  heard  from  a  reliable  source  that 
apparently  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay  they  expected  the 
Monarchy  to  separate  from  Germany,  which,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  would  alter  the  entire  military 
situation. 

Soon  afterward  very  secret  information  was  received 
from  a  neutral  country  that  a  Bulgarian  group  was 
negotiating  with  the  Entente  behind  the  back  and  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  Radoslawoff.  As  soon  as  sus- 
picion of  a  breach  in  the  Alliance  had  been  aroused  in 
our  allies,  the  Bulgarian  party  hastened  to  forestall 
the  event.  We  felt  as  safe  about  Radoslawoff  as 
about  Talaat  Pasha;  but  in  both  countries  other 
forces  were  at  work. 

The  suspicions  aroused  in  our  friends  concerning 
our  plans  were  a  further  disadvantage,  certainly  only 
of  a  technical  nature,  but  yet  not  to  be  underestimated. 
Our  various  agents  worked  splendidly,  but  it  lay  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  that  their  dealings  were  more  pro- 
tracted than  those  carried  out  by  the  Foreign  Minister 
himself.  According  to  the  course  taken  by  the  con- 

13 


182  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

versation,  they  were  obliged  to  seek  fresh  instructions; 
they  were  more  tied,  and  therefore  forced  to  assume  a 
more  halting  attitude,  than  a  responsible  leader  would 
have  to  do.  In  the  summer  of  1917,  therefore,  I  sug- 
gested going  to  Switzerland  myself,  where  negotiations 
were  proceeding.  But  my  journey  could  not  have  been 
kept  secret,  and  if  an  effort  had  been  made  to  do  so  it 
would  have  been  all  the  more  certain  to  arouse  suspicion, 
owing  to  the  mistrust  already  awakened.  But  not  in 
Berlin.  I  believe  I  still  held  the  confidence  of  the  lead- 
ing men  in  Berlin  sufficiently  to  avert  that.  I  should 
have  explained  the  situation  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
and  that  would  have  sufficed.  In  Turkey  and  Bulgaria 
the  case  was  different. 

One  party  in  Bulgaria  favored  the  Entente.  If 
Bulgaria  was  under  the  impression  that  our  group  was 
falling  asunder  she  would  have  staked  everything  to 
try  to  save  herself  by  a  separate  peace.  In  Constan- 
tinople, too,  there  was  an  Entente  group.  Talaat  and 
Enver  were  as  reliable  as  they  were  strong.  But  a 
journey  undertaken  by  me  to  Switzerland  in  the  con- 
ditions described  might  prove  to  be  the  alarm  signal 
for  a  general  sauve  qui  pent.  But  the  very  idea  that 
the  two  Balkan  countries  would  act  as  they  supposed 
we  should  do  would  have  sufficed  to  destroy  any 
attempt  at  peace  in  Paris  and  London. 

The  willingness  to  prepare  for  peace  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  declined  visibly  during  the  summer.  It  was 
evident  from  many  trifling  signs,  separately  of  small 
import,  collectively  of  much.  In  the  summer  of  1917, 
too,  the  first  horror  of  the  U-boat  warfare  began  to 
grow  less.  It  was  seen  by  the  enemy  that  it  could  not 
accomplish  what  he  had  first  feared,  and  that  again 
put  life  into  the  desire  for  a  final  military  victory. 

These  two  facts  together  probably  contributed  to 
fan  back  the  peace  wind  blowing  from  the  west. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  183 

Among  other  things,  the  Armand-Revertera  negotia- 
tions were  proceeding  the  whole  time.  It  is  not  yet 
the  moment  to  speak  of  the  negotiations  which  in  the 
spring  of  1918,  together  with  the  letters  of  the  Emperor 
to  Prince  Sixtus,  created  such  a  sensation.  But  this 
much  must  be  stated:  that  Revertera  in  the  negotia- 
tions proved  himself  to  be  an  equally  correct  as  efficient 
agent  who  acted  exactly  according  to  the  instructions 
he  received  from  the  Ballplatz.  Our  various  attempts 
to  take  up  the  threads  of  peace  when  emanating  from 
the  Ballplatz  were  always  intended  for  our  entire  group 
of  Powers. 

Naturally,  it  was  not  in  the  interests  of  the  Entente 
to  prevent  us  from  separating  from  Germany,  and  when 
the  impression  was  produced  in  London  and  Paris 
unofficially  that  we  were  giving  Germany  up,  we  our- 
selves thus  used  sabotage  in  the  striving  for  a  gen- 
eral peace;  for  it  would,  of  course,  have  been  pleas- 
ing to  the  Entente  to  see  Germany,  her  chief  enemy, 
isolated. 

There  was  a  twofold  and  terrible  mistake  in  thus 
trifling  with  the  idea  of  a  separate  peace.  First  of  all, 
it  could  not  release  us  from  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
London,  and  yet  it  spoiled  the  atmosphere  for  negoti- 
ating a  general  peace.  At  the  time  when  these  events 
were  being  enacted,  I  presumed,  but  only  knew  for 
certain  later,  that  Italy,  in  any  case,  would  claim  the 
promises  made  to  her. 

In  the  spring  of  1917  Ribot  and  Lloyd  George  con- 
ferred with  Orlando  on  the  subject,  when  at  St. -Jean 
de  Maurienne,  and  endeavored  to  modify  the  terms 
in  case  of  our  separating  from  Germany.  Orlando 
refused,  and  insisted  on  his  view  that,  even  in  the  event 
of  a  separate  peace,  we  should  still  have  to  yield  up 
Trieste  and  the  Tyrol  as  far  as  the  Brenner  Pass  to 
Italy,  and  thus  have  to  pay  an  impossible  price.  And 


i84  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

secondly,  these  separatist  tactics  would  break  up  our 
forces,  and  had  already  begun  to  do  so. 

When  a  person  starts  running  away  in  a  fight  he  but 
too  easily  drags  the  other  with  him.  I  do  not  doubt 
that  the  Bulgarian  negotiations,  in  order  to  take  sound- 
ings, were  connected  with  the  above  events. 

The  effect  of  this  well-meant  but  secret  and  dilet- 
tante policy  was  that  we  suggested  to  the  Entente  a 
willingness  to  separate  from  our  allies,  and  lost  our 
position  in  the  struggle  for  a  separate  peace.  For  we 
saw  that  in  separating  from  Germany  we  could  not 
escape  being  crippled ;  that,  therefore,  a  separate  peace 
was  impossible,  and  that  we  had  dealt  a  death-blow  at 
the  still  intact  Quadruple  Alliance. 

Later  I  had  information  from  London  relating  to 
the  official  view  of  the  situation  there,  which  differed 
very  much  from  the  optimistic  confidential  reports 
and  proved  that  the  desire  for  peace  was  not  so  strong. 
It  will  easily  be  understood  that  for  us  the  English 
policy  was  always  the  most  interesting.  England's 
entry  into  the  war  had  made  the  situation  so  dangerous 
that  an  understanding  arrived  at  with  her — that  is,  an 
understanding  between  England  and  Germany  through 
our  intervention — would  have  put  an  end  to  the  war. 

This  information  was  to  the  effect  that  England  was 
less  than  ever  in  a  position  to  confer  with  Germany 
until  the  two  cardinal  points  had  been  guaranteed — 
the  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  abolition  of 
German  militarism.  The  former  was  a  French  claim, 
and  England  must  and  would  support  France  in  this 
to  her  very  utmost;  the  second  claim  was  necessary 
in  the  interests  of  the  future  peace  of  the  world.  Ger- 
many's military  strength  was  always  estimated  very 
highly  in  England,  but  the  army's  deeds  in  this  war 
had  surpassed  all  expectations.  The  military  successes 
had  encouraged  the  growth  of  the  military  spirit. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  185 

The  peace  resolution  passed  in  the  Reichstag  proved 
nothing,  or,  at  any  rate,  not  enough,  for  the  Reichstag 
is  not  the  real  exponent  of  the  Empire  in  the  outside 
world;  it  became  paralyzed  through  an  unofficial  col- 
lateral government,  the  generals,  who  possessed  the 
greater  power.  Certain  statements  made  by  General 
Ludendorff — so  the  Entente  said — proved  that  Ger- 
many did  not  wish  for  an  honorable  peace  of  under- 
standing. Besides  this  the  Wilhelmstrasse  did  not 
associate  itself  with  the  majority  in  the  Reichstag. 
The  war  was  not  being  waged  against  the  German 
nation,  but  against  its  militarism,  and  to  conclude 
peace  with  the  latter  would  be  impossible.  It  appeared, 
further,  that  under  no  circumstances  would  England 
restore  Germany's  colonies.  So  far  as  the  Monarchy 
was  concerned,  England  appeared  to  be  ready  to  con- 
clude a  separate  peace  with  her,  though  subject  to  the 
promises  made  to  her  own  allies.  According  to  the 
latter  there  was  much  territory  to  be  given  up  to  Italy, 
Serbia,  and  Rumania.  But  in  exchange  we  might 
reckon  on  a  sort  of  annexation  of  newly  made  states 
like  Poland. 

Although  this  information  left  no  doubt  that  England 
was  not  then  thinking  of  making  advances  to  Germany, 
still  the  fear  of  Prussian  militarism  was  at  the  bottom 
of  her  reasons  for  refusing.  My  impression  was  that, 
through  a  more  favorable  continuous  development,  a 
settlement  and  understanding  might  be  feasible  on  the 
territorial  but  not  on  the  military  questions.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  the  stronger  Germany's  military  power 
proved  itself  to  be,  the  more  did  the  Entente  fear 
that  its  power  of  defense  was  invincible  unless  it  was 
broken  then. 

Not  only  the  period  preceding  war  and  the  outbreak 
of  war,  but  the  actual  course  of  the  war  has  been  full 
of  many  and  disturbing  misunderstandings.  For  long, 


186  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

it  was  not  understood  here  what  England  meant  by 
the  term  militarism.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  Eng- 
lish navy  was  jealously  defending  the  dominion  of  the 
seas,  that  France  and  Russia  stood  ready  armed  for 
the  attack,  and  that  Germany  was  only  in  a  similar 
position  to  any  other  state;  that  every  state  strength- 
ened and  equipped  its  defensive  forces  as  thoroughly 
as  possible. 

By  the  term  "Prussian  militarism"  England  did  not 
only  mean  the  strength  of  the  German  army.  She 
understood  it  to  be  a  combination  of  a  warlike  spirit 
bent  on  oppressing  others,  and  supported  by  the  best 
and  strongest  army  in  the  world.  The  first  would 
have  been  innocuous  without  the  second;  and  the 
splendid  German  army  was  in  England's  eyes  the 
instrument  of  a  domineering  and  conquest-loving 
autocrat.  According  to  England's  view,  Germany  was 
exactly  the  counterpart  of  France  under  Bonaparte — 
if  for  Napoleon  be  substituted  a  many-headed  being 
called  "Emperor,  Crown  Prince,  Hindenburg,  Luden- 
dorff" — and  just  as  little  as  England  would  treat  with 
Napoleon  would  she  have  any  dealings  with  the  juridi- 
cal individual  who  to  her  was  the  personification  of  the 
lust  for  conquest  and  the  policy  of  violence. 

The  notion  of  the  existence  of  German  militarism 
seems  to  be  quite  justified,  although  the  Emperor  and 
the  Crown  Prince  played  the  smallest  part  in  it.  But 
it  seems  to  me  an  altogether  wrong  conception  that 
militarism  is  a  specialty  of  Germany.  The  negotia- 
tions at  Versailles  must  now  have  convinced  the  general 
public  that  it  is  not  only  on  the  banks  of  the  Spree  that 
militarism  reigns. 

Germany  in  former  days  was  never  able  to  under- 
stand that  on  the  enemy  continent,  by  the  side  of 
morally  unjustified  envy,  fear  and  anxiety  as  to  Ger- 
many's plans  practically  reigned,  and  that  the  talk 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  187 

about  the  "hard"  and  "German"  peace,  about  "vic- 
tory and  triumph"  was  like  throwing  oil  on  the  flames 
of  their  fears,  that  in  England,  and  France,  too,  at  one 
time,  there  was  a  current  of  feeling  urging  for  a  peace 
of  settlement,  and  that  such  expressions  as  those  above 
were  highly  detrimental  to  all  pacifist  tendencies. 

In  my  opinion  the  air  raids  on  England  may  be 
ranked  in  the  same  category  as  the  above  expressions. 
They  were  carried  out  with  the  greatest  heroism  by 
the  German  fliers,  but  no  other  object  was  gained 
but  to  irritate  and  anger  England  and  rouse  to  the 
utmost  resistance  all  who  otherwise  had  pacifist  ten- 
dencies. I  said  this  to  Ludendorff  when  he  called  on 
me  at  the  Ballplatz  in  the  summer  of  1917,  but  it  made 
not  the  slightest  impression  on  him. 

The  demarche  for  peace  made  by  the  Pope  and  our 
reply  had  been  published  in  the  European  press.  We 
accepted  the  noble  proposals  made  by  the  Holy  Father. 
I  have  therefore  nothing  to  add. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  summer  of  1917  the  Socialist 
Conference  at  Stockholm  had  become  a  practical 
question.  I  issued  passports  to  the  representatives 
of  our  Social  Democrats,  and  had  several  difficulties 
to  overcome  in  connection  therewith.  My  own  stand- 
point is  made  clear  by  the  following  letter  to  Tisza. 

(Not  dated.) 

DEAR  FRIEND, — I  hear  that  you  do  not  approve  of  the  delegation 
of  Socialists  for  Stockholm.  To  begin  with,  it  is  not  a  delegation. 
The  men  came  to  me  of  their  own  accord  and  applied  for  the  per- 
mission to  travel,  which  I  granted.  Adler,  Ellenbogen,  and  Seitz 
were  there,  Renner  as  well.  The  first  two  are  capable  men,  and  I 
value  them  in  spite  of  the  differences  that  exist  between  them. 
The  last  two  are  not  well  known  to  me.  But  all  are  genuinely 
desirous  of  peace,  and  Adler  in  particular  does  not  wish  the  down- 
fall of  the  Empire. 

If  they  secure  peace  it  will  be  a  socialistic  one,  and  the  Emperor 
will  have  to  pay  out  of  his  own  pocket;  I  am  sure  too,  dear  friend, 


i88  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  if  it  is  not  possible  to  end  the  war,  the  Emperor  will  have  to 
pay  still  more;  you  may  be  sure  of  that. 

Or,  as  may  be  expected,  if  they  do  not  secure  peace,  then  my 
prediction  was  all  the  more  correct,  for  then  I  shall  have  proved 
to  them  that  it  is  not  the  inefficiency  of  the  Diplomatic  Service,  but 
the  conditions  surrounding  it,  that  must  be  blamed  for  the  war  not 
coming  to  an  end. 

If  I  had  refused  to  grant  permission  for  them  to  travel,  they 
would  have  continued  to  the  last  declaring  that,  if  they  had  been 
allowed  to  proceed,  they  would  have  secured  peace. 

Every  one  is  indignant  with  me  here,  particularly  in  the  Herren- 
haus.  They  even  go  so  far  that  they  imagine  I  had  tried  to  "buy" 
the  Socialists  by  promising  to  lower  the  customs  dues  if  they 
returned  with  peace.  I  do  not  want  the  dues,  as  you  know,  but 
that  has  no  connection  with  Stockholm,  "Sozie"  and  peace. 

I  was  at  an  Austrian  Cabinet  Council  lately  and  gave  the  death- 
blow to  the  customs  dues — but  I  felt  rather  like  Daniel  in  the  lions' 
den  when  I  did  it;  N.  and  E.  in  particular  were  very  indignant. 
The  only  one  who  entirely  shares  my  standpoint  beside  Trnka  is  the 
Prime  Minister  Clam. 

Consequently,  this  contention  that  they  have  been  deprived  of 
the  octroi  owing  to  my  love  for  the  "Sozies"  angers  them  still  more, 
but  the  contention  is  false. 

You,  my  dear  friend,  are  doubly  wrong.  In  the  first  place,  we 
shall  be  forced  to  have  Socialist  policy  after  the  war,  whether  it  is 
welcome  or  not,  and  I  consider  it  extremely  important  to  prepare 
the  Social  Democrats  for  it.  Socialist  policy  is  the  valve  we  are 
bound  to  open  in  order  to  let  off  the  superfluous  steam,  otherwise 
the  boiler  will  burst.  In  the  second  place,  none  of  us  ministers 
can  take  upon  ourselves  the  false  pretense  of  using  sabotage  with 
regard  to  peace.  The  nations  may  perhaps  tolerate  the  tortures 
of  war  for  a  while,  but  only  if  they  understand  and  have  the  con- 
viction that  it  cannot  be  otherwise — that  a  vis  major  predominates; 
in  other  words,  that  peace  can  fail  owing  to  circumstances,  but 
not  owing  to  the  bad  will  or  stupidity  of  the  Ministers. 

The  German-Bohemian  Deputy,  K.  H.  Wolf,  made  a  scene  when 
the  speech  from  the  throne  was  read  to  the  "Burg";  he  declared 
that  we  were  mad  and  would  have  to  account  for  it  to  the  delegation, 
and  made  many  other  equally  pleasant  remarks,  but  he  had  also 
come  to  a  wrong  conclusion  about  the  customs  dues  and  Stockholm. 

You  are  quite  right  in  saying  that  it  is  no  concern  of  Germany's 
what  we  do  in  the  interior.  But  they  have  not  attempted  the 
slightest  interference  with  the  dues.  If  they  are  afraid  of  an  anti- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  189 

German  rate  of  exchange  and,  therefore,  are  in  favor  of  the  dues,  we 
are  to  a  certain  extent  to  blame.  The  Berlin  people  are  always  afraid 
of  treachery.  When  a  vessel  answers  the  starboard  helm  it  means 
she  turns  to  the  right,  and  in  order  to  check  this  movement  the 
steersman  must  put  the  helm  to  larboard  as  the  only  way  to  keep  a 
straight  course — he  must  hold  out.  Such  is  the  case  of  statecraft 
in  Vienna — it  is  always  carried  out  of  the  course  of  the  Alliance. 

It  is  possible  to  turn  and  steer  the  Entente  course  if  thought 
feasible;  but  then  courage  would  be  needed  to  make  the  turn  fully. 
Nothing  is  more  stupid  than  trifling  with  treachery  and  not  carrying 
it  out ;  we  lose  all  ground  in  Berlin  and  gain  nothing  either  in  London 
or  in  Paris.  But  why  should  I  write  all  this — you  share  my  opinions; 
I  do  not  need  to  convert  you.  We  will  talk  about  Stockholm  again. 

In  true  friendship,  your  old  CZERNIN. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Tisza  in  this  instance  allowed 
himself  to  be  quite  converted,  and  raised  no  objections 
as  to  the  Hungarian  Social  Democrats.  The  negative 
result  of  the  Stockholm  Congress  is  already  known. 

As  already  mentioned,  it  is  at  present  still  impossible 
to  discuss  in  detail  the  various  negotiations  and  at- 
tempts at  peace.  Besides  the  negotiations  between 
Revertera  and  Armand,  other  tentative  efforts  were 
made.  For  instance,  the  interviews  already  alluded  to 
between  the  Ambassador  Mennsdorff  and  General 
Smuts,  which  were  referred  to  in  the  English  Parliament. 
I  do  not  consider  it  right  to  say  more  about  the  matter 
here.  But  I  can  and  will  repeat  the  point  of  view 
which  was  at  the  bottom  of  all  our  peace  efforts  since 
the  summer  of  1917,  and  which  finally  wrecked  them  all. 

The  last  report  cited  reflected  the  views  of  the 
Entente  quite  correctly.  With  Germany  there  was  at 
present  no  possibility  of  intercourse.  France  insisted 
on  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  entire 
Entente  demanded  the  abolition  of  German  militarism. 
Neither  would  Germany  be  allowed  to  retain  her  colo- 
nies. But  Germany  was  not  yet ' '  ripe ' '  for  this  demand 
to  be  made.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Entente,  therefore, 


J9o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

any  debate  on  the  subject  would  be  useless.  For  us 
the  case  was  different.  The  impression  prevailed  that 
we  could  conclude  a  separate  peace  provided  we  were 
ready  to  make  sacrifices.  The  London  terms  had 
created  a  situation  which  must  be  accepted.  Con- 
cessions to  Rumania,  the  cession  of  Trieste  and  the 
Trentino,  as  well  as  the  German  South  Tyrol,  to  Italy, 
and  concessions  to  the  Southern  Slav  state  would  be 
unavoidable,  besides  reforms  in  the  Monarchy  on  a 
federal  basis.  Our  answer  was  that  a  one-sided  con- 
cession of  Austro-Hungarian  and  German  territory  in 
that  form  was,  naturally,  not  possible.  But  still  we 
thought  that,  under  certain  premises  in  the  territorial 
questions,  an  agreement  might  perhaps  not  meet  with 
insurmountable  difficulties.  As  a  matter  of  course, 
however,  the  Entente  was  not  in  a  position  to  make 
terms  such  as  could  only  be  laid  down  by  the  victor 
to  the  vanquished,  as  we  were  anything  but  beaten, 
but,  in  spite  of  that,  we  did  not  cling  so  firmly  to  the 
frontier  posts  in  the  Monarchy. 

It  might  be  thought,  therefore,  that,  the  Entente 
being  willing,  a  settlement  of  the  various  interests 
would  be  possible;  but  proposals  such  as  the  giving  up 
of  Trieste,  Bozen,  and  Meran  were  impossible,  as  was 
also  the  suggestion  to  make  peace  behind  Germany's 
back.  I  referred  to  the  military  situation  and  the 
impossibility  of  any  one  accepting  these  views  of  the 
Entente.  I  was  full  of  confidence  in  the  future,  and 
even  if  that  were  not  the  case  I  could  not  conclude  a 
peace  in  the  present  situation  which  the  Entente  could 
not  dictate  in  other  terms,  even  if  we  were  beaten. 
To  lose  Trieste  and  access  to  the  Adriatic  was  a  totally 
unacceptable  condition,  just  as  much  as  the  uncon- 
ditional surrender  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Neutral  statesmen  agreed  with  my  views  that  the 
Entente  demands  were  not  couched  in  the  terms  of  a 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  191 

peace  of  understanding,  but  of  victory.  Opinion  in 
neutral  countries  was  quite  clear  on  the  subject.  But 
in  England  especially  there  were  various  currents  of 
thought;  not  every  one  shared  Lloyd  George's  views. 
The  main  point  was,  however,  to  lead  up  to  a  debate 
which  would  tend  to  clear  up  many  matters,  and  I 
seized  the  idea  eagerly.  The  greatest  difficulty,  I  was 
assured  by  some,  lay  in  the  Entente's  assertion  that 
Germany  had  shown  remarkable  military  strength,  but 
yet  had  not  been  adequately  prepared  for  war;  she  had 
not  had  sufficient  stores  either  of  raw  materials  or 
provisions,  and  had  not  built  sufficient  U-boats.  The 
Entente's  idea  was  that  if  peace  were  made  now,  Ger- 
many might  perhaps  accept  even  unfavorable  con- 
ditions, but  it  would  be  only  to  gain  time  and  make 
use  of  the  peace  to  draw  breath  before  beginning  a 
fresh  war.  She  would  make  up  for  loss  of  time  and 
"hit  out  again."  The  Entente,  therefore,  considered 
the  preliminary  condition  of  any  peace,  or  even  of  a 
discussion  of  terms,  to  be  the  certainty  of  the  abolition 
of  German  militarism.  I  replied  that  nobody  wished 
for  more  war,  and  that  I  agreed  with  the  Entente  that  a 
guaranty  in  that  connection  must  be  secured,  but  that 
a  one-sided  disarmament  and  disbanding  of  men  by 
the  Central  Powers  and  Germany  was  an  impossibility. 
It  might  be  imagined  what  it  would  be  like  if  one  fine 
day  an  army,  far  advanced  in  the  enemy  country,  full 
of  confidence  and  hope  and  certain  of  victory,  had  to 
lay  down  arms  and  disappear.  No  one  could  accept 
such  a  proposal.  Meanwhile,  a  general  disarmament 
of  all  the  Powers  was  both  possible  and  necessary. 
Disarmament,  the  establishment  of  courts  of  arbitra- 
tion under  international  control;  that,  according  to 
my  idea,  would  present  an  acceptable  basis.  I  men- 
tioned my  fears  that  the  Entente  rulers  in  this,  as  in  the 
territorial  question,  would  not  mete  out  the  same  meas- 


i92  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

lire  to  themselves  as  they  intended  for  us,  and  unless 
I  had  some  guaranty  in  the  matter  I  should  not  be  in  a 
position  to  carry  the  plan  through  here  and  with  our 
allies;  anyhow,  it  would  be  worth  a  trial. 

Long  and  frequent  were  the  debates  on  the  Central 
European  question,  which  was  the  Entente's  terror,  as 
it  implied  an  unlimited  increase  in  Germany's  power. 
In  Paris  and  London  it  would  presumably  be  preferred 
that  the  Monarchy  should  be  made  independent  of 
Germany,  and  any  further  advances  to  Berlin  on  the 
part  of  Vienna  checked.  We  rejoined  that  to  us  this 
was  not  a  new  Entente  standpoint,  but  that  the  mutila- 
tion caused  by  the  resolutions  of  the  Treaty  of  London 
forced  us  to  investigate  the  matter.  Apart  from  the 
question  of  honor  and  duty  to  the  Alliance,  as  matters 
now  stood,  Germany  was  fighting  almost  more  for  us 
than  for  herself.  If  Germany  to-day,  and  we  knew  it, 
concluded  peace,  she  would  lose  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
her  military  superiority  on  land;  but  we,  with  our 
territory,  would  have  to  pay  the  Italians,  Serbians,  and 
Rumanians  for  their  part  in  the  war. 

I  heard  it  said  on  many  sides  that  there  were  men 
in  the  Entente  who  readily  understood  this  point  of 
view,  but  that  the  Entente  nations  would  do  what 
they  had  intended.  Italy  had  based  her  entry  into  the 
war  on  promises  from  London.  Rumania  also  had 
been  given  very  solid  assurances,  and  heroic  Serbia 
must  be  compensated  by  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
Many,  both  in  Paris  and  London,  regretted  the  situa- 
tion that  had  arisen  through  the  Conference  in  London, 
but  a  treaty  is  a  treaty,  and  neither  London  nor  Paris 
could  forsake  their  allies.  Meanwhile,  it  was  thought 
likely  in  Entente  circles  that  both  the  new  Serbian 
and  Polish  states,  probably  Rumania  as  well,  would 
have  certain  relations  with  the  Monarchy.  Further 
details  respecting  such  relations  were  still  unknown. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  193 

Our  reply  was  we  would  not  give  up  Galicia  to  Poland, 
Transylvania  and  the  Bukovina  to  Rumania,  and 
Bosnia  together  with  Herzegovina  to  Serbia,  in  return 
for  a  vague  promise  of  the  closer  relations  of  those  states 
with  the  pitiful  remains  left  to  us  of  the  Monarchy. 
We  were  not  impelled  thereto  by  dynastic  interests.  I 
myself  had  persuaded  the  Emperor  to  sacrifice  Galicia 
to  Poland;  but  in  Transylvania  there  lived  so  many 
Germans  and  Magyars  who  simply  could  not  be  made 
a  present  of,  and  above  all  the  concessions  to  Italy! 
I  once  asked  a  neutral  statesman  if  he  could  under- 
stand what  was  meant  by  making  Austria  voluntarily 
give  up  the  arch-German  Tyrol  as  far  as  the  Brenner 
Pass.  The  storm  that  would  be  let  loose  by  such  a 
peace  would  uproot  more  than  merely  the  Minister 
who  had  made  the  peace.  I  told  my  visitor  that  there 
were  certain  sacrifices  which  on  no  conditions  could  be 
expected  of  any  living  being.  I  would  not  give  up 
German  Tyrol,  not  even  though  we  were  still  more 
unfavorably  situated.  I  reminded  him  of  a  picture  that 
represented  wolves  chasing  a  sledge.  One  by  one  the 
driver  threw  out  fur,  coat,  and  whatever  else  he  had 
to  the  pack  to  check  them  to  save  himself — but  he 
could  not  throw  his  own  child  to  them ;  rather  would  he 
suffer  to  the  last  gasp.  That  was  how  I  felt  about 
Triest  and  the  German  Tyrol.  We  were  not  in  the 
position  of  the  man  in  the  sledge,  for,  thank  God, 
we  had  our  arms  and  could  beat  off  the  wolves;  but 
even  in  the  extremest  emergency,  never  would  I  accept 
a  peace  that  deprived  us  of  Bozen  and  Meran. 

My  listener  did  not  disagree  with  my  argument,  but 
could  see  no  end  to  the  war  in  that  way.  England  was 
ready  to  carry  on  the  war  for  another  ten  years  and, 
in  any  case,  would  crush  Germany.  Not  the  German 
people,  for  whom  no  hatred  was  felt — always  the  same 
repetition  of  that  deceptive  argument — but  German 


194  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

militarism.  England  was  in  a  condition  of  constraint. 
Repeatedly  it  had  been  said  that  if  Germany  were  not 
defeated  in  this  war  she  would  continue  with  still  more 
extensive  armaments.  That  was  the  firm  belief  in 
London;  she  would  then,  in  a  few  years,  have  not  one 
hundred,  but  one  thousand,  U-boats,  and  then  England 
would  be  lost.  Then  England  was  also  fighting  for 
her  own  existence,  and  her  will  was  iron.  She  knew 
that  the  task  would  be  a  hard  one,  but  it  would  not 
crush  her.  In  London  they  cite  again  the  example  of 
the  wars  of  Napoleon,  and  conclude  with,  "What  man 
has  done  man  can  do  again." 

This  fear  of  Prussian  militarism  was  noticeable  on  all 
occasions,  and  the  suggestion  constantly  was  put  for- 
ward that  if  we  were  to  declare  ourselves  satisfied  with 
a  general  disarmament,  that  in  itself  would  be  a  great 
advantage  and  an  important  step  toward  peace. 

My  speech  on  October  2,  1917,  at  Budapest,  on  the 
necessity  of  securing  a  reorganized  world  was  prompted 
by  the  argument  that  militarism  was  the  greatest  ob- 
stacle in  the  way  of  any  advance  in  that  direction. 

At  Budapest  on  that  occasion  I  was  addressing  an 
audience  of  party  leaders.  I  had  to  take  into  con- 
sideration that  too  pacifist  a  tone  would  have  an  effect 
at  home  and  abroad  contrary  to  my  purpose.  At  home 
the  lesser  powers  of  resistance  would  be  still  further 
paralyzed,  and  abroad  it  would  be  taken  as  the  end  of 
our  capacity  for  fighting,  and  would  further  check  all 
friendly  intentions. 

The  passage  in  my  speech  relating  to  the  securing  of  a 
new  world  organization  is  as  follows : 

The  great  French  statesman,  Talleyrand,  is  supposed  to  have 
said  words  are  merely  to  conceal  thoughts.  It  may  be  that  it  was 
true  respecting  the  diplomacy  of  his  century,  but  I  cannot  imagine 
a  maxim  less  suited  to  the  present  day.  The  millions  who  are  fight- 
ing, whether  in  the  trenches  or  behind  the  lines,  wish  to  know  why 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  195 

and  wherefore  they  are  fighting.  They  have  a  right  to  know  why 
peace,  which  all  the  world  is  longing  for,  has  not  yet  been  made. 

When  I  entered  upon  office  I  seized  the  first  opportunity  openly 
to  state  that  we  should  commit  no  violence,  but  that  we  should 
tolerate  none,  and  that  we  were  ready  to  enter  into  peace  negotia- 
tions as  soon  as  our  enemies  accepted  the  point  of  view  of  a  peace 
of  understanding.  I  think  I  have  thus  clearly  explained,  though  on 
broad  lines  only,  the  peace  idea  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy. 
Many  at  home  and  also  in  friendly  countries  abroad  have  reproached 
me  for  speaking  so  openly.  The  arguments  of  the  said  critical 
gentlemen  have  only  confirmed  my  belief  of  the  justness  of  my 
views.  I  take  nothing  back  of  what  I  said,  convinced  as  I  am 
that  the  great  majority  of  people  here  and  in  Austria  approve  my 
attitude.  Following  on  these  introductory  remarks,  I  feel  called 
upon  to-day  to  tell  the  public  how  the  imperial  and  royal  govern- 
ment will  deal  with  the  further  development  of  the  utterly  distorted 
European  conditions. 

Our  program  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  world  organization, 
preferably  to  be  called  the  building  of  a  new  world  organization,  is 
given  in  our  answer  to  the  peace  note  of  the  Holy  Father.  It,  there- 
fore, only  remains  for  me  to-day  to  complete  the  program  and, 
above  all,  to  state  what  were  the  considerations  that  decided  us  to 
accept  the  principles  that  overthrow  the  former  system.  It  will 
come  as  a  surprise  to  many,  and  perhaps  appear  incomprehensible, 
that  the  Central  Powers,  and  especially  Austria-Hungary,  should 
be  willing  to  desist  from  future  military  armament,  as  it  is  only 
their  military  power  that  has  protected  them  through  these  trying 
years  against  vastly  superior  forces. 

Not  only  has  the  war  created  new  factors  and  conditions,  but 
it  has  also  led  to  new  conceptions  which  have  shattered  the  founda- 
tions of  former  European  policy.  Among  many  other  political 
theses,  the  one  which  held  that  Austria-Hungary  was  an  expiring 
state  has  vanished.  The  dogma  of  the  impending  collapse  of  the 
Monarchy  was  what  made  our  position  in  Europe  more  difficult  and 
caused  all  the  misunderstanding  concerning  our  vital  needs.  But 
having  shown  ourselves  in  this  war  to  be  thoroughly  sound  and,  at 
any  rate,  of  equal  standing,  it  follows  that  we  can  reckon  now  on  a 
proper  understanding  of  our  vital  needs  in  Europe  and  that  no 
hopes  are  left  of  being  able  to  beat  us  down  by  force  of  arms.  Until 
the  moment  had  arrived  when  this  could  be  proved,  we  could  not  do 
without  the  protection  of  armaments  nor  expose  ourselves  to  un- 
favorable treatment  in  the  matters  vital  to  us  produced  by  the 
legend  of  our  impending  collapse.  But  from  that  moment,  we  have 


ig6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

been  in  the  position  simultaneously  with  our  enemies  to  lay  down 
arms  and  settle  our  difficulties  peacefully  and  by  arbitration.  This 
being  recognized  by  the  world  affords  us  the  possibility  of  not  only 
accepting  the  plan  of  disarmament  and  a  court  of  arbitration,  but, 
as  you,  gentlemen,  are  aware,  of  working  with  all  our  energy  for  its 
realization,  as  we  have  for  some  time  past. 

After  this  war,  Europe  must  doubtless  be  placed  on  a  new  juridical 
basis  of  which  the  permanency  can  be  guaranteed.  This  juridical 
basis  will,  I  believe,  be  of  a  fourfold  nature: 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  furnish  a  guaranty  that  there  shall 
be  no  war  of  revenge  on  any  side;  we  must  make  sure  that  we  can 
bequeath  to  our  children's  children  the  knowledge  that  they  will  be 
spared  the  horrors  of  a  time  similar  to  that  which  we  have  under- 
gone. No  shifting  of  power  in  the  belligerent  states  can  achieve 
that.  The  only  manner  by  which  it  can  be  attained  is  international 
disarmament  throughout  the  world  and  acceptance  of  the  principle 
of  arbitration.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  these  measures  for  dis- 
armament must  not  be  confined  to  one  separate  state  or  to  a  single 
group  of  Powers,  and  that  they  apply  equally  to  land,  water,  and 
air.  War  as  a  factor  in  policy  must  be  combated.  A  general,  uni- 
form and  progressive  disarmament  of  all  the  states  in  the  world 
must  be  established  on  an  international  basis  and  under  international 
control,  and  the  defensive  forces  limited  to  the  utmost.  I  am  well 
aware  that  this  object  will  be  difficult  to  achieve  and  that  the  path 
that  leads  thereto  is  long  and  thorny  and  full  of  difficulties.  And 
yet  I  am  firmly  convinced  it  is  a  path  that  must  be  trodden  and  will 
be  trodden,  no  matter  whether  it  is  approved  of  individuals  or  not. 
It  is  a  great  mistake  to  imagine  that  after  such  a  war  the  world  can 
begin  from  where  it  left  off  in  1914.  A  catastrophe  such  as  this 
war  does  not  pass  by  and  leave  no  trace,  and  the  most  terrible  mis- 
fortune that  could  happen  to  us  would  be  if  the  race  for  armaments 
were  to  continue  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  for  it  would  mean 
the  economic  ruin  of  all  states.  Before  the  war  began  the  military 
burdens  to  be  borne  were  heavy — though  we  specially  note  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  far  from  being  on  a  high  level  of  military 
preparedness  when  we  were  surprised  by  the  outbreak  of  war,  and 
it  was  only  during  the  war  that  she  resumed  her  armaments — but 
after  this  war  an  open  competition  in  armaments  would  render  state 
burdens  all  round  simply  intolerable.  In  order  to  keep  a  high 
standard  of  armaments  in  open  competition  all  the  states  would  have 
to  secure  a  tenfold  supply  of  everything — ten  times  the  artillery, 
munition-factories,  vessels,  and  U-boats  of  former  days,  and  also 
many  more  soldiers  to  work  the  machinery.  The  annual  military 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  197 

budget  of  all  the  Great  Powers  would  comprise  many  milliards — it 
would  be  impossible,  with  all  the  other  burdens  which  the  belligerent 
states  will  have  to  bear  after  peace  is  concluded.  This  expense, 
I  repeat,  would  mean  the  ruin  of  the  nations.  To  return,  however, 
to  the  relatively  limited  armaments  in  existence  previous  to  1914 
would  be  quite  impossible,  for  any  individual  state  which  would 
be  so  far  behind  that  its  military  strength  would  not  count.  The 
expense  incurred  would  be  futile.  But  were  it  possible  to  return  to 
the  relatively  low  level  of  armaments  in  1914,  that  in  itself  would 
signify  an  international  lowering  of  armaments.  But  then  there 
would  be  no  sense  in  not  going  farther  and  practically  disarming 
altogether. 

There  is  but  one  egress  from  this  narrow  defile:  the  absolute 
international  disarmament  of  the  world.  There  is  no  longer  any 
object  in  such  colossal  fleets  if  the  states  of  the  world  guarantee 
the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  armies  must  be  reduced  to  the  lowest 
limit  requisite  for  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  interior.  This 
will  only  be  possible  on  an  international  basis;  that  is,  under  inter- 
national control.  Every  state  will  have  to  cede  some  of  its  indepen- 
dence to  insure  a  world  peace.  The  present  generation  will  prob- 
ably not  live  to  see  this  great  pacifist  movement  fully  completed. 
It  cannot  be  carried  out  rapidly,  but  I  consider  it  our  duty  to  put 
ourselves  at  the  head  of  the  movement  and  do  all  that  lies  in  human 
power  to  hasten  its  achievement.  The  conclusion  of  peace  will 
establish  the  fundamental  principles. 

If  the  first  principle  be  laid  down  as  the  compulsory  international 
arbitration  system  as  well  as  general  disarmament  on  land,  the 
second  one  must  be  that  of  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas  and  dis- 
armament at  sea.  I  purposely  say  the  high  seas,  as  I  do  not  extend 
the  idea  to  straits  or  channels,  and  I  readily  allow  that  special  rules 
and  regulations  must  be  laid  down  for  the  connecting  sea  routes. 
If  these  two  factors  have  been  settled  and  assured,  any  reason 
for  territorial  adjustments  on  the  plea  of  insuring  national  safety 
is  done  away  with,  and  this  forms  the  third  fundamental  principle 
of  the  new  international  juridical  basis.  This  idea  is  the  gist  of  the 
beautiful  and  sublime  note  that  His  Holiness  the  Pope  addressed 
to  the  whole  world.  We  have  not  gone  to  war  to  make  conquests, 
and  we  have  no  aggressive  plans.  If  the  international  disarmament 
that  we  so  heartily  are  longing  for  be  adopted  by  our  present  enemies 
and  becomes  a  fact,  then  we  are  in  no  need  of  assurances  of  territorial 
safety;  in  that  case,  we  can  give  up  the  idea  of  expanding  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  provided,  of  course,  that  the  enemy 
has  entirely  evacuated  our  own  territory. 

14 


198  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  fourth  principle  to  enforce  in  order  to  insure  a  free  and 
peaceful  development  of  the  world  after  the  hard  times  we  have 
experienced  is  the  free  economic  participation  by  every  one  and  the 
unconditional  avoidance  of  an  economic  war;  a  war  of  that  nature 
must  be  excluded  from  all  future  contingencies.  Before  we  con- 
clude peace  we  must  have  the  positive  assurance  that  our  present 
enemies  have  given  up  that  idea. 

Those,  my  honorable  friends,  are  the  principles  of  the  new  world 
organization  as  it  presents  itself  to  me,  and  they  are  all  based  on 
general  disarmament.  Germany,  in  her  answer  to  the  papal  note, 
has  also  positively  recognized  the  idea  of  a  general  disarmament. 
Our  present  enemies  have  likewise,  partly,  at  any  rate,  adopted 
these  principles.  I  differ  from  Lloyd  George  in  most  points, 
but  agree  thoroughly  on  one — that  there  nevermore  should  be  a  war 
of  revenge. 

The  impression  made  by  my  speech  on  the  Entente 
surpassed  the  most  pessimistic  expectations.  In  order 
not  to  approach  too  closely  the  subject  of  their  own 
disarmament,  my  propositions  were  said  to  be  hypo- 
critical and  a  peace  trap.  This  needs  no  comment. 

Had  the  Entente  replied  that  I  must  obtain  the  sup- 
port of  and  secure  a  guaranty  from  Germany  that 
she  would  disarm,  it  would  have  been  an  opportu- 
nity for  me,  with  the  help  of  the  nations,  to  exercise 
the  greatest  possible  pressure  on  Germany's  leaders. 
But  the  sword  was  knocked  out  of  my  hand  by  them 
themselves,  for  the  retort  came  from  Berlin:  Here  is 
the  proof  that  the  Entente  rejects  our  offer  of  disarma- 
ment as  they  reject  everything  coming  from  us.  There 
is  only  one  way  out  of  it — a  fight  to  the  end  and  then 
victory. 

Again  did  the  Entente  force  the  peoples  of  the 
Central  Powers  to  side  unconditionally  with  the 
generals. 

Never  in  the  whole  term  of  my  office  did  I  receive 
so  many  letters  as  after  my  speech — both  for  and 
against,  with  both  sides  equally  impetuous.  "Death 
sentences"  from  Germany  were  showered  on  me;  scorn 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  199 

and  contempt  alternated  with  genuine  sympathy  and 
agreement. 

In  the  autumn  of  1917  the  peace  movement  di- 
minished visibly.  The  U-boat  fiasco  was  very  obvious. 
England  saw  that  she  was  able  to  overcome  the  dan- 
ger. The  German  military  leaders  still  spoke  of  the 
positively  expected  successes  of  their  submarines, 
but  the  tenor  of  their  predictions  became  very  different. 
There  was  no  longer  any  talk  of  the  downfall  of  Eng- 
land within  a  few  months.  A  new  winter  campaign 
was  almost  a  certainty,  and  yet  the  Germans  insisted 
that,  though  mistakes  occurred  in  the  term  fixed,  this 
was  not  so  respecting  the  effect  of  the  U-boats,  and  that 
England  would  collapse.  The  U-boat  warfare  had 
achieved  this  amount  of  success,  that  the  western 
front  remained  intact,  though  it  would  otherwise  have 
fallen. 

The  military  situation  underwent  a  change  in  the 
autumn.  The  end  of  the  war  in  the  east  was  within 
sight,  and  the  possibility  of  being  able  to  fling  the 
enormous  masses  of  troops  from  the  east  into  the  line 
in  the  west,  and  at  last  break  through  there,  greatly 
improved  the  situation. 

It  was  not  the  U-boat  campaign  that  brought  about 
a  decision  at  sea,  but  it  enabled  a  final  decision  on  land 
to  be  made;  such  was  the  new  military  opinion.  Paris 
and  Calais  could  not  be  taken. 

In  these  different  phases  of  military  hopes  and  ex- 
pectations we  floated  like  a  boat  on  a  stormy  sea.  In 
order  to  land  in  the  haven  of  peace  we  needed  a  mili- 
tary wave  to  carry  us  nearer  to  the  land;  then  only 
could  we  unfurl  the  sail  of  understanding  that  would 
help  us  to  reach  the  saving  shores.  As  long  as  the 
enemy  persisted  only  in  dealing  with  the  crushed  and 
depopulated  Central  Powers  all  was  in  vain. 

I  never  believed  in  the  success  of  the  U-boat  warfare. 


200  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I  believed  in  a  break-through  on  the  western  front, 
and  during  the  winter  of  1917-18  lived  in  the  hope 
that  by  such  means  we  might  break  the  obstinate  love 
of  destruction  in  our  enemies. 

'As  long  as  our  adversaries'  peace  terms  remained 
the  same  peace  was  impossible,  as  was  also  the  bringing 
of  any  outside  pressure  to  bear  on  Germany,  for  it  was 
true  that  "the  German  army  was  fighting  more  to 
support  Austria-Hungary  than  it  was  for  its  own 
existence." 

Threatening  and  breathing  disaster,  the  decisions 
of  the  Treaty  of  London  confronted  us.  They  forced 
us  always  to  take  up  arms  again,  and  drove  us  back 
into  the  field. 

At  the  time  of  writing  these  lines,  in  June,  1919, 
Austria  has  long  ceased  to  exist.  There  is  only  left 
now  a  small,  impoverished,  wretched  land  called  Ger- 
man-Austria, a  country  without  army  or  money;  help- 
less, starving,  and  well-nigh  in  despair.  This  country- 
has  been  told  of  the  peace  terms  at  St. -Germain.  It 
has  been  told  it  must  give  up  the  Tyrol  as  far  as  the 
Brenner  Pass,  that  Andreas  Hofer's  mountains  are 
to  be  handed  over  to  Italy.  And  defenseless  and 
helpless  as  it  is,  it  sends  up  a  cry  of  despair  and  frantic 
grief.  One  voice  only  is  heard — such  peace  is  impos- 
sible ! 

How  could  an  Austrian  government  accept  the 
dictates  of  London  at  a  time  when  our  armies  stood 
far  advanced  in  enemy  country,  unvanquished  and 
unbroken,  when  we  had  for  ally  the  strongest  land 
Power  in  the  world,  and  when  the  greatest  generals 
of  the  war  so  firmly  believed  in  the  break-through  and 
in  final  victory? 

To  demand  that  in  1917  or  1918  I  should  have 
accepted  peace  terms  which  in  1919  were  rejected  by 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  201 

the  whole  of  the  German-Austrian  people  is  sheer 
madness.  But  it  may  be  there  is  method  in  such 
madness.  The  method  of  using  every  means  to  dis- 
credit the  "old  regime." 

In  the  beginning  of  August,  1917,  an  effort  was 
made  at  a  rapprochement  between  England  and  Ger- 
many which,  unfortunately,  almost  immediately  broke 
down. 

At  the  suggestion  of  England  a  neutral  Power  had 
sounded  Germany  with  regard  to  Belgium.  Germany 
replied  that  she  was  ready  for  direct  verbal  negotia- 
tions with  England  on  the  Belgian  question.  In  trans- 
mitting this  favorable  answer,  Germany  did  not  intrust 
it  to  the  same  neutral  Power  that  had  brought  the 
message,  but  for  some  unknown  reason  confided  it  to  a 
trusted  messenger  from  another  neutral  country.  This 
latter  appears  to  have  been  guilty  of  some  indiscreet 
dealings,  and  when  rumors  of  the  affair  reached  Paris 
it  caused  some  anxiety.  It  was  probably  thought 
there  that  England  was  more  interested  in  the  Belgian 
than  in  the  Alsace-Lorraine  question. 

The  messenger  sent  from  Berlin  thought  that  his 
task  had  failed,  and  sent  word  to  Berlin  that,  owing 
to  his  errand  having  been  made  known,  the  opinion 
among  the  Entente  was  that  every  step  taken  by 
Germany  was  condemned  beforehand  to  failure. 

The  government  which  had  employed  the  messenger 
took  up  the  case  on  its  own  initiative,  and  transmitted 
the  German  reply  to  London.  No  answer  was  ever 
received  from  England. 

This  is  the  account  as  given  to  me  post  festum  by 
Berlin,  and  doubtless  reflects  Berlin's  views.  Whether 
the  incident  in  detail  was  exactly  as  described,  or 
whether  many  more  hitherto  unknown  events  took 
place,  has  not  been  proved. 


202  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

During  the  war  all  happenings  on  the  other  side  of 
the  trenches  were  looked  upon  with  dim  and  gloomy 
eyes  as  through  a  veil,  and,  according  to  news  received 
by  me  later,  it  was  not  clear  whether  England  had 
sent  an  answer.  Whether  it  was  despatched  and  held 
up  on  the  way,  or  what  became  of  it  I  never  knew. 
It  is  said  never  to  have  reached  Berlin. 

A  warlike  speech  by  Asquith  on  September  2yth 
appears  to  be  connected  with  this  unsuccessful  attempt, 
and  served  to  calm  the  Allies. 

It  appears  extremely  doubtful  to  me,  however, 
whether  this  advance  would  have  led  to  anything, 
had  the  occasion  been  more  favorable.  The  previously 
mentioned  letter  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  Michaelis 
dates  from  those  August  days,  a  letter  referring  to 
Belgian  projects  which  were  very  far  removed  from  the 
English  ideas  on  the  subject.  And  even  if  it  had  been 
possible  to  settle  the  Belgian  question,  there  would 
have  been  the  Alsace-Lorraine  question,  which  linked 
France  and  England  together,  and,  first  and  foremost, 
the  question  of  disarmament.  The  chasm  that  divided 
the  two  camps  would  have  grown  so  wide  that  no 
bridge  could  possibly  have  spanned  it. 

Not  until  January,  1918,  did  I  learn  the  English 
version.  According  to  that,  the  Germans  are  said 
to  have  taken  the  first  steps,  and  the  English  were  not 
disinclined  to  listen,  but  heard  nothing  further.  It 
was  stated  in  Vorwdrts  that  the  suggestion  was  made 
at  the  instigation  of  the  Cabinet  Council,  but  that 
subsequently  military  influence  gained  the  upper  hand. 
The  episode  did  not  tend  to  improve  the  frame  of 
mind  of  the  leading  men  in  England. 

In  the  early  summer  of  1917  conditions  seemed  favor- 
able for  peace  and  the  hope  of  arriving  at  an  under- 
standing, though  still  far  distant,  was  not  exactly  a 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  203 

Utopian  dream.  How  far  the  hope  of  splitting  our 
group  and  the  failure  of  the  U-boat  warfare  may  have 
contributed  to  stiffen  the  desire  for  war  in  the  Entente 
countries  cannot  definitely  be  stated.  Both  factors 
had  a  share  in  it.  Before  we  came  to  a  deadlock  in  the 
negotiations,  the  position  was  such  that  even  in  case 
of  a  separate  peace  we  should  have  been  compelled  to 
accept  the  terms  of  the  Conference  of  London.  Whether 
the  Entente  would  have  abandoned  that  basis  if  we 
had  not  veered  from  the  straight  course,  and  by  un- 
official cross-purposes  become  caught  in  the  toils  of 
separatist  desires,  but  had  quickly  and  consistently 
carried  out  our  task,  is  not  proved,  and  never  will  be. 
After  the  debacle  in  the  winter  of  1919  it  was  intimated 
to  me  as  a  fact  that  when  Clemenceau  came  into  power 
a  peace  of  understanding  with  Germany  became  out 
of  the  question.  His  standpoint  was  that  Germany 
must  be  definitely  vanquished  and  crushed.  Our 
negotiations,  however,  had  begun  under  Briand,  and 
Clemenceau  only  came  into  power  when  the  peace 
negotiations  had  become  entangled  and  were  beginning 
to  falter. 

With  regard  to  Austria-Hungary,  both  France  and 
England  would  have  welcomed  a  separate  peace  on 
our  part,  even  during  Clemenceau's  period  of  office; 
but  in  that  case  we  should  have  had  to  accept  the  terms 
of  the  London  Conference. 

Such  was  the  peace  question  then.  How  it  would 
have  developed  if  no  misleading  policy  had  come  into 
being  naturally  cannot  be  stated. 

I  am  not  putting  forward  suppositions,  but  confirming 
facts.  And  the  fact  remains  that  the  failure  of  the 
U-boat  campaign,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  policy  carried 
on  behind  the  backs  of  the  responsible  men,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  the  reasons  why  the  favorable  moment 
passed  and  the  peace  efforts  were  checked.  And  I 


204  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

herewith  repeat  that  this  fact  does  not  in  itself  prove 
that  peace  negotiations  would  not  also  have  failed 
later  if  the  two  reasons  mentioned  above  had  not 
existed. 

It  became  quite  clear  in  the  autumn  that  the  war 
would  have  to  continue.  In  my  speeches  to  delegations 
I  endeavored  to  leave  no  doubt  that  we  were  faithful 
to  our  allies.  When  I  said,  ' '  I  see  no  difference  between 
Strassburg  and  Trieste,"  I  said  it  chiefly  for  Sofia  and 
Constantinople,  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  was  the  greatest  danger.  I  still  hoped  to  be 
able  to  prop  the  trembling  foundations  of  the  Alliance 
policy,  and  either  to  secure  a  general  peace  in  the 
east,  where  the  military  opposition  was  giving  way, 
or  to  see  it  draw  nearer  through  the  anticipated  German 
break-through  on  the  western  front. 

Several  months  after  my  dismissal  in  the  summer  of 
1918  I  spoke  in  the  Herrenhaus  on  foreign  policy,  and 
warned  every  one  present  against  trying  to  undermine 
the  Quadruple  Alliance.  When  I  declared  that  "honor, 
duty  to  the  Alliance,  and  the  call  for  self-preservation 
compel  us  to  fight  by  the  side  of  Germany,"  I  was  mis- 
understood. It  did  not  seem  as  though  the  public 
realized  that  the  moment  the  Entente  thought  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  was  about  to  break  up,  from  that 
moment  our  cause  was  lost.  Had  the  public  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  London  agreement?  Did  it  not  know  that 
a  separate  peace  would  hand  us  over  totally  defenseless 
to  those  cruel  conditions?  Did  they  not  realize  that 
the  German  army  was  the  shield  that  afforded  us  the 
last  and  only  possibility  of  escaping  the  fate  of  being 
broken  up? 

My  successor  steered  the  same  course  as  I  had  done, 
doubtless  from  the  same  reasons  of  honor  and  the  call 
for  self-preservation.  I  have  no  particulars  as  to  what 
occurred  in  the  summer  of  1918. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  205 

Afterward  events  followed  in  rapid  succession.  First 
came  our  terrible  defeat  in  Italy,  then  the  Entente 
break-through  on  the  western  front,  and  finally  the 
Bulgarian  secession,  which  had  gradually  been  ap- 
proaching since  the  summer  of  1917. 


in 

As  is  the  case  in  all  countries,  among  the  Entente 
during  the  war  there  were  many  and  varied  currents 
of  thought.  When  Clemenceau  came  into  office  the 
definite  destruction  of  Germany  was  the  dominant 
war  aim. 

To  those  who  neither  see  nor  hear  the  secret  informa- 
tion which  a  Foreign  Minister  naturally  has  at  his  dis- 
posal, it  may  appear  as  though  the  Entente,  in  the 
question  of  crushing  Germany's  military  strength, 
had  sometimes  been  ready  to  make  concessions.  I 
think  that  this  may  have  been  the  case  in  the  spring 
of  1917,  but  not  later,  when  any  such  hope  was  decep- 
tive. Lansdowne  in  particular  spoke  and  wrote  in  a 
somewhat  friendly  tone,  but  Lloyd  George  was  the 
determining  influence  in  England. 

When  sounding  England  on  different  occasions,  I 
endeavored  to  discover  by  what  means  the  dissolution 
of  the  military  power  in  Germany  was  to  be  or  could  be 
guaranteed — and  I  invariably  came  to  an  impasse. 
It  was  never  explained  how  England  intended  to  carry 
out  the  proposal. 

The  truth  is  that  there  is  no  way  of  disarming  a  strong 
and  determined  people  except  by  defeating  them, 
but  such  an  aim  was  not  to  be  openly  admitted  to  us 
in  the  preliminary  dealings.  The  delegates  could  not 
suggest  any  suitable  mode  of  discussion,  and  no  other 
proposals  could  lead  to  a  decision. 

Lansdowne,  and  perhaps  Asquith  as  well,  would  have 


206  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

been  content  with  a  parliamentary  regime  which  would 
have  deprived  the  Emperor  of  power  and  given  it  to  the 
Reichstag.  Not  so  Lloyd  George;  at  least,  not  later. 
The  English  Prime  Minister's  well-known  speech,  "A 
disarmament  treaty  with  Germany  would  be  a  treaty 
between  a  fox  and  many  geese,"  conveyed  what  he 
really  thought. 

After  my  Budapest  speech,  which  was  treated  with 
such  scorn  and  contempt  in  the  press  and  by  public 
opinion  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel,  word  was 
sent  to  me  from  an  English  source  that  it  was  said  the 
"Czernin  scheme"  might  settle  the  question.  But 
again  it  was  not  Lloyd  George  who  said  that. 

Owing  to  the  extreme  distrust  that  Clemenceau,  the 
English  Prime  Minister,  and  with  them  the  great 
majority  in  France  and  England,  had  of  Germany's 
intentions,  no  measure  could  be  devised  that  would 
have  given  London  and  Paris  a  sufficient  guaranty  for 
a  future  peaceful  policy.  From  the  summer  of  1917,  no 
matter  what  Germany  had  proposed,  Lloyd  George 
would  always  have  rejected  it  as  inadequate. 

In  consequence  of  this  it  was  quite  immaterial  later 
to  the  course  of  the  war  that  Germany  not  only  did 
nothing  whatever  to  allay  English  fears,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  poured  oil  in  the  fire  and  fanned  the  flames. 

Germany,  the  leading  military  Power  in  the  war, 
never  for  one  moment  thought  of  agreeing  to  disarma- 
ment under  international  control.  After  my  speech  in 
Budapest  I  was  received  in  Berlin  not  in  an  unfriendly 
manner,  but  with  a  sort  of  pity,  as  some  poor  insane 
person  might  be  treated.  The  subject  was  avoided 
as  much  as  possible.  Erzberger  alone  told  me  of  his 
complete  agreement  with  me. 

Had  Germany  been  victorious  her  militarism  would 
have  increased  enormously.  In  the  summer  of  1917 
I  spoke  to  several  generals  of  high  standing  on  the 


ATTEMPTS  AT  PEACE  207 

western  front,  who  unanimously  declared  that  after 
the  war  armaments  must  be  maintained,  but  on  a  very 
much  greater  scale.  They  compared  this  war  with  the 
first  Punic  War.  It  would  be  continued  and  its  con- 
tinuation be  prepared  for;  in  short,  the  tactics  of 
Versailles.  The  standard  of  violence  must  be  planted, 
and  would  be  the  banner  of  the  generals,  the  Pan- 
Germans,  the  Fatherland  party,  etc.  They  thought 
as  little  about  a  reconciliation  of  the  nations  after  the 
war  as  did  the  Supreme  Council  of  Four  at  Versailles, 
and  Emperor,  government  and  Reichstag  floundered 
helplessly  in  this  torrent  of  violent  purpose. 

The  military  spirit  flourished  on  the  Spree  as  it  is 
doing  now  on  the  Seine  and  the  Thames.  Lloyd  George 
and  Clemenceau  will  find  many  counterparts  of  them- 
selves at  the  Unter  den  Linden  in  Berlin.  The  only 
difference  between  Foch  and  Ludendorff  is  that  the 
one  is  a  Frenchman  and  the  other  a  German;  as  men 
they  are  as  like  as  two  peas. 

The  Entente  is  victorious,  and  many  millions  are 
delighted  and  declare  that  the  policy  of  might  is  justi- 
fied. The  future  only  can  show  whether  this  is  not  a 
terrible  mistake.  The  lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  young,  hopeful  men  who  have  fallen  might  have  been 
saved  if  in  1917  peace  had  been  made  possible  for  us. 
The  triumph  of  victory  cannot  call  them  back  to  life 
again.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  Entente  has  con- 
quered too  much,  too  thoroughly.  The  madness  of 
expiring  militarism,  in  spite  of  all  its  orgies,  has  perhaps 
celebrated  its  last  triumph  at  Versailles. 

POSTSCRIPT 

Taking  it  all  together,  the  real  historical  truth  con- 
cerning the  peace  movement  is  that,  in  general,  neither 
the  Entente  nor  the  ruling,  all-powerful  military  party 


208  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

in  Germany  wished  for  a  peace  of  understanding. 
They  both  wished  to  be  victorious  and  to  enforce  a 
peace  of  violence  on  the  defeated  adversary.  The 
leading  men  in  Germany — Ludendorff  above  all — never 
had  a  genuine  intention  of  releasing  Belgium  in  an 
economic  and  political  sense ;  neither  would  they  agree 
to  any  sacrifices.  They  wished  to  conquer  in  the  east 
and  the  west,  and  their  arbitrary  tendencies  counter- 
acted the  pacifist  leaning  of  the  Entente  as  soon  as 
there  were  the  slightest  indications  of  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  leading  men  in  the  Entente — Clemenceau 
from  the  first  and  Lloyd  George  later — were  firmly 
resolved  to  crush  Germany,  and  therefore  profited  by 
the  continuous  German  threats  to  suppress  all  pacifist 
movements  in  their  own  countries,  always  ready  to 
prove  that  a  peace  of  understanding  with  Berlin  would 
be  a  "pact  between  the  fox  and  the  geese." 

Thanks  to  the  attitude  of  the  leading  Ministers  in 
Germany,  the  Entente  was  fully  persuaded  that  an 
understanding  with  Germany  was  quite  out  of  the 
question,  and  insisted  obstinately  on  peace  terms 
which  could  not  be  accepted  by  a  Germany  still  un- 
beaten. This  closes  the  circular  vitiosus  which  para- 
lyzed all  negotiating  activities. 

We  were  wedged  in  between  these  two  movements 
and  unable  to  strike  out  for  ourselves,  because  the 
Entente,  bound  by  its  promises  to  its  allies,  had  already 
disposed  of  us  by  the  Treaty  of  London  and  the  under- 
takings to  Rumania  and  Serbia.  We  therefore  could 
not  exercise  extreme  pressure  on  Germany,  as  we  were 
unable  to  effect  the  annulment  of  those  treaties. 

In  the  early  summer  of  1917  the  possibility  of  an 
understanding  seemed  to  show  itself  on  the  horizon,  but 
it  was  wrecked  by  the  previously  mentioned  events. 


CHAPTER  VII 

WILSON 

THROUGH  the  dwindling  away  of  the  inclination 
for  peace  in  the  enemy  camp  we  were  faced  in  the 
autumn  of  1917  by  the  prospect  either  of  concluding 
separate  peace  and  accepting  the  many  complicatec 
consequences  of  a  war  with  Germany  and  the  ensuing 
mutilation  of  the  Monarchy  under  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  London,  or  else  fighting  on  and,  aided  by 
our  allies,  breaking  the  will  for  destruction   of  our 
enemies. 

If  Russia  was  the  one  to  let  loose  war,  it  was  Italy 
who  perpetually  stood  in  the  way  of  a  peace  of  under- 
standing, insisting  upon  obtaining  under  all  circum- 
stances the  whole  of  the  Austrian  territory  promised  to 
her  in  1915.  The  Entente  during  the  war  assigned 
the  several  parts  to  be  enacted.  France  was  to  shed 
the  most  blood;  England,  besides  her  fabulous  military 
action,  to  finance  the  war,  together  with  America,  and 
diplomatic  affairs  to  be  in  Italy's  hands.  Far  too  little 
is  known  as  yet,  and  will  only  later  be  public  knowledge, 
as  to  the  extent  to  which  Italian  diplomacy  dominated 
affairs  during  the  war.  Our  victories  in  Italy  would 
only  have  changed  the  situation  if  the  defeats  that  were 
suffered  had  led  to  an  Italian  revolution  and  a  complete 
overthrow  of  the  regime  existing  there.  In  other  words, 
the  royal  government  would  not  be  influenced  in  its 
attitude  by  our  victories.  Even  had  our  armies 


210  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

advanced  much  farther  than  they  did,  it  would  have 
held  to  its  standpoint  in  the  expectation  that,  perhaps 
not  Italy  herself,  but  her  allies,  would  secure  final 
victory. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  the  autumn  of  1917  when 
Wilson  came  forward  with  his  Fourteen  Points. 

The  advantage  of  the  Wilson  program  in  the  eyes  of 
the  whole  world  was  its  violent  contrast  to  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  London.  The  right  of  self-determina- 
tion for  the  nations  had  been  utterly  ignored  in  London 
by  the  allotment  of  German  Tyrol  to  Italy.  Wilson 
forbade  this  and  declared  that  nations  could  not  be 
treated  against  their  will  and  moved  hither  and  thither 
like  the  pieces  in  a  game  of  chess.  Wilson  said  that 
every  solution  of  a  territorial  question  arising  out  of 
this  war  must  be  arrived  at  in  the  interests  and  in 
favor  of  the  peoples  concerned,  and  not  as  a  mere 
balancing  or  compromise  of  claims  from  rival  sources; 
and  further,  that  all  clearly  stated  national  claims 
would  receive  the  utmost  satisfaction  that  could  be 
afforded  them,  without  admitting  new  factors  or  the 
perpetuation  of  old  disputes  or  oppositions,  which  in 
all  probability  would  soon  again  disturb  the  peace  of 
Europe  and  the  whole  world.  A  general  peace,  estab- 
lished on  such  a  basis,  could  be  discussed — and  more 
in  the  same  strain. 

The  publication  of  this  clear  and  absolutely  accept- 
able program  seemed  from  day  to  day  to  render  possible 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  world  conflict.  In  the  eyes 
of  millions  of  people  this  program  opened  up  a  world 
of  hope.  A  new  star  had  risen  on  the  other  side  of  the 
ocean,  and  all  eyes  were  turned  in  that  direction.  A 
mighty  man  had  come  forward  and  with  one  powerful 
act  had  upset  the  London  Resolutions  and,  in  so  doing, 
had  reopened  the  gates  for  a  peace  of  understanding. 

From  the  first  moment  the  main  question  was,  so  it 


WILSON  211 

seemed,  what  hopes  were  there  of  Wilson's  program 
being  carried  out  in  London,  Paris,  and,  above  all,  in 
Rome? 

Secret  information  sent  to  me  from  the  Entente 
countries  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  Fourteen  Points 
were  decidedly  not  drawn  up  in  agreement  with  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Italy.  On  the  other  hand,  I  was, 
and  still  am,  fully  persuaded  that  Wilson  had  spoken 
honestly  and  sincerely  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  believed 
that  his  program  could  be  carried  out. 

Wilson's  great  miscalculation  was  his  mistaken  esti- 
mate of  the  actual  distribution  of  power  in  the  Entente, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  his  surprising  ignorance  of  na- 
tional relationships  in  Europe,  and  especially  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  on  the  other  hand,  which  would  greatly 
weaken  his  position  and  his  influence  on  his  allies. 
There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  the  Entente's  cleverly 
introducing  Wilson  into  the  international  labyrinth 
and  there  bewildering  him  with  wrong  directions,  so 
that  he  could  not  find  his  way  out  again.  To  begin 
with,  therefore,  Wilson's  theory  brought  us  not  a  step 
farther. 

The  '67  settlement  was  proposed  by  a  leading  Ger- 
man-Magyar magnate  in  Austria-Hungary.  Fifty  years 
ago  nationalism  was  much  less  developed  than  it  is  now. 
Nations  were  still  sleeping.  The  Czechs,  Slovaks,  and 
Southern  Slavs,  the  Rumanians  and  Ruthenians,  had 
barely  awakened  to  national  life.  Fifty  years  ago  it 
was  possible  to  distinguish  between  what  was  deceptive 
and  what  gave  promise  of  lasting.  The  union  between 
Italians  and  Germans  only  took  effect  with  the  coming 
of — or  was  perhaps  the  first  sign  of — the  world-move- 
ment. At  all  events,  it  was  in  the  second  half  of  the 
last  century  that  we  came  within  the  radius  of  inter- 
national politics. 

The  world's  racial  problems  found  a  center  in  Austria- 


212  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Hungary,  whose  affairs,  therefore,  became  very  promi- 
nent. A  chemist  can  inclose  in  his  retorts  different 
substances  and  observe  how,  following  the  eternal  laws 
of  nature,  the  processes  of  nature  take  place.  In  a 
similar  way  during  past  decades  the  effect  of  unsolved 
racial  antagonisms  might  have  been  studied  within 
the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  and  the  inevitable  explosion 
anticipated,  instead  of  its  being  allowed  to  culminate 
in  the  World  War. 

In  putting  forward,  his  Fourteen  Points  Mr.  Wilson 
obviously  felt  the  necessity  of  settling  the  world  prob- 
lem of  nationality  and  recognized  that  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy,  once  arranged  and  settled,  could  serve  as 
a  model  to  the  world,  as  hitherto  it  had  afforded  a 
terrifying  example.  But  to  begin  with,  he  overlooked 
the  fact  that  in  the  settling  of  national  questions  there 
must  be  neither  adversary  nor  ally,  as  these  reflect 
passing  differences,  whereas  the  problem  of  nationality 
is  a  permanent  one.  He  also  ignored  the  fact  that 
what  applies  to  the  Czechs  applies  also  to  Ireland,  that 
the  Armenians  as  well  as  the  Ukrainians  desire  to  live 
their  own  national  life,  and  that  the  colored  peoples 
of  Africa  and  India  are  human  beings  with  the  same 
rights  as  white  people.  He  also  failed  to  see  that 
good  will  and  the  desire  for  justice  are  far  from  being 
sufficient  in  themselves  to  solve  the  problem  of  nation- 
ality. Thus  it  was  that  under  his  patronage,  and 
presumably  on  the  basis  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  the 
question  of  nationality  was  not  solved,  but  simply 
turned  round  where  not  actually  left  untouched.  If 
Germans  and  Magyars  had  hitherto  been  the  domi- 
nating races  they  would  now  become  the  oppressed. 
By  the  terms  settled  at  Versailles  they  were  to  be 
handed  over  to  states  of  other  nationality.  Ten  years 
hence,  perhaps  sooner,  both  groups  of  Powers  as  they 
exist  at  present  will  have  fallen.  Other  constellations 


WILSON  213 

will  have  appeared  and  become  dominant.  The 
explosive  power  of  unsolved  questions  will  continue 
to  take  effect  and  within  a  measurable  space  of  time 
again  blow  up  the  world. 

Mr.  Wilson,  who  evidently  was  acquainted  with  the 
program  of  the  Treaty  of  London,  though  not  attaching 
sufficient  importance  to  the  national  difficulties,  proba- 
bly hoped  to  be  able  to  effect  a  compromise  between 
the  Italian  policy  of  conquest  and  his  own  ideal  policy. 
In  this  connection,  however,,  no  bridge  existed  between 
Rome  and  Washington.  Conquests  are  made  by  right 
of  the  conqueror — such  was  Clemenceau's  and  Orlando's 
policy — or  else  the  world  is  ruled  on  the  principles  of 
national  justice,  as  Wilson  wished  it  to  be.  This  ideal, 
however,  will  not  be  attained — no  ideal  is  obtainable; 
but  it  will  be  brought  very  much  nearer.  Might  or 
right,  the  one  alone  can  conquer.  But  Czechs,  Poles, 
and  others  cannot  be  freed  while  at  the  same  time 
Tyrolese-Germans,  Alsatian-Germans,  and  Transyl- 
vanian-Hungarians  are  handed  over  to  foreign  states. 
It  cannot  be  done  from  the  point  of  view  of  justice  or 
with  any  hope  of  its  being  permanent.  Versailles  and 
St. -Germain  have  proved  that  it  can.be  done  by  might 
and  as  a  temporary  measure. 

The  solution  of  the  question  of  nationality  was  the 
point  round  which  all  Franz  Ferdinand's  political  in- 
terests were  centered  during  his  lifetime.  Whether  he 
would  have  succeeded  is  another  question,  but  he  cer- 
tainly did  try.  The  Emperor  Charles,  too,  was  not 
averse  to  the  movement.  The  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  was  too  old  and  too  conservative  to  make  the 
experiment.  His  idea  was  quieta  non  mover e.  Without 
powerful  help  from  outside,  any  attempt  during  the 
war  against  the  German-Magyar  opposition  would 
not  have  been  feasible.  Therefore,  when  Wilson  came 
forward  with  his  Fourteen  Points,  and  in  spite  of  the 

15 


2i4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

skepticism  with  which  the  message  from  Washington 
was  received  by  the  German  public  and  here,  too,  I 
at  once  resolved  to  take  up  the  thread. 

I  repeat  that  I  never  doubted  the  honorable  and 
sincere  intentions  entertained  by  Wilson — nor  do  I 
doubt  them  now — but  my  doubts  as  to  his  powers  of 
carrying  them  out  were  from  the  first  very  pronounced. 
It  was  obvious  that  Wilson,  when  conducting  the  war, 
was  much  stronger  than  when  he  took  part  in  the  Peace 
Conference.  As  long  as  fighting  proceeded  Wilson 
was  master  of  the  world.  He  had  only  to  call  back  his 
troops  from  the  European  theater  of  war  and  the 
Entente  would  be  placed  in  a  most  difficult  position. 
It  has  always  been  incomprehensible  to  me  why  the 
President  of  the  United  States  did  not  have  recourse 
to  this  strong  pressure  during  this  time  in  order  to 
preserve  his  own  war  aims. 

The  secret  information  that  I  received  soon  after  the 
publication  of  the  Fourteen  Points  led  me  to  fear  that 
Wilson,  not  understanding  the  situation,  would  fail 
to  take  any  practical  measures  to  secure  respect  for  the 
regulations  he  had  laid  down,  and  that  he  underesti- 
mated France's, 'and  particularly  Italy's,  opposition. 
The  logical  and  practical  consequences  of  the  Wilson 
program  would  have  been  the  public  annulment  of 
the  Treaty  of  London;  it  must  have  been  so  for  us  to 
understand  the  principles  on  which  we  could  enter 
upon  peace  negotiations.  Nothing  of  that  nature 
occurred,  and  the  gap  between  Wilson  and  Orlando's 
ideas  of  peace  remained  open. 

On  January  24,  1918,  in  the  Committee  of  the  Aus- 
trian Delegation,  I  spoke  publicly  on  the  subject  of  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  declared  them  to  be — in  so  far  as 
they  applied  to  us  and  not  to  our  allies-^-a  suitable 
basis  for  negotiations.  Almost  simultaneously  we  took 
steps  to  enlighten  ourselves  on  the  problem  of  how  in 


WILSON  215 

a  practical  way  the  fourteen  theoretical  ideas  of  Wilson 
could  be  carried  out.  The  negotiations  were  then  by  no 
means  hopeless. 

Meanwhile  the  Brest  negotiations  were  proceeding. 
Although  that  episode,  which  represented  a  victory  for 
German  militarism,  cannot  have  been  very  encouraging 
for  Wilson,  he  was  wise  enough  to  recognize  that  we 
were  in  an  awkward  position  and  that  the  charge 
brought  against  her  that  Germany  was  making  hidden 
annexations  did  not  apply  to  Vienna.  On  February 
1 2th — thus,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Brest  peace — 
the  President,  in  his  speech  to  Congress,  said : 

Count  Czernin  appears  to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  peace 
foundations  and  does  not  obscure  their  sense.  He  sees  that  an 
independent  Poland  composed  of  all  the  undeniably  Polish  inhabi- 
tants, the  one  bordering  on  the  other,  is  a  matter  for  European 
settlement  and  must  be  granted;  further,  that  Belgium  must  be 
evacuated  and  restored,  no  matter  what  sacrifices  and  concessions 
it  may  involve;  also  that  national  desires  must  be  satisfied, 
even  in  his  own  Empire,  in  the  common  interests  of  Europe  and 
humanity. 

Though  he  is  silent  on  certain  matters  more  closely  connected 
with  the  interests  of  his  allies  than  with  Austria-Hungary,  that  is 
only  natural,  because  he  feels  compelled  under  the  circumstances 
to  refer  to  Germany  and  Turkey.  Recognizing  and  agreeing  with 
the  important  principles  in  question  and  the  necessity  of  converting 
them  into  action,  he  naturally  feels  that  Austria-Hungary,  more 
easily  than  Germany,  can  concur  with  the  war  aims  as  expressed 
by  the  United  States.  He  would  probably  have  gone  even  further 
had  he  not  been  constrained  to  consider  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Alliance  and  the  country's  dependence  on  Germany. 

In  the  same  speech  the  President  goes  on  to  say : 

Count  Czernin 's  answer  referring  mainly  to  my  speech  of  Janu- 
ary 8th  is  couched  in  very  friendly  terms.  He  sees  in  my  statements 
a  sufficiently  encouraging  approach  to  the  views  of  his  own  govern- 
ment to  justify  his  belief  that  they  afford  a  basis  for  a  thorough 
discussion  by  both  governments  of  the  aims. 


2i6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

And  again : 

I  must  say  Count  Hertling's  answer  is  very  undecided  and  most 
confusing,  full  of  equivocal  sentences,  and  it  is  difficult  to  say  what 
it  aims  at.  It  certainly  is  written  in  a  very  different  tone  from  that 
of  Count  Czernin's  speech  and  obviously  with  a  very  different  object 
in  view. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  when  the  head  of  a  state 
at  war  with  us  speaks  in  such  friendly  terms  of  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  he  has  the  best  intentions 
of  coming  to  an  understanding.  My  efforts  in  this 
connection  were  interrupted  by  my  dismissal. 

In  these  last  weeks  during  which  I  remained  in  office 
the  Emperor  had  definitely  lost  faith  in  me.  This  was 
not  due  to  the  Wilson  question,  nor  yet  was  it  the  direct 
consequence  of  my  general  policy.  A  difference  of 
opinion  between  certain  persons  in  the  Emperor's 
entourage  and  myself  was  the  real  reason.  The  situa- 
tion became  so  strained  as  to  make  it  unbearable. 
The  forces  that  conspired  against  me  convinced  me 
that  it  would  be  impossible  for  me  to  gain  my  objective, 
which,  being  of  a  very  difficult  nature,  could  not  be  ob- 
tained unless  the  Emperor  gave  me  his  full  confidence. 

In  spite  of  all  the  rumors  and  stories  spread  about 
me,  I  do  not  intend  to  go  into  details  unless  I  should  be 
compelled  to  do  so  by  accounts  derived  from  reliable 
sources.  I  am  still  convinced  to  this  day  that  morally 
I  was  perfectly  right.  I  was  wrong  as  to  form,  because 
I  was  neither  clever  nor  patient  enough  to  bend  the 
opposition,  but  would  have  broken  it  by  reducing  the 
situation  to  a  case  of  "either — or." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

IMPRESSIONS   AND   REFLECTIONS 


IN  the  autumn  of  1917  I  had  a  visit  from  a  subject 
of  a  neutral  state,  who  is  a  pronounced  upholder 
of  general  disarmament  and  world  pacifism.  We  began, 
of  course,  to  discuss  the  theme  of  free  competition  in 
armaments,  of  militarism,  which  in  England  prevails 
on  the  sea  and  in  Germany  on  land,  and  my  visitor 
entered  upon  the  various  possibilities  likely  to  occur 
when  the  war  was  at  an  end.  He  had  no  faith  in  the 
destruction  of  England,  nor  had  I;  but  he  thought  it 
possible  that  France  and  Italy  might  collapse.  The 
French  and  Italians  could  not  possibly  bear  any 
heavier  burdens  than  already  were  laid  on  them;  in 
Paris  and  Rome,  he  thought,  revolution  was  not  far 
distant,  and  a  fresh  phase  of  the  war  would  then  ensue. 
England  and  America  would  continue  to  fight  on  alone, 
for  ten,  perhaps  even  twenty,  years.  England  was 
not  to  be  considered  just  a  little  island,  but  comprised 
Australia,  India,  Canada,  and  the  sea.  " L' Angleterre 
est  imbattable,"  he  repeated,  and  America  likewise. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  German  army  was  also  invin- 
cible. The  secession  of  France  and  Italy  would  greatly 
hinder  the  cruel  blockade,  for  the  resources  of  those  two 
countries — once  they  were  conquered  by  the  Central 
Powers — were  very  vast,  and  in  that  case  he  could  not 
see  any  end  to  the  war.  Finally,  the  world  would 
collapse  from  the  general  state  of  exhaustion.  My 


218  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

visitor  cited  the  fable  in  which  two  goats  met  on  a 
narrow  bridge;  neither  would  give  way  to  the  other, 
and  they  fought  until  they  both  fell  into  the  water 
and  were  drowned.  The  victory  of  one  group,  as  in 
previous  wars,  he  continued,  where  the  conqueror 
gleaned  a  rich  harvest  of  gains  and  the  vanquished 
had  to  bear  all  the  losses,  was  out  of  the  question  in 
this  present  war.  Tout  le  monde  perdera,  et  a  la  fin  il  riy 
aura  que  des  vaincus. 

I  often  recalled  that  interview  later.  Much  that 
was  false  and  yet,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  much  that  was 
true,  lay  in  my  friend's  words.  France  and  Italy  did 
not  break  down ;  the  end  of  the  war  came  more  quickly 
than  he  thought;  and  the  invincible  Germany  was 
defeated.  And  still  I  think  that  the  conclusions  he 
arrived  at  came  very  near  the  truth. 

The  conquerors'  finances  are  in  a  very  precarious 
state,  particularly  in  Italy  and  France;  unrest  prevails; 
wages  are  exorbitant;  discontent  is  general;  the  phan- 
tom of  Bolshevism  leers  at  them;  and  they  live  in  the 
hope  that  the  defeated  Central  Powers  will  have  to  pay, 
and  they  will  thus  be  saved.  It  was  set  forth  in  the 
peace  terms,  but  ultra  posse  nemo  tenetur,  and  the 
future  will  show  to  what  extent  the  Central  Powers  can 
fulfil  the  conditions  dictated  to  them. 

Since  the  opening  of  the  Peace  Congress  at  Versailles 
continued  war  in  Europe  has  been  declared:  Russians 
against  the  whole  world,  Czechs  against  Hungarians, 
Rumanians  against  Hungarians,  Poles  against  Ukrain- 
ians, Southern  Slavs  against  Germans,  communists 
against  socialists.  Three-fourths  of  Europe  is  turned 
into  a  witch's  caldron  where  everything  is  concocted 
except  work  and  production,  and  it  is  futile  to  ask 
how  this  self -lacerated  Europe  will  be  able  to  find  the 
war  expenses  laid  upon  her.  According  to  human 
reckoning,  the  conquerors  cannot  extract  even  approxi- 


IMPRESSIONS  AND  REFLECTIONS         219 

mate  compensation  for  their  losses  from  the  defeated 
states,  and  their  victory  will  terminate  with  a  con- 
siderable deficit.  If  that  be  the  case,  then  my  visitor 
will  be  right — there  will  only  be  the  vanquished. 

If  our  plan  in  1917,  namely,  Germany  to  cede  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France  in  exchange  for  the  annexation  of 
all  Poland,  together  with  Galicia,  and  all  states  to  dis- 
arm— if  that  plan  had  been  accepted  in  Berlin  and 
sanctioned  by  the  Entente — unless  the  non  possumus 
in  Berlin  and  opposition  in  Rome  to  a  change  in  the 
Treaty  of  London  had  hindered  any  action — it  seems 
to  me  the  advantage  would  not  only  have  been  on  the 
side  of  the  Central  Powers. 

Pyrrhus  also  conquered  at  Asculum. 

My  visitor  was  astonished  at  Vienna.  The  psy- 
chology of  no  city  that  he  had  seen  during  the  war 
could  compare  with  that  of  Vienna.  An  amazing 
apathy  prevailed.  In  Paris  there  was  a  passionate 
demand  for  Alsace-Lorraine;  in  Berlin  the  contrary 
was  demanded  just  as  eagerly;  in  England  the  destruc- 
tion of  Germany  was  the  objective;  in  Sofia  the  con- 
quest of  the  Dobrudja;  in  Rome  they  clamored  for  all 
possible  and  impossible  things;  in  Vienna  nothing  at 
all  was  demanded.  In  Cracow  they  called  for  a  Great 
Poland;  in  Budapest  for  an  unmolested  Hungary;  in 
Prague  for  a  united  Czech  state ;  and  in  Innsbruck  the 
descendants  of  Andreas  Hofer  were  fighting  as  they 
did  in  his  day  for  their  sacred  land,  Tyrol.  In  Vienna 
they  asked  only  for  peace  and  quiet. 

Old  men  and  children  would  fight  the  arch-enemy  in 
Tyrol,  but  if  the  Italians  were  to  enter  Vienna  and 
bring  bread  with  them  they  would  be  received  with 
shouts  of  enthusiasm.  And  yet  Berlin  and  Innsbruck 
were  just  as  hungry  as  Vienna.  C  'est  une  mile  sans  dme. 

My  visitor  compared  the  Viennese  to  a  pretty,  gay, 


220  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  frivolous  woman,  whose  aim  in  life  is  pleasure 
and  only  pleasure.  She  must  dance,  sing,  and  enjoy 
life,  and  will  do  so  under  any  circumstances — sans  dme. 

This  pleasure-loving  good-nature  of  the  Viennese 
has  its  admirable  points.  For  instance,  all  enemy  aliens 
were  better  treated  in  Vienna  than  anywhere  else.  Not 
the  slightest  trace  of  enmity  was  shown  to  those  who 
were  the  first  to  attack  and  then  starve  the  town. 

Stronger  than  anything  else  in  Vienna  was  the  desire 
for  sensation,  pleasure,  and  a  gay  life.  My  friend  once 
saw  a  piece  acted  at  one  of  the  theaters  in  Vienna  called, 
I  believe,  "Der  Junge  Medardus."  The  scene  is  laid 
during  the  occupation  of  Vienna  by  Napoleon.  Viennese 
citizens  condemned  to  death  for  intriguing  with  the 
enemy  are  led  away  by  the  French.  In  a  most  thrilling 
scene  weeping  women  and  children  bid  them  farewell. 
A  vast  crowd  witnesses  the  affair.  A  boy  suddenly 
rushes  in,  shouting,  "Napoleon  is  coming."  The 
crowd  hurries  away  to  see  him,  and  cries  of  "Long  live 
Napoleon"  are  heard  in  the  distance. 

Such  was  Vienna  a  hundred  years  ago,  and  it  is  still 
the  same.  Une  mile  sans  dme. 

I  pass  on  the  criticism  without  comment. 

ii 

In  different  circles  which  justly  and  unjustly  inter- 
vened in  politics  during  my  time  of  office,  the  plan  was 
suggested  of  driving  a  wedge  between  North  and  South 
Germany,  and  converting  the  latter  to  the  peaceful  pol- 
icy of  Vienna  in  contradistinction  to  Prussian  militarism. 

The  plan  was  a  faulty  one  from  the  very  first.  To 
begin  with,  as  already  stated,  the  most  pronounced 
obstacle  to  peace  was  not  only  the  Prussian  spirit,  but 
the  Entente  program  for  our  disruption,  which  a  closer 
connection  with  Bavaria  and  Saxony  would  not  have 
altered.  Secondly,  Austria-Hungary,  obviously  falling 


IMPRESSIONS  AND  REFLECTIONS         221 

more  and  more  to  pieces,  formed  no  point  of  attraction 
for  Munich  and  Dresden,  who,  though  not  Prussian, 
yet  were  German  to  the  very  backbone.  The  vague 
and  irresponsible  plan  of  returning  to  the  conditions 
of  the  period  before  1866  was  an  anachronism.  Thirdly 
and  chiefly,  all  experiments  were  dangerous  which 
might  create  the  impression  in  the  Entente  that  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  was  about  to  be  dissolved.  In  a 
policy  of  that  nature  executive  ability  was  of  supreme 
importance,  and  that  was  exactly  what  was  usually 
lacking. 

The  plan  was  not  without  good  features.  The 
appointment  of  the  Bavarian  Count  Hertling  to  be 
Imperial  Chancellor  was  not  due  to  Viennese  influence, 
though  a  source  of  the  greatest  pleasure  to  us,  and  the 
fact  of  making  a  choice  that  satisfied  Vienna  played  a 
great  part  with  the  Emperor  William.  Two  Bavarians, 
Hertling  and  Kuhlmann,  had  taken  over  the  leader- 
ship of  the  German  Empire,  and  they,  apart  from  their 
great  personal  qualities,  presented  a  certain  natural 
counter-balance  to  Prussian  hegemony  through  their 
Bavarian  origin ;  but  only  as  far  as  it  was  still  possible 
in  general  administration  which  then  was  in  a  disturbed 
state.  But  farther  they  could  not  go  without  causing 
injury. 

Count  Hertling  and  I  were  on  very  good  terms. 
This  wise  and  clear-sighted  old  man,  whose  only  fault 
was  that  he  was  too  old  and  physically  incapable  of 
offering  resistance,  would  have  saved  Germany,  if  she 
possibly  could  have  been  saved,  in  1017.  In  the  rush- 
ing torrent  that  whirled  her  away  to  her  fall,  he  found 
no  pillar  to  which  he  could  cling. 

Latterly  his  sight  began  to  fail  and  give  way.  He 
suffered  from  fatigue,  and  the  conferences  and  councils 
lasting  often  for  hours  and  hours  were  beyond  his 
strength, 


CHAPTER  IX 

POLAND 


BY  letters  patent  November  5,  1916,  both  the  Em- 
perors declared  Poland's  existence  as  a  kingdom. 

When  I  came  into  office,  I  found  the  situation  to  be 
that  the  Poles  were  annoyed  with  my  predecessor 
because,  they  declared,  Germany  had  wanted  to  cede 
the  newly  created  kingdom  of  Poland  to  us,  and 
Count  Burian  had  rejected  the  offer.  Apparently  there 
is  some  misunderstanding  in  this  version  of  the  case, 
as  Burian  says  it  is  not  correctly  rendered. 

There  were  three  reasons  that  made  the  handling 
of  the  Polish  question  one  of  the  greatest  difficulty. 
The  first  was  the  totally  different  views  of  the  case 
held  by  competent  individuals  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy.  While  the  Austrian  Ministry  was  in  favor 
of  the  so-called  Austro-Polish  solution,  Count  Tisza 
was  strongly  opposed  to  it.  His  standpoint  was  that 
the  political  structure  of  the  Monarchy  ought  not  to 
undergo  any  change  through  the  annexation  of  Poland, 
and  that  Poland  eventually  might  be  joined  to  the 
Monarchy  as  an  Austrian  province,  but  never  as  a 
partner  in  a  tripartite  Monarchy. 

A  letter  that  he  wrote  to  me  from  Budapest  on 
February  22,  1917,  was  characteristic  of  his  train  of 
thought.  It  was  as  follows; 


POLAND  223 

YOUR  EXCELLENCY, — Far  be  it  from  me  to  raise  a  discussion  on 
questions  which  to-day  are  without  actual  value  and  most  probably 
will  not  assume  any  when  peace  is  signed.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
wish  to  avoid  the  danger  that  might  arise  from  mistaken  con- 
clusions drawn  from  the  fact  that  I  accepted  without  protest  certain 
statements  that  appeared  in  the  correspondence  of  our  diplomatic 
representatives. 

Guided  exclusively  by  this  consideration,  I  beg  to  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  your  Excellency  to  the  fact  that  the  so-called  Austro-Polish 
solution  of  the  Polish  question  has  repeatedly  (as  in  telegram  No.  63 
from  Herr  von  Ugron)  been  referred  to  as  the  "tripartite  solution." 

With  reference  to  this  appellation  I  am  compelled  to  point  out 
the  fact  that  in  the  first  period  of  the  war,  at  a  time  when  the  Austro- 
Polish  solution  was  in  the  foreground,  all  competent  circles  in  the 
Monarchy  were  agreed  that  the  annexation  of  Poland  to  the  Mon- 
archy must  on  no  account  affect  its  dualistic  structure. 

This  principle  was  distinctly  recognized  by  the  then  leaders  in 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  as  also  by  both  Prime  Ministers; 
it  was  also  recognized  and  sanctioned  by  his  late  Majesty  the 
Emperor  and  King  Francis  Joseph.  I  trust  I  may  assume  that  this 
view  is  shared  by  your  Excellency;  in  any  case,  and  to  avoid  mis- 
understanding, I  must  state  that  the  Royal  Hungarian  government 
considers  this  to  be  the  ground-pillar  of  its  entire  political  system, 
from  which,  under  no  circumstances,  would  it  be  in  a  position  to 
deviate. 

It  would,  in  our  opinion,  be  fatal  for  the  whole  Monarchy.  The 
uncertainty  of  the  situation  lies  in  the  Austrian  state,  where  the 
German  element,  after  the  separation  of  Galicia,  would  be  in  a  very 
unsafe  position,  confronted  by  powerful  tendencies  that  easily  might 
gain  the  upper  hand  should  a  relatively  small  number  of  the  Ger- 
mans, whether  from  social-democratic,  political-reactionary,  or 
doctrinary  reasons,  separate  from  the  other  German  parties.  The 
establishment  of  the  new  Polish  element  as  a  third  factor  with 
Austria-Hungary  in  our  constitutional  organism  would  represent 
an  element  so  unsafe,  and  would  be  combined  with  such  risks  for  the 
further  development  of  the  policy  of  the  Hapsburg  Great  Power, 
that,  in  view  of  the  position  of  the  Monarchy  as  such,  I  should  feel 
the  greatest  anxiety  lest  the  new  and  unreliable  Russian-Polish 
element,  so  different  from  us  in  many  respects,  should  play  too 
predominating  a  part. 

The  firm  retention  of  dualism,  according  to  which  half  the  political 
influence  on  general  subjects  rests  with  Hungary,  and  the  Hungarian 
and  German  element  in  common  furnish  a  safe  majority  in  the  delega- 


224  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion,  alone  can  secure  for  the  dynasty  and  the  two  states  under  its 
scepter  an  adequate  guaranty  for  the  future. 

There  is  no  other  factor  in  the  Monarchy  whose  every  vital 
interest  is  so  bound  up  in  the  dynasty  and  in  the  position  of  the 
Monarchy  as  a  Great  Power,  as  Hungary.  The  few  people  whose 
clear  perception  of  that  fact  may  have  become  dulled  during  the 
last  peaceful  decade  must  have  been  brought  to  a  keener  realization 
of  it  by  the  present  war. 

The  preservation  of  the  Danube  Monarchy  as  a  vigorous  and 
active  Great  Power  is  in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word  a  vital  condi- 
tion for  the  existence  of  the  Hungarian  state.  It  was  fatal  for  all 
of  us  that  this  willing  people,  endowed  with  so  many  administrative 
qualities,  ready  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  all  state  and  national  aims, 
have  for  centuries  past  not  been  able  to  devote  themselves  to  the 
common  cause.  The  striving  for  a  solution  of  the  world  racial 
problem  and  the  necessity  of  combining  the  responsibilities  of  a 
Great  Power  with  the  independence  of  the  Hungarian  state  have 
caused  heavy  trials  and  century -long  friction  and  fighting. 

Hungary's  longing  for  independence  did  not  take  the  form  of 
efforts  for  dissolution.  The  great  leaders  in  our  struggle  for  liberty 
did  not  attack  the  continuance  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  as  a  Great 
Power.  And  even  during  the  bitter  trials  of  the  struggle  they  never 
followed  any  further  aim  than  to  obtain  from  the  Crown  a  guaranty 
for  their  chartered  rights. 

Hungary,  free  and  independent,  wished  to  remain  under  the 
scepter  of  the  Hapsburgs;  she  did  not  wish  to  come  under  any 
foreign  rule,  but  to  be  a  free  nation  governed  by  her  own  king  and 
her  own  laws  and  not  subordinate  to  any  other  ruler.  This  prin- 
ciple was  repeatedly  put  forward  in  solemn  form  (in  the  years  1723 
and  1791),  and  finally,  in  the  agreement  of  1867,  a  solution  was 
found  which  endowed  it  with  life  and  insured  its  being  carried 
out  in  a  manner  favorable  for  the  position  of  a  great  nation. 

In  the  period  of  preparation  for  the  agreement  of  1867  Hungary 
was  a  poor  and,  comparatively  speaking,  small  part  of  the  then 
Monarchy,  and  the  great  statesmen  of  Hungary  based  their  admin- 
istrative plan  on  dualism  and  equality  as  being  the  only  possible  way 
for  insuring  that  Hungarian  independence,  recognized  and  appealed 
to  on  many  occasions,  should  materialize  in  a  framework  of  modern 
constitutional  practice. 

A  political  structure  for  the  Monarchy  which  would  make  it 
possible  for  Hungary  to  be  outvoted  on  the  most  important  questions 
of  state  affairs,  and  therefore  subject  to  a  foreign  will,  would  again 
have  nullified  all  that  had  been  achieved  after  so  much  striving  and 


POLAND  225 

suffering,  so  much  futile  waste  of  strength  for  the  benefit  of  us  all, 
which  even  in  this  war,  too,  would  have  brought  its  blessings.  All 
those,  therefore,  who  have  already  stood  up  firmly  and  loyally  for 
the  agreement  of  1867  must  put  their  whole  strength  into  resisting 
any  tripartite  experiments. 

I  would  very  much  regret  if,  in  connection  with  this  question, 
differences  of  opinion  should  occur  among  the  present  responsible 
leaders  of  the  Monarchy.  In  view  of  this  I  considered  it  unneces- 
sary to  give  publicity  to  a  question  that  is  not  pressing.  At  all 
events,  in  dealing  with  the  Poles,  all  expressions  must  be  avoided 
which,  in  the  improbable,  although  not  impossible,  event  of  a 
resumption  of  the  Austro-Polish  solution,  might  awaken  expecta- 
tions in  them  which  could  only  lead  to  the  most  complicated 
consequences. 

The  most  moderate  Poles  had  made  up  their  minds  that  the 
dualistic  structure  of  the  Monarchy  would  have  to  remain  intact, 
and  that  the  annexation  of  Poland  by  way  of  a  junction  with  the 
Austrian  state,  with  far-reaching  autonomy  to  follow,  would  have 
to  be  the  consequence.  It  would  therefore  be  extremely  imprudent 
and  injurious  to  awaken  fresh  aspirations,  the  realization  of  which 
seems  very  doubtful,  not  only  from  a  Hungarian  point  of  view,  but 
from  that  which  concerns  the  future  of  the  Monarchy. 

I  beg  your  Excellency  to  accept  the  expression  of  my  highest 
esteem.  TISZA. 

BUDAPEST,  February  22,  1917. 

The  question  as  to  what  was  to  be  Poland's  future 
position  with  regard  to  the  Monarchy  remained  still 
unsolved.  I  continued  to  press  the  point  that  Poland 
should  be  annexed  as  an  independent  state.  Tisza 
wanted  it  to  be  a  province.  When  the  Emperor  dis- 
missed him,  although  he  was  favored  by  the  majority 
of  the  Parliament,  it  did  not  alter  the  situation  in 
regard  to  the  Polish  question,  as  Wekerle,  in  this  as  in 
almost  all  other  questions,  had  to  adopt  Tisza's  views; 
otherwise  he  would  not  have  been  in  the  minority. 

The  actual  reason  of  Tisza's  dismissal  was  not  the 
question  of  electoral  reforms,  as  his  successors  could  only 
act  according  to  Tisza's  instructions.  For,  as  leader 
of  the  majority,  which  he  continued  to  be  even  after 


226  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

his  dismissal,  no  electoral  reforms  could  be  carried 
out  in  opposition  to  his  will.  Tisza  thought  that  the 
Emperor  meditated  putting  in  a  coalition  majority 
against  him,  which  he  considered  quite  logical,  though 
not  agreeable. 

The  next  difficulty  was  the  attitude  of  the  Germans 
toward  Poland.  At  the  occupation  of  Poland  we  were 
already  unfairly  treated,  and  the  Germans  had  appro- 
priated the  greater  part  of  the  country.  Always  and 
everywhere  they  were  the  stronger  on  the  battle-field, 
and  the  consequence  was  that  they  claimed  the  lion's 
share  of  all  the  successes  gained.  This  was  in  reality 
quite  natural,  but  it  greatly  added  to  all  diplomatic 
and  political  activities,  which  were  invariably  prejudiced 
and  hindered  by  military  facts.  When  I  entered  upon 
office  Germany's  standpoint  was  that  she  had  a  far 
superior  right  to  Poland,  and  that  the  simplest  solution 
would  be  for  us  to  evacuate  the  territory  we  had 
occupied.  It  was,  of  course,  obvious  that  I  could  not 
accept  such  a  proposal,  and  we  held  firmly  to  the  point 
that  under  no  circumstances  would  our  troops  leave 
Lublin.  After  much  controversy  the  Germans  agreed, 
tant  bien  que  mal,  to  this  solution.  The  further  develop- 
ment of  the  affair  showed  that  the  German  standpoint 
went  through  many  changes.  In  general,  it  fluctuated 
between  two  extremes:  either  Poland  must  unite  her- 
self to  Germany — the  German-Polish  solution — or  else 
vast  portions  of  her  territory  must  be  ceded  to  Germany 
to  be  called  frontier  adjustments,  and  what  remained 
would  be  either  for  us  or  for  Poland  herself.  Neither 
solution  could  be  accepted  by  us.  The  first  one  for  this 
reason,  that  the  Polish  question  being  in  the  foreground 
made  our  Galician  question  very  acute,  as  it  would 
have  been  out  of  the  question  to  retain  Galicia  in  the 
Monarchy  when  separated  from  the  rest  of  Poland. 
We  were  obliged  to  oppose  the  German-Polish  solution, 


POLAND  227 

not  from  any  desire  for  conquest,  but  to  prevent  the 
sacrifice  of  Galicia  for  no  purpose. 

The  second  German  suggestion  was  just  as  impos- 
sible to  carry  out,  because  Poland,  crippled  beyond 
recognition  by  the  frontier  readjustment,  even  though 
united  with  Galicia,  would  have  been  so  unsatisfactory 
a  factor  that  there  would  never  have  been  any  prospect 
of  harmonious  dealings  with  her. 

The  third  difficulty  was  presented  by  the  Poles  them- 
selves, as  they  naturally  wished  to  secure  the  greatest 
possible  profit  out  of  their  release  by  the  Central 
Powers,  even  though  it  did  not  contribute  much  to 
their  future  happiness  so  far  as  military  support  was 
concerned.  There  were  many  different  parties  among 
them:  first  of  all,  one  for  the  Entente;  a  second,  Bilin- 
sky's  party;  above  all,  one  for  the  Central  Powers, 
especially  when  we  gained  military  successes. 

On  the  whole,  Polish  policy  was  to  show  their  hand 
as  little  as  possible  to  any  particular  group,  and  in 
the  end  range  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  con- 
querors. It  must  be  admitted  that  these  tactics  were 
successful. 

In  addition  to  these  difficulties,  there  prevailed  almost 
always  in  Polish  political  circles  a  certain  nervous 
excitement,  which  made  it  extremely  difficult  to  enter 
into  any  calm  and  essential  negotiations.  At  the  very 
beginning,  misunderstandings  occurred  between  the 
Polish  leaders  and  myself  with  regard  to  what  I  pro- 
posed to  do;  misunderstandings  which,  toward  the 
end  of  my  term  of  office,  developed  into  the  most  bitter 
enmity  toward  me  on  the  part  of  the  Poles.  On 
February  10,  1917,  a  whole  year  before  Brest-Litovsk, 
I  received  the  news  from  Warsaw  that  Herr  von 
Bilinsky,  apparently  misunderstanding  my  standpoint, 
evolved  from  the  facts,  considered  that  hopes  repre- 
sented promises,  and  in  so  doing  raised  Polish  expecta- 


228  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tions  to  an  unwarranted  degree.     I  telegraphed,  there- 
upon, to  our  representative  as  follows: 

February  16,  1917. 

I  have  informed  Herr  von  Bilinsky,  as  well  as  different  other 
Poles,  that  it  is  impossible,  in  the  present  unsettled  European  situa- 
tion, to  make,  on  the  whole,  any  plans  for  the  future  of  Poland.  I 
have  told  them  that  I  sympathize  with  the  Austro-Polish  solution 
longed  for  by  all  Poles,  but  that  I  am  not  in  the  position  to  say 
whether  this  position  will  be  attainable,  though  I  am  equally  unable 
to  foretell  the  opposite.  Finally,  I  have  also  declared  that  our  whole 
policy  where  Poland  is  concerned  can  only  consist  in  our  leaving  a 
door  open  for  all  future  transactions. 

I  added  that  our  representative  must  quote  my 
direct  orders  in  settling  the  matter. 

In  January,  1917,  a  conference  was  held  respecting 
the  Polish  question ;  a  conference  which  aimed  at  laying 
down  a  broad  line  of  action  for  the  policy  to  be  adopted. 
I  first  of  all  referred  to  the  circumstances  connected 
with  the  previously  mentioned  German  request  for  us 
to  evacuate  Lublin,  and  explained  my  reasons  for  not 
agreeing  to  the  demand.  I  pointed  out  that  it  did 
not  seem  probable  to  me  that  the  war  would  end  with  a 
dictated  peace  on  our  side,  and  that,  with  reference  to 
Poland,  we  should  not  be  able  to  solve  the  Polish 
question  without  the  co-operation  of  the  Entente,  and 
that  there  was  not  much  object  as  long  as  the  war  lasted 
in  endeavoring  to  secure  faits  accomplis.  The  main 
point  was  that  we  remain  in  the  country,  and  on  the 
conclusion  of  peace  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
Entente  and  the  Central  Powers  to  secure  a  solution 
of  the  Austro-Polish  question.  That  should  be  the 
gist  of  our  policy.  Count  Tisza  spoke  after  me  and 
agreed  with  me  that  we  must  not  yield  to  the  German 
demand  for  our  evacuation  of  Lublin.  As  regards 
the  future,  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  stated  that 
he  had  always  held  the  view  that  we  should  cede  to 


POLAND  2*9 

Germany  our  claim  to  Poland  in  exchange  for  economic 
and  financial  compensation;  but  that,  at  the  present 
time,  he  did  not  feel  so  confident  about  it.  The  con- 
ditions then  prevailing  were  unbearable,  chiefly  owing 
to  the  variableness  of  German  policy,  and  he,  Count 
Tisza,  returned  to  his  former,  oft-repeated  opinion  that 
we  should  strive  as  soon  as  possible  to  withdraw  with 
honor  out  of  the  affair;  no  conditions  that  would  lead 
to  further  friction,  but  the  surrendering  to  Germany 
of  our  share  in  Poland  in  exchange  for  economic  com- 
pensation. 

The  Austrian  Prime  Minister,  Count  Clam,  opposed 
this  from  the  Austrian  point  of  view,  which  supported 
the  union  of  all  the  Poles  under  the  Hapsburg  scepter 
as  being  the  one  and  only  desirable  solution. 

The  feeling  during  the  debate  was  that  the  door  must 
be  closed  against  the  Austro-Polish  proposals,  and  that, 
in  view  of  the  impossibility  of  an  immediate  definite 
solution,  we  must  adhere  firmly  to  the  policy  that  ren- 
dered possible  the  union  of  all  the  Poles  under  the  Haps- 
burg rule. 

After  Germany's  refusal  of  the  proposal  to  accept 
Galicia  as  compensation  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  this  pro- 
gram was  adhered  to  through  various  phases  and  vicis- 
situdes until  the  ever-increasing  German  desire  for 
frontier  readjustment  created  a  situation  which  made 
the  achievement  of  the  Austro-Polish  project  very 
doubtful.  Unless  we  could  secure  a  Poland  which, 
thanks  to  the  unanimity  of  the  great  majority  of  all 
Poles,  would  willingly  and  cheerfully  join  the  Mon- 
archy, the  Austro-Polish  solution  would  not  have  been 
a  happy  one,  as  in  that  case  we  should  only  have 
increased  the  number  of  discontented  elements  in  the 
Monarchy,  already  very  high,  by  adding  fresh  ones 
to  them.  As  it  proved  impossible  to  break  the  resist- 
ance put  up  by  General  Ludendorff,  the  idea  pre- 
16 


230  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

sented  itself  at  a  later  stage  to  strive  for  the  annexation 
of  Rumania  instead  of  Poland.  It  was  a  return  to  the 
original  idea  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  the 
union  of  Rumania  with  Transylvania,  closely  linked 
to  the  Monarchy.  In  that  case  we  should  have  lost 
Galicia  to  Poland,  but  a  certain  compensation  would 
have  been  conceded  to  us  in  Rumania  with  her  corn 
and  oil  springs,  and  for  the  Monarchy,  as  for  the  Poles, 
it  appeared  better  to  unite  the  latter  collectively  with 
Germany  rather  than  to  divide  them,  as  suggested  in 
the  Vienna-Berlin  dispute. 

The  plan  for  the  annexation  of  Rumania  presented 
well-nigh  insurmountable  internal  difficulties.  Owing 
to  her  geographical  position,  Rumania  ought  naturally 
to  be  annexed  to  Hungary.  Tisza,  who  was  not  in 
favor  of  the  plan,  would,  nevertheless,  have  agreed  to 
it  if  the  annexed  country  had  been  administered  from 
Budapest  and  in  the  Magyar  spirit,  which  meant  that 
it  would  be  incorporated  in  Hungary.  This,  for 
obvious  reasons,  would  involve  the  failure  of  the  plan, 
for  the  Rumanians  would  gain  no  advantage  from  the 
annexation  if  it  was  to  be  at  the  sacrifice  of  their 
national  independence.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Austrian  Ministry  raised  quite  justifiable  objections 
to  the  suggestion  of  a  future  combination  that  would 
add  a  rich  and  vast  country  to  Hungary,  while  Austria 
would  be  reduced  in  proportion,  and  compensation 
in  one  or  other  form  was  demanded.  Another,  but 
transitory,  plan  was  to  make  over  Bosnia  and  the  Herze- 
govina definitely  by  way  of  compensation  to  Austria. 
All  these  ideas  and  plans,  however,  were  of  a  transitory 
nature,  evoked  by  the  constantly  recurring  difficulties 
in  Berlin  and  Warsaw,  and  they  invariably  fell  through 
when  it  was  seen  that  the  obstacles  arising  from  dualism 
were  not  to  be  overcome.  The  original  Austro-Polish 
solution  was  taken  up  again,  although  it  was  impossible 


POLAND  231 

to  extort  from  the  Germans  a  definite  statement  as  to 
a  reasonable  western  frontier  for  Poland.  In  the  very 
last  term  of  my  office  the  Rumanian  plan  again  came 
up,  partly  owing  to  the  bitter  feelings  of  the  Poles 
on  the  Cholm  question,  and  partly  owing  to  the  claims 
made  by  Germany,  which  rendered  the  Austro-Polish 
solution  impossible. 

Simultaneously  with  these  efforts,  a  plan  for  the 
future  organization  of  the  Monarchy  was  being  con- 
sidered. The  Emperor  adhered  to  the  correct  stand- 
point, as  I  still  consider  it  to  be,  that  the  structure 
of  the  Monarchy,  after  an  endurable  issue  from  the  war, 
would  have  to  be  altered,  and  reconstruction  on  a  far 
more  pronounced  national  basis  be  necessary.  As 
applied  to  the  Poles,  this  project  would  entail  the 
dividing  of  East  and  West  Galicia,  and  an  independent 
position  for  the  Ruthenian  Poles. 

When  at  Brest-Litovsk,  under  the  pressure  of  the 
hunger  riots  that  were  beginning,  I  refused  to  agree  to 
the  Ukrainian  demands,  but  consented  to  submit 
the  question  of  the  division  of  Galicia  to  the  Austrian 
Crown  Council.  I  was  impelled  thereto  by  the  con- 
viction that  we  were  adhering  strictly  to  the  program 
as  it  had  been  planned  for  the  Monarchy. 

I  will  give  fuller  details  respecting  this  question  in 
the  next  chapter,  but  will  merely  relate  the  following 
incident  as  an  example  to  show  the  degree  of  hostile 
persecution  to  which  I  was  exposed.  The  rumor  was 
spread  on  all  sides  that  the  Emperor  had  told  the  Poles 
that  "I  had  concluded  peace  with  the  Ukraine  without 
his  knowledge  and  against  his  will."  It  is  quite  out 
of  the  question  that  the  Emperor  can  have  made  such 
a  statement,  as  the  peace  conditions  at  Kieff  were  a 
result  of  a  council  convoked  ad  hoc,  where — as  the 
protocol  proves — the  Emperor  and  Doctor  von  Seidler 
.were  responsible  for  the  terms. 


232  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  great  indignation  of  the  Poles  at  my  conduct  at 
Brest-Litovsk  was  quite  unfounded.  I  never  promised 
the  Poles  that  they  were  to  have  the  Cholm  district, 
and  never  alluded  to  any  definite  frontiers.  Had  I 
done  so  the  capable  political  leaders  in  Poland  would 
never  have  listened  to  me,  as  they  knew  very  well  that 
the  frontiers,  only  in  a  very  slight  degree,  depended 
on  the  decisions  at  Vienna.  If  we  lost  the  war  we 
had  nothing  more  to  say  in  the  matter;  if  a  peace  of 
agreement  was  concluded,  then  Berlin  would  be  the 
strongest  side,  having  occupied  the  largest  portion  of 
the  country;  the  question  would  then  have  to  be 
decided  at  the  general  Conference. 

I  always  told  the  Polish  leaders  that  I  hoped  to 
secure  a  Poland  thoroughly  satisfied,  also  with  respect 
to  her  frontier  claims,  and  there  were  times  when  we 
seemed  to  be  very  near  the  accomplishment  of  such 
an  aim;  but  I  never  concealed  the  fact  that  there  were 
many  influences  at  work  restricting  my  wishes  and 
keeping  them  very  much  subdued. 

The  partition  of  Galicia  was  an  internal  Austrian 
question.  Doctor  von  Seidler  took  up  the  matter 
most  warmly,  and  at  the  Council  expressed  the  hope 
of  being  able  to  carry  out  these  measures  by  parlia- 
mentary procedure  and  against  the  opposition  of  the 
Poles. 

I  will  allude  to  this  question  also  in  my  next  chapter. 

Closely  connected  with  the  Polish  question  was  the 
so-called  Central  Ei  ropean  project. 

For  obvious  and  very  comprehensible  reasons  Ger- 
many was  keenly  interested  in  a  scheme  for  closer  union. 
I  was  always  full  of  the  idea  of  turning  these  important 
concessions  to  account  at  the  right  moment  as  com- 
pensation for  prospective  German  sacrifices,  and  thus 
promoting  a  peace  of  understanding. 

During  the  first  period  of  my  official  activity,   I 


POLAND  233 

still  hoped  to  secure  a  revision  of  the  Treaty  of 
London. 

I  hoped,  as  already  mentioned,  that  the  Entente 
would  not  keep  to  the  resolution  adopted  for  the 
mutilation  of  the  Monarchy,  and  I  did  not,  therefore, 
approach  the  Central  European  question  closer;  had 
I  raised  it,  it  would  greatly  have  complicated  our  posi- 
tion with  regard  to  Paris  and  London.  When  I  was 
compelled  later  to  admit  that  the  Entente  kept  firmly 
to  the  decision  that  we  were  to  be  divided  in  any  case, 
and  that  any  change  in  its  purpose  would  only  be 
effected,  if  at  all,  by  military  force,  I  endeavored  to 
work  out  the  Central  European  plan  in  detail,  and  to 
reserve  the  concessions  ready  to  be  made  to  Germany 
until  the  right  moment  had  arrived  to  make  the  offer. 

In  this  connection  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  Customs 
Union  was  unfeasible,  at  any  rate  at  first;  but  on  the 
other  hand,  a  new  and  closer  commercial  treaty  would 
be  desirable,  and  a  closer  union  of  the  armies  would 
offer  no  danger;  it  was  hoped  greatly  to  reduce  them 
after  the  war.  I  was  convinced  that  a  peace  of  under- 
standing would  bring  about  disarmament,  and  that 
the  importance  of  military  settlements  would  be  in- 
fluenced thereby.  Also,  that  the  conclusion  of  peace 
would  bring  with  it  different  relations  between  all 
states,  and  that,  therefore,  the  political  and  military 
decisions  to  be  determined  in  the  settlement  with  Ger- 
many were  not  of  such  importance  as  those  relating 
to  economic  questions. 

The  drawing  up  of  this  program  was  met,  however,  by 
the  most  violent  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor. 
He  was  particularly  opposed  to  all  military  rap- 
prochement. 

When  the  attempt  to  approach  the  question  failed 
through  the  resistance  from  the  crown,  I  arranged 
on  my  own  initiative  for  a  debate  on  the  economic 


234  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

question.  The  Emperor  then  wrote  me  a  letter  in 
which  he  forbade  any  further  dealings  in  the  matter. 
I  answered  his  letter  by  a  business  report,  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  continuing  the  negotiations. 

The  question  then  became  a  sore  point  between  the 
Emperor  and  myself.  He  did  not  give  his  permission 
for  further  negotiations,  but  I  continued  them  notwith- 
standing. The  Emperor  knew  of  it,  but  did  not  make 
further  allusion  to  the  matter.  The  vast  claims  put 
forward  by  the  Germans  made  the  negotiations  ex- 
tremely difficult,  and  with  long  intervals  and  at  a  very 
slow  pace  they  dragged  on  until  I  left  office. 

Afterward  the  Emperor  went  with  Burian  to  the 
German  headquarters.  Following  that,  the  Salzburg 
negotiations  were  proceeded  with  and,  apparently,  at 
greater  speed. 


CHAPTER  X 

BREST-LITOVSK 


IN  the  summer  of  1917  we  received  information  which 
seemed  to  suggest  a  likelihood  of  realizing  the  con- 
templated peace  with  Russia.    A  report  dated  June 
13, 1917,  which  came  to  me  from  a  neutral  country,  ran 
as  follows: 

The  Russian  press,  bourgeois  and  socialistic,  reveals  the  following 
state  of  affairs: 

At  the  front  and  at  home  bitter  differences  of  opinion  are  rife 
as  to  the  offensive  against  the  Central  Powers  demanded  by  the 
Allies  and  now  also  energetically  advocated  by  Kerensky  in  speeches 
throughout  the  country.  The  Bolsheviks,  as  also  the  Socialists 
under  the  leadership  of  Lenin,  with  their  press,  are  taking  a  definite 
stand  against  any  such  offensive.  But  a  great  part  of  the  Menshe- 
viks  as  well — i.e.,  Tscheide's  party,  to  which  the  present  Ministers 
Tseretelli  and  Skobeleff  belong — is  likewise  opposed  to  the  offensive, 
and  the  lack  of  unanimity  on  this  question  is  threatening  the  unity 
of  the  party,  which  has  only  been  maintained  with  difficulty  up  to 
now.  A  section  of  the  Mensheviks,  styled  Internationalists  from 
their  trying  to  re-establish  the  old  Internationale,  also  called  Zim- 
merwalder  or  Kienthaler,  and  led  by  Trotzky,  or,  more  properly, 
Bronstein,  who  has  returned  from  America,  with  Larin,  Martow, 
Martynoz,  etc.,  returned  from  Switzerland,  are  on  this  point,  as 
with  regard  to  the  entry  of  Menshevik  Social  Democrats  into  the 
Provisional  government,  decidedly  opposed  to  the  majority  of  the 
party.  And  for  this  reason  Leo  Deutsch,  one  of  the  founders  of 
the  Marxian  Social  Democracy,  has  publicly  withdrawn  from  the 
party,  as  being  too  little  patriotic  for  his  views  and  not  insisting 
on  final  victory.  He  is,  with  Georgei  Plechanow,  one  of  the  chief 


236  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

supporters  of  the  Russian  "Social  Patriots,"  which  group  is  termed, 
after  their  press  organ,  the  Echinstw  group,  but  is  of  no  importance 
either  as  regards  numbers  or  influence.  Thus  it  comes  about  that 
the  official  organ  of  the  Mensheviks,  the  Rabocaja  Gazeta,  is  forced 
to  take  up  an  intermediate  position,  and  publishes,  for  instance, 
frequent  articles  against  the  offensive. 

There  is  then  the  Social  Revolutionary  party,  represented  in  the 
Cabinet  by  the  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Tschernow.  This  is  per- 
haps the  strongest  of  all  the  Russian  parties,  having  succeeded 
in  leading  the  whole  of  the  peasant  movement  into  its  course;  at  the 
Pan-Russian  Congress  the  great  majority  of  the  peasants'  deputies 
were  Social  Revolutionaries,  and  no  Social  Democrat  was  elected  to 
the  executive  committee  of  the  Peasants'  Deputies'  Council.  A 
section  of  this  party,  and,  it  would  seem,  the  greater  and  more  influ- 
ential portion,  is  definitely  opposed  to  any  offensive.  This  is  plainly 
stated  in  the  leading  organs  of  the  party,  Delo  Naroda  and  Zemlja  i 
Wolja.  Only  a  small  and  apparently  uninfluential  portion,  grouped 
round  the  organ  Volja  Naroda,  faces  the  bourgeois  press  with  uncon- 
ditional demands  for  an  offensive  to  relieve  the  Allies,  as  does  the 
Plechanow  group.  Kerensky's  party,  the  Trudoviks,  as  also  the 
related  People's  Socialists,  represented  in  the  Cabinet  by  the  Minis- 
ter of  Food,  Peschechonow,  are  still  undecided  whether  to  follow 
Kerensky  here  or  not.  Verbal  information,  and  utterances  in  the 
Russian  press,  as,  for  instance,  the  Retsch,  assert  that  Kerensky's 
health  gives  grounds  for  fearing  a  fatal  catastrophe  in  a  short  time. 
The  official  organ  of  the  Workers'  and  Soldiers'  Deputies'  Council, 
the  Irwestija,  on  the  other  hand,  frequently  asserts  with  great 
emphjisis  that  an  offensive  must  unquestionably  be  made.  It  is 
characteristic  that  a  speech  made  by  the  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
Tschernow,  to  the  Peasants'  Congress,  was  interpreted  as  meaning 
that  he  was  opposed  to  the  offensive,  so  that  he  was  obliged  to 
justify  himself  to  his  colleagues  in  the  Ministry  and  deny  that  such 
had  been  his  meaning. 

While,  then,  people  at  home  are  seriously  divided  on  the  question 
of  an  offensive,  the  men  at  the  front  appear  but  little  inclined  to 
undertake  any  offensive.  This  is  stated  by  all  parties  in  the  Russian 
press,  the  symptoms  being  regarded  either  with  satisfaction  or  with 
regret.  The  infantry  in  particular  are  against  the  offensive;  the 
only  enthusiasm  is  to  be  found  among  the  officers,  in  the  cavalry  or 
a  part  of  it,  and  the  artillery.  It  is  characteristic  also  that  the 
Cossacks  are  in  favor  of  war.  These,  at  any  rate,  have  an  ulterior 
motive,  in  that  they  hope  by  success  at  the  front  to  be  able  ulti- 
mately to  overthrow  the  revolutionary  regime.  For  there  is  this  to 


BREST-LITOVSK  237 

be  borne  in  mind:  that  while  most  of  the  Russian  peasants  have  no 
landed  property  exceeding  five  deshatin,  and  three  millions  have  no 
land  at  all,  every  Cossack  owns  forty  deshatin,  an  unfair  distinction 
which  is  constantly  being  referred  to  in  all  discussions  of  the  land 
question.  This  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  isolated  position  of  the 
Cossacks  in  the  Revolution,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  also  that 
they  were  formerly  always  among  the  most  loyal  supporters  of 
the  Tsar. 

Extremely  characteristic  of  the  feeling  at  the  front  are  the  follow- 
ing details: 

At  the  sitting  on  May  3oth  of  the  Pan-Russian  Congress,  Officers' 
Delegates,  a  representative  of  the  officers  of  the  3d  Elizabethengrad 
Hussars  is  stated,  according  to  the  Retsch  of  May  ist,  to  have  given, 
in  a  speech  for  the  offensive,  the  following  characteristic  statement: 
"You  all  know  to  what  extremes  the  disorder  at  the  front  has 
reached.  The  infantry  cut  the  wires  connecting  them  with  their 
batteries  and  declare  that  the  soldiers  will  not  remain  more  than  one 
month  at  the  front,  but  will  go  home." 

It  is  very  instructive  also  to  read  the  report  of  a  delegate  from 
the  front,  who  had  accompanied  the  French  and  English  majority 
Socialists  at  the  front.  This  report  was  printed  in  the  Rabocaja 
Gazeta,  May  i8th  and  igth — this  is  the  organ  of  the  Mensheviks 
— i.e.,  that  of  Tscheide,  Tseretelli,  and  Skobeleff.  These  Entente 
Socialists  at  the  front  were  told  with  all  possible  distinctness  that 
the  Russian  army  could  not  and  would  not  fight  for  the  imperialistic 
aims  of  England  and  France.  The  state  of  the  transport,  provisions 
and  forage  supplies,  as  also  the  danger  to  the  achievements  of  the 
Revolution  by  further  war,  demanded  a  speedy  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities. The  English  and  French  Socialist  delegates  were  said 
to  be  not  altogether  pleased  at  this  state  of  feeling  at  the  front. 
And  it  was  further  demanded  of  them  that  they  should  undertake 
to  make  known  the  result  of  their  experience  in  Russia  on  the 
western  front — i.e.,  in  France.  There  was  some  very  plain  speaking, 
too,  with  regard  to  America:  representatives  from  the  Russian  front 
spoke  openly  of  America's  policy  of  exploitation  toward  Europe 
and  the  Allies.  It  was  urged  then  that  an  international  Socialist 
conference  should  be  convened  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
and  supported  by  the  English  and  French  majority  Socialists.  At 
one  of  the  meetings  at  the  front,  the  French  and  English  Socialists 
were  given  the  following  reply: 

"Tell  your  comrades  that  we  await  definite  declarations  from 
your  governments  and  peoples  renouncing  conquest  and  indemnities. 
We  will  shed  no  drop  of  blood  for  imperialists,  whether  they  be 


238  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Russians,  Germans,  or  English.  We  await  the  speediest  agreement 
between  the  workers  of  all  countries  for  the  termination  of  the  war, 
which  is  a  thing  shameful  in  itself,  and  will,  if  continued,  prove 
disastrous  to  the  Russian  Revolution.  We  will  not  conclude  any 
separate  peace,  but  tell  your  people  to  let  us  know  their  aims  as 
soon  as  possible." 

According  to  the  report,  the  French  Socialists  were  altogether 
converted  to  this  point  of  view.  This  also  appears  to  be  the  case, 
from  the  statements  with  regard  to  the  attitude  of  Cachin  and 
Moutet  at  the  French  Socialist  Congress.  The  English,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  immovable,  with  the  exception  of  Sanders,  who  inclined 
somewhat  toward  the  Russian  point  of  view. 

Private  information  reaching  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in 
this  country  states  that  shots  were  fired  at  M.  Thomas,  the  Minister 
of  Munitions,  in  the  course  of  one  of  his  war  speeches  at  the  Russian 
front. 

The  disorganization  at  the  front  is  described  by  an  officer  or 
soldier  at  the  front  in  the  same  organ,  the  Rabocaja  Gazeta,  for 
May  26th,  as  follows: 

"The  passionate  desire  for  peace,  peace  of  whatever  kind,  aye, 
even  a  peace  costing  the  loss  of  ten  governments  (i.e.,  districts),  is 
growing  ever  more  plainly  evident.  Men  dream  of  it  passionately, 
even  though  it  is  not  yet  spoken  of  at  meetings  and  in  revolutions, 
even  though  all  conscious  elements  of  the  army  fight  against  this 
party  that  longs  for  peace."  And  to  paralyze  this,  there  can  be  but 
one  way:  let  the  soldiers  see  the  democracy  fighting  emphatically 
for  peace  and  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  Pan-Russian  Congress  of  Workers'  and  Soldiers'  Delegates' 
Councils  and  the  Army  Organization  at  the  front  in  St.  Petersburg 
June  ist  to  1 4th  took  for  its  first  point  in  the  order  of  the  day  the  fol- 
lowing: "The  war,  questions  of  defense  and  the  struggle  for  peace." 
At  this  time  the  government  would  doubtless  have  to  give  a  declara- 
tion with  regard  to  the  answer  already  received  at  the  beginning 
of  June  from  the  Allies  as  to  their  war  aims.  This  congress  will  also 
probably,  decide  definitely  upon  the  nomination  for  the  Stockholm 
Conference  and  appoint  delegates.  Point  4  deals  with  the  ques- 
tion of  nationality.  An  open  conflict  had  broken  out  between 
the  Petersburg  Workers'  and  Soldiers'  Deputy  Councils  and  the 
Ukrainian  Soldiers'  Congress,  sitting  at  Kieff,  on  account  of  the 
formation  of  a  Ukrainian  army.  The  appointment  of  a  "Ukrai- 
nian Army  General  Committee"  further  aggravated  the  conflict. 

With  regard  to  the  increasing  internal  confusion,  the  growing 
seriousness  of  the  nationality  dispute,  the  further  troubles  in  con- 


BREST-LITOVSK  239 

nection  with  agricultural  and  industrial  questions,  a  detailed  report 
dealing  separately  with  these  heads  will  be  forwarded  later. 

At  the  end  of  November  I  wrote  to  one  of  my  friends 
the  following  letter,  which  I  here  give  in  extenso,  as  it 
shows  faithfully  my  estimate  of  the  situation  at  the 
time: 

VIENNA,  November  17,  1917. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND, — After  many  days,  full  of  trouble,  annoyance, 
and  toil,  I  write  to  you  once  more  in  order  to  answer  your  very 
noteworthy  observations;  to  be  in  contact  with  you  again  turns  my 
thoughts  into  other  channels,  and  enables  me,  for  the  time  at  least, 
to  forget  the  wretchedness  of  every  day. 

You  have  heard,  you  say,  that  matters  are  not  going  so  well 
between  the  Emperor  and  myself,  and  you  are  sorry  for  this.  I  am 
sorry  myself,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  it  increases  the  friction 
of  the  daily  working  machine  to  an  insupportable  degree.  As  soon 
as  a  thing  of  this  sort  leaks  out — and  it  does  so  fast  enough — all 
enemies,  male  and  female,  rush  in  with  renewed  strength,  making 
for  the  vulnerable  point,  in  the  hope  of  securing  my  overthrow. 
These  good  people  are  like  carrion  vultures — I  myself  am  the  carrion 
— they  can  scent  from  afar  that  there  is  something  for  them  to  do, 
and  come  flying  to  the  spot.  And  the  lies  they  invent  and  the 
intrigues  they  contrive,  with  a  view  to  increasing  existing  differences 
— really,  they  are  worthy  of  admiration.  You  ask,  who  are  these 
inveterate  enemies  of  mine? 

Well,  first  of  al,  those  whom  you  yourself  conjecture. 

And,  secondly,  the  enemies  whom  every  Minister  has,  the  numbers 
of  those  who  would  fane  be  in  his  place.  Finally,  a  crowd  of  political 
mountebanks  from  the  Jockey  Club,  who  are  disgusted  because  they 
had  hoped  for  some  personal  advantage  through  my  influence,  and 
I  have  ignored  them.  No.  i  is  a  comfortingly  negligible  quantity, 
No.  2  are  dangerous,  but  No.  3  are  deadly. 

In  any  case,  then,  my  days  are  numbered.  Heaven  be  thanked, 
relief  is  not  far  off.  If  only  I  could  now  settle  things  with  Russia 
quickly,  and  thus  perhaps  secure  the  possibility  of  a  peace  all  round. 
All  reports  from  Russia  seem  to  point  to  the  fact  that  the  govern- 
ment there  is  determined  on  peace,  and  peace  as  speedily  as  possible. 
But  the  Germans  are  now  full  of  confidence.  If  they  can  throw 
their  massed  forces  against  the  west,  they  have  no  doubt  of  being 
able  to  break  through,  take  Paris  and  Calais,  and  directly  threaten 
England.  Such  a  success,  however,  could  only  lead  to  peace  if 


Germany  could  be  persuaded  to  renounce  all  plans  of  conquest.  I, 
at  any  rate,  cannot  believe  that  the  Entente,  after  losing  Paris  and 
Calais,  would  refuse  to  treat  for  peace  as  inter  pares — it  would  at 
least  be  necessary  to  make  every  endeavor  in  that  direction.  Up 
to  now  Hindenburg  has  done  all  that  he  promised,  so  much  we 
must  admit,  and  the  whole  of  Germany  believes  in  his  forthcoming 
success  in  the  west — always  taking  for  granted,  of  course,  the 
freeing  of  the  eastern  front;  that  is  to  say,  peace  with  Russia. 
The  Russian  peace,  then,  may  prove  the  first  step  on  the  way  to  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

I  have  during  the  last  few  days  received  reliable  information 
about  the  Bolsheviks.  Their  leaders  are  almost  all  of  them  Jews, 
with  altogether  fantastic  ideas,  and  I  do  not  envy  the  country  that 
is  governed  by  them.  From  our  point  of  view,  however,  the  most 
interesting  thing  about  them  is  that  they  are  anxious  to  make  peace, 
and  in  this  respect  they  do  not  seem  likely  to  change,  for  they 
cannot  carry  on  the  war. 

In  the  Ministry  here,  three  groups  are  represented:  one  declines 
to  take  Lenin  seriously, regarding  him  as  an  ephemeral  personage; 
the  second  does  not  take  this  view  at  all,  but  is,  nevertheless,  un- 
willing to  treat  with  a  revolutionary  of  this  sort;  and  the  third 
consists,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  of  myself  alone,  and  I  will  treat  with 
him,  despite  the  possibly  ephemeral  character  of  his  position  and  the 
certainty  of  revolution.  The  briefer  Lenin's  period  of  power  the 
more  need  to  act  speedily,  for  no  subsequent  Russian  government 
will  recommence  the  war — and  I  cannot  take  a  Russian  Mettenich 
as  my  partner  when  there  is  none  to  be  had. 

The  Germans  are  hesitating — they  do  not  altogether  like  the  idea 
of  having  any  dealings  with  Lenin,  possibly  also  from  the  reasons 
already  mentioned;  they  are  inconsistent  in  this,  as  is  often  the  case. 
The  German  military  party — which,  as  every  one  knows,  holds  the 
reins  of  policy  in  Germany  entirely — have,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  done 
all  they  could  to  overthrow  Kerensky  and  set  up  "something  else" 
in  his  place.  Now,  the  something  else  is  there  and  is  ready  to  make 
peace;  obviously,  then,  one  must  act,  even  though  the  party  con- 
cerned is  not  such  as  one  would  have  chosen  for  oneself. 

It  is  impossible  to  get  any  exact  information  about  these  Bolshe- 
viks; that  is  to  say,  there  is  plenty  of  information  available,  but 
it  is  contradictory.  The  way  they  begin  is  this:  everything  in  the 
least  reminiscent  of  work,  wealth,  and  culture  must  be  destroyed, 
and  the  bourgeoisie  exterminated.  Freedom  and  equality  seem  no 
longer  to  have  any  place  on  their  program;  only  a  bestial  sup- 
pression of  all  but  the  proletariat  itself.  The  Russian  bourgeois 


BREST-LITOVSK  241 

class,  too,  seems  almost  as  stupid  and  cowardly  as  our  own,  and 
its  members  let  themselves  be  slaughtered  like  sheep. 

True,  this  Russian  Bolshevism  is  a  peril  to  Europe,  and  if  we 
had  the  power,  besides  securing  a  tolerable  peace  for  ourselves,  to 
force  other  countries  into  a  state  of  law  and  order,  then  it  would  be 
better  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  such  people  as  these,  but  to  march 
on  Petersburg  and  arrange  matters  there.  But  we  have  not  the 
power;  peace  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  is  necessary  for  our 
own  salvation,  and  we  cannot  obtain  peace  unless  the  Germans 
get  to  Paris — and  they  cannot  get  to  Paris  unless  their  eastern 
front  is  freed.  That  is  the  circle  complete.  All  this  the  German 
military  leaders  themselves  maintain,  and  it  is  altogether  illogical  of 
them  now  apparently  to  object  to  Lenin  on  personal  grounds. 

I  was  unable  to  finish  this  letter  yesterday,  and  now  add  this 
to-day.  Yesterday  another  attempt  was  made,  from  a  quarter 
which  you  will  guess,  to  point  out  to  me  the  advantage  of  a  separate 
peace.  I  spoke  to  the  Emperor  about  it  and  told  him  that  this 
would  simply  be  shooting  oneself  for  fear  of  death;  that  I  could 
not  take  such  a  step  myself,  but  would  be  willing  to  resign  under 
some  pretext  or  other,  when  he  would  certainly  find  men  ready  to 
make  the  attempt.  The  Conference  of  London  has  determined  on  a 
division  of  the  Monarchy,  and  no  separate  peace  on  our  part  would 
avail  to  alter  that.  The  Rumanians,  Serbians,  and  Italians  are  to 
receive  enormous  compensations;  we  are  to  lose  Trieste,  and  the 
remainder  is  to  be  broken  up  into  separate  states — Czechish,  Polish, 
Hungarian,  and  German.  There  will  be  very  slight  contact  between 
these  new  states;  in  other  words,  a  separate  peace  would  mean 
that  the  Monarchy,  having  first  been  mutilated,  would  then  be 
hacked  to  pieces.  But  until  we  arrive  at  this  result  we  must 
fight  on,  and  that,  moreover,  against  Germany,  which  will,  of  course, 
make  peace  with  Russia  at  once  and  occupy  the  Monarchy.  The 
German  generals  will  not  be  so  foolish  as  to  wait  until  the  Entente 
has  invaded  Germany  through  Austria,  but  will  take  care  to  make 
Austria  itself  the  theater  of  war.  So  that  instead  of  bringing  the 
war  to  an  end,  we  should  be  merely  changing  one  opponent  for 
another  and  delivering  up  provinces  hitherto  spared — such  as 
Bohemia  and  Tyrol — to  the  fury  of  battle,  only  to  be  wrecked  com- 
pletely in  the  end. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  might  perhaps,  in  a  few  months'  time, 
secure  peace  all  round,  with  Germany  as  well — a  tolerable  peace  of 
mutual  understanding — always  provided  the  German  offensive  turns 
out  successful.  The  Emperor  was  more  silent  then.  Among  his 
entourage,  one  pulls  this  way,  another  that — and  we  gain  nothing 


242  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

in  that  manner  among  the  Entente,  while  we  are  constantly  losing 
the  confidence  of  Berlin.  If  a  man  wishes  to  go  over  to  the  enemy, 
then  let  him  do  it — le  remkde  sera  pire  que  le  mal — but  to  be  forever 
dallying  with  the  idea  of  treachery  and  adopting  the  pose  without 
carrying  it  out  in  reality — this  I  cannot  regard  as  prudent  policy. 

I  believe  we  could  arrive  at  a  tolerable  peace  of  understanding; 
we  should  lose  something  to  Italy,  and  should,  of  course,  gain 
nothing  in  exchange.  Furthermore,  we  should  have  to  alter  the 
entire  structure  of  the  Monarchy — after  the  fashion  of  the  federation 
Danubienne  proposed  to  France — and  I  am  certainly  rather  at  a  loss 
to  see  how  this  can  be  done  in  face  of  the  Germans  and  Hungarians. 
But  I  hope  we  may  survive  the  war,  and  I  hope  also  that  they  will 
ultimately  revise  the  conditions  of  the  London  Conference.  Let 
but  old  Hindenburg  once  make  his  entry  into  Paris,  and  then  the 
Entente  must  utter  the  decisive  word  that  it  is  willing  to  treat. 
But  when  that  moment  comes,  I  am  firmly  determined  to  do  the 
utmost  possible  to  appeal  publicly  to  the  peoples  of  the  Central 
Powers  and  ask  them  if  they  prefer  to  fight  on  for  conquest  or  if 
they  will  have  peace. 

To  settle  with  Russia  as  speedily  as  possible,  then  break  through 
the  determination  of  the  Entente  to  exterminate  us,  and  then  to 
make  peace — even  at  a  loss — that  is  my  plan  and  the  hope  for  which 
I  live.  Naturally,  after  the  capture  of  Paris,  all  "leading"  men 
— with  the  exception  of  the  Emperor  Karl — will  demand  a  "good" 
peace,  and  that  we  shall  never  get  in  any  case.  The  odium  of  having 
"spoiled  the  peace "  I  will  take  upon  myself. 

So,  I  hope,  we  may  come  out  of  it  at  last,  albeit  rather  mauled. 
But  the  old  days  will  never  return.  A  new  order  will  be  born  in 
throes  and  convulsions.  I  said  so  publicly  some  time  back,  in  my 
Budapest  speech,  and  it  was  received  with  disapproval  practically 
on  all  sides. 

This  has  made  a  long  letter,  after  all,  and  it  is  late.  Lebe  wohl, 
and  let  me  hear  from  you  again  soon. — In  friendship  as  of  old,  yours, 

[signed]  CZERNIN. 

With  regard  to  the  peace  negotiations  in  Brest- 
Litovsk,  I  will  leave  my  diary  to  speak  for  itself. 
Despite  many  erroneous  views  that  may  appear  in  the 
following  notes  and  various  unimportant  details,  I 
have  not  abbreviated  it  at  all,  since  it  gives,  in  its 
present  form,  what  I  believe  will  be  a  clear  picture  of 
the  development. 


BREST-LITOVSK  243 

"December  IQ,  1917. — Departure  from  Vienna, 
Wednesday  ipth. 

"Four  o'clock,  Nordbahnhof.  Found  the  party 
already  assembled  there :  Gratz  and  Wiesner,  Colloredo, 
Gautsch  and  Andrian,  also  Lieut.  Field-Marshal 
Csicserics,  and  Major  Fleck,  Baden. 

"I  took  the  opportunity  on  the  journey  to  give 
Csicserics  an  idea  of  my  intentions  and  the  tactics  to 
be  pursued.  I  told  him  that  in  my  opinion  Russia 
would  propose  a  general  peace,  and  that  we  must  of 
course  accept  this  proposal.  I  hoped  that  the  first 
steps  for  a  general  peace  would  be  taken  at  Brest, 
and  not  given  up  for  a  long  time.  Should  the  Entente 
not  accept,  then  at  least  the  way  would  be  open  for  a 
separate  peace.  After  that  I  had  long  discussions  with 
Gratz  and  Wiesner,  which  took  up  more  or  less  the 
whole  day. 

"December  20,  1917. — Arrived  at  Brest  a  few  minutes 
past  five.  At  the  station  were  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Gen- 
eral Hoffmann,  with  some  ten  of  his  suite,  also  the 
emissary  Roseberg  and  Merey  with  my  party.  I 
greeted  them  on  the  platform,  and  after  a  few  words 
Merey  went  into  the  train  with  me  to  tell  me  what 
had  happened  during  the  past  few  days.  On  the  whole, 
Merey  takes  a  not  unfavorable  view  of  the  situation 
and  believes  that,  unless  something  unforeseen  crops 
up,  we  should  succeed  within  a  reasonable  time  in 
arranging  matters  satisfactorily. 

"At  six  o'clock  I  went  to  pay  my  visit  to  General 
Hoffmann;  he  gave  me  some  interesting  details  as  to 
the  mentality  of  the  Russian  delegates,  and  the  nature 
of  the  armistice  he  had  so  fortunately  concluded.  I 
had  the  impression  that  the  general  combined  expert 
knowledge  and  energy  with  a  good  deal  of  calm  and 
ability,  but  also  not  a  little  Prussian  brutality,  whereby 
he  had  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Russians,  despite 


244  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

opposition  at  first,  to  agree  to  very  favorable  terms  of 
truce.  A  little  later,  as  arranged,  Prince  Leopold  of 
Bavaria  came  in,  and  I  had  a  little  talk  with  him  on 
matters  of  no  importance. 

"We  then  went  to  dinner,  all  together,  including  the 
whole  staff  of  nearly  one  hundred  persons.  The  dinner 
presented  one  of  the  most  remarkable  pictures  ever 
seen.  The  Prince  of  Bavaria  presided.  Next  to  the 
Prince  sat  the  leader  of  the  Russian  delegation,  a  Jew 
called  Joffe,  recently  liberated  from  Siberia;  then  came 
the  generals  and  the  other  delegates.  Apart  from 
this  Joffe,  the  most  striking  personality  in  the  delega- 
tion is  the  brother-in-law  of  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister,  Trotzky,  a  man  named  Kamenew,  who, 
likewise  liberated  from  prison  during  the  Revolution, 
now  plays  a  prominent  part.  The  third  delegate  is 
Madame  Bizenko,  a  woman  with  a  comprehensive  past. 
Her  husband  is  a  minor  official;  she  herself  took  an 
early  part  in  the  revolutionary  movement.  Twelve 
years  ago  she  murdered  General  Sacharow,  the  governor 
of  some  Russian  city,  who  had  been  condemned  to 
death  by  the  Socialists  for  his  energy.  She  appeared 
before  the  general  with  a  petition,  holding  a  revolver 
under  her  petticoat.  When  the  general  began  to 
read  she  fired  four  bullets  into  his  body,  killing  him 
on  the  spot.  She  was  sent  to  Siberia,  where  she  lived 
for  twelve  years,  at  first  in  solitary  confinement,  after- 
ward under  somewhat  easier  conditions;  she  also  owes 
her  freedom  to  the  Revolution.  This  remarkable 
woman  learned  French  and  German  in  Siberia  well 
enough  to  read  them,  though  she  cannot  speak  them, 
not  knowing  how  the  words  should  be  pronounced. 
She  is  the  type  of  the  educated  Russian  proletariat. 
Extremely  quiet  and  reserved,  with  a  curious  deter- 
mined set  of  the  mouth,  and  eyes  that  flare  up  pas- 
sionately at  times.  All  that  is  taking  place  around 


BREST-LITOVSK  245 

her  here  she  seems  to  regard  with  indifference.  Only 
when  mention  is  made  of  the  great  principle  of  the 
International  Revolution  does  she  suddenly  awake, 
her  whole  expression  alters;  she  reminds  one  of  a 
beast  of  prey  seeing  its  victim  at  hand  and  preparing 
to  fall  upon  it  and  rend  it. 

"After  dinner  I  had  my  first  long  conversation  with 
Hr.  Joffe.  His  whole  theory  is  based  on  the  idea  of 
establishing  the  right  of  self-determination  of  peoples 
on  the  broadest  basis  throughout  the  world,  and  trusting 
to  the  peoples  thus  freed  to  continue  in  mutual  love. 
Joffe  does  not  deny  that  the  process  would  involve 
civil  war  throughout  the  world,  to  begin  with,  but 
he  believes  that  such  a  war,  as  realizing  the  ideals  of 
humanity,  would  be  justified,  and  its  end  worth  all  it 
would  cost.  I  contented  myself  with  telling  him  that 
he  must  let  Russia  give  proof  that  Bolshevism  was 
the  way  to  a  happier  age;  when  he  had  shown  this  to 
be  so,  the  rest  of  the  world  would  be  won  over  to  his 
ideals.  But  until  his  theory  had  been  proved  by 
example  he  would  hardly  succeed  in  convincing  people 
generally  to  adopt  his  views.  We  were  ready  to 
conclude  a  general  peace  without  indemnities  or  annexa- 
tions, and  were  thoroughly  agreed  to  leave  the  develop- 
ment of  affairs  in  Russia  thereafter  to  the  judgment 
of  the  Russian  government  itself.  We  should  also  be 
willing  to  learn  something  from  Russia,  and  if  his 
revolution  succeeded  he  would  force  Europe  to  follow 
him,  whether  we  would  or  not.  But  meanwhile  there 
was  a  great  deal  of  skepticism  about,  and  I  pointed 
out  to  him  that  we  should  not  ourselves  undertake 
any  imitation  of  the  Russian  methods,  and  did  not  wish 
for  any  interference  with  our  own  internal  affairs ;  this 
we  must  strictly  forbid.  If  he  persisted  in  endeavoring 
to  carry  out  this  Utopian  plan  of  grafting  his  ideas  on 

ourselves,  he  had  better  go  back  home  by  the  next 
17 


246  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

train,  for  there  could  be  no  question  of  making  peace. 
Hr.  Joffe  looked  at  me  in  astonishment  with  his  soft 
eyes,  was  silent  for  a  while,  and  then,  in  a  kindly,  almost 
imploring  tone  that  I  shall  never  forget,  he  said:  'Still, 
I  hope  we  may  yet  be  able  to  raise  the  revolution  in 
your  country  too.' 

"We  shall  hardly  need  any  assistance  from  the  good 
Joffe,  I  fancy,  in  bringing  about  a  revolution  among 
ourselves;  the  people  will  manage  that,  if  the  Entente 
persist  in  refusing  to  come  to  terms. 

' '  They  are  strange  creatures,  these  Bolsheviks.  They 
talk  of  freedom  and  the  reconciliation  of  the  peoples 
of  the  world,  of  peace  and  unity,  and  withal  they  are 
said  to  be  the  most  cruel  tyrants  history  has  ever 
known.  They  are  simply  exterminating  the  bour- 
geoisie, and  their  arguments  are  machine-guns  and  the 
gallows.  My  talk  to-day  with  Joffe  has  shown  me 
that  these  people  are  not  honest,  and  in  falsity  surpass 
all  that  cunning  diplomacy  has  been  accused  of,  for  to 
oppress  decent  citizens  in  this  fashion  and  then  talk 
at  the  same  time  of  the  universal  blessing  of  freedom — 
it  is  sheer  lying. 

"December  21,  1917. — I  went  with  all  my  party  to 
lunch  at  noon  with  the  Prince  of  Bavaria.  He  lives  in 
a  little  bit  of  a  palace  half  an  hour  by  car  from  Brest. 
He  seems  to  be  much  occupied  with  military  matters 
and  is  very  busy. 

"I  spent  the  first  night  in  the  train,  and  while  we 
were  at  breakfast  our  people  moved  in  with  the  luggage 
to  our  residence.  We  are  in  a  small  house,  where  I 
live  with  all  the  Austro-Hungarian  party,  quite  close 
to  the  officers'  casino,  and  there  is  every  comfort  that 
could  be  wished  for  here.  I  spent  the  afternoon  at 
work  with  my  people,  and  in  the  evening  there  was  a 
meeting  of  the  delegates  of  the  three  Powers.  This 
evening  I  had  the  first  talk  with  Kuhlmann  alone,  and 


BREST-LITOVSK  247 

at  once  declared  positively  that  the  Russians  would 
propose  a  general  peace,  and  that  we  must  accept  it. 
Kuhlmann  is  half  disposed  to  take  my  view  himself; 
the  formula,  of  course,  will  be  'no  party  to  demand 
annexations  or  indemnities ' ;  then,  if  the  Entente  agree, 
we  shall  have  an  end  of  all  this  suffering.  But,  alas! 
it  is  hardly  likely  that  they  will. 

"December  22,  1917. — The  forenoon  was  devoted  to 
the  first  discussion  among  the  allies,  the  principles  just 
referred  to  as  discussed  with  Kuhlmann  being  then 
academically  laid  down.  In  the  afternoon  the  first 
plenary  sitting  took  place,  the  proceedings  being  opened 
by  the  Prince  of  Bavaria  and  then  led  by  Doctor  Kuhl- 
mann. It  was  decided  that  the  Powers  should  take 
it  in  turns  to  preside,  in  order  of  the  Latin  alphabet  as 
to  their  names — i.e.,  Allemagne,  Autriche,  etc.  Doctor 
Kuhlmann  requested  Hr.  Joffe  to  tell  us  the  principles 
on  which  he  considered  a  future  peace  should  be  based, 
and  the  Russian  delegate  then  went  through  the  six 
main  tenets  already  familiar  from  the  newspapers. 
The  proposal  was  noted,  and  we  undertook  to  give 
a  reply  as  early  as  possible  after  having  discussed 
the  matter  among  ourselves.  These,  then,  were  the 
proceedings  of  the  first  brief  sitting  of  the  peace 
congress. 

"December  23,  1917. — Kuhlmann  and  I  prepared  our 
answer  early.  It  will  be  generally  known  from  the 
newspaper  reports.  It  cost  us  much  heavy  work  to 
get  it  done.  Kuhlmann  is  personally  an  advocate  of 
general  peace,  but  fears  the  influence  of  the  military 
party,  who  do  not  wish  to  make  peace  until  definitely 
victorious.  But  at  last  it  is  done.  Then  there  were 
further  difficulties  with  the  Turks.  They  declared  that 
they  must  insist  on  one  thing,  to  wit,  that  the  Russian 
troops  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  Caucasus  immedi- 
ately on  the  conclusion  of  peace,  a  proposal  to  which 


248  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Germans  would  not  agree,  as  this  would  obviously 
mean  that  they  would  have  to  evacuate  Poland,  Cour- 
land,  and  Lithuania  at  the  same  time,  to  which  Germany 
would  never  consent.  After  a  hard  struggle  and  re- 
peated efforts,  we  at  last  succeeded  in  persuading  the 
Turks  to  give  up  this  demand.  The  second  Turkish 
objection  was  that  Russia  had  not  sufficiently  clearly 
declared  its  intention  of  refraining  from  all  interference 
in  internal  affairs.  But  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister 
agreed  that  internal  affairs  in  Austria-Hungary  were 
an  even  more  perilous  sphere  for  Russian  intrigues 
than  were  the  Turkish;  if  I  had  no  hesitation  in 
accepting,  he  also  could  be  content. 

"The  Bulgarians,  who  are  represented  by  Popow,  the 
Minister  of  Justice,  as  their  chief,  and  some  of  whom 
cannot  speak  German  at  all,  some  hardly  any  French, 
did  not  get  any  proper  idea  of  the  whole  proceedings 
until  later  on,  and  postponed  their  decision  until  the 
24th. 

"December  24,  1917. — Morning  and  afternoon,  long 
conferences  with  the  Bulgarians,  in  the  course  of  which 
Kuhlmann  and  I,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Bulgarian 
representatives,  on  the  other,  were  engaged  with  con- 
siderable heat.  The  Bulgarian  delegates  demanded 
that  a  clause  should  be  inserted  exempting  Bulgaria 
from  the  no-annexation  principle,  and  providing  that 
the  taking  over  by  Bulgaria  of  Rumanian  and  Serbian 
territory  should  not  be  regarded  as  annexation.  Such 
a  clause  would,  of  course,  have  rendered  all  our  efforts 
null  and  void,  and  could  not  under  any  circumstances 
be  agreed  to.  The  discussion  was  attended  with  con- 
siderable excitement  at  times,  and  the  Bulgarian 
delegates  even  threatened  to  withdraw  altogether  if  we 
did  not  give  way.  Kuhlmann  and  my  humble  self 
remained  perfectly  firm,  and  told  them  we  had  no 
objection  to  their  withdrawing  if  they  pleased;  they 


fcREST-LITOVSK 

could  also,  if  they  pleased,  send  their  own  answer 
separately  to  the  proposal,  but  no  further  alteration 
would  be  made  in  the  draft  which  we,  Kuhlmann  and 
I,  had  drawn  up.  As  no  settlement  could  be  arrived 
at,  the  plenary  sitting  was  postponed  to  the  25th 
and  the  Bulgarian  delegates  wired  to  Sofia  for  fresh 
instructions. 

"The  Bulgarians  received  a  negative  reply,  and 
presumably  the  snub  we  had  expected.  They  were  very 
dejected,  and  made  no  further  difficulty  about  agreeing 
to  the  common  action.  So  the  matter  is  settled  as  far  as 
that  goes. 

"In  the  afternoon  I  had  more  trouble  with  the  Ger- 
mans. The  German  military  party  'fear'  that  the 
Entente  may,  perhaps,  be  inclined  to  agree  to  a  general 
peace,  and  could  not  think  of  ending  the  war  in  this 
'unprofitable'  fashion.  It  is  intolerable  to  have  to 
listen  to  such  twaddle. 

"If  the  great  victories  which  the  German  generals 
are  hoping  for  on  the  western  front  should  be  realized, 
there  will  be  no  bounds  to  their  demands,  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  all  negotiations  will  be  still  further  increased. 

"December  25,  1917. — The  plenary  sitting  took  place 
to-day,  when  we  gave  the  Russians  our  answer  to  their 
peace  proposals.  I  was  presiding,  and  delivered  the 
answer,  and  Joffe  replied.  The  general  offer  of  peace  is 
thus  to  be  made,  and  we  must  await  the  result.  In  order 
to  lose  no  time,  however,  the  negotiations  on  matters 
concerning  Russia  are  being  continued  meanwhile. 
We  have  thus  made  a  good  step  forward,  and  perhaps 
got  over  the  worst.  It  is  impossible  to  say  whether 
yesterday  may  not  have  been  a  decisive  turning-point 
in  the  history  of  the  world. 

"December  26,  1917. — The  special  negotiations  began 
at  9  A.M.  The  program  drawn  up  by  Kuhlmann, 
chiefly  questions  of  economical  matters  and  representa- 


250  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion,  were  dealt  with  so  rapidly  and  smoothly  that  by 
ii  o'clock  the  sitting  terminated,  for  lack  of  further 
matter  to  discuss.  This  is  perhaps  a  good  omen. 
Our  people  are  using  to-day  to  enter  the  results  of  the 
discussion  in  a  report  of  proceedings,  as  the  sitting  is 
to  be  continued  to-morrow,  when  territorial  questions 
will  be  brought  up. 

"December  26,  1917. — I  have  been  out  for  a  long 
walk.  Alone. 

"On  the  way  back,  I  met  an  old  Jew.  He  was  sitting 
in  the  gutter,  weeping  bitterly.  He  did  not  beg,  did 
not  even  look  at  me,  only  wept  and  wept,  and  could 
not  speak  at  first  for  sobs.  And  then  he  told  me  his 
story — Russian,  Polish,  and  German,  all  mixed  together. 

"Well,  he  had  a  store — Heaven  knows  where,  but 
somewhere  in  the  war  zone.  First  came  the  Cossacks. 
They  took  all  he  had — his  goats  and  his  clothes  and 
everything  in  the  place — and  then  they  beat  him. 
Then  the  Russians  retired,  beat  him  again,  en  passant 
as  it  were,  and  then  came  the  Germans.  They  fired 
his  house  with  their  guns,  pulled  off  his  boots,  and  beat 
him.  Then  he  entered  the  service  of  the  Germans, 
carrying  water  and  wood,  and  receiving  his  food  and 
beatings  in  return.  But  to-day  he  had  got  into  trouble 
with  them  in  some  incomprehensible  fashion;  no  food 
after  that,  only  the  beatings;  and  was  thrown  into  the 
street. 

"The  beatings  he  referred  to  as  something  altogether 
natural.  They  were  to  him  the  natural  accompaniment 
to  any  sort  of  action — but  he  could  not  live  on  beatings 
alone. 

"I  gave  him  what  I  had  on  me — money  and  cigars — 
told  him  the  number  of  my  house,  and  said  he  could 
come  to-morrow,  when  I  could  get  him  a  pass  to  go  off 
somewhere  where  there  were  no  Germans  and  no  Rus- 
sians, and  try  to  get  him  a  place  of  some  sort  where  he 


BREST-LITOVSK  251 

would  be  fed  and  not  beaten.  He  took  the  money  and 
cigars  thankfully  enough;  the  story  of  the  railway  pass 
and  the  place  he  did  not  seem  to  believe.  Railway 
traveling  was  for  soldiers,  and  an  existence  without 
beatings  seemed  an  incredible  idea. 

"He  kept  on  thanking  me  till  I  was  out  of  sight, 
waving  his  hand,  and  thanking  me  in  his  German- 
Russian  gibberish. 

"A  terrible  thing  is  war.  Terrible  at  all  times,  but 
worst  of  all  in  one's  own  country.  We  at  home  suffer 
hunger  and  cold,  but  at  least  we  have  been  spared  up 
to  now  the  presence  of  the  enemy  hordes. 

"This  is  a  curious  place — melancholy,  yet  with  a 
beauty  of  its  own.  An  endless  flat,  with  just  a  slight 
swelling  of  the  ground,  like  an  ocean  set  fast,  wave 
behind  wave  as  far  as  the  eye  can  see.  And  all  things 
gray,  dead  gray,  to  where  this  dead  sea  meets  the  gray 
horizon.  Clouds  race  across  the  sky,  the  wind  lashing 
them  on. 

"This  evening,  before  supper,  Hoffmann  informed 
the  Russians  of  the  German  plans  with  regard  to  the 
outer  provinces.  The  position  is  this:  As  long  as  the 
war  in  the  west  continues,  the  Germans  cannot  evacu- 
ate Courland  and  Lithuania,  since,  apart  from  the  fact 
that  they  must  be  held  as  security  for  the  general  peace 
negotiations,  these  countries  form  part  of  the  German 
munition  establishment.  The  railway  material,  the 
factories,  and,  most  of  all,  the  grain  are  indispensable 
as  long  as  the  war  lasts.  That  they  cannot  now  with- 
draw from  there  at  once  is  clear  enough.  If  peace  is 
signed,  then  the  self-determination  of  the  people  in 
the  occupied  territory  will  decide.  But  here  arises  the 
great  difficulty — how  this  right  of  self-determination 
is  to  be  exercised. 

"The  Russians  naturally  do  not  want  the  vote  to  be 
taken  while  the  German  bayonets  are  still  in  the  coun- 


252  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

try,  and  the  Germans  reply  that  the  unexampled  ter- 
rorism of  the  Bolsheviks  would  falsify  any  election 
result,  since  the  'bourgeoisie,'  according  to  Bolshevist 
ideas,  are  not  human  beings  at  all.  My  idea  of  having 
the  proceedings  controlled  by  a  neutral  Power  was  not 
altogether  acceptable  to  any  one.  During  the  war 
no  neutral  Power  would  undertake  the  task,  and  the 
German  occupation  could  not  be  allowed  to  last  until 
the  ultimate  end.  In  point  of  fact,  both  sides  are 
afraid  of  terrorization  by  the  opposing  party,  and  each 
wishes  to  apply  the  same  itself. 

"December  26,  1917. — There  is  no  hurry,  apparently, 
in  this  place.  Now  it  is  the  Turks  who  are  not  ready, 
now  the  Bulgarians,  then  it  is  the  Russians'  turn — 
and  the  sitting  is  again  postponed  or  broken  off  almost 
as  soon  as  commenced. 

"I  am  reading  some  memoirs  from  the  French  Revo- 
lution. A  most  appropriate  reading  at  the  present 
time,  in  view  of  what  is  happening  in  Russia  and  may 
perhaps  come  throughout  Europe.  There  were  no 
Bolsheviks  then,  but  men  who  tyrannized  the  world 
under  the  battle-cry  of  freedom  were  to  be  found  in 
Paris  then  as  well  as  now  in  St.  Petersburg.  Charlotte 
Corday  said:  'It  was  not  a  man,  but  a  wild  beast  I 
killed.'  These  Bolsheviks  in  their  turn  will  disappear, 
and  who  can  say  if  there  will  be  a  Corday  ready  for 
Trotzky? 

"Joffe  told  me  about  the  Tsar  and  his  family,  and 
the  state  of  things  said  to  exist  there.  He  spoke  with 
great  respect  of  Nicolai  Nicolaievitsch  as  a  thorough 
man,  full  of  energy  and  courage,  one  to  be  respected 
even  as  an  enemy.  The  Tsar,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
considered  cowardly,  false,  and  despicable.  It  was  a 
proof  of  the  incapacity  of  the  bourgeoisie  that  they 
had  tolerated  such  a  Tsar.  Monarchs  were  all  of  them 
more  or  less  degenerate;  he  could  not  understand  how 


BREST-LITOVSK  253 

any  one  could  accept  a  form  of  government  which 
involved  the  risk  of  having  a  degenerate  ruler.  I 
answered  him  as  to  this,  that  a  monarchy  had  first 
of  all  one  advantage,  that  there  was  at  least  one  place 
in  the  state  beyond  the  sphere  of  personal  ambition 
and  intrigues,  and  as  to  degeneration,  that  was  often 
a  matter  of  opinion :  there  were  also  degenerates  to  be 
found  among  the  uncrowned  rulers  of  states.  Joffe 
considered  that  there  would  be  no  such  risk  when  the 
people  could  choose  for  themselves.  I  pointed  out 
that  Hr.  Lenin,  for  instance,  had  not  been  'chosen,' 
and  I  considered  it  doubtful  whether  an  impartial 
election  would  have  brought  him  into  power.  Possibly 
there  might  be  some  in  Russia  who  would  consider 
him  also  degenerate. 

" December  27,  1917. — The  Russians  are  in  despair, 
and  some  of  them  even  talked  of  withdrawing  alto- 
gether. They  had  thought  the  Germans  would  renounce 
all  occupied  territory  without  further  parley,  or  hand 
it  over  to  the  Bolsheviks.  Long  sittings  between  the 
Russians,  Kuhlmann,  and  myself,  part  of  the  time  with 
Hoffmann.  I  drew  up  the  following: 

"i.  As  long  as  general  peace  is  not  yet  declared,  we 
cannot  give  up  the  occupied  areas;  they  form  part  of 
our  great  munition  works  (factories,  railways,  sites 
with  buildings,  etc.). 

"2.  After  the  general  peace,  a  plebiscite  in  Poland, 
Courland,  and  Lithuania  is  to  decide  the  fate  of  the 
people  there :  as  to  the  form  in  which  the  vote  is  to  be 
taken,  this  remains  to  be  further  discussed,  in  order  that 
the  Russians  may  have  surety  that  no  coercion  is  used. 
Apparently,  this  suits  neither  party.  Situation  much 
worse. 

"Afternoon. — Matters  still  getting  worse.  Furious 
wire  from  Hindenburg  about  'renunciation'  of  every- 
thing; Ludendorff  telephoning  every  minute;  more 


254  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

furious  outbursts,  Hoffmann  very  excited,  Kuhlmann 
true  to  his  name  and  'cool'  as  ever.  The  Russians 
declare  they  cannot  accept  the  vague  formulas  of  the 
Germans  with  regard  to  freedom  of  choice. 

"I  told  Kuhlmann  and  Hoffmann  I  would  go  as  far 
as  possible  with  them ;  but  should  their  endeavors  fail, 
then  I  would  enter  into  separate  negotiations  with  the 
Russians,  since  Berlin  and  Petersburg  were  really  both 
opposed  to  an  uninfluenced  vote.  Austria-Hungary, 
on  the  other  hand,  desired  nothing  but  final  peace. 
Kuhlmann  understands  my  position,  and  says  he  him- 
self would  rather  go  than  let  it  fail.  Asked  me  to  give 
him  my  point  of  view  in  writing,  as  it  'would  strengthen 
his  position.'  Have  done  so.  He  has  telegraphed 
it  to  the  Kaiser. 

"Evening. — Kuhlmann  believes  matters  will  be  set- 
tled— or  broken  off  altogether — by  to-morrow. 

"December  28,  ipi/. — General  feeling,  dull.  Fresh 
outbursts  of  violence  from  Kreuznach.  But  at  noon  a 
wire  from  Bussche:  Hertling  had  spoken  with  the 
Kaiser,  who  is  perfectly  satisfied.  Kuhlmann  said  to 
me:  'The  Kaiser  is  the  only  sensible  man  in  the  whole 
of  Germany.' 

"We  have  at  last  agreed  about  the  form  of  the  com- 
mittee; that  is,  a  committee  ad  hoc  is  to  be  formed  in 
Brest,  to  work  out  a  plan  for  the  evacuation  and  voting 
in  detail.  Tant  bien  que  mal,  a  provisional  expedient. 
All  home  to  report;  next  sitting  to  be  held  January 
5,  1918. 

"Russians  again  somewhat  more  cheerful. 

"This  evening  at  dinner  I  rose  to  express  thanks  on 
the  part  of  the  Russians  and  the  four  allies  to  Prince 
Leopold.  He  answered  at  once,  and  very  neatly, 
but  told  me  immediately  afterward  that  I  had  taken 
him  by  surprise.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  had  been  taken 
by  surprise  myself;  no  notice  had  been  given;  it  was 


BREST-LITOVSK  255 

only  during  the  dinner  itself  that  the  Germans  asked 
me  to  speak. 

"Left  at  10  P.M.  for  Vienna. 

"From  the  2gth  to  the  morning  of  the  3d  I  was  in 
Vienna.  Two  long  audiences  with  the  Emperor  gave 
me  the  opportunity  of  telling  him  what  had  passed  at 
Brest.  He  fully  approves,  of  course,  the  point  of  view 
that  peace  must  be  made,  if  at  all  possible. 

"I  have  despatched  a  trustworthy  agent  to  the  outer 
provinces  in  order  to  ascertain  the  exact  state  of  feeling 
there.  He  reports  that  all  are  against  the  Bolsheviks 
except  the  Bolsheviks  themselves.  The  entire  body  of 
citizens,  peasants — in  a  word,  every  one  with  any  pos- 
sessions at  all — trembles  at  the  thought  of  these  red 
robbers,  and  wishes  to  go  over  to  Germany.  The  ter- 
rorism of  Lenin  is  said  to  be  indescribable,  and  in 
Petersburg  all  are  absolutely  longing  for  the  entry  of 
the  German  troops  to  deliver  them. 

"January  j,  1918. — Return  to  Brest. 

"On  the  way,  at  6  P.M.,  I  received,  at  a  station,  the 
following  telegram,  in  code,  from  Baron  Gautsch, 
who  had  remained  at  Brest: 

"Russian  delegation  received  following  telegram  from  Peters- 
burg this  morning:  'To  General  Hoffmann.  For  the  representa- 
tives of  the  German,  Austro-Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish 
delegations.  The  government  of  the  Russian  Republic  considers  it 
necessary  to  carry  on  the  further  negotiations  on  neutral  ground, 
and  proposes  removing  to  Stockholm.  Regarding  attitude  to  the 
proposals  as  formulated  by  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
delegation  in  Points  i  and  2,  the  government  of  the  Russian  Republic 
and  the  Pan-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Councils 
of  Workers',  Soldiers'  and  Peasants'  Deputies  consider,  in  entire 
agreement  with  the  view  expressed  by  our  delegation,  that  the 
proposals  are  contrary  to  the  principle  of  national  self-determina- 
tion, even  in  the  restricted  form  in  which  it  appears  in  Pcint  3 
of  the  reply  given  by  the  Four  Powers  on  the  1 2th  ult.  President 
of  the  Russian  Delegation,  A.  Joffe.  Major  Brinkmann  has  com- 
municated this  by  telephone  to  the  German  delegation,  already 


on  the  way  here.  Heir  von  Kuhlmann  has  sent  a  telephone  message 
in  return  that  he  is  continuing  the  journey  and  will  arrive  at  Brest 
this  evening.' 

"I  also  went  on,  of  course,  considering  this  maneuver 
on  the  part  of  the  Russians  as  rather  in  the  nature  of 
bluffing.  If  they  do  not  come,  then  we  can  treat  with 
the  Ukrainians,  who  should  be  in  Brest  by  now. 

"In  Vienna  I  saw,  among  politicians,  Baernreither, 
Hauser,  Wekerle,  Seidler,  and  some  few  others.  The 
opinion  of  almost  all  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 
'Peace  must  be  arranged,  but  a  separate  peace  without 
Germany  is  impossible.' 

"No  one  has  told  me  how  I  am  to  manage  it  if 
neither  Germany  nor  Russia  will  listen  to  reason. 

"January  4,  igi8. — Fearful  snowstorm  in  the  night; 
the  heating  apparatus  in  the  train  was  frozen,  and  the 
journey  consequently  far  from  pleasant.  On  awaking 
early  at  Brest  the  trains  of  the  Bulgarians  and  Turks 
were  standing  on  adjacent  sidings.  Weather  magnif- 
icent now:  cold,  and  the  air  as  at  St.  Moritz.  I  went 
across  to  Kuhlmann,  had  breakfast  with  him,  and  talked 
over  events  in  Berlin.  There  seems  to  have  been 
desperate  excitement  there.  Kuhlmann  suggested  to 
Ludendorfl  that  he  should  come  to  Brest  himself  and 
take  part  in  the  negotiations.  After  long  discussion, 
however,  it  appeared  that  Ludendorff  himself  was  not 
quite  clear  as  to  what  he  wanted,  and  declared  spontane- 
ously that  he  considered  it  superfluous  for  him  to  go 
to  Brest;  he  would,  at  best,  'only  spoil  things  if  he 
did.'  Heaven  grant  the  man  such  gleams  of  insight 
again  and  often!  It  seems  as  if  the  whole  trouble  is 
more  due  to  feeling  against  Kuhlmann  than  to  anything 
in  the  questions  at  issue;  people  do  not  want  the 
world  to  have  the  impression  that  the  peace  was  gained 
by  'adroit  diplomacy,'  but  by  military  success  alone. 
General  Hoffmann  appears  to  have  been  received  with 


BREST-LITOVSK  257 

marked  favor  by  the  Kaiser,  and  both  he  and  Kuhlmann 
declare  themselves  well  satisfied  with  the  results  of 
their  journey. 

"We  talked  over  the  reply  to  the  Petersburg  tele- 
gram, declining  a  conference  in  Stockholm,  and  further 
tactics  to  be  followed  in  case  of  need.  We  agreed  that 
if  the  Russians  did  not  come  we  must  declare  the 
armistice  at  an  end,  and  chance  what  the  Petersburgers 
would  say  to  that.  On  this  point  Kuhlmann  and  I 
were  entirely  agreed.  Nevertheless,  the  feeling,  both 
in  our  party  and  in  that  of  the  Germans,  was  not  a 
little  depressed.  Certainly,  if  the  Russians  do  break 
off  negotiations,  it  will  place  us  in  a  very  unpleasant 
position.  The  only  way  to  save  the  situation  is  by 
acting  quickly  and  energetically  with  the  Ukrainian 
delegation,  and  we  therefore  commenced  this  work 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day.  There  is  thus  at 
least  a  hope  that  we  may  be  able  to  arrive  at  positive 
results  with  them  within  reasonable  time. 

"In  the  evening,  after  dinner,  came  a  wire  from 
Petersburg  announcing  the  arrival  of  the  delegation, 
including  the  Foreign  Minister,  Trotzky.  It  was 
interesting  to  see  the  delight  of  all  the  Germans  at  the 
news;  not  until  this  sudden  and  violent  outbreak  of 
satisfaction  was  it  fully  apparent  how  seriously  they 
had  been  affected  by  the  thought  that  the  Russians 
would  not  come.  Undoubtedly  this  is  a  great  step 
forward,  and  we  all  feel  that  peace  is  really  now  on  the 
way. 

"January  5,  igi8. — At  seven  this  morning  a  few  of 
us  went  out  shooting  with  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria. 
We  went  for  a  distance  of  20  to  30  kilometers  by  train, 
and  then  in  open  automobiles  to  a  magnificent  primeval 
forest  extending  over  two  to  three  hundred  square 
kilometers.  Weather  very  cold,  but  fine,  much  snow, 
and  pleasant  company.  From  the  point  of  view  of 


258  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

sport,  it  was  poorer  than  one  could  have  expected. 
One  of  the  Prince's  aides  stuck  a  pig,  another  shot  two 
hares,  and  that  was  all.  Back  at  6  P.M. 

"January  6,  ipi8. — To-day  we  had  the  first  dis- 
cussions with  the  Ukrainian  delegates,  all  of  whom 
were  present  except  the  leader.  The  Ukrainians  are 
very  different  from  the  Russian  delegates.  Far  less 
revolutionary,  and  with  far  more  interest  in  their  own 
country,  less  in  the  progress  of  Socialism  generally. 
They  do  not  really  care  about  Russia  at  all,  but  think 
only  of  the  Ukraine,  and  their  efforts  are  solely  directed 
toward  attaining  their  own  independence  as  soon  as 
possible.  Whether  that  independence  is  to  be  com- 
plete and  international,  or  only  as  within  the  bounds 
of  a  Russian  federative  state,  they  do  not  seem  quite 
to  know  themselves.  Evidently,  the  very  intelligent 
Ukrainian  delegates  intended  to  use  us  as  a  springboard 
from  which  they  themselves  could  spring  upon  the 
Bolsheviks.  Their  idea  was  that  we  should  acknowl- 
edge their  independence,  and  then,  with  this  as  a  fait 
accompli,  they  could  face  the  Bolsheviks  and  force  them 
to  recognize  their  equal  standing  and  treat  with  them 
on  that  basis.  Our  line  of  policy,  however,  must  be 
either  to  bring  over  the  Ukrainians  to  our  peace  basis, 
or  else  to  drive  a  wedge  between  them  and  the  Peters- 
burgers.  As  to  their  desire  for  independence,  we 
declared  ourselves  willing  to  recognize  this,  provided 
the  Ukrainians  on  their  part  would  agree  to  the  follow- 
ing three  points:  i.  The  negotiations  to  be  concluded 
at  Brest-Litovsk  and  not  at  Stockholm.  2.  Recogni- 
tion of  the  former  political  frontier  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Ukraine.  3.  Non-interference  of  any 
one  state  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another.  Char- 
acteristically enough,  no  answer  has  yet  been  received 
to  this  proposal ! 

"January  7,  1918. — This  forenoon,  all  the  Russians 


BREST-LITOVSK  259 

arrived,  under  the  leadership  of  Trotzky.  They  at 
once  sent  a  message  asking  to  be  excused  for  not  appear- 
ing at  meals  with  the  rest  for  the  future.  At  other 
times  we  see  nothing  of  them.  The  wind  seems  to 
be  in  a  very  different  quarter  now  from  what  it  was. 
The  German  officer  who  accompanied  the  Russian 
delegation  from  Dunaburg,  Captain  Baron  Lamezan, 
gave  us  some  interesting  details  as  to  this.  In  the  first 
place,  he  declared  that  the  trenches  in  front  of  Duna- 
burg are  entirely  deserted,  and  save  for  an  outpost 
or  so  there  were  no  Russians  there  at  all;  also,  that 
at  many  stations  delegates  were  waiting  for  the  deputa- 
tion to  pass,  in  order  to  demand  that  peace  should  be 
made.  Trotzky  had  throughout  answered  them  with 
polite  and  careful  speeches,  but  grew  ever  more  and 
more  depressed.  Baron  Lamezan  had  the  impression 
that  the  Russians  were  altogether  desperate  now,  hav- 
ing no  choice  save  between  going  back  with  a  bad 
peace  or  with  no  peace  at  all;  in  either  case  with  the 
same  result — that  they  would  be  swept  away.  Kuhl- 
mann  said,  'Us  n'ont  que  le  choix  a  quelle  sauce  ils  se 
feront  manger.'  I  answered,  'Tout  comme  chez  nous.' 

"A  wire  had  just  come  in  reporting  demonstrations 
in  Budapest  against  Germany.  The  windows  of  the 
German  Consulate  were  broken,  a  clear  indication  of 
the  state  of  feeling  which  would  arise  if  the  peace  were 
to  be  lost  through  our  demands. 

"January  8,  1918. — The  Turkish  Grand  Vizier, 
Talaat  Pasha,  arrived  during  the  night,  and  has  just 
been  to  call  on  me.  He  seems  emphatically  in  favor 
of  making  peace;  but  I  fancy  he  would  like,  in  case 
of  any  conflict  arising  with  Germany,  to  push  me  into 
the  foreground  and  keep  out  of  the  way  himself. 
Talaat  Pasha  is  one  of  the  cleverest  heads  among  the 
Turks,  and  perhaps  the  most  energetic  man  of  them  all. 

"Before  the  Revolution  he  was  a  minor  official  in  the 


26o  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

telegraph  service,  and  was  on  the  revolutionary  com- 
mittee. In  his  official  capacity,  he  got  hold  of  a  tele- 
gram from  the  government  which  showed  him  that  the 
revolutionary  movement  would  be  discovered  and  the 
game  lost  unless  immediate  action  were  taken.  He 
suppressed  the  message,  warned  the  revolutionary  com- 
mittee, and  persuaded  them  to  start  their  work  at  once. 
The  coup  succeeded,  the  Sultan  was  deposed,  and 
Talaat  was  made  Minister  of  the  Interior.  With  iron 
energy  he  then  turned  his  attention  to  the  suppression 
of  the  opposing  movement.  Later  he  became  Grand 
Vizier,  and  impersonated,  together  with  Enver  Pasha, 
the  will  and  power  of  Turkey. 

"This  afternoon,  first  a  meeting  of  the  five  heads 
of  the  allied  delegations  and  the  Russian.  Afterward, 
plenary  sitting. 

"The  sitting  postponed  again,  as  the  Ukrainians  are 
still  not  ready  with  their  preparations.  Late  in  the 
evening  I  had  a  conversation  with  Kuhlmann  and 
Hoffmann,  in  which  we  agreed  fairly  well  as  to  tactics. 
I  said  again  that  I  was  ready  to  stand  by  them  and 
hold  to  their  demands  as  far  as  ever  possible,  but  in 
the  event  of  Germany's  breaking  off  the  negotiations 
with  Russia  I  must  reserve  the  right  to  act  with  a  free 
hand.  Both  appeared  to  understand  my  point  of  view, 
especially  Kuhlmann,  who,  if  he  alone  should  decide, 
would  certainly  not  allow  the  negotiations  to  prove 
fruitless.  As  to  details,  we  agreed  to  demand  con- 
tinuation of  the  negotiations  at  Brest-Litovsk  in  the 
form  of  an  ultimatum. 

"January  p,  ipi8. — Acting  on  the  principle  that 
attack  is  the  best  defense,  we  had  determined  not  to 
let  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  speak  at  all,  but  to 
go  at  him  at  once  with  our  ultimatum. 

"Trotzky  had  prepared  a  long  speech,  and  the  effect 
of  our  attack  was  such  that  he  at  once  appealed  for 


BREST-LITOVSK  261 

adjournment,  urging  that  the  altered  state  of  affairs 
called  for  new  resolutions.  The  removal  of  the  con- 
ference to  Stockholm  would  have  meant  the  end  of 
matters  for  us,  for  it  would  have  been  utterly  impos- 
sible to  keep  the  Bolsheviks  of  all  countries  from 
putting  in  an  appearance  there,  and  the  very  thing  we 
had  endeavored  with  the  utmost  of  our  power  to  avoid 
from  the  start — to  have  the  reins  torn  from  our  hands 
and  these  elements  take  the  lead — would  infallibly 
have  taken  place.  We  must  now  wait  to  see  what  to- 
morrow brings :  either  a  victory  or  the  final  termination 
of  the  negotiations. 

"Adler  said  to  me  in  Vienna,  'You  will  certainly  get 
on  all  right  with  Trotzky,'  and  when  I  asked  him  why 
he  thought  so,  he  answered,  'Well,  you  and  I  get  on 
quite  well  together,  you  know.' 

"I  think,  after  all,  the  clever  old  man  failed  to 
appreciate  the  situation  there.  These  Bolsheviks  have 
no  longer  anything  in  common  with  Adler;  they  are 
brutal  tyrants,  autocrats  of  the  worst  kind,  a  disgrace 
to  the  name  of  freedom. 

"Trotzky  is  undoubtedly  an  interesting,  clever 
fellow,  and  a  very  dangerous  adversary.  He  is  quite 
exceptionally  gifted  as  a  speaker,  with  a  swiftness  and 
adriotness  in  retort  which  I  have  rarely  seen,  and  has, 
moreover,  all  the  insolent  boldness  of  his  race. 

"January  10, 1918. — The  sitting  has  just  taken  place. 
Trotzky  made  a  great  and,  in  its  way,  really  fine  speech, 
calculated  for  the  whole  of  Europe,  in  which  he  gave 
way  entirely.  He  accepts,  he  says,  the  German- 
Austria  'ultimatum,'  and  will  remain  in  Brest-Litovsk, 
as  he  will  not  give  us  the  satisfaction  of  being  able  to 
blame  Russia  for  the  continuation  of  the  war. 

"Following  on  Trotzky 's  speech,  the  committee  was 
at  once  formed  to  deal  with  the  difficult  questions 
of  territory.  I  insisted  on  being  on  the  committee 

lo 


262  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

myself,  wishing  to  follow  throughout  the  progress  of 
these  important  negotiations.  This  was  not  an  easy 
matter  really,  as  the  questions  involved,  strictly  speak- 
ing, concern  only  Courland  and  Lithuania — i.e.,  they 
are  not  our  business,  but  Germany's  alone. 

"In  the  evening  I  had  another  long  talk  with  Kuhl- 
mann  and  Hoffmann,  in  the  course  of  which  the  general 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  came  to  high  words  between 
themselves.  Hoffmann,  elated  at  the  success  of  our 
ultimatum  to  Russia,  wished  to  go  on  in  the  same 
fashion  and  'give  the  Russians  another  touch  of  the 
whip.'  Kuhlmann  and  I  took  the  opposite  view,  and 
insisted  that  proceedings  should  be  commenced  quietly, 
confining  ourselves  to  the  matters  in  hand,  clearing 
up  point  by  point  as  we  went  on,  and  putting  all  doubt- 
ful questions  aside.  Once  we  had  got  so  far,  in  clearing 
up  things  generally,  we  could  then  take  that  which 
remained  together,  and  possibly  get  telegraphic  instruc- 
tions from  the  two  Emperors  for  dealing  therewith. 
This  is  undoubtedly  the  surest  way  to  avoid  disaster 
and  a  fresh  breach. 

"A  new  conflict  has  cropped  up  with  the  Ukrainians. 
They  now  demand  recognition  of  their  independence, 
and  declare  they  will  leave  if  this  is  not  conceded. 

"Adler  told  me  at  Vienna  that  Trotzky  had  his 
library,  by  which  he  set  great  store,  somewhere  in 
Vienna,  with  a  Herr  Bauer,  I  fancy.  I  told  Trotzky 
that  I  would  arrange  to  have  the  books  forwarded  to 
him,  if  he  cared  about  it.  I  then  recommended  to 
his  consideration  certain  prisoners  of  war,  as  L.  K.  and 
W.,  all  of  whom  are  said  to  have  been  very  badly 
treated.  Trotzky  noted  the  point,  declared  that  he 
was  strongly  opposed  to  ill-treatment  of  prisoners  of 
war,  and  promised  to  look  into  the  matter;  he  wished 
to  point  out,  however,  that  in  so  doing  he  was  not  in 
the  least  influenced  by  the  thought  of  his  library;  he 


BREST-LITOVSK  263 

would  in  any  case  have  considered  my  request.  He 
would  be  glad  to  have  the  books. 

"January  n,  igi8. — Forenoon  and  afternoon,  long 
sittings  of  the  committee  on  territorial  questions.  Our 
side  is  represented  by  Kuhlmann,  Hoffmann,  Rosen- 
berg, and  a  secretary,  in  addition  to  myself,  Csicserics, 
Wiesner,  and  Colloredo.  The  Russians  are  all  present, 
but  without  the  Ukrainians.  I  told  Kuhlmann  that  I 
only  proposed  to  attend  as  a  second,  seeing  that  the 
German  interests  were  incomparably  more  affected 
than  our  own.  I  only  interpose  now  and  again. 

' '  Trotzky  made  a  tactical  blunder  this  afternoon.  In 
a  speech  rising  to  violence  he  declared  that  we  were 
playing  false;  we  aimed  at  annexations,  and  were 
simply  trying  to  cover  them  with  the  cloak  of  self- 
determination.  He  would  never  agree  to  this,  and 
would  rather  break  off  altogether  than  continue  in  that 
way.  If  we  were  honest,  we  should  allow  representa- 
tives from  Poland,  Courland,  and  Lithuania  to  come 
to  Brest,  and  there  express  their  views  without  being 
influenced  in  any  way  by  ourselves.  Now  it  should 
here  be  noted  that  from  the  commencement  of  the 
negotiations  it  has  been  a  point  of  conflict  whether  the 
legislative  bodies  at  present  existing  in  the  occupied 
territories  are  justified  in  speaking  in  the  name  of  their 
respective  peoples,  or  not.  We  affirm  that  they  are; 
the  Russians  maintain  they  are  not.  We  at  once 
accepted  Trotzky's  proposal,  that  representatives  of 
these  countries  should  be  called,  but  added  that,  when 
we  agreed  to  accept  their  testimony,  then  their  judg- 
ment also  in  our  favor  should  be  taken  as  valid. 

"It  was  characteristic  to  see  how  gladly  Trotzky 
would  have  taken  back  what  he  had  said.  But  he 
kept  his  countenance,  fell  in  with  the  new  situation  at 
once,  and  requested  that  the  sitting  be  adjourned 
for  twenty-four  hours,  as  our  reply  was  of  such  far- 


264  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

reaching  importance  that  he  must  confer  with  his 
colleagues  on  the  matter.  I  hope  Trotzky  will  make 
no  difficulty  now.  If  the  Poles  could  be  called,  it  would 
be  an  advantage.  The  awkward  thing  about  it  is  that 
Germany,  too,  would  rather  be  without  them,  knowing 
the  anti-Prussian  feeling  that  exists  among  the  Poles. 

"January  12,  ipi8. — Radek  has  had  a  scene  with  the 
German  chauffeur,  which  led  to  something  more. 
General  Hoffmann  had  placed  cars  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Russians  in  case  they  cared  to  drive  out.  In  this  case 
it  happened  that  the  chauffeur  was  not  there  at  the 
proper  time,  and  Radek  flew  into  a  rage  with  the  man 
and  abused  him  violently.  The  chauffeur  complained, 
and  Hoffmann  took  his  part.  Trotzky  seems  to  con- 
sider Hoffmann's  action  correct,  and  has  forbidden  the 
entire  delegation  to  go  out  any  more.  That  settled 
them.  And  serve  them  right. 

"No  one  ventured  to  protest.  They  have  indeed  a 
holy  fear  of  Trotzky.  At  the  sittings,  too,  no  one 
dares  to  speak  while  he  is  there. 

"January  12,  1918. — Hoffmann  has  made  his  unfor- 
tunate speech.  He  has  been  working  at  it  for  days, 
and  was  very  proud  of  the  result.  Kuhlmann  and  I 
did  not  conceal  from  him  that  he  gained  nothing  by  it 
beyond  exciting  the  people  at  home  against  us.  This 
made  a  certain  impression  on  him,  but  it  was  soon 
effaced  by  Ludendorff 's  congratulations,  which  followed 
promptly.  Anyhow,  it  has  rendered  the  situation  more 
difficult,  and  there  was  certainly  no  need  for  that. 

"January  15,  igi8. — I  had  a  letter  to-day  from  one 
of  our  mayors  at  home,  calling  my  attention  to  the  fact 
that  disaster  due  to  lack  of  foodstuffs  is  now  imminent. 

"I  immediately  telegraphed  the  Emperor  as  follows: 

"I  have  just  received  a  letter  from  Statthalter  N.  N.  which 
justifies  all  the  fears  I  have  constantly  repeated  to  your  Majesty, 
and  shows  that  in  the  question  of  food-supplies  we  are  on  the  very 


&REST-L1TOVSK  265 

verge  of  a  catastrophe.  The  situation  arising  out  of  the  carelessness 
and  incapacity  of  the  Ministers  is  terrible,  and  I  fear  it  is  already 
too  late  to  check  the  total  collapse  which  is  to  be  expected  in  the 
next  few  weeks.  My  informant  writes:  'Only  small  quantities  are 
now  being  received  from  Hungary,  from  Rumania  only  10,000 
wagons  of  maize;  this  gives  then  a  decrease  of  at  least  30,000 
wagons  of  grain,  without  which  we  must  infallibly  perish.  On 
learning  the  state  of  affairs,  I  went  to  the  Prime  Minister  to  speak 
with  him  about  it.  I  told  him,  as  is  the  case,  that  in  a  few  weeks 
our  war  industries,  our  railway  traffic,  would  be  at  a  standstill,  the 
provisioning  of  the  army  would  be  impossible,  it  must  break  down, 
and  that  would  mean  the  collapse  of  Austria  and  therewith  also  of 
Hungary.  To  each  of  these  points  he  answered  yes,  that  is  so, 
and  added  that  all  was  being  done  to  alter  the  state  of  affairs, 
especially  as  regards  the  Hungarian  deliveries.  But  no  one,  not 
even  his  Majesty,  has  been  able  to  get  anything  done.  We  can 
only  hope  chat  some  deus  ex  machina  may  intervene  to  save  us  from 
the  worst.' 

"To  this  I  added: 

"I  can  find  no  words  to  describe  properly  the  apathetic  attitude 
of  Seidler.  How  often  and  how  earnestly  have  I  not  implored  your 
Majesty  to  intervene  forcibly  for  once  and  compel  Seidler,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Hadik,  on  the  other,  to  set  these  things  in  order. 
Even  from  here  I  have  written  entreating  your  Majesty  to  act  while 
there  was  yet  time.  But  all  in  vain. 

' '  I  then  pointed  out  that  the  only  way  of  meeting  the 
situation  would  be  to  secure  temporary  assistance  from 
Germany,  and  then  to  requisition  by  force  the  stocks 
that  were  doubtless  still  available  in  Hungary;  finally, 
I  begged  the  Emperor  to  inform  the  Austrian  Prime 
Minister  of  my  telegram. 

"  January  16, 1918. — Despairing  appeals  from  Vienna 
for  food-supplies.  Would  I  apply  at  once  to  Berlin 
for  aid,  otherwise  disaster  imminent.  I  replied  to 
General  Landwehr  as  follows: 

"  Doctor  Kuhlmann  is  telegraphing  to  Berlin,  but  has  little  hope 
of  success.  The  only  hope  now  is  for  his  Majesty  to  do  as  I  have 
advised,  and  send  an  urgent  wire  at  once  to  Kaiser  Wilhelm.  On 


266  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

my  return  I  propose  to  put  before  his  Majesty  my  point  of  view, 
that  it  is  impossible  to  carry  on  the  foreign  policy  if  the  food  question 
at  home  is  allowed  to  come  to  such  a  state  as  now. 

"Only  a  few  weeks  back  your  Excellency  declared  most  posi- 
tively that  we  could  hold  out  till  the  new  harvest. 

"At  the  same  time  I  wired  the  Emperor: 

"Telegrams  arriving  show  the  situation  becoming  critical  for 
us.  Regarding  question  of  food,  we  can  only  avoid  collapse  on  two 
conditions:  first,  that  Germany  helps  us  temporarily,  second,  that 
we  use  this  respite  to  set  in  order  our  machinery  of  food-supply, 
which  is  at  present  beneath  contempt,  and  to  gain  possession  of  the 
stocks  still  existing  in  Hungary. 

"I  have  just  explained  the  entire  situation  to  Doctor  Kuhlmann, 
and  he  is  telegraphing  to  Berlin.  He,  however,  is  not  at  all  san- 
guine, as  Germany  is  itself  in  straitened  circumstances.  I  think 
the  only  way  to  secure  any  success  from  this  step  would  be  for  your 
Majesty  to  send  at  once,  through  the  military  organs,  a  Hughes 
telegram  to  Kaiser  Wilhelm  direct,  urgently  entreating  him  to 
intervene  himself,  and  by  securing  us  a  supply  of  grain  prevent  the 
outbreak  of  revolution,  which  would  otherwise  be  inevitable.  I 
must,  however,  emphatically  point  out  that  the  commencement  of 
unrest  among  our  people  at  home  will  have  rendered  conclusion  of 
peace  here  absolutely  impossible.  As  soon  as  the  Russian  repre- 
sentatives perceive  that  we  ourselves  are  on  the  point  of  revolution, 
they  will  not  make  peace  at  all,  since  their  entire  speculation  is 
based  on  this  factor. 

"  January  17,  1918. — Bad  news  from  Vienna  and 
environs:  serious  strike  movement,  due  to  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  flour  rations  and  the  tardy  progress  of  the 
Brest  negotiations.  The  weakness  of  the  Vienna 
Ministry  seems  to  be  past  all  understanding. 

"I  have  telegraphed  to  Vienna  that  I  hope  in  time 
to  secure  some  supplies  from  the  Ukraine,  if  only  we 
can  manage  to  keep  matters  quiet  at  home  for  the  next 
few  weeks,  and  I  have  begged  the  gentlemen  in  question 
to  do  their  utmost  not  to  wreck  the  peace  here.  On 
the  same  day,  in  the  evening,  I  telegraphed  to  Doctor 
von  Seidler,  the  Prime  Minister: 


BREST-LITOVSK  267 

"I  very  greatly  regret  my  inability  to  counteract  the  effect  of 
all  the  errors  made  by  those  intrusted  with  the  food  resources. 

"Germany  declares  categorically  that  it  is  unable  to  help  us, 
having  insufficient  for  itself. 

"Had  your  Excellency  or  your  department  called  attention  to 
the  state  of  things  in  time,  it  might  still  have  been  possible  to  procure 
supplies  from  Rumania.  As  things  are  now,  I  can  see  no  other 
way  than  that  of  brute  force,  by  requisitioning  Hungarian  grain 
for  the  time  being,  and  forwarding  it  to  Austria,  until  the  Ru- 
manian, and  it  is  to  be  hoped  also  Ukrainian,  supplies  can  come 
to  hand. 

' '  January  20,  igi8.  The  negotiations  have  now  come 
to  this:  that  Trotzky  declares  his  intention  of  laying 
the  German  proposals  before  Petersburg,  though  he 
cannot  accept  them  himself;  he  undertakes,  in  any 
case,  to  return  here.  As  to  calling  in  representatives 
from  the  other  provinces,  he  will  only  do  this  provided 
he  is  allowed  to  choose  them.  We  cannot  agree  to  this. 
With  the  Ukrainians,  who,  despite  their  youth,  are 
showing  themselves  quite  sufficiently  grown  to  profit 
by  the  situation,  negotiations  are  proceeding  but 
slowly.  First  they  demanded  East  Galicia  for  the  new 
'Ukrainia.'  This  could  not  be  entertained  for  a 
moment.  Then  they  grew  more  modest,  but  since  the 
outbreak  of  trouble  at  home  among  ourselves  they 
realized  our  position  and  know  that  we  must  make 
peace  in  order  to  get  corn.  Now  they  demand  a 
separate  position  for  East  Galicia.  The  question  will 
have  to  be  decided  in  Vienna,  and  the  Austrian  Minis- 
try will  have  the  final  word. 

"Seidler  and  Landwehr  again  declare  by  telegram  that 
without  supplies  of  grain  from  Ukraine  the  catastrophe 
is  imminent.  There  are  supplies  in  the  Ukraine ;  if  we 
can  get  them  the  worst  may  be  avoided. 

"The  position  now  is  this:  Without  help  from  out- 
side, we  shall,  according  to  Seidler,  have  thousands 
perishing  in  a  few  weeks.  Germany  and  Hungary 


268  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

are  no  longer  sending  anything.  All  messages  state 
that  there  is  a  great  surplus  in  Ukraine.  The  question 
is  only  whether  we  can  get  it  in  time.  I  hope  we  may. 
But  if  we  do  not  make  peace  soon,  then  the  troubles  at 
home  will  be  repeated,  and  each  demonstration  in 
Vienna  will  render  peace  here  most  costly  to  obtain,  for 
Messrs.  Sewrjuk  and  Lewicky  can  read  the  degree  of 
our  state  of  famine  at  home  from  these  troubles  as  by 
a  thermometer.  If  only  the  people  who  create  these 
disturbances  know  how  they  are  by  that  very  fact 
increasing  the  difficulty  of  procuring  supplies  from 
Ukraine !  And  we  were  all  but  finished ! 

"The  question  of  East  Galicia  I  will  leave  to  the 
Austrian  Ministry;  it  must  be  decided  in  Vienna.  I 
cannot,  and  dare  not,  look  on  and  see  hundreds  of 
thousands  starve  for  the  sake  of  retaining  the  sympathy 
of  the  Poles,  as  long  as  there  is  a  possibility  of  help. 

"January  21,  igi8. — Back  to  Vienna.  The  impres- 
sion of  the  troubles  here  is  even  greater  than  I  thought, 
and  the  effect  disastrous.  The  Ukrainians  no  longer 
treat  with  us ;  they  dictate! 

"On  the  way,  reading  through  old  reports,  I  came 
upon  the  notes  relating  to  the  discussions  with  Michaelis 
on  August  ist.  According  to  these,  Under-Secretary 
of  State  von  Stumm  said  at  the  time : 

"'The  Foreign  Ministry  was  in  communication  with 
the  Ukrainians,  and  the  separatist  movement  in 
Ukrainia  was  very  strong.  In  furtherance  of  their 
movement,  the  Ukrainians  demanded  the  assurance 
that  they  should  be  allowed  to  unite  with  the  govern- 
ment of  Cholm,  and  with  the  areas  of  East  Galicia 
occupied  by  Ukrainians.  So  long  as  Galicia  belongs 
to  Austria  the  demand  for  East  Galicia  cannot  be  con- 
ceded. It  would  be  another  matter  if  Galicia  were 
united  with  Poland;  then  a  cession  of  East  Galicia 
might  be  possible,' 


BREST-LITOVSK  269 

"It  would  seem  that  the  unpleasant  case  had  long 
since  been  prejudged  by  the  Germans. 

"On  January  22d  the  council  was  held  which  was  to 
determine  the  issue  of  the  Ukrainian  question.  The 
Emperor  opened  the  proceedings,  and  then  called  on 
me  to  speak.  I  described  first  of  all  the  difficulties 
that  lay  in  the  way  of  a  peace  with  Petersburg,  which 
will  be  apparent  from  the  foregoing  entries  in  this 
diary.  I  expressed  my  doubt  as  to  whether  our  group 
would  succeed  in  concluding  general  peace  with  Peters- 
burg. I  then  sketched  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
with  the  Ukrainians.  I  reported  that  the  Ukrainians 
had  originally  demanded  the  cession  of  East  Galicia, 
but  that  I  had  refused  this.  With  regard  to  the 
Ruthenian  districts  of  Hungary  also  they  had  made 
demands  which  had  been  refused  by  me.  At  present 
they  demanded  the  division  of  Galicia  into  two  parts 
and  the  formation  of  an  independent  Austrian  province 
from  East  Galicia  and  Bukovina.  I  pointed  out  the 
serious  consequences  which  the  acceptance  of  the 
Ukrainian  demands  would  have  upon  the  further 
development  of  the  Austro-Polish  question.  The  con- 
cessions made  by  the  Ukrainians  on  their  part  were  to 
consist  in  the  inclusion  in  the  peace  treaty  of  a  com- 
mercial agreement  which  would  enable  us  to  cover 
our  immediate  needs  in  the  matter  of  grain-supplies. 
Furthermore,  Austria-Hungary  would  insist  on  full 
reciprocity  of  the  Poles  resident  in  Ukraine. 

"I  pointed  out  emphatically  that  I  considered  it 
my  duty  to  state  the  position  of  the  peace  negotiations ; 
that  the  decision  could  not  lie  with  me,  but  with  the 
Ministry  as  a  whole,  in  particular  with  the  Austrian 
Prime  Minister.  The  Austrian  government  would 
have  to  decide  whether  these  sacrifices  could  be  made 
or  not,  and  here  I  could  leave  them  in  no  doubt  that 
if  we  declined  the  Ukrainian  demands  we  should  proba- 


270  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

bly  come  to  no  result  with  that  country,  and  should 
thus  be  compelled  to  return  from  Brest-Litovsk  with- 
out having  achieved  any  peace  settlement  at  all. 

"When  I  had  finished,  the  Prime  Minister,  Doctor 
von  Seidler,  rose  to  speak.  He  pointed  out  first  of  all 
the  necessity  of  an  immediate  peace,  and  then  dis- 
cussed the  question  of  establishing  a  Ukrainian  crown 
land,  especially  from  the  parliamentary  point  of  view. 
Seidler  believed  that,  despite  the  active  opposition 
which  was  to  be  expected  from  the  Poles,  he  would  still 
have  a  majority  of  two-thirds  in  the  house  for  the 
acceptance  of  the  bill  on  the  subject.  He  was  not 
blind  to  the  fact  that  arrangement  would  give  rise  to 
violent  parliamentary  conflicts,  but  repeated  his  hope 
that  a  two-thirds  majority  could  be  obtained  despite 
the  opposition  of  the  Polish  delegation.  After  Seidler 
came  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister,  Doctor  Wekerle. 
He  was  particularly  pleased  to  note  that  no  concessions 
had  been  made  to  the  Ukrainians  with  regard  to  the 
Ruthenians  resident  in  Hungary.  A  clear  division  of 
the  nationalities  in  Hungary  was  impracticable.  The 
Hungarian  Ruthenians  were  also  at  too  low  a  stage  of 
culture  to  enable  them  to  be  given  national  indepen- 
dence. Doctor  Wekerle  also  laid  stress  on  the  danger, 
also  in  Austria,  of  allowing  any  interference  from  with- 
out; the  risk  of  any  such  proceeding  would  be  very 
great;  we  should  find  ourselves  on  a  downward  grade 
by  so  doing,  and  we  must  hold  firmly  to  the  principle 
that  no  interference  in  the  affair  of  the  Monarchy 
from  without  could  be  tolerated.  In  summing  up, 
however,  Wekerle  opposed  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Austrian  Prime  Minister. 

"I  then  rose  again  to  speak,  and  declared  that  I  was 
perfectly  aware  of  the  eminent  importance  and  perilous 
aspects  of  this  step.  It  was  true  that  it  would  bring 
us  on  to  a  down-grade,  but  from  all  appearances  we^ 


BREST-LITOVSK  271 

had  been  in  that  position  already  for  a  long  time, 
owing  to  the  war,  and  could  not  say  how  far  it  might 
lead  us.  I  put  the  positive  question  to  Doctor  Wekerle, 
what  was  a  responsible  leader  of  our  foreign  policy 
to  do  when  the  Austrian  Prime  Minister  and  both  the 
Ministers  of  Food  unanimously  declared  that  the  Hun- 
garian supplies  would  only  suffice  to  help  us  over  the 
next  two  months,  after  which  time  a  collapse  would  be 
absolutely  unavoidable,  unless  we  could  secure  assist- 
ance from  somewhere  in  the  way  of  corn.  On  being 
interrupted  here  by  a  dissentient  observation  from 
Doctor  Wekerle,  I  told  him  that  if  he,  Wekerle,  could 
bring  corn  into  Austria  I  should  be  the  first  to  support 
his  point  of  view,  and  that  with  pleasure,  but  as  long 
as  he  stood  by  his  categorical  denial  and  insisted  on  his 
inability  to  help  us,  we  were  in  the  position  of  a  man 
on  the  third  floor  of  a  burning  house  who  jumps  out  of 
the  window  to  save  himself.  A  man  in  such  a  situation 
would  not  stop  to  think  whether  he  risked  breaking  his 
legs  or  not;  he  would  prefer  the  risk  of  death  to  the 
certainty  of  the  same.  If  the  position  really  were 
as  stated,  that  in  a  couple  of  months  we  should  be 
altogether  without  food-supplies,  then  we  must  take 
the  consequences  of  such  a  position.  Doctor  von 
Seidler  here  once  more  took  up  the  discussion,  and 
declared  himself  entirely  in  agreement  with  my  re- 
mark. 

"During  the  further  course  of  the  debate,  the  proba- 
bility of  a  definitive  failure  of  the  Austro-Polish  solu- 
tion in  connection  with  the  Ukrainian  peace  was  dis- 
cussed, and  the  question  was  raised  as  to  what  new 
constellation  would  arise  out  of  such  failure.  Sek- 
tionschef  Doctor  Gratz  then  took  up  this  question. 
Doctor  Gratz  pointed  out  that  the  Austro-Polish 
solution  must  fail  even  without  acceptance  of  the 
Ukrainian  demands,  since  the  German  postulates  ren- 


272  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

dered  solution  impossible.  The  Germans  demanded, 
apart  from  quite  enormous  territorial  reductions  of 
Congress-Poland,  the  restriction  of  Polish  industry, 
part  possession  of  the  Polish  railways  and  state  domains, 
as  well  as  the  imposition  of  part  of  the  costs  of  war 
upon  the  Poles.  We  could  not  attach  ourselves  to  a 
Poland  thus  weakened,  hardly,  indeed,  capable  of  living 
at  all,  and  necessarily  highly  dissatisfied  with  its  posi- 
tion. Doctor  Gratz  maintained  that  it  would  be  wiser 
to  come  back  to  the  program  already  discussed  in 
general  form;  the  project,  by  which  United  Poland 
should  be  left  to  Germany,  and  the  attachment  of 
Rumania  to  the  Monarchy  in  consequence.  Doctor 
Gratz  went  at  length  into  the  details  of  this  point  of 
view.  The  Emperor  then  summed  up  the  essence 
of  the  opinions  expressed  to-day  as  indicating  that 
it  was  primarily  necessary  to  make  peace  with  Peters- 
burg and  the  Ukrainians,  and  that  negotiations  should 
be  entered  upon  with  Ukrainia  as  to  the  division  of 
Galicia.  The  question  as  to  whether  the  Austro-Polish 
solution  should  be  definitely  allowed  to  drop  was  not 
finally  settled,  but  shelved  for  the  time  being. 

"In  conclusion,  Doctor  Burian,  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  rose  to  speak,  and  pointed  out,  as  Doctor 
Wekerle  had  done,  the  danger  of  the  Austrian  stand- 
point. Burian  declared  that,  while  the  war  might 
doubtless  change  the  internal  structure  of  the  Mon- 
archy, such  alterations  must  be  made  from  within, 
not  from  without,  if  it  were  to  be  of  any  benefit  to  the 
Monarchy  at  all.  He  further  pointed  out  that  if  the 
Austrian  principle  of  the  division  of  Galicia  were  to 
be  carried  through,  the  form  of  so  doing  would  be  of 
great  importance.  Baron  Burian  advised  that  a  clause 
referring  to  this  should  be  inserted,  not  in  the  instru- 
ment of  peace  itself,  but  in  a  secret  annexe.  This 
form  was,  in  his,  Burian's,  view,  the  only  possible  means 


BREST-LITOVSK  273 

of  diminishing  the  serious  consequences  of  the  steps 
which  the  Austrian  government  wished  to  take." 

Thus  the  notes  of  my  diary  relative  to  this  Council. 
The  Austrian  government  was  thus  not  only  agreed 
as  to  the  proposed  arrangement  with  the  Ukraine; 
it  was  indeed  at  the  direct  wish  of  the  government,  by 
its  instigation  and  on  its  responsibility,  that  it  was 
brought  about. 

"January  28,  1918. — Reached  Brest  this  evening. 

"January  29,  1918. — Trotzky  arrived. 

"January  30,  1918. — The  first  plenary  session  has 
been  held.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  revolutionary 
happenings  in  Austria  and  in  Germany  have  enor- 
mously raised  the  hopes  of  the  Petersburgers  for  a  gen- 
eral convulsion,  and  it  seems  to  me  altogether  out  of 
the  question  now  to  come  to  any  peace  terms  with 
the  Russians.  It  is  evident  among  the  Russians  them- 
selves that  they  positively  expect  the  outbreak  of  a 
world-revolution  within  the  next  few  weeks,  and  their 
tactics  now  are  simply  to  gain  time  and  wait  for  this 
to  happen.  The  conference  was  not  marked  by  any 
particular  event,  only  pin-pricks  between  Kuhlmann 
and  Trotzky.  To-day  is  the  first  sitting  of  the  com- 
mittee on  territorial  questions,  where  I  am  to  preside, 
and  deal  with  our  territorial  affairs. 

"The  only  interesting  point  about  the  new  con- 
stellation seems  to  be  that  the  relations  between  Peters- 
burg and  Kieff  are  considerably  worse  than  before, 
and  the  Kieff  Committee  is  no  longer  recognized  at  all 
by  the  Bolsheviks  as  independent. 

"February  i,  1918. — Sitting  of  the  territorial  com- 
mittee, I  myself  presiding,  with  the  Petersburg  Rus- 
sians. My  plan  is  to  play  the  Petersburgers  and  the 
Ukrainians  one  against  the  other  and  manage  at  least 
to  make  peace  with  one  of  the  two  parties.  I  have 
still  some  slight  hope  that  a  peace  with  one  may  so 


274  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

affect  the  other  that  possibly  peace  with  both  may  be 
attained. 

"As  was  to  be  expected,  Trotzky  replied  to  my 
question,  whether  he  admitted  that  the  Ukrainians 
should  treat  with  us  alone  on  questions  dealing  with 
their  frontiers,  with  an  emphatic  denial.  I  then,  after 
some  exchange  of  words,  proposed  that  the  sitting  be 
adjourned  and  a  plenary  sitting  convened,  in  order 
that  the  matter  might  be  dealt  with  by  the  Kieff  and 
Petersburg  parties  together. 

''February  2,  igi8. — I  have  tried  to  get  the  Ukrai- 
nians to  talk  over  things  openly  with  the  Russians,  and 
succeeded  almost  too  well.  The  insults  hurled  by  the 
Ukrainians  to-day  against  the  Russians  were  simply 
grotesque,  and  showed  what  a  gulf  is  fixed  between 
these  two  governments  and  that  it  is  not  our  fault 
that  we  have  not  been  able  to  bring  them  together 
under  one  hat  on  the  question  of  peace.  Trotzky 
was  so  upset  it  was  painful  to  see.  Perfectly  pale,  he 
stared  fixedly  before  him,  drawing  nervously  on  his 
blotting-paper.  Heavy  drops  of  sweat  trickled  down 
his  forehead.  Evidently  he  felt  deeply  the  disgrace 
of  being  abused  by  his  fellow-citizens  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy. 

"The  two  brothers  Richthofen  were  here  a  little 
while  ago.  The  elder  has  shot  down  some  sixty,  the 
younger  'only'  some  thirty,  enemy  airmen.  The  elder's 
face  is  like  that  of  a  young  and  pretty  girl.  He  told 
me  'how  the  thing  is  done.'  It  is  very  simple.  Only 
get  as  near  to  the  enemy  as  possible,  from  behind, 
and  then  keep  on  shooting,  when  the  other  man  would 
fall.  The  one  thing  needful  was  to  'get  over  your  own 
fright,'  and  not  be  shy  of  getting  quite  close  to  your 
opponent.  Modern  heroes. 

"Two  charming  stories  were  told  about  these  two 
brothers.  The  English  had  put  a  price  on  the  head  of 


BREST-LITOVSK  275 

the  elder  Richthofen.  When  he  learned  of  this  he 
sent  down  broadsheets  informing  them  that,  to  make 
matters  easier  for  them,  he  would  from  the  following 
day  have  his  machine  painted  bright  red.  Next  morn- 
ing, going  to  the  shed,  he  found  all  the  machines  there 
painted  bright  red.  One  for  all  and  all  for  one. 

"The  other  story  is  this:  Richthofen  and  an  English 
airman  were  circling  round  each  other  and  firing  furi- 
ously. They  came  closer  and  closer,  and  soon  they 
could  distinctly  see  each  other's  faces.  Suddenly 
something  went  wrong  with  Richthofen's  machine-gun 
and  he  could  not  shoot.  The  Englishman  looked  across 
in  surprise  and,  seeing  what  was  wrong,  waved  his 
hand,  turned,  and  flew  off.  Fair  play!  I  should  like 
to  meet  that  Englishman,  only  to  tell  him  that  he  is 
greater,  to  my  mind,  than  the  heroes  of  old. 

"February  j,  igi8. — Started  for  Berlin.  Kuhlmann, 
Hoffmann,  Colloredo. 

"February  4,  ipi8. — Arrived  Berlin.  Nothing  this 
afternoon,  as  the  Germans  are  holding  council  among 
themselves. 

"February  5,  ipi8. — Sitting  all  day.  I  had  several 
violent  passages  of  arms  with  Ludendorff.  Matters 
seemed  to  be  clearing  up,  though  this  is  not  yet  alto- 
gether done.  Apart  from  deciding  on  our  tactics  for 
Brest,  we  have  at  last  to  set  down  in  writing  that  we 
are  only  obliged  to  fight  for  the  pre-war  possessions  of 
Germany.  Ludendorff  was  violently  opposed  to  this, 
and  said,  'If  Germany  makes  peace  without  profit, 
then  Germany  has  lost  the  war.' 

"The  controversy  was  growing  more  and  more 
heated,  when  Hertling  nudged  me  and  whispered, 
'Leave  him  alone;  we  two  will  manage  it  together 
without  him.' 

"I  am  now  going  to  work  out  the  draft  at  once  and 
send  it  in  to  Hertling. 


276  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"Supper  this  evening  at  Hohenlohe. 

"February  6,  igi8. — Arrived  Brest  this  evening. 
Wiesner  has  been  at  it  untiringly  and  done  excellent 
work;  the  situation,  too,  is  easier  now.  The  leader 
of  the  Austrian  Ruthenians,  Nikolay  Wassilko,  arrived 
yesterday,  and  albeit  evidently  excited  -by  the  part 
his  Russian-Ukrainian  comrades  are  playing  at  Brest, 
speaks  nationally,  far  more  chauvinistically  than  when  I 
thought  I  knew  him  in  Vienna,  and  we  have  at  last 
agreed  on  the  minimum  of  the  Ukrainian  demands.  I 
gave  as  my  advice  in  Berlin  that  we  should  try  to  finish 
with  the  Ukrainians  as  soon  as  possible.  I  could  then 
in  the  name  of  Germany  commence  negotiations  with 
Trotzky,  and  try  if  I  could  not  get  speech  with  him 
privately,  and  find  out  whether  any  agreement  were 
possible  or  not.  It  is  Gratz's  idea.  After  some  opposi- 
tion we  agreed. 

"February  7,  1918. — My  conversation  with  Trotzky 
took  place.  I  took  Gratz  with  me;  he  has  far  exceeded 
all  my  expectations  of  him.  I  began  by  telling  Trotzky 
that  a  breach  of  the  regulations  and  a  resumption  of 
hostilities  were  imminent,  and  wished  to  know  if  this 
could  not  be  avoided  before  the  fatal  step  were  definitely 
taken.  I  therefore  begged  Herr  Trotzky  to  inform  me 
openly  and  without  reserve  what  conditions  he  would 
accept.  Trotzky  then  declared  very  frankly  and  clearly 
that  he  was  not  so  simple  as  we  appeared  to  think, 
that  he  knew  well  enough  force  was  the  strongest  of  all 
arguments,  and  that  the  Central  Powers  were  quite 
capable  of  taking  away  the  Russian  provinces.  He 
had  several  times  tried  to  bridge  a  way  for  Kuhlmann 
during  the  conference,  telling  him  it  was  not  a  question 
of  the  right  of  self-determination  of  the  peoples  in  the 
occupied  districts,  but  of  sheer  brutal  annexation,  and 
that  he  must  give  way  to  force.  He  would  never 
relinquish  his  principles,  and  would  never  give  his  con- 


BREST-LITOVSK  277 

sent  to  this  interpretation  of  the  right  of  self-determina- 
tion. The  Germans  must  say  straight  out  what  were 
the  boundaries  they  demanded,  and  he  would  then 
make  clear  to  all  Europe  that  it  was  a  brutal  annexa- 
tion and  nothing  else,  but  that  Russia  was  too  weak 
to  oppose  it.  Only  the  Moon  Sound  Islands  seemed 
to  be  more  than  he  could  swallow.  Secondly,  and 
this  is  very  characteristic,  Trotzky  said  he  could  never 
agree  to  our  making  peace  with  the  Ukraine,  since  the 
Ukraine  was  no  longer  in  the  hands  of  its  Rada,  but 
in  the  hands  of  his  troops.  It  was  a  part  of  Russia, 
and  to  make  peace  with  it  would  be  interfering  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Russia  itself.  The  fact  of  the  matter 
seems  to  be  that  about  nineteen  days  ago  the  Russian 
troops  really  did  enter  Kieff,  but  were  subsequently 
driven  out,  the  Rada  once  more  coming  into  power  as 
before.  Whether  Trotzky  was  unaware  of  this  latter 
development  or  purposely  concealed  the  truth  I  cannot 
say  for  certain,  but  it  seems  as  if  the  former  were  the 
case. 

"The  last  hope  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
Petersburg  has  vanished.  An  appeal  from  the  Peters- 
burg government  to  the  German  soldiers  has  been 
discovered  in  Berlin,  inciting  them  to  revolt,  to  murder 
the  Kaiser  and  their  generals,  and  unite  with  the 
Soviets.  Following  on  this  came  a  telegram  from 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  to  Kuhlmann  ordering  him  to  terminate 
negotiations  at  once  by  demanding,  besides  Courland 
and  Lithuania,  also  the  unoccupied  territories  of 
Livonia  and  Esthonia — all  without  regard  to  the  right 
of  self-determination  of  the  peoples  concerned. 

"The  dastardly  behavior  of  these  Bolsheviks  renders 
negotiations  impossible.  I  cannot  blame  Germany  for 
being  incensed  at  such  proceedings,  but  the  instructions 
from  Berlin  are  hardly  likely  to  be  carried  out.  We 
do  not  want  to  drag  in  Livonia  and  Esthonia. 

19 


278  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

11  February  8,  1918. — This  evening  the  peace  with 
Ukraine  is  to  be  signed.  The  first  peace  in  this  terrible 
war.  I  wonder  if  the  Rada  is  still  really  sitting  at 
Kieff?  Wassilko  showed  me  a  Hughes  message  dated 
6th  inst.  from  Kieff  to  the  Ukrainian  delegation  here, 
and  Trotzky  has  declined  my  suggestion  to  despatch 
an  officer  of  the  Austrian  General  Staff  to  the  spot,  in 
order  to  bring  back  reliable  information.  Evidently, 
then,  his  assertion  that  the  Bolsheviks  were  already 
masters  at  Kieff  was  only  a  ruse.  Gratz  informs  me, 
by  the  way,  that  Trotzky,  with  whom  he  spoke  early 
this  morning,  is  much  depressed  at  our  intention  of 
concluding  peace  with  Ukraine  to-day,  after  all.  This 
confirms  me  in  my  purpose  of  having  it  signed.  Gratz 
has  convened  a  meeting  with  Petersburgers  for  to-mor- 
row; this  will  clear  matters  up  and  show  us  whether 
any  agreement  is  possible  or  if  we  must  break  off 
altogether.  In  any  case,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  intermezzo  at  Brest  is  rapidly  nearing  its  end." 

After  conclusion  of  peace  with  Ukraine,  I  received 
the  following  telegram  from  the  Emperor  : 

"  Court  train,  February  9,  igi8. 

"  Deeply  moved  and  rejoiced  to  learn  of  the  conclusion  of  peace 
with  Ukraine.  I  thank  you,  dear  Count  Czernin,  from  my  heart  for 
your  persevering  and  successful  endeavors. 

"You  have  thereby  given  me  the  happiest  day  of  my  hitherto 
far  from  happy  reign,  and  I  pray  God  Almighty  that  He  may  further 
continue  to  aid  you  on  your  difficult  path — to  the  benefit  of  the 
Monarchy  and  of  our  peoples.  KARL. 

"February  n,  1918. — Trotzky  declines  to  sign.  The 
war  is  over,  but  there  is  no  peace. 

"The  disastrous  effects  of  the  troubles  in  Vienna 
will  be  seen  clearly  from  the  following  message  from 
Herr  von  Skrzynski,  dated  Montreux,  February  12, 
1918.  Skrzynski  writes: 


BREST-LITOVSK  279 

"'I  learn  from  a  reliable  source  that  France  has  issued  the  fol- 
lowing notifications:  We  were  already  quite  disposed  to  enter 
into  discussion  with  Austria.  Now  we  are  asking  ourselves  whether 
Austria  is  still  sound  enough  for  the  part  it  was  intended  to  give 
her.  One  is  afraid  of  basing  an  entire  policy  upon  a  state  which 
is,  perhaps,  already  threatened  with  the  fate  of  Russia.'  And 
Skrzynski  adds:  'During  the  last  few  days  I  have  heard  as  follows: 
It  has  been  decided  to  wait  for  a  while.'" 


Our  position,  then,  during  the  negotiations  with 
Petersburg  was  as  follows:  We  could  not  induce  Ger- 
many to  resign  the  idea  of  Courland  and  Lithuania.  We 
had  not  the  physical  force  to  do  so.  The  pressure  ex- 
erted by  the  supreme  army  command,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  shifty  tactics  of  the  Russians  made  this  impos- 
sible. We  had  then  to  choose  between  leaving  Ger- 
many to  itself  and  signing  a  separate  peace,  or  acting 
together  with  our  three  allies  and  finishing  with  a  peace 
including  the  covert  annexation  of  the  Russian  outer 
provinces. 

The  former  alternative  involved  the  serious  risk 
of  making  a  breach  in  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  where 
some  dissension  was  already  apparent.  The  Alliance 
could  no  longer  stand  such  experiments.  We  were 
faced  with  the  final  military  efforts  now,  and  the  unity 
of  the  allies  must  not  in  any  case  be  further  shaken. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  danger  that  Wilson,  the  only 
statesman  in  the  world  ready  to  consider  the  idea  of  a 
peace  on  mutual  understanding,  might  from  the  con- 
clusion of  such  a  peace  obtain  an  erroneous  impression 
as  to  our  intentions.  I  hoped  then,  and  I  was  not 
deceived,  that  this  eminently  clever  man  would  see 
through  the  situation  and  recognize  that  we  were 
forced  to  act  under  pressure  of  circumstances.  His 
speeches  delivered  to  our  address  after  the  peace  at 
Brest  confirmed  my  anticipation. 

The  peace  with  Ukraine  was  made  under  pressure  of 


280  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

imminent  famine.  And  it  bears  the  characteristic 
marks  of  such  a  birth.  That  is  true.  But  it  is  no  less 
true  that  despite  the  fact  of  our  having  obtained  far 
less  from  Ukraine  than  we  had  hoped,  we  should, 
without  these  supplies,  have  been  unable  to  carry  on 
at  all  until  the  new  harvest.  Statistics  show  that 
during  the  spring  and  summer  of  1918,  42,000  wagon- 
loads  were  received  from  the  Ukraine.  It  would  have 
been  impossible  to  procure  these  supplies  from  any- 
where else.  Millions  of  human  beings  were  thus  saved 
from  death  by  starvation — and  let  those  who  sit  in 
judgment  on  the  peace  terms  bear  this  in  mind. 

It  is  also  beyond  doubt  that  with  the  great  stocks 
available  in  Ukraine,  an  incomparably  greater  quantity 
could  have  been  brought  into  Austria  if  the  collecting 
and  transport  apparatus  had  worked  differently. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  Food  Supplies  has,  at  my 
request,  in  May,  1919,  furnished  me  with  the  following 
statistical  data  for  publication: 

Brief  survey  of  the  organization  of  corn  imports  from  Ukraine 
(on  terms  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  Peace)  and  the  results  of  same: 

When,  after  great  efforts,  a  suitable  agreement  had  been  arrived 
at  with  Germany  as  to  the  apportionment  of  the  Ukrainian  supplies, 
a  mission  was  despatched  to  Kieff,  in  which  not  only  government 
officials,  but  also  the  best  qualified  and  most  experienced  experts 
which  the  government  could  procure  were  represented. 

Germany  and  Hungary  had  also  sent  experts,  among  them  being 
persons  with  many  years  of  experience  in  the  Russian  grain  busi- 
ness, and  had  been  in  the  employ  of  both  German  and  Entente  grain 
houses  (as,  for  instance,  the  former  representative  of  the  leading 
French  corn  merchants,  the  house  of  Louis  Dreyfuss). 

The  official  mission  arrived  at  Kieff  by  the  middle  of  March,  and 
commenced  work  at  once.  A  comparatively  short  time  sufficed  to 
show  that  the  work  would  present  quite  extraordinary  difficulties. 

The  Ukrainian  government,  which  had  declared  at  Brest-Litovsk 
that  very  great  quantities,  probably  about  one  million  tons,  of 
surplus  foodstuffs  were  ready  for  export,  had  in  the  mean  time  been 
replaced  by  another  Ministry.  The  Cabinet  then  in  power  evinced 


BREST-LITOVSK  281 

no  particular  inclination,  or  at  any  rate  no  hurry,  to  fulfil  obligations 
on  this  scale,  but  was  more  disposed  to  point  out  that  it  would  be 
altogether  impossible,  for  various  reasons,  to  do  so. 

Moreover,  the  Peace  of  Brest  had  provided  for  a  regular  exchange 
system,  bartering  load  by  load  of  one  article  against  another.  But 
neither  Germany  nor  Austria-Hungary  was  even  approximately  in 
a  position  to  furnish  the  goods  (textiles  especially  were  demanded) 
required  in  exchange. 

We  had  then  to  endeavor  to  obtain  the  supplies  on  credit,  and 
the  Ukrainian  government  agreed,  after  long  and  far  from  easy 
negotiations,  to  provide  credit  valuta  (against  vouchers  for  mark 
and  krone  in  Berlin  and  Vienna).  The  arrangements  for  this  were 
finally  made,  and  the  two  Central  Powers  drew  in  all  six  hundred  and 
forty -three  million  karbowanez. 

The  Ruble  Syndicate,  however,  which  had  been  formed  under 
the  leadership  of  the  principal  banks  in  Berlin,  Vienna  and  Budapest, 
was  during  the  first  few  months  only  able  to  exert  a  very  slight 
activity.  Even  the  formation  of  this  syndicate  was  a  matter  of 
great  difficulty,  and  in  particular  a  great  deal  of  time  was  lost;  and 
even  then  the  apparatus  proved  very  awkward  to  work  with.  Any- 
how, it  had  only  procured  comparatively  small  sums  of  rubles,  so 
that  the  purchasing  organization  in  Ukraine,  especially  at  first, 
suffered  from  a  chronic  lack  of  means  of  payment. 

But,  in  any  case,  a  better  arrangement  of  the  money  question 
would  only  have  improved  matters  in  a  few  of  the  best  supplied 
districts,  for  the  principal  obstacle  was  simply  the  lack  of  supplies. 
The  fact  that  Kieff  and  Odessa  were  themselves  continually  in 
danger  of  a  food  crisis  is  the  best  indication  as  to  the  state  of 
things. 

In  the  Ukraine,  the  effects  of  four  years  of  war,  with  the  result- 
ing confusion,  and  of  the  destruction  wrought  by  the  Bolsheviks 
(November,  1917,  to  March,  1918)  were  conspicuously  apparent: 
cultivation  and  harvesting  had  suffered  everywhere,  but  where 
supplies  had  existed  they  had  been  partly  destroyed,  partly  carried 
off  by  the  Bolsheviks  on  their  way  northward.  Still,  the  harvest  had 
given  certain  stocks  available  in  the  country,  though  these  were  not 
extensive,  and  the  organization  of  a  purchasing  system  was  now 
commenced.  The  free  buying  in  Ukraine  which  we  and  Germany 
had  originally  contemplated  could  not  be  carried  out,  in  fact,  since 
the  Ukrainian  government  declared  that  it  would  itself  set  up  this 
organization,  and  maintained  this  intention  with  the  greatest  stub- 
bornness. But  the  authority  in  the  country  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  Revolution,  and  then  by  the  Bolshevist  invasion;  the  peasantry 


282  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

turned  Radical,  and  the  estates  were  occupied  by  revolutionaries 
and  cut  up.  The  power  of  the  government,  then,  in  respect  of 
collecting  supplies  of  grain,  was  altogether  inadequate;  on  the 
other  hand,  however,  it  was  still  sufficient  (as  some  actual  instances 
proved)  to  place  serious,  indeed  insuperable,  obstacles  in  our  way. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  co-operate  with  the  government — 
that  is,  to  come  to  a  compromise  with  it.  After  weeks  of  negotia- 
tion this  was  at  last  achieved,  by  strong  diplomatic  pressure,  and, 
accordingly,  the  agreement  of  April  23,  1918,  was  signed. 

This  provided  for  the  establishment  of  a  German-Austro-Hun- 
garian  Economical  Central  Commission;  practically  speaking,  a 
great  firm  of  corn  merchants,  in  which  the  Central  Powers  appointed 
a  number  of  their  most  experienced  men,  familiar,  through  years  of 
activity  in  the  business,  with  Russian  grain  affairs. 

But  while  this  establishment  was  still  in  progress  the  people  in 
Vienna  (influenced  by  the  occurrences  on  the  Emperor's  journey 
to  North  Bohemia)  had  lost  patience;  military  leaders  thought  it  no 
longer  advisable  to  continue  watching  the  operations  of  a  civil 
commercial  undertaking  in  Ukraine  while  that  country  was  occupied 
by  the  military,  and  so  finally  the  General  Staff  elicited  a  decree  from 
the  Emperor  providing  that  the  procuring  of  grain  should  be 
intrusted  to  Austro-Hungarian  army  units  in  the  districts  occupied 
by  them.  To  carry  out  this  plan  a  general,  who  had  up  to  that 
time  been  occupied  in  Rumania,  was  despatched  to  Odessa  and 
now  commenced  independent  military  proceedings  from  there.  For 
payment  kronen  were  used,  drawn  from  Vienna.  The  War  Grain 
Transactions  department  was  empowered,  by  Imperial  instructions 
to  the  government,  to  place  one  hundred  million  kronen  at  the 
disposal  of  the  War  Ministry,  and  this  amount  was  actually  set 
aside  by  the  finance  section  of  that  department. 

This  military  action  and  its  execution  very  seriously  affected  the 
civil  action  during  its  establishment,  and  also  greatly  impaired  the 
value  of  our  credit  in  the  Ukraine  by  offering  kronen  notes  to  such 
an  extent  at  the  time.  Moreover,  the  kronen  notes  thus  set  in  cir- 
culation in  Ukraine  were  smuggled  into  Sweden,  and  coming  thus 
into  the  Scandinavian  and  Dutch  markets  undoubtedly  contributed 
to  the  well-known  fall  in  the  value  of  the  krone  which  took  place 
there  some  months  later. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  military  action  was  received  with  great 
disapproval  by  the  Germans,  and  when  in  a  time  of  the  greatest 
scarcity  among  ourselves  (mid-May)  we  were  obliged  to  ask  Ger- 
many for  temporary  assistance,  this  was  granted  only  on  condition 
that  independent  military  action  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary 


BREST-LITOVSK  283 

should  be  suppressed  and  the  whole  leadership  in  Ukraine  be 
intrusted  to  Germany. 

It  was  then  hoped  that  increased  supplies  might  be  procured, 
especially  from  Bessarabia,  where  the  Germans  have  established 
a  collecting  organization,  to  the  demand  of  which  the  Rumanian 
government  had  agreed.  This  hope,  however,  also  proved  vain, 
and  in  June  and  July  the  Ukraine  was  still  further  engaged.  The 
country  was,  in  fact,  almost  devoid  of  any  considerable  supplies,  and 
in  addition  to  this  the  collecting  system  never  really  worked  prop- 
erly at  all,  as  the  arrangement  for  maximum  prices  was  frequently 
upset  by  overbidding  on  the  part  of  our  own  military  section. 

Meantime  everything  had  been  made  ready  for  getting  in  the 
harvest  of  1918.  The  collecting  organization  had  become  more 
firmly  established  and  extended,  the  necessary  personal  requirements 
were  fully  complied  with,  and  it  would  doubtless  have  been  possible  to 
bring  great  quantities  out  of  the  country.  But  first  of  all  the  demands 
of  the  Ukrainian  cities  had  to  be  met,  and  there  was  in  many  cases 
a  state  of  real  famine  there;  then  came  the  Ukrainian  and  finally 
the  very  considerable  contingents  of  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  of  occupation.  Not  until  supplies  for  these  groups  had  been 
assured  would  the  Ukrainian  government  allow  any  export  of  grain, 
and  to  this  we  were  forced  to  agree. 

It  was  at  once  evident  that  the  degree  of  cultivation  throughout 
the  whole  country  had  seriously  declined — owing  to  the  entire 
uncertainty  of  property  and  rights  after  the  agrarian  revolution. 
The  local  authorities,  affected  by  this  state  of  things,  were  little 
inclined  to  agree  to  export,  and  it  actually  came  to  local  embargoes, 
one  district  prohibiting  the  transfer  of  its  stocks  to  any  other, 
exactly  as  we  had  experienced  with  ourselves. 

In  particular,  however,  the  agitation  of  the  Entente  agents  (which 
had  been  frequently  perceptible  before),  under  the  impression  of  the 
German  military  defeats,  was  most  seriously  felt.  The  position  of 
the  government  which  the  Germans  had  set  up  at  Kieff  was  unusu- 
ally weak.  Moreover,  the  ever-active  Bolshevik  elements  through- 
out the  whole  country  were  now  working  with  increasing  success 
against  our  organization.  All  this  rendered  the  work  more  difficult 
in  September  and  October — and  then  came  the  collapse. 

The  difficulties  of  transport,  too,  were  enormous;  supplies  had 
either  to  be  sent  to  the  Black  Sea,  across  it  and  up  the  Danube, 
or  straight  through  Galicia.  For  this  we  often  lacked  sufficient 
wagons,  and  in  the  Ukraine  also  coal;  there  were,  in  addition,  often 
instances  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  local  railways,  incited  by 
the  Bolsheviks,  and  much  more  of  the  same  sort. 


284  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

However  great  the  lack  of  supplies  in  Ukraine  itself,  however 
much  the  limitations  of  our  Russian  means  of  payment  may  have 
contributed  to  the  fact  that  the  hopes  entertained  on  the  signing  of 
peace  at  Brest-Litovsk  were  far  from  being  realized,  we  may  never- 
theless maintain  that  all  that  was  humanly  possible  was  done  to  over- 
come the  unprecedented  difficulties  encountered.  And  in  particu- 
lar, by  calling  in  the  aid  of  the  most  capable  and  experienced  firms  of 
grain  merchants,  the  forces  available  were  utilized  to  the  utmost 
degree. 

Finally  it  should  perhaps  be  pointed  out  that  the  import  organiza- 
tion— apart  from  the  before-mentioned  interference  of  the  military 
department  and  consequent  fluctuations  of  the  system — was  largely 
upset  by  very  extensive  smuggling  operations,  carried  on  more 
particularly  from  Galicia.  As  such  smuggling  avoided  the  high 
export  duty,  the  maximum  prices  appointed  by  the  Ukrainian 
government  were  constantly  being  overbid.  This  smuggling  was 
also  in  many  cases  assisted  by  elements  from  Vienna;  altogether 
the  nervousness  prevailing  in  many  leading  circles  in  Vienna,  and 
frequently  criticizing  our  own  organization  in  public,  or  upsetting 
arrangements  before  they  could  come  into  operation,  did  a  great 
deal  of  damage.  It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  Germany  like- 
wise carried  on  a  great  deal  of  unofficially  assisted  smuggling,  with 
ill  effects  on  the  official  import  organization,  and  led  to  similar 
conditions  on  our  own  side. 

Despite  all  obstacles,  the  machinery  established,  as  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  survey,  nevertheless  succeeded  in  getting  not 
inconsiderable  quantities  of  foodstuffs  into  the  states  concerned, 
amounting  in  all  to  about  forty-two  thousand  wagons,  though, 
unfortunately,  the  quantities  delivered  did  not  come  up  to  the 
original  expectations. 

SURVEY  OF  THE  IMPORTS  FROM  UKRAINE  DATING  FROM  COMMENCE- 
MENT  OF  IMPORTATION   (SPRING,    IQl8)    TO  NOVEMBER,    IQl8 

I.  Foodstuffs  obtained  by  the  War  Grain  Transactions  Depart- 
ment (corn,  cereal  products,  leguminous  fruits,  fodder,  seeds): 

Total  imported  for  the  contracting  states  (Germany, 

Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey) 113,421  tons 

Of  which  Austria-Hungary  received 57,382    " 

Grain  and  flour  amounting  to 46,225    " 

II.  Articles  obtained  by  the  Austrian  Central  Purchasing  Com- 
pany: 


BREST-LITOVSK  285 

Of  Which  Austria- 
Total  Hungary  Received: 

Butter,  fat,  bacon 3,329,4°3  kg-  2,170,437  kg. 

Oil,  edible  oils 1,802,847    "  977,105    " 

Cheese,  curds 420,818    "  325,103    " 

Fish,  preserved  fish,  her- 
rings      1,213,961    "  473,561    " 

Cattle 105,542  head  55,42 1  head 

(36,834,885  kg.)  (19,505,760  kg.) 

Horses 98,976  head  40,027  head 

(31,625,172  kg.)  (13,165,725  kg.) 

Salted  meat 2,927,439    '  1,571,569    " 

Eggs 75,2oo  boxes  32,433  boxes 

Sugar 66,809,969  kg.  24,973,443  kg. 

Various  foodstuffs 27,385,095    "  7,836,287    " 

Total 172,349,556  kg.  61,528,220  kg. 

and  75,200  boxes          and  32,433  boxes 
eggs  eggs 

(Total,  30,757  wagons)  (Total,  13,037  wagons) 

The  goods  imported  under  II  represent  a  value  of  roughly  450 
million  kronen. 

The  quantities  smuggled  unofficially  into  the  states  concerned  are 
estimated  at  about  15,000  wagons  (about  half  the  official  imports). 

So  ended  this  phase,  a  phase  which  seemed  important 
while  we  were  living  through  it,  but  which  was  yet 
nothing  but  a  phase  of  no  great  importance,  after  all, 
since  it  produced  no  lasting  effect. 

The  waves  of  war  have  passed  over  the  Peace  of  Brest- 
Litovsk,  washing  it  away  as  completely  as  a  castle  of 
sand  on  the  shore  is  destroyed  by  the  incoming  tide. 

Long  after  I  was  reproached  by  the  Polish  element  in 
the  Herrenhaus,  who  asserted  that  I  had  proved  my 
incapability  by  my  own  confession  that  the  Peace  of 
Brest  had  not  withstood  the  test  of  subsequent  events. 
But  should  I  have  shown  more  capability  by  asserting, 
after  the  collapse  of  the  Central  Powers,  that  the  peace 
still  existed.? 


286  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  term  "bread  peace"  (Brotfrieden)  was  not  coined 
by  me,  but  by  Burgemeister  Weisskirchner  on  the 
occasion  of  my  reception  by  the  Gemeinderat  of  Vienna 
at  the  Nordbahnhof.  The  millions  whose  lives  were 
saved  by  those  42,000  wagon-loads  of  food  may  repeat 
the  words  without  a  sneer. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   PEACE    OF   BUKHAREST 

AT  Brest  -  Litovsk  the  news  began  already  to  be 
spread  that  Rumania  did  not  intend  to  continue 
the  war.  This  news  assumed  a  very  definite  character 
after  the  peace  concluded  with  the  Ukraine.  That 
peace,  as  well  as  Trotzky's  attitude,  left  no  doubt  in 
Bukharest  that  Rumania  could  no  longer  reckon  on 
further  co-operation  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  gave 
rise  to  the  idea  in  some  circles  that  she  would  turn  back. 
I  say  in  some  circles,  for  there  was  one  group  which,  to 
the  very  last  moment,  was  all  for  war. 

While  at  Brest-Litovsk  I  began  to  get  into  touch 
with  the  leaders  of  the  Hungarian  Parliament  in  order 
to  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  peace  aims  relating  to 
Rumania.  It  was  evident  that,  as  regards  Rumania, 
a  peace  without  annexations  would  be  more  difficult 
to  bring  about  than  with  any  other  state,  because  the 
treacherous  attack  by  the  Rumanians  on  the  whole 
of  Hungary  had  raised  the  desire  for  a  better  strategical 
frontier.  As  might  be  expected,  I  met  with  violent 
opposition  from  Hungary,  where,  under  the  name  of 
strategical  frontier  rectifications,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
greater  annexations  were  desired.  The  first  person 
with  whom  I  dealt  was  Stephen  Tisza,  who,  at  great 
trouble,  was  brought  to  modify  his  original  standpoint 
and  finally  was  led  so  far  as  to  admit  that  the  funda- 
mental ideas  for  peace  were  capable  of  acceptance. 


288  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

On  February  27,  1918,  he  handed  me  a  pro-memoria 
with  the  request  to  show  it  to  the  Emperor,  in  which 
he  explained  his  already  more  conciliatory  point  of 
view,  though,  nevertheless,  he  very  distinctly  showed 
his  disapproval  of  my  intentions.  The  pro-memoria 
reads  as  follows  : 

Unfortunately,  Rumania  can  withdraw  from  the  war  not  as  much 
exhausted  as  justice  and  the  justified  interests  of  the  Monarchy 
could  wish. 

The  loss  of  the  Dobrudsha  will  be  made  good  by  territorial  gains 
in  Bessarabia,  while  the  frontier  rectifications  demanded  by  us  are 
out  of  all  proportion  with  Rumania's  guilt  and  with  her  military 
situation. 

Our  peace  terms  are  so  mild  that  they  are  as  a  generous  gift 
offered  to  vanquished  Rumania  and  are  not  at  all  to  be  made  a 
subject  for  negotiations.  In  no  case  are  these  negotiations  to  assume 
the  character  of  trading  or  bargaining.  If  Rumania  refuses  to 
conclude  peace  on  the  basis  laid  down  by  us  our  answer  can  only  be 
a  resumption  of  hostilities. 

I  consider  it  highly  probable  that  the  Rumanian  government 
will  run  that  risk  to  prove  her  necessity  in  the  eyes  of  the  Western 
Powers  and  her  own  population.  But  it  is  just  as  probable  that 
after  breaking  off  negotiations  she  will  just  as  quickly  turn  back 
and  give  way  before  our  superior  forces. 

At  the  worst  a  short  campaign  would  result  in  the  total  collapse 
of  Rumania. 

In  all  human  probability  it  is  almost  certain  that  the  development 
of  affairs  will  take  a  course  similar  to  the  last  phase  in  the  peace 
with  northern  Russia,  and  will  lead  to  an  easy  and  complete  success 
for  the  Central  Powers.  That  we  lay  down  the  frontier  rectification 
as  conditio  sine  qua  non  forms  a  justifiable  measure  to  protect  an 
important  interest  for  the  Monarchy  of  a  purely  defensive  nature. 
It  is  energetically  demanded  by  the  entire  patriotic  public  opinion  of 
Hungary.  It  appears  out  of  the  question  that  a  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  had  he  taken  up  another  attitude  in  the  matter,  would  have 
been  able  to  remain  in  the  Delegation. 

And,  besides,  the  procedure — to  which  the  greatest  importance 
must  be  attached — is  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  compromise 
the  chances  of  a  general  peace. 

It  is  obvious  from  the  public  statements  of  leading  statesmen  of 
the  Western  Powers  that  they  will  not  be  prevailed  upon  to  agree  to 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  289 

an  acceptable  peace,  as  they  do  not  believe  in  our  capacity  and  firm 
resolve  to  carry  it  out.  Whatever  confirms  their  views  in  this 
respect  widens  the  distance  between  us  and  peace;  the  only  way 
to  bring  us  really  nearer  to  peace  is  to  adopt  an  attitude  that  will 
lead  them  to  think  differently. 

This  must  constitute  the  line  of  action  in  our  resolves  and  under- 
takings. In  connection  with  the  Rumanian  peace,  it  is  evident  that 
to  yield  on  the  frontier  question — even  for  fear  of  a  breakdown  in 
the  negotiations — must  have  a  deplorable  effect  on  the  opinion  our 
enemies  have  of  us.  It  would  certainly  be  right  not  to  take  advan- 
tage of  Rumania's  desperate  situation,  but  to  grant  her  reasonable 
peace  terms  in  accordance  with  the  principles  embodied  in  our 
statements.  But  if  we  do  not  act  with  adequate  firmness  on  that 
reasonable  basis  we  shall  encourage  the  Western  Powers  in  the 
belief  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  conclude  a  peace  with  us  on  the 
basis  of  the  integrity  of  our  territory  and  sovereignty,  and  fierce 
and  bitter  fighting  may  be  looked  for  to  teach  them  otherwise. 

TlSZA. 

February  27,  i$i8. 

Andrassy  and  Wekerle  were  also  opposed  to  a  milder 
treatment  of  Rumania,  and  thus  the  whole  Hungarian 
Parliament  were  of  one  accord  on  the  question.  I  am 
not  sure  what  standpoint  Karolyi  held,  and  I  do  not 
know  if  at  that  period  the  "tiger  soul"  which  he  at 
one  time  displayed  to  Rumania,  or  the  pacifist  soul 
which  he  laid  later  at  the  feet  of  General  Franchet 
d'Esperey,  dominated. 

Thus  at  Brest-Litovsk,  when  the  Rumanian  peace 
appeared  on  the  horizon,  I  took  up  the  standpoint 
that  the  party  desirous  of  peace  negotiations  must  be 
supported. 

The  episode  of  the  Rumanian  peace  must  not  be 
taken  out  of  the  great  picture  of  the  war.  Like  the 
Peace  of  Brest-Litovsk,  the  Rumanian  peace  was  neces- 
sary from  a  military  point  of  view,  because  it  seemed 
desirable  to  release  troops  in  the  east  as  quickly  as 
possible  and  transfer  them  to  the  western  front.  It 
was  urgently  desired  and  repeatedly  demanded  that 


290  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

we  should  come  to  a  final  settlement  with  Rumania 
as  soon  as  possible.  In  order  to  secure  a  speedy  result 
I  had  already,  from  Brest-Litovsk,  advised  the  Em- 
peror to  send  word  privately  to  King  Ferdinand  that 
he  could  reckon  on  an  honorable  peace  should  he  wish 
to  enter  into  negotiations.  The  Emperor  took  my 
advice,  and  Colonel  Randa  had  one  or  two  interviews 
with  a  gentleman  sent  from  the  immediate  entourage 
of  the  King.  But  the  German  opinion  was  that  King 
Ferdinand  must  be  "punished  for  his  treachery"  and 
no  negotiations  entered  into  with  him.  For  this  reason, 
and  to  avoid  fruitless  controversy,  I  first  imparted  to 
Herr  von  Kuhlmann  the  accomplished  fact  and  informed 
him  that  we  had  put  ourselves  secretly  into  communi- 
cation with  King  Ferdinand.  This  event  was  quite 
in  accordance  with  the  standard  of  equality  in  our 
Federation,  by  which  every  member  was  privileged 
to  act  according  to  the  best  of  his  ability  and  was 
merely  bound  to  inform  the  friendly  Powers  of  the 
proceedings.  It  was  not  our  duty  to  apply  to  Germany 
for  permission  to  take  such  a  step. 

There  was  a  threefold  reason  why  I  did  not  share 
Germany's  opinion  in  this  question.  In  the  first  place, 
my  point  of  view  was  that  it  was  not  our  duty  to  mete 
out  divine  justice  and  to  inflict  the  punishment,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  to  end  the  war  as  quickly  as  possible. 
Therefore  my  duty  was  to  seize  every  means  possible 
to  prevent  a  continuation  of  the  war.  I  must  mention 
here  that  the  idea  prevailing  in  many  circles  that  the 
Rumanians  were  quite  at  the  end  of  their  strength, 
and  were  compelled  to  accept  all  the  conditions,  is 
entirely  false.  The  Rumanians  held  very  strong  posi- 
tions, the  morale  in  the  army  was  excellent,  and  in  the 
last  great  attack  on  Maracesci  Mackensen's  troops 
had  suffered  very  severely.  This  success  turned  the 
Rumanians'  heads,  and  there  were  many  leading  men 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  291 

in  the  ranks  of  the  Rumanian  army  who  sided  entirely 
with  those  who  wished  to  carry  on  the  war  d,  I'outrance. 
They  did  not  count  so  much  on  an  actual  victory, 
but  were  upheld  by  the  hope  that  for  some  time  to 
come  they  could  maintain  the  defensive  and  that, 
meanwhile,  the  decisive  successes  of  their  allies  on  the 
west  would  also  bring  victory  for  them.  They  were 
probably  afraid,  too,  that  a  peace  concluded  with  us 
would  place  them  into  permanent  disgrace  with  the 
Entente — that  they  would  lose  the  friendship  of  the 
Entente,  fail  to  gain  ours,  and  find  themselves  between 
two  stools.  The  second  reason  which  decided  me  to 
insist  on  negotiating  with  the  King  was  that,  from  a 
dynastic  point  of  view,  I  considered  it  most  unwise 
to  dethrone  a  foreign  king.  There  was  already  then  a 
certain  fall  in  the  value  of  kings  on  the  European 
market,  and  I  was  afraid  it  might  develop  into  a  panic 
if  we  put  more  kings  on  the  market.  The  third  reason 
was  that,  in  order  to  conclude  peace,  we  must  have  a 
competent  representative  in  Rumania.  If  we  were  to 
depose  the  King  we  should  divide  Rumania  into  two 
camps  and  would,  at  the  best,  only  be  able  to  conclude 
an  illegitimate  peace  with  that  party  which  accepted 
the  dethronement  of  the  King.  A  rapid  and  properly 
secured  peace  could  only  be  concluded  with  the^  legit- 
imate head  in  Rumania. 

In  the  introductory  interviews  which  Colonel  Randa 
had  on  February  4th  and  5th  with  the  confidential  en- 
voy from  the  King  of  Rumania,  the  envoy  asked  whether 
all  the  Quadruple  Alliance  Powers  were  acting  in  the 
step  in  question,  and  whether  the  occupied  territory  in 
Rumania  would  be  released.  I  was  notified  of  this 
inquiry  of  the  King,  and  replied  that  I  was  persuaded 
that  no  refusal  need  be  expected  from  the  other  Central 
Powers  should  he,  with  the  object  of  securing  an 
honorable  peace,  address  them  accordingly.  As  to  the 


292  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

question  of  territorial  possessions,  I  stated  that,  for  the 
present,  I  was  not  able  to  express  any  opinion  on  the 
matter,  as  it  would  have  to  be  a  subject  for  the  intro- 
ductory negotiations. 

The  view  held  by  the  German  military  leaders  in 
agreement  with  Hungarian  politicians  that  Rumania 
should  be  treated  differently  from,  and  in  a  much 
sterner  manner  than,  any  other  state  was,  if  the  ques- 
tion is  considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  retribution, 
quite  justified.  Rumania's  actions  with  regard  to  us 
were  far  more  treacherous  than  those  with  Italy. 
Italy,  owing  to  her  geographical  position  and  to  the 
fact  of  her  being  totally  dependent  on  the  Western 
Powers — a  blockade  by  whom  might  finally  have 
forced  her  to  submit  to  their  demands — would  have 
found  it  very  difficult  to  remain  neutral  in  this  world 
war.  Rumania  was  not  only  perfectly  independent, 
but  was  amply  provided  for  through  her  rich  granaries. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  Rumania  alone  was  to  blame 
for  allowing  things  to  go  so  far  that  Russia  was  en- 
abled finally  to  send  her  an  ultimatum  and  so  force 
her  into  war,  it  must  be  admitted  that  Rumania  was 
far  less  likely  to  be  influenced  by  the  Entente  than 
Italy.  But  neither  would  the  Russian  ultimatum 
have  taken  effect  if  Rumania  had  not  consciously  and 
willingly  placed  herself  in  a  position  in  regard  to  mili- 
tary and  political  matters  that  gave  her  into  Russia's 
power.  Bratianu  said  to  me  in  one  of  our  last  inter- 
views: "Russia  is  exactly  like  a  black  cock  dancing 
before  the  hens."  In  admitting  the  truth  of  this 
appropriate  comparison,  it  must  be  added  that  the 
female  of  the  simile,  longing  to  be  embraced,  directly 
provoked  violence. 

For  two  years  Bratianu  had  stirred  up  public  opinion 
against  us  in  his  own  country.  Had  he  not  done  so, 
and  had  he  not  finally  bared  his  Russian  frontier  of  all 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  293 

troops,  the   Russian   ultimatum  would  have  had  no 
effect. 

In  Rumania  the  Avarescu  Ministry  was  in  power. 
On  February  24th  Kuhlmann  and  I  had  our  first  inter- 
view alone  with  Avarescu  at  the  castle  of  Prince  Stirbey, 
at  Buftia.  At  this  interview,  which  was  very  short, 
the  sole  topic  was  the  Dobrudsha  question.  The 
frontier  rectifications,  as  they  stood  on  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  program,  were  barely  alluded  to,  and  the 
economic  questions,  which  later  played  a  rather  im- 
portant part,  were  only  hinted  at.  Avarescu's  stand- 
point was  that  the  cession  of  the  Dobrudsha  was  an 
impossibility,  and  the  interview  ended  with  a  non  pos- 
sumus  from  the  Rumanian  general,  which  was  equiv- 
alent to  breaking  off  negotiations.  As  regards  the 
Dobrudsha  question,  our  position  was  one  of  constraint. 
The  so-called  "old"  Dobrudsha,  the  portion  that 
Rumania  in  1913  had  wrested  from  Bulgaria,  had 
been  promised  to  the  Bulgarians  by  a  treaty  in  the 
time  of  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  as  a  reward  for  their 
co-operation,  and  the  area  that  lies  between  that 
frontier  and  the  Constanza-Carnavoda  railway  line 
was  vehemently  demanded  by  the  Bulgarians.  They 
went  much  farther  in  their  aspirations :  they  demanded 
the  whole  of  the  Dobrudsha,  including  the  mouth  of 
the  Danube,  and  the  great  and  numerous  disputes  that 
occurred  later  in  this  connection  show  how  insistently 
and  obstinately  the  Bulgarians  held  to  their  demands. 
At  the  same  time,  as  there  was  a  danger  that  the  Bui- 
gars,  thoroughly  disappointed  in  their  aspirations, 
might  secede  from  us,  it  became  absolutely  impossible 
to  hand  over  the  Dobrudsha  to  the  Rumanians.  All 
that  could  be  effected  was  to  secure  for  the  Rumanians 
free  access  to  Constanza,  and,  further,  to  find  a  way 
out  of  the  difficulty  existing  between  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria  in  connection  with  the  Dobrudsha. 

20 


294  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

In  order  not  to  break  off  entirely  all  discussion,  I 
suggested  to  Avarescu  that  he  should  arrange  for  his 
King  to  meet  me.  My  plan  was  to  make  it  clear  to 
the  King  that  it  would  be  possible  for  him  now  to 
conclude  a  peace,  though  involving  certain  losses, 
but  still  a  peace  that  would  enable  him  to  keep  his 
crown.  On  the  other  hand,  by  continuing  the  war  he 
could  not  count  on  forbearance  on  the  part  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.  I  trusted  that  this  move  on  my  part 
would  enable  him  to  continue  the  peace  negotiations. 

I  met  the  King  on  February  2yth  at  a  little  station 
in  the  occupied  district  of  Moldavia. 

We  arrived  at  Foesani  at  noon  and  continued  by 
motor  to  the  lines,  where  Colonel  Ressel  and  a  few 
Rumanian  officers  were  waiting  to  receive  me.  We 
drove  past  positions  on  both  sides  in  a  powerful  German 
car  that  had  been  placed  at  my  disposal,  and  proceeded 
as  far  as  the  railway  station  of  Padureni.  A  saloon  car- 
riage in  the  train  had  been  reserved  for  me  there,  and 
we  set  off  for  Rasaciuni,  arriving  there  at  five  o'clock. 

The  Rumanian  royal  train  arrived  a  few  minutes 
later,  and  I  at  once  went  across  to  the  King. 

Incidentally  my  interview  with  King  Ferdinand 
lasted  twenty  minutes. 

As  the  King  did  not  begin  the  conversation,  I  had 
to  do  so,  and  said  that  I  had  not  come  to  sue  for  peace 
but  purely  as  the  bearer  of  a  message  from  the  Emperor 
Charles,  who,  in  spite  of  Rumania's  treachery,  would 
show  indulgence  and  consideration  if  King  Ferdinand 
would  at  once  conclude  peace  under  the  conditions 
mutually  agreed  on  by  the  Quadruple  Alliance  Powers. 

Should  the  King  not  consent,  then  a  continuation  of 
the  war  would  be  unavoidable  and  would  put  an  end 
to  Rumania  and  the  dynasty.  Our  military  superiority 
was  already  very  considerable,  and  now  that  our  front 
would  be  set  free  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea, 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  295 

it  would  be  an  easy  matter  for  us,  in  a  very  short  space 
of  time,  to  increase  our  strength  still  more.  We  were 
aware  that  Rumania  would  very  soon  have  no  more 
munitions  and,  were  hostilities  to  continue,  in  six  weeks 
the  kingdom  and  dynasty  would  have  ceased  to  exist. 

The  King  did  not  oppose  anything,  but  thought  the 
conditions  terribly  hard.  Without  the  Dobrudsha  Ru- 
mania would  hardly  be  able  to  draw  her  breath.  At 
any  rate,  there  could  be  further  parley  as  to  ceding 
' ' old ' '  Dobrudsha  again. 

I  said  to  the  King  that  if  he  complained  about  hard 
conditions  I  could  only  ask  what  would  his  conditions 
have  been  if  his  troops  had  reached  Budapest  ?  Mean- 
while I  was  ready  to  guarantee  that  Rumania  would 
not  be  cut  off  from  the  sea,  but  would  have  free  access 
to  Constanza. 

Here  the  King  again  complained  of  the  hard  con- 
ditions enforced  on  him,  and  declared  he  would  never 
be  able  to  find  a  Ministry  who  would  accept  them. 

I  rejoined  that  the  forming  of  a  Cabinet  was  Ru- 
mania's internal  business,  but  my  private  opinion  was 
that  a  Marghiloman  Cabinet,  in  order  to  save  Rumania, 
would  agree  to  the  conditions  laid  down.  I  could  only 
repeat  that  no  change  could  be  made  in  the  peace  terms 
laid  before  the  King  by  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  If 
the  King  did  not  accept  them,  we  should  have,  in  a 
month's  time,  a  far  better  peace  than  the  one  which 
the  Rumanians  might  consider  themselves  lucky  to 
get  to-day. 

We  were  ready  to  give  our  diplomatic  support  to 
Rumania  that  she  might  obtain  Bessarabia,  and  she 
would,  therefore,  gain  far  more  than  she  would  lose. 

The  King  replied  that  Bessarabia  was  nothing  to 
him,  that  it  was  steeped  in  Bolshevism,  and  the  Do- 
brudsha could  not  be  given  up;  anyhow,  it  was  only 
under  the  very  greatest  pressure  that  he  had  decided 


296  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  enter  into  the  war  against  the  Central  Powers.  He 
began  again,  however,  to  speak  of  the  promised  access 
to  the  sea,  which  apparently  made  the  cession  of  the 
Dobrudsha  somewhat  easier. 

We  then  entered  into  details,  and  I  reproached  the 
King  for  the  dreadful  treatment  of  our  people  interned 
in  Rumania,  which  he  said  he  regretted. 

Finally  I  requested  that  he  would  give  me  a  clear 
and  decided  answer  within  forty-eight  hours  as  to 
whether  he  would  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  our  proposals 
or  not. 

The  result  of  the  interview  was  the  appointment  of 
the  Marghiloman  Ministry  and  the  continuation  of  the 
negotiations. 

Before  Marghiloman  consented  to  form  a  Cabinet, 
he  approached  me  to  learn  the  exact  terms. 

He  declared  himself  to  be  in  agreement  with  the  first 
and  hardest  of  the  conditions — the  cession  of  the  Do- 
brudsha, because  he  was  quicker  than  the  King  in 
seeing  that  in  consequence  of  our  binding  obligation 
to  Bulgaria  in  this  connection  it  could  not  be  otherwise. 
As  to  our  territorial  demands,  I  told  Marghiloman  that 
I  laid  chief  stress  on  entering  into  friendly  and  lasting 
relations  with  Rumania  after  peace  was  concluded, 
and,  therefore,  desired  to  reduce  the  demands  in  such 
measure  as  Rumania,  on  her  part,  would  consider 
bearable.  On  the  other  hand,  he,  Marghiloman,  must 
understand  that  I  was  bound  to  consider  the  Hungarian 
aspirations  to  a  certain  degree.  Marghiloman,  who 
was  an  old  friend  and  tried  parliamentarian,  fully  saw 
in  what  a  constrained  position  I  was  placed.  We 
finally  agreed  that  the  cession  of  the  populated  districts 
and  towns  like  Turn-Saverin  and  Okna  should  not 
take  place,  and,  altogether,  the  original  claims  were 
reduced  to  about  the  half.  Marghiloman  said  he 
accepted  the  compromise. 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  297 

My  desire  to  enter  into  a  lasting  economic  union  with 
Rumania  played  an  important  part  in  the  negotiations. 
It  was  clear  to  me  that  this  demand  was  in  Austrian, 
but  not  in  Hungarian  interests;  but  I  still  think  that, 
even  so,  it  was  my  duty,  although  joint  Minister  for 
both  countries,  to  work  for  Austria,  as  the  shortage 
of  provisions  made  the  opening  of  the  Rumanian 
granaries  very  desirable.  As  was  to  be  expected,  this 
clause  in  the  negotiations  met  with  the  most  violent 
opposition  in  Hungary,  and  it  was  at  first  impossible 
to  see  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  I  never  took  back 
my  demand,  however,  and  was  firmly  resolved  that 
peace  should  not  be  signed  if  my  plan  was  not  realized. 
I  was  dismissed  from  office  in  the  middle  of  the  negotia- 
tions, and  my  successor  did  not  attach  the  same 
importance  to  that  particular  item  as  I  did. 

On  the  German  side  there  was  at  once  evidence  of 
that  insatiable  appetite  which  we  had  already  noticed 
at  Brest-Litovsk.  The  Germans  wished  to  have  a 
species  of  war  indemnity  by  compelling  Rumania  to 
cede  her  petroleum  springs,  her  railways  and  harbors, 
to  German  companies,  and  placing  the  permanent  con- 
trol of  her  finances  in  German  hands.  I  opposed  these 
demands  in  the  most  decided  manner  from  the  very 
first,  as  I  was  convinced  that  such  terms  would  preclude 
all  possibility  of  any  friendly  relations  in  future.  I 
went  so  far  as  to  ask  the  Emperor  Charles  to  telegraph 
direct  to  the  Emperor  William  in  that  connection,  which 
met  with  a  certain  amount  of  success.  In  the  end  the 
German  claims  were  reduced  by  about  50  per  cent., 
and  accepted  by  Marghiloman  in  the  milder  form. 
With  regard  to  the  petroleum  question,  a  ninety  years' 
lease  was  agreed  on.  In  the  matter  of  the  corn  supply, 
Rumania  was  to  bind  herself  to  deliver  her  agricultural 
produce  to  the  Central  Powers  for  a  certain  number  of 
years.  The  plan  for  Germany  to  be  in  the  permanent 


298  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

control  of  Rumanian  finances  was  not  carried  out.  In 
the  question  of  price,  the  Rumanian  views  held  good. 
The  most  impossible  of  the  German  demands,  namely, 
the  occupation  of  Rumania  for  five  to  six  years  after 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  gave  rise  to  great  difficulties. 
This  was  the  point  that  was  most  persistently  and 
energetically  insisted  on  by  the  German  Supreme  Mili- 
tary Command,  and  it  was  only  with  great  trouble  and 
after  lengthy  explanations  and  discussions  that  we 
settled  the  matter  on  the  following  lines:  That  on  the 
conclusion  of  peace  the  entire  legislative  and  executive 
power  of  the  Rumanian  government  would  be  restored 
in  principle,  and  that  we  should  content  ourselves  with 
exercising  a  certain  control  through  a  limited  number 
of  agents,  this  control  not  to  be  continued  after  the 
general  peace  was  made.  I  cannot  say  positively 
whether  this  standpoint  was  adhered  to  by  my  suc- 
cessor or  not,  but  certain  it  is  that  Marghiloman  only 
undertook  office  on  condition  that  I  give  him  a  guaran- 
tee that  the  plan  would  be  supported  by  me. 

As  already  mentioned,  the  question  of  the  Dobrudsha 
had  prepared  great  difficulties  for  us  in  two  respects. 
First  of  all  there  was  the  relinquishing  of  their  claim, 
which,  for  the  Rumanians,  was  the  hardest  term  of  all 
and  imparted  to  the  peace  the  character  of  a  peace  of 
violence;  and,  secondly,  the  matter  had  precipitated  a 
dispute  between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria. 

The  Bulgarians'  view  was  that  the  entire  Dobrudsha, 
including  the  mouth  of  the  Danube,  must  be  promised 
to  them,  and  they  insisted  on  their  point  with  an 
obstinacy  which  I  have  seldom,  if  ever,  come  across. 
They  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  neither  the  present 
government  nor  any  other  would  be  able  to  return  to 
Sofia,  and  allowed  it  clearly  to  be  seen  that  by  refusing 
their  claims  we  could  never  again  count  on  Bulgaria. 
The  Turks,  on  the  other  hand,  protested  with  equal 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  299 

vehemence  that  the  Dobrudsha  had  been  conquered 
by  two  Turkish  army  corps,  that  it  was  a  moral  injustice 
that  the  gains  chiefly  won  by  Turkish  forces  should  be 
given  exclusively  to  the  Bulgarians,  and  that  they 
would  never  consent  to  Bulgaria  receiving  the  whole 
of  the  Dobrudsha  unless  compensation  was  given  them. 
By  way  of  compensation  they  asked  not  only  for  that 
stretch  of  land  which  they  had  ceded  to  Bulgaria  on 
their  entry  into  the  war  (Adrianople),  but  also  a  con- 
siderable area  beyond. 

In  the  numerous  conferences  at  which  the  question 
was  discussed,  Kuhlmann  and  I  played  the  part  of 
honest  mediators  who  were  making  every  effort  to 
reconcile  the  two  so  diverging  standpoints.  We  both 
saw  clearly  that  the  falling  off  of  the  Bulgars  or  Turks 
might  be  the  result  if  a  compromise  was  not  effected. 
Finally,  after  much  trouble,  we  succeeded  in  drawing 
up  a  program  acceptable  to  both  sides.  It  took  this 
form:  that  "old"  Dobrudsha  should  at  once  be  given 
back  to  Bulgaria,  and  the  other  parts  of  the  area  to  be 
handed  over  as  a  possession  to  the  combined  Central 
Powers,  and  a  definite  decision  agreed  upon  later. 

Neither  Turkey  nor  Bulgaria  was  quite  satisfied  with 
the  decision,  nor  yet  averse  to  it;  but,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  was  the  only  possible  way  of  building  a 
bridge  between  the  Turks  and  the  Bulgars. 

Just  as  England  and  France  secured  the  entry  into 
the  war  of  Italy  through  the  Treaty  of  London,  so 
did  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  and  Burian,  as  well 
as  the  government  in  Berlin,  give  binding  promises 
to  the  Bulgars  to  secure  their  co-operation,  and  these 
promises  proved  later  to  be  the  greatest  obstacles  to  a 
peace  of  understanding.  Nevertheless,  no  sensible 
person  can  deny  that  it  is  natural  that  a  state  engaged 
in  a  life-and-death  struggle  should  seek  an  ally  without 
first  asking  whether  the  keeping  of  a  promise  later  will 


300  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

give  rise  to  important  or  minor  difficulties.  The  fire- 
man extinguishing  flames  in  a  burning  house  does  not 
first  ask  whether  the  water  he  pumps  on  it  has  damaged 
anything.  When  Rumania  attacked  us  in  the  rear 
the  danger  was  very  great,  the  house  was  in  flames, 
and  the  first  act  of  my  predecessor  was  naturally, 
and  properly,  to  avert  the  great  danger.  There  was  no 
lack  of  promises,  and  the  Dobrudsha  was  assigned  to  the 
.  Bulgarians.  Whether  and  in  what  degree  the  Turks 
had  a  right,  through  promises,  to  the  territory  they, 
on  their  part,  had  ceded  to  the  Bulgars  I  do  not  know. 
But  they  certainly  had  a  moral  right  to  it. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  Rumanian  peace  in  the  spring 
of  1918,  too  severe  a  test  of  the  loyalty  of  Bulgars  and 
Turks  to  the  Alliance  was  dangerous.  For  some  time 
past  the  former  had  been  dealing  in  secret  with  the 
Entente.  The  alliance  with  Turkey  rested  mainly  on 
Talaat  and  Enver.  Talaat  told  me  in  Bukharest, 
however,  quite  positively  that  he  would  be  forced  to 
send  in  his  resignation  if  he  were  to  return  empty- 
handed,  and  in  that  case  the  secession  of  Turkey  would 
be  very  probable. 

We  tried  then  at  Bukharest  to  steer  our  way  through 
the  many  shoals;  not  mortally  to  offend  the  Rumanians, 
to  observe  as  far  as  possible  the  character  of  a  peace  of 
understanding,  and  yet  to  keep  both  Turks  and  Bul- 
gars on  our  side. 

The  cession  of  the  Dobrudsha  was  a  terribly  hard 
demand  to  make  on  the  Rumanians,  and  was  only 
rendered  bearable  for  them  when  Kuhlmann  and  I, 
with  the  greatest  difficulty  and  against  the  most  violent 
opposition  from  the  Bulgarians,  obtained  for  them  free 
access  to  the  Black  Sea. 

When,  later,  in  one  breath,  we  were  reproached  with 
having  enforced  a  peace  of  violence  on  the  Rumanians 
and  with  not  having  treated  the  Bulgarian  claims  and 


THE  PEACE  OF  BUKHAREST  301 

wishes  with  sufficient  consideration — the  answer  to  the 
charge  is  obvious.  Because  we  were  compelled  to 
consider  both  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  we  were  forced  to 
demand  the  Dobrudsha  from  the  Rumanians  and 
treat  them  with  greater  severity  than  we  should  have 
done  otherwise,  in  order  finally  to  gain  the  Turks  and 
the  Bulgars  for  our  negotiation  plans.  Judged  accord- 
ing to  the  Versailles  standard,  the  Peace  of  Bukharest 
would  be  a  peace  of  understanding,  as  regards  both 
form  and  contents. 

The  Central  Powers'  mediators,  both  at  Versailles 
and  St. -Germain,  would  have  been  glad  had  they  been 
treated  in  the  same  way  as  the  Marghiloman  Ministry 
was  treated. 

The  Rumanians  lost  the  Dobrudsha,  but  acquired 
safe  and  guaranteed  access  to  the  sea;  they  lost  a 
district  of  sparsely  populated  mountainous  country  to 
us,  and  through  us  they  acquired  Bessarabia. 

They  gained  far  more  than  they  lost. 


CHAPTER  XII 

FINAL   REFLECTIONS 

THE  farther  the  World  War  progressed,  the  more 
did  it  lose  the  character  of  the  work  of  individual 
men.  It  assumed  rather  the  character  of  a  cosmic 
event,  taking  more  and  more  from  the  effectiveness  of 
the  most  powerful  individuals. 

All  settlements  on  which  coalitions  were  based  were 
connected  with  certain  war  aims  by  the  Cabinets, 
such  as  the  promises  of  compensation  given  to  their 
own  people,  the  hopes  of  gain  from  the  final  victory. 
The  encouragement  of  intense  and  boundless  hatred, 
the  increasing  crude  brutality  of  the  world,  all  tended 
to  create  a  situation  making  each  individual  like  a  small 
stone,  which,  breaking  away  from  an  avalanche  of 
stones,  hurls  itself  downward  without  a  leader  and 
without  goal,  and  is  no  longer  capable  of  being  guided 
by  any  one. 

The  Council  of  Four  at  Versailles  tried  for  some  time 
to  make  the  world  believe  that  they  possessed  the 
power  to  rebuild  Europe  according  to  their  own  ideas. 
According  to  their  own  ideas !  That  signified,  to  begin 
with,  four  utterly  different  ideas,  for  four  different 
worlds  were  comprised  in  Rome,  Paris,  London,  and 
Washington.  And  the  four  representatives — "the  Big 
Four,"  as  they  were  called — were  each  individually 
the  slave  of  his  program,  his  pledges,  and  his  people. 
Those  responsible  for  the  Paris  negotiations  in  camera, 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS  303 

which  lasted  for  many  months,  and  were  a  breeding- 
ground  for  European  anarchy,  had  their  own  good 
reasons  for  secrecy;  there  was  no  end  to  the  disputes 
for  which  no  outlet  could  be  found. 

Here  Wilson  had  been  scoffed  at  and  cursed  because 
he  deserted  his  program;  certainly,  there  is  not  the 
slightest  similarity  between  the  Fourteen  Points  and 
the  Peace  of  Versailles  and  St. -Germain,  but  it  is  for- 
gotten now  that  Wilson  no  longer  had  the  power  to 
enforce  his  will  against  the  three  others.  We  do  not 
know  what  occurred  behind  those  closed  doors,  but 
we  can  imagine  it,  and  Wilson  probably  fought  weeks 
and  months  for  his  program.  He  could  have  broken 
off  proceedings  and  left !  He  certainly  could  have  done 
so,  but  would  the  chaos  have  been  any  less;  would 
it  have  been  any  better  for  the  world  if  the  only  one 
who  was  not  solely  imbued  with  the  lust  of  conquest 
had  thrown  down  his  arms?  But  Clemenceau,  too, 
the  direct  opposite  of  Wilson,  was  not  quite  open  in  his 
dealings.  Undoubtedly  this  old  man,  who  now  at 
the  close  of  his  life  was  able  to  satisfy  his  hatred  of  the 
Germans  of  1870,  gloried  in  the  triumph;  but,  apart 
from  that,  if  he  had  tried  to  conclude  a  "Wilson  peace," 
all  the  private  citizens  of  France,  great  and  small, 
would  have  risen  against  him,  for  they  had  been  told 
for  the  last  five  years,  que  les  baches  payeront  tout. 
What  he  did,  he  enjoyed  doing;  but  he  was  forced  to 
do  it  or  France  would  have  dismissed  him. 

And  Italy?  From  Milan  to  Naples  is  heard  the 
subterraneous  rumbling  of  approaching  revolution; 
the  only  means  the  government  has  adopted  to  check 
the  upheaval  is  to  drown  the  revolution  in  a  sea  of 
national  interests.  I  believe  that  in  1917,  when  the 
general  discontent  was  much  less  and  finances  were 
much  better,  the  Italian  government  might  much  more 
probably  have  accepted  Wilson's  standpoint  than  after 


304  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

final  victory.  Then  they  could  not  do  it.  At  Versailles 
they  were  the  slaves  of  their  promises.  And  does  any 
one  believe  that  Lloyd  George  would  have  had  the 
power  at  Versailles  to  extend  the  Wilson  principle  of 
the  right  of  self-determination  to  Ireland  and  the 
Dominions?  Naturally,  he  did  not  wish  to  do  other- 
wise than  he  did;  but  that  is  not  the  question  here, 
but  rather  that  neither  could  have  acted  very  differently 
even  had  he  wished  to  do  so. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  historical  moment  is  the 
year  1917,  when  Wilson  lost  his  power,  which  was 
swallowed  up  in  imperialism,  and  when  the  President 
of  the  United  States  neglected  to  force  his  program 
on  his  allies.  Then  power  was  still  in  his  hands,  as  the 
American  troops  were  so  eagerly  looked  for,  but  later, 
when  victory  came,  he  no  longer  held  it. 

And  thus  there  came  about  what  is  now  a  fact.  A 
dictated  peace  of  the  most  terrible  nature  was  con- 
cluded and  a  foundation  laid  for  a  continuance  of 
unimaginable  disturbances,  complications,  and  wars. 

In  spite  of  all  the  apparent  power  of  victorious  armies, 
in  spite  of  all  the  claims  of  the  Council  of  Four,  a  world 
has  expired  at  Versailles — the  world  of  militarism. 
Solely  bent  on  exterminating  Prussian  militarism,  the 
Entente  have  gained  so  complete  a  victory  that  all 
fences  and  barriers  have  been  pulled  down  and  they 
can  give  themselves  up  unchecked  to  a  torrent  of 
violence,  vengeance,  and  passion.  And  the  Entente 
are  so  swallowed  up  by  their  revengeful  paroxysm  of 
destruction  that  they  do  not  appear  to  see  that,  while 
they  imagine  they  still  rule  and  command,  they  are 
even  now  but  instruments  in  a  world  revolution. 
.  The  Entente,  who  would  not  allow  the  war  to  end 
and  kept  up  the  blockade  for  months  after  the  cessation 
of  hostilities,  has  made  Bolshevism  a  danger  to  the 
world.  War  is  its  father,  famine  its  mother,  despair 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS  305 

its  godfather.  The  poison  of  Bolshevism  will  course  in 
the  veins  of  Europe  for  many  a  long  year. 

Versailles  is  not  the  end  of  the  war;  it  is  only  a  phase 
of  it.  The  war  goes  on,  though  in  another  form.  I 
think  that  the  coming  generation  will  not  call  the  great 
drama  of  the  last  five  years  the  World  War,  but  the 
World  Revolution,  which  it  will  realize  began  with  the 
World  War. 

Neither  at  Versailles  nor  at  St.  -Germain  has  any 
lasting  work  been  done.  The  germs  of  decomposition 
and  death  lie  in  this  peace.  The  paroxysms  that 
shattered  Europe  are  not  yet  over,  as,  after  a  terrible 
earthquake,  the  subterraneous  rumblings  may  still  be 
heard.  Again  and  again  we  shall  see  the  earth  open, 
now  here,  now  there,  and  shoot  up  flames  into  the 
heavens;  again  and  again  there  will  be  expressions  of 
elementary  nature  and  elementary  force  that  will  spread 
devastation  through  the  land  —  until  everything  has 
been  swept  away  that  reminds  us  of  the  madness  of 
the  war  and  the  French  peace. 

Slowly  but  with  unspeakable  suffering  a  new  world 
will  be  born.  Coming  generations  will  look  back  to 
our  times  as  to  a  long  and  very  bad  dream,  but  day 
follows  the  darkest  night.  Generations  have  been  laid 
in  their  graves,  murdered,  famished,  and  a  prey  to  dis- 
ease. Millions,  with  hatred  and  murder  in  their  hearts, 
have  died  in  their  efforts  to  devastate  and  destroy. 

But  other  generations  will  arise  and  with  them  a  new 
spirit.  They  will  rebuild  what  war  and  revolution  have 
pulled  down.  Spring  comes  always  after  winter.  Res- 
urrection follows  after  death  ;  it  is  the  eternal  law  in  life. 

Well  for  those  who  will  be  called  upon  to  serve  as 
soldiers  in  the  ranks  of  whoever  comes  to  build  the 
new  world. 


June, 


APPENDIX 

i 

RESOLUTIONS  OF  THE  LONDON  CONFERENCE  OF  APRIL  26,  1915* 

ON  February  28,  1917,  the  Isvestia  published  the  following  text  of 
this  agreement: 

The  Italian  Ambassador  in  London,  Marchese  Imperiali,  acting 
on  the  instructions  of  his  government,  has  the  honor  to  convey  to 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  French  Am- 
bassador in  London,  M.  Cambon,  and  the  Russian  Ambassador  in 
London,  Count  Benkendorff,  the  following  notable  points: 

§  i.  A  Military  Convention  shall  be  concluded  without  delay 
between  the  General  Staffs  of  France,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and 
Italy.  This  convention  to  determine  the  minimum  of  forces  to  be 
directed  by  Russia  against  Austria-Hungary  in  case  that  country 
should  turn  all  its  forces  against  Italy,  provided  Russia  decides  to 
concentrate  chiefly  against  Germany.  The  Military  Convention 
referred  to  shall  also  settle  questions  bearing  upon  an  armistice,  in  so 
far  as  these  by  their  nature  come  within  the  scope  of  the  Army 
Command. 

§  2.  Italy  on  her  part  undertakes  to  carry  on  war  with  all  the 
means  at  her  disposal,  together  with  France,  Great  Britain,  and 
Russia,  against  all  countries  at  war  with  them. 

§  3.  The  naval  forces  of  France  and  Great  Britain  are  to  render 
Italy  undiminished,  active  assistance  until  the  destruction  oj  the 
Austrian  fleet,  or  until  the  moment  peace  is  concluded.  A  Naval 
Convention  shall  be  concluded  without  delay  between  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Italy. 

§4.  At  the  coming  conclusion  of  peace  Italy  is  to  receive:  the 
district  of  the  Trentino;  the  whole  of  South  Tyrol  as  far  as  its  natural 

1  Translated  from  the  German  text  given  by  Count  Czernin,  no 
English  text  being  available. 


3o8  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

geographical  boundary,  thereby  understood  the  Brenner;  the  city 
and  district  of  Trieste;  the  provinces  of  Goerz  and  Gradisca,  the 
whole  of  Istria  as  far  as  Quarnero,  including  Voloska  and  the  Istrian 
islands  of  Cherso  and  Lussin,  also  the  smaller  islands  of  Plavnica, 
Unie,  Canidolo,  Palazzoli,  as  well  as  the  island  of  St.  Peter  de 
Nembi,  Astinello  and  Cruica,  with  the  neighboring  islands. 

Note:  i.  By  way  of  supplement  to  §  4,  the  frontier  shall  be  drawn 
through  the  following  points:  From  the  peak  of  the  Umbrail  in  a 
northerly  direction  as  far  as  the  Stilfserjoch,  and  thence  along  the 
watershed  of  the  Ratische  Alps  as  far  as  the  source  of  the  rivers 
Etsch  and  Eisack,  then  over  the  Reschen-Scheideck,  the  Brenner 
and  the  Oetztaler  and  Zillertaler  Alps;  the  frontier  line  then  to  turn 
southward,  cutting  the  Toblach  range,  and  proceeding  as  far  as  the 
present  frontier  of  Grein,  drawn  toward  the  Alps;  following  this 
it  will  run  to  the  heights  of  Tarvis,  then,  however,  pursuing  a  course 
along  the  watershed  of  the  Julian  Alps;  over  the  heights  of  Predil, 
Mangart,  and  Triglav  group,  and  the  passes  of  Podbrda,  Podlanes- 
kan,  and  Idria.  From  there  the  frontier  continues  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  to  the  Schneeberg,  so  that  the  basin  of  the  River 
Save,  with  its  sources,  shall  not  fall  within  the  Italian  territory. 
From  the  Schneeberg  the  frontier  proceeds  toward  the  coast,  inclos- 
ing Castua,  Matuglie,  and  Voloska  in  the  Italian  possessions. 

§  5.  Similarly,  Italy  is  to  receive  the  province  of  Dalmatia  in  its 
present  form,  including  Lissarik  and  Trebinje  in  the  north,  and  all 
possessions  as  far  as  a  line  drawn  from  the  coast  at  Cape  Blanca 
eastward  to  the  watershed  in  the  south,  so  as  to  include  in  the  Italian 
possessions  all  valleys  on  the  course  of  the  rivers  debouching  at 
Sebenico,such  as  Cikola,  Kerke,  and  Budisnica,  with  all  those  situate 
on  their  sources.  Similarly  also,  Italy  is  promised  all  the  islands 
lying  north  and  west  of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  beginning  with  the 
islands  of  Premuda,  Selve,  Ulbo,  Skerda  Maon,  Pago,  and  Punta- 
dura,  etc.,  in  the  north;  as  far  as  Malarda  in  the  south,  adding  also 
the  islands  of  St.  Andrae,  Busi,  Lissa,  Lessina,  Torzola,  Curzola, 
Cazza,  and  Lagosta,  with  all  rocks  and  islets  thereto  pertaining,  as 
well  as  Pelagosa,  but  not  to  include  the  islands  of  Great  and  Lesser 
Zirona,  Pua,  Solta,  and  Brazza. 

The  following  are  to  be  neutralized:  (i)  The  entire  coast  from 
Cape  Blanca  in  the  north  as  far  as  the  southern  end  of  the  peninsula 
of  Sabbioncello,  and  in  the  south  including  the  whole  of  the  men- 
tioned peninsula  in  the  neutralized  area;  (2)  a  part  of  the  coast 
beginning  from  a  point  situate  ten  versts  south  of  the  cape  of  Alt- 
Ragusa,  as  far  as  the  River  Vojusa  in  the  south,  so  as  to  include 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  neutralized  zone  the  whole  of  the  Bay 


APPENDIX  309 

of  Cattaro  with  its  ports,  Antivari,  Dulcigno,  San  Giovanni  di  Medua, 
and  Durazzo;  this  not  to  affect  the  declarations  of  the  contracting 
parties  in  April  and  May,  1909,  as  to  the  rights  of  Montenegro. 

In  consideration,  however,  of  the  fact  that  these  rights  were  only 
admitted  as  applying  to  the  present  possessions  of  Montenegro,  they 
shall  not  be  so  extended  as  to  embrace  any  lands  or  ports  which 
may  in  the  future  be  ceded  to  Montenegro.  In  the  same  way,  no 
part  of  the  coast  at  present  belonging  to  Montenegro  shall  be  subject 
to  future  neutralization.  The  restrictions  in  the  case  of  the  port  of 
Antivari,  agreed  by  Montenegro  itself  in  1909,  remain  in  force. 
(3)  Finally,  the  islands  not  accorded  to  Italy. 

Note:  3.  The  following  lands  in  the  Adriatic  Sea  are  accorded 
by  the  Powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  to  the  territories  of  Croatia, 
Serbia,  and  Montenegro:  In  the  north  of  the  Adriatic,  the  entire  coast, 
commencing  from  the  Bay  of  Volosca  on  the  frontier  of  Istria  as  far 
as  the  northern  frontier  of  Dalmatia,  including  the  whole  of  the  coast- 
line now  belonging  to  Hungary,  the  entire  coast  of  Croatia,  the  port 
of  Fiume  and  the  small  harbors  of  Novi  and  Carlopago,  as  also 
the  islands  of  Velia,  Pervicchio,  Gregorio,  Goli,  and  Arbe.  In  the 
south  of  the  Adriatic,  where  Serbia  and  Austrian  interests  lie,  the 
entire  coast  from  Cape  Blanca  as  far  as  the  River  Drina,  with  the 
principal  ports  of  S potato,  Ragusa,  Cattaro,  Antivari,  Dulcigno,  and 
San  Giovanni  di  Medua,  and  with  the  islands  of  Greater  Zirona,  Bua, 
Solta,  Brazza,  Jaklian,  and  Calamotta. 

The  port  of  Durazzo  can  be  accorded  to  an  independent  Moham- 
medan State  of  Albania. 

§  6.  Italy  to  be  given  full  possession  of  Valona,  the  Island  of 
Sasseno,  and  a  sufficiently  extensive  territory  to  protect  it  in  military 
respects,  approximately  from  the  River  Vojusa  in  the  north  and  east 
to  the  boundary  of  the  Chimara  district  in  the  south. 

§  7.  Italy,  receiving  the  Trentino  according  to  §  4,  Dalmatia  and 
the  islands  of  the  Adriatic  according  to  §  5,  as  well  as  Valona,  is  not 
to  oppose  the  possible  wishes  of  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia 
in  case  of  the  establishment  of  a  small  autonomous  neutralized  state 
in  Albania,  as  to  division  of  the  northern  and  southern  frontier  belts 
of  Albania  between  Montenegro,  Serbia,  and  Greece.  The  southern 
strip  of  coast  from  the  frontier  of  the  Italian  district  of  Valona  as 
far  as  Cape  Stiloa  to  be  subject  to  neutralization. 

Italy  has  the  prospect  of  right  to  determine  the  foreign  policy  of 
Albania;  in  any  case,  Italy  undertakes  to  assent  to  the  cession  of  a 
sufficient  territory  to  Albania  to  make  the  frontiers  of  the  latter  on 
the  west  of  the  Ochrida  Lake  coincide  with  the  frontiers  of  Greece 
and  Serbia. 

21 


3io  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

§  8.  Italy  to  have  full  possession  of  all  the  islands  of  the  Dode- 
canessus  which  it  occupies  at  present. 

§  9.  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia  accept  in  principle  the  fact 
of  Italy1 's  interest  in  maintaining  political  equilibrium  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, as  also  Italy's  right,  in  case  of  any  division  of  Turkey,  to  a 
like  portion  with  themselves  in  the  basin  of  the  Mediterranean,  and 
that  in  the  part  adjacent  to  the  province  of  Adalia,  where  Italy  has 
already  acquired  particular  rights  and  developed  particular  inter- 
ests, to  be  noted  in  the  Italo-British  Convention.  The  zone  then 
falling  to  the  possession  of  Italy  will  in  due  time  be  determined 
according  to  the  vital  interests  of  France  and  Great  Britain.  Simi- 
larly, the  interests  of  Italy  are  also  to  be  considered  in  case  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Asiatic  Turkey  should  be  maintained  by  the 
Powers  for  a  further  period,  and  only  a  limitation  between  the 
spheres  of  interest  be  made.  Should,  in  such  case,  any  areas  of 
Asiatic  Turkey  be  occupied  by  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia 
during  the  present  war,  then  the  entire  area  contiguous  to  Italy, 
and  further  defined  below,  shall  be  granted  to  Italy,  together  with 
the  right  to  occupy  the  same. 

§  10.  In  Lybia,  Italy  is  to  be  granted  all  rights  and  claims  hitherto 
conceded  to  the  Sultan  on  the  basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne. 

§  ii.  Italy  to  receive  such  part  of  the  war  contribution  as  shall 
be  commensurate  with  her  sacrifices  and  efforts. 

§  12.  Italy  subscribes  to  the  declaration  issued  by  France,  Eng- 
land, and  Russia  whereby  Arabia  and  the  holy  cities  of  the  Moham- 
medans are  to  be  granted  to  an  independent  Mohammedan  Power. 

§  13.  In  case  of  any  extension  of  the  French  and  English  colonial 
possessions  in  Africa  at  the  expense  of  Germany,  France  and  Great 
Britain  acknowledge  in  principle  the  right  of  Italy  to  demand  certain 
compensation  in  respect  of  extension  of  Italian  possessions  in  Eritrea, 
Somaliland,  in  Lybia,  and  the  colonial  areas  contiguous  to  the 
colonies  of  France  and  England. 

§  14.  England  undertakes  to  facilitate  the  immediate  realization 
of  a  loan  of  not  less  than  fifty  million  pounds  sterling  in  the  English 
market  on  favorable  conditions. 

§  15.  France,  England,  and  Russia  undertake  to  support  Italy  in 
preventing  the  representatives  of  the  Holy  See  from  taking  any  diplo- 
matic steps  whatever  in  connection  with  the  conclusion  of  a  peace, 
or  the  regulation  of  questions  connected  with  the  present  war. 

§  16.  The  present  treaty  to  be  kept  secret.  As  regards  Italy's 
agreement  to  the  declaration  of  September  5,  1914,  this  declaration 
will  be  made  public  as  soon  as  war  is  declared  by  Italy  or  against 
Italy. 


APPENDIX  311 

The  foregoing  points  having  been  duly  noted,  the  respective 
authorized  representatives  of  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia, 
together  with  the  representative  of  Italy  similarly  authorized  by  his 
government  for  this  purpose,  are  agreed:  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Russia  declare  their  full  agreement  with  the  foregoing  notable 
points,  as  set  before  them  by  the  Italian  government.  With  regard 
to  §§i,  2,  and  3,  referring  to  the  agreement  upon  military  and  naval 
undertakings  of  all  Four  Powers,  Italy  undertakes  to  commence  active 
operations  at  the  earliest  possible  date,  and  in  any  case  not  later  than 
one  month  after  the  signing  of  the  present  document  by  the  contract- 
ing parties. 

The  present  agreement,  in  four  copies,  signed  in  London  on  the 
26th  April,  1915,  and  sealed,  by 

SIR  EDWARD  GREY, 
CAMBON, 

MARCHESE  IMPERIALI, 
GRAF  BENKENDORFF. 

After  the  entry  of  Rumania  into  the  war  (September,  1916)  this 
program  was  further  extended. 


II 

NOTE  FROM  COUNT  CZERNIN  TO  THE  AMERICAN  GOVERNMENT,    DATED 
MARCH   5,    1917 

FROM  the  aide-memoire  of  the  American  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 
dated  February  i8th  of  this  year,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs  understands  that  the  Washington  Cabinet  enter- 
tains some  doubt,  in  view  of  the  statements  issued  by  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  government  on  February  loth  and  January  i  ith  of  this 
year,  as  to  what  attitude  Austria-Hungary  contemplates  adopting 
for  the  future  with  regard  to  submarine  warfare,  and  whether  the 
assurance  given  by  the  Austrian  government  to  the  Washington 
Cabinet  in  the  course  of  the  proceedings  with  regard  to  the  case  of 
the  vessels  Ancona  and  Persia  might  not  be  taken  as  altered  or 
withdrawn  by  the  statements  mentioned. 

The  AUltrian  government  is  most  willing  to  meet  the  desire  of 
the  United  States  government  that  this  doubt  should  be  removed 
by  a  clear  and  final  declaration. 

It  should  here  be  permitted  first  of  all  to  touch  very  briefly  on 
the  methods  adopted  by  the  Allied  Powers  in  marine  warfare,  since 


3i2  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

these  form  the  starting-point  of  the  aggravated  submarine  warfare 
put  into  practice  by  Austria-Hungary  and  her  allies,  besides  throw- 
ing a  clear  light  upon  the  attitude  hitherto  adopted  by  the  Austrian 
government  in  the  questions  arising  therefrom. 

When  Great  Britain  entered  upon  the  war  with  the  Central 
Powers,  but  a  few  years  had  elapsed  since  the  memorable  time  when 
Great  Britain  itself,  together  with  the  remaining  states,  had  com- 
menced at  The  Hague  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  modern  code  of  law 
for  marine  warfare.  Shortly  after  that  the  English  government  had 
brought  about  a  meeting  of  representatives  of  the  principal  naval 
Powers,  assembling  in  London,  in  order  further  to  carry  forward 
the  work  commenced  at  The  Hague,  presumably  in  a  spirit  of 
reasonable  compromise  between  the  interests  of  belligerents  and 
those  of  neutrals.  The  unexpected  success  of  these  endeavors, 
which  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  concerted  establishment  of  legal 
standards  calculated  to  maintain  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  the 
interests  of  neutrals  even  in  time  of  war,  was  not  to  be  long  enjoyed 
by  the  peoples  concerned. 

Hardly  had  the  United  Kingdom  decided  to  take  part  in  the  war 
than  it  also  began  to  break  through  the  barriers  with  which  it  was 
confronted  by  the  standards  of  international  law.  While  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war  had  announced  their 
intention  of  observing  the  Declaration  of  London,  which  also  bore 
the  signature  of  the  British  representative,  England  discarded  the 
most  important  points  in  that  Declaration.  In  the  endeavor  to  cut 
off  the  Central  Powers  from  all  supplies  by  sea,  England  gradually 
extended  the  list  of  contraband  until  it  included  everything  now 
required  by  human  beings  for  the  maintenance  of  life.  Great  Brit- 
ain then  placed  all  the  coasts  of  the  North  Sea — an  important 
transit-way  also  for  the  maritime  trade  of  Austria-Hungary — under 
the  obstruction  of  a  so-called  "blockade,"  in  order  to  prevent  the 
entry  into  Germany  of  all  goods  not  yet  inscribed  on  the  contraband 
list,  as  also  to  bar  all  neutral  traffic  with  these  coasts,  and  prevent 
any  export  from  the  same.  That  this  method  of  proceeding  stands 
in  the  most  lurid  contradiction  to  the  standards  of  blockade  law 
arrived  at  and  established  by  international  congress  has  already 
been  admitted  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  words  which 
will  live  in  the  history  of  the  law  of  nations.  By  thus  illegally  pre- 
venting export  of  goods  from  the  Central  Powers  Great  Britain 
thought  to  be  able  to  shut  down  the  innumerable  factories  and 
industries  which  had  been  set  up  by  industrious  and  highly 
developed  peoples  in  the  heart  of  Europe;  and  to  bring  the  workers 
to  idleness  and  thence  to  want  and  revolt.  And  when  Austria.- 


APPENDIX  313 

Hungary's  southern  neighbor  joined  the  ranks  of  the  enemies  of  the 
Central  Powers  her  first  step  was  to  declare  a  blockade  of  all  the 
coasts  of  her  opponent — following  the  example,  of  course,  of  her 
allies — in  disregard  of  the  legal  precepts  which  Italy  had  shortly 
before  helped  to  lay  down.  Austria-Hungary  did  not  fail  to  point 
out  to  the  neutral  Powers  at  once  that  this  blockade  was  void  of  all 
legal  validity. 

For  two  years  the  Central  Powers  have  hesitated.  Not  until 
then,  and  after  long  and  mature  consideration  for  and  against,  did 
they  proceed  to  answer  in  like  measure  and  close  with  their  adver- 
saries at  sea.  As  the  only  belligerents  who  had  done  everything 
to  secure  the  observance  of  the  agreement  which  should  provide 
for  freedom  of  the  seas  to  neutrals,  it  was  sorely  against  their  wishes 
to  bow  to  the  need  of  the  moment  and  attack  that  freedom;  but 
they  took  that  step  in  order  to  fulfil  their  urgent  duty  to  their  peo- 
ples and  with  the  conviction  that  the  step  in  question  must  lead 
toward  the  freedom  of  the  seas  in  the  end.  The  declarations  made 
by  the  Central  Powers  on  the  last  day  of  January  of  this  year  are 
only  apparently  directed  against  the  rights  of  neutrals;  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  they  are  working  toward  the  restitution  of  those  rights 
which  the  enemy  has  constantly  infringed  and  would,  if  victorious, 
annihilate  forever.  The  submarines,  then,  would  circle  round 
England's  shores,  announce  to  all  peoples  using  and  needing  the 
sea — and  who  does  not  need  it? — that  the  day  is  not  far  off  when 
the  flags  of  all  nations  shall  wave  over  the  seas  in  newly  acquired 
freedom. 

It  may  doubtless  be  hoped  that  this  announcement  will  find  echo 
wherever  neutral  peoples  live,  and  that  it  will  be  understood  in  par- 
ticular by  the  great  people  of  the  United  States  of  America,  whose 
most  famous  representative  has  in  the  course  of  the  war  spoken  up 
with  ardent  words  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas  as  the  highway  of  all 
nations.  If  the  people  and  the  government  of  the  Union  will  bear  in 
mind  that  the  "blockade"  established  by  Great  Britain  is  intended 
not  only  to  force  the  Central  Powers  to  submission  bystarvation,  but 
ultimately  to  secure  undisputed  mastery  of  the  sea  for  itself,  and 
thereby  insure  its  supremacy  over  all  other  nations,  while  on  the 
other  hand  the  blockading  of  England  and  its  allies  only  serves  to 
render  possible  a  peace  with  honor  for  these  Powers  and  to  guarantee 
to  all  peoples  the  freedom  of  navigation  and  maritime  trade, 
thus  insuring  their  safe  existence,  then  the  question  as  to  which 
of  the  two  belligerent  parties  has  right  on  its  side  is  already  decided. 
Though  the  Central  Powers  are  far  from  wishing  to  seek  for  further 
allies  in  their  struggle,  they  nevertheless  feel  justified  in  claiming 


3H  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  neutrals  should  appreciate  their  endeavors  to  bring  to  life 
again  the  principles  of  international  law  and  the  equal  rights  of 
nations. 

Proceeding  now  to  answer  the  questions  set  forth  in  the  memo- 
randum of  February  i8th  of  this  year,  already  referred  to,  the  Aus- 
trian government  would  first  of  all  remark  that  in  the  exchange  of 
notes  in  the  cases  of  the  Ancona  and  Persia  this  government  restricted 
itself  to  consideration  of  the  concrete  questions  which  had  up  to  then 
arisen,  without  setting  forth  the  legal  position  in  point  of  principle. 
In  the  note  of  December  29,  1915,  however,  regarding  the  Ancona 
case  it  reserved  the  right  to  bring  up  the  intricate  questions  of  inter- 
national law  connected  with  the  submarine  warfare  for  discussion  at 
a  later  date.  In  reverting  now  to  this  point,  and  taking  up  the 
question  as  to  sinking  of  enemy  ships,  with  which  the  memorandum 
is  concerned,  for  brief  consideration,  it  is  with  the  hope  that  it  may 
be  made  clear  to  the  American  government  that  the  Austrian 
government  now  as  heretofore  holds  unmovably  by  the  assurance 
already  given,  and  with  the  endeavor  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding 
between  the  Monarchy  and  the  American  Union  by  clearing  up  the 
most  important  question  arising  out  of  the  submarine  warfare — most 
important  as  it  rests  on  the  dictates  of  humanity. 

First  and  foremost  the  Austrian  government  wishes  to  point  out 
that  the  thesis  advanced  by  the  American  government  and  adopted 
in  many  learned  works — to  the  effect  that  enemy  merchant- vessels, 
save  in  event  of  attempted  flight  or  resistance,  should  not  be 
destroyed  without  provision  for  the  safety  of  those  on  board — is  also, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Austrian  government  itself,  the  kernel,  so  to 
speak,  of  the  whole  matter.  Regarded  from  a  higher  point  of  view, 
this  theory  can  at  any  rate  be  considered  in  connection  with  possible 
circumstances,  and  its  application  be  more  closely  defined;  from  the 
dictates  of  humanity,  which  the  Austrian  government  and  the  Wash- 
ington Cabinet  have  equally  adopted  as  their  guide,  we  can  lay  down 
the  general  principle  that,  in  exercising  the  right  to  destroy  enemy 
merchant  shipping,  loss  of  life  should  be  avoided  as  far  as  possible. 
This  necessitates  a  warning  on  the  part  of  the  belligerent  before 
exercising  the  right  of  destruction.  And  he  can  here  adopt  the 
method  indicated  by  the  theory  of  the  Union  government  referred  to, 
according  to  which  the  commander  of  the  war-ship  himself  issues  a 
warning  to  the  vessel  about  to  be  sunk,  so  that  crew  and  passengers 
can  be  brought  into  safety  at  the  last  moment ;  or,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  government  of  the  belligerent  state  can,  when  it  is  considered  an 
imperative  necessity  of  war,  give  warning,  with  complete  effect, 
before  the  sailing  of  the  vessel  to  be  sunk;  or,  finally,  such  govern- 


APPENDIX  315 

ment  can,  when  preparing  comprehensive  measures  against  the 
enemy  traffic  at  sea,  have  recourse  to  a  general  warning  applicable 
to  all  enemy  vessels  concerned. 

That  the  principle  as  to  providing  for  the  safety  of  persons  on 
board  is  liable  to  exceptions  has  been  admitted  by  the  Union  govern- 
ment itself.  The  Austrian  government  believes,  however,  that 
destruction  without  warning  is  not  only  justifiable  in  cases  of 
attempted  escape  or  resistance.  It  would  seem,  to  take  one  instance 
only,  that  the  character  of  the  vessel  itself  should  be  taken  into 
consideration;  thus  merchant-ships  or  other  private  craft,  placed  in 
the  service  of  war  operations,  whether  as  transports  or  guard-ships, 
or  with  a  military  crew  or  weapons  on  board  for  the  purpose  of  any 
kind  of  hostilities,  should  doubtless,  according  to  general  law,  be 
liable  to  destruction  without  notice.  The  Austrian  government  need 
not  go  into  the  question  of  how  far  a  belligerent  is  released  from  any 
obligation  as  to  provision  for  safety  of  human  life  when  his  oppo- 
nent sinks  enemy  merchant- vessels  without  such  previous  warning, 
as  in  the  well-known  cases,  previously  referred  to,  of  the  Eleklra, 
Dubrovnik,  Zagreb,  etc.,  since,  in  this  respect,  despite  its  evident 
right,  the  Austrian  government  itself  has  never  returned  like  for 
like.  Throughout  the  entire  course  of  the  war  Austro-Hungarian 
war-ships  have  not  destroyed  a  single  enemy  merchant- vessel  without 
previous  warning,  though  this  may  have  been  of  a  general  character. 

The  theory  of  the  Union  government,  frequently  referred  to,  also 
admits  of  several  interpretations;  the  question  arises,  for  instance, 
whether,  as  has  frequently  been  maintained,  only  armed  resistance 
can  be  held  to  justify  destruction  of  ship  and  persons  on  board,  or 
whether  the  same  applies  to  resistance  of  another  sort,  as,  for 
example,  when  the  crew  purposely  refrain  from  getting  the  pas- 
sengers into  the  boats  (the  case  of  the  Ancona),  or  when  the  pas- 
sengers themselves  decline  to  enter  the  boats.  In  the  opinion  of 
the  Austrian  government  cases  such  as  those  last  should  also  justify 
destruction  of  the  vessel  without  responsibility  for  the  lives  of  those 
on  board,  as  otherwise  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  any  one  on  the 
vessel  to  deprive  the  belligerent  of  his  right  to  sink  the  ship.  For  the 
rest  it  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  is  no  unanimity  of 
opinion  really  as  to  when  the  destruction  of  enemy  merchant  ton- 
nage is  justifiable  at  all. 

The  obligation  as  to  issuing  a  warning  immediately  before  sinking 
a  vessel  will,  in  the  view  of  the  Austrian  government,  on  the  one 
hand,  involve  hardships  otherwise  avoidable,  while,  on  the  other,  it 
may  in  certain  circumstances  be  calculated  to  prejudice  the  rightful 
interests  of  the  belligerent.  In  the  first  place,  it  cannot  be  denied 


316  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  saving  lives  at  sea  is  nearly  always  a  matter  of  blind  uncertainty, 
since  the  only  alternatives  are  to  leave  them  on  board  a  vessel 
exposed  to  the  operations  of  the  enemy,  or  to  take  them  off  in  small 
boats  to  face  the  dangers  of  the  elements.  It  is,  therefore,  far  more 
in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  humanity  to  restrain  people  from 
venturing  upon  vessels  thus  endangered  by  warning  them  beforehand. 
For  the  rest,  however,  the  Austrian  government  is  not  convinced, 
despite  careful  consideration  of  all  legal  questions  concerned, 
that  the  subjects  of  neutral  countries  have  any  claim  to  immunity 
when  traveling  on  board  enemy  ships. 

The  principle  that  neutrals  shall  also  in  time  of  war  enjoy  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  extends  only  to  neutral  vessels,  not  to  neutral 
persons  on  board  enemy  ships,  since  the  belligerents  are  admittedly 
justified  in  hampering  enemy  traffic  at  sea  as  far  as  lies  in  their 
power.  Granted  the  necessary  military  power,  they  can,  if  deemed 
necessary  to  their  ends,  forbid  enemy  merchant- vessels  to  sail  the 
sea,  on  pain  of  instant  destruction,  as  long  as  they  make  their 
purpose  known  beforehand  so  that  all,  whether  enemy  or  neutral, 
are  enabled  to  avoid  risking  their  lives.  But  even  where  there  is 
doubt  as  to  the  justification  of  such  proceeding,  and  possible 
reprisals  threatened  by  the  opposing  side,  the  question  would  remain 
one  to  be  decided  between  the  belligerents  themselves  alone,  they 
being  admittedly  allowed  the  right  of  making  the  high  seas  a  field 
for  their  military  operations,  of  suppressing  any  interruption  of 
such  operations  and  supremely  determining  what  measures  are  to 
be  taken  against  enemy  ships.  The  neutrals  have  in  such  case 
no  legitimate  claims  beyond  that  of  demanding  that  due  notice  be 
given  them  of  measures  contemplated  against  the  enemy,  in  order 
that  they  may  refrain  from  intrusting  their  persons  or  goods  to 
enemy  vessels. 

The  Austrian  government  may  presumably  take  it  for  granted 
that  the  Washington  Cabinet  agrees  with  the  foregoing  views,  which 
the  Austrian  government  is  fully  convinced  are  altogether  unassail- 
able. To  deny  the  correctness  of  these  views  would  imply — and  this 
the  Union  government  can  hardly  intend — that  neutrals  have  the 
right  of  interfering  in  the  military  operations  of  the  belligerents; 
indeed,  ultimately  to  constitute  themselves  the  judges  as  to  what 
methods  may  or  may  not  be  employed  against  an  enemy.  It  wotild 
also  seem  a  crying  injustice  for  a  neutral  government,  in  order 
merely  to  secure  for  its  subjects  the  right  of  passage  on  enemy  ships 
when  they  might  just  as  well,  or  indeed  with  far  greater  safety, 
travel  by  neutral  vessels,  to  grasp  at  the  arm  of  a  belligerent  Power, 
fighting  perhaps  for  its  very  existence.  Not  to  mention  the  fact 


APPENDIX  317 

that  it  would  open  the  way  for  all  kinds  of  abuses  if  a  belligerent 
were  forced  to  lay  down  arms  at  the  bidding  of  any  neutral  whom 
it  might  please  to  make  use  of  enemy  ships  for  business  or  pleasure. 
No  doubt  has  ever  been  raised  as  to  the  fact  that  subjects  of  neutral 
states  are  themselves  responsible  for  any  harm  they  may  incur  by 
their  presence  in  any  territory  on  land  -where  military  operations  are 
in  progress.  Obviously,  there  is  no  ground  for  establishing  another 
standard  for  naval  warfare,  particularly  since  the  second  Peace  Con- 
ference expressed  the  wish  that,  pending  the  agreement  of  rules  for 
naval  warfare,  the  rules  observed  in  warfare  upon  land  should  be 
applied  as  far  as  possible  at  sea. 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears  that  the  rule  as  to  warning  being 
given  to  the  vessel  itself  before  such  vessel  is  sunk  is  subject  to 
exceptions  of  various  kinds  under  certain  circumstances,  as,  for 
instance,  the  cases  cited  by  the  Union  government  of  flight  and 
resistance,  the  vessel  may  be  sunk  without  any  warning;  in  others 
warning  should  be  given  before  the  vessel  sails.  The  Austrian 
government  may  then  assert  that  it  is  essentially  in  agreement  with 
the  Union  government  as  to  the  protection  of  neutrals  against  risk 
of  life,  whatever  may  be  the  attitude  of  the  Washington  Cabinet 
toward  some  of  the  separate  questions  here  raised.  The  Austrian 
government  has  not  only  put  into  practice  throughout  the  war  the 
views  it  holds  in  this  respect,  but  has  gone  even  farther,  regulating 
its  actions  with  the  strictest  care  according  to  the  theory  advanced 
by  the  Washington  Cabinet,  although  its  assurance  as  published  only 
stated  that  it  was  "essentially  in  agreement"  with  the  Union  govern- 
ment's views.  The  Austrian  government  would  be  extremely  satis- 
fied if  the  Washington  Cabinet  should  be  inclined  to  assist  it  in  its 
endeavors,  which  are  inspired  by  the  warmest  feelings  of  humanity, 
to  save  American  citizens  from  risk  at  sea  by  instructing  and  warning 
its  subjects  in  this  direction. 

Then,  as  regards  the  circular  verbal  note  of  February  loth  of  this 
year  concerning  the  treatment  of  armed  enemy  merchant- vessels,  the 
Austrian  government  must  in  any  case  declare  itself  to  be,  as 
indicated  in  the  foregoing,  of  the  opinion  that  the  arming  of  trading- 
ships,  even  when  only  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  capture,  is  not 
justified  in  modern  international  law.  The  rules  provide  that  a 
war-ship  is  to  approach  an  enemy  merchant-vessel  in  a  peaceable 
manner;  it  is  required  to  stop  the  vessel  by  means  of  certain  signals, 
to  interview  the  captain,  examine  the  ship's  papers,  enter  the  par- 
ticulars in  due  form,  and,  where  necessary,  make  an  inventory,  etc. 
But  in  order  to  comply  with  these  requirements  it  must  obviously 
be  understood  that  the  war-ship  has  full  assurance  that  the  merchant- 


318  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

vessel  will  likewise  observe  a  peaceable  demeanor  throughout.  And 
it  is  clear  that  no  such  assurance  can  exist  when  the  merchant-ves- 
sel is  so  armed  as  to  be  capable  of  offering  resistance  to  a  war-ship. 
A  war-ship  can  hardly  be  expected  to  act  in  such  a  manner  under  the 
guns  of  an  enemy,  whatever  may  be  the  purpose  for  which  the  guns 
were  placed  on  board.  Not  to  speak  of  the  fact  that  the  merchant- 
vessels  of  the  Entente  Powers,  despite  all  assurances  to  the  con- 
trary, have  been  proved  to  be  armed  for  offensive  purposes,  and 
make  use  of  their  armament  for  such  purposes.  It  would  also  be 
to  disregard  the  rights  of  humanity  if  the  crew  of  a  war-ship  were 
expected  to  surrender  to  the  guns  of  an  enemy  without  resistance 
on  their  own  part.  No  state  can  regard  its  duty  to  humanity  as 
less  valid  in  respect  of  men  defending  their  country  than  in  respect 
of  the  subjects  of  a  foreign  Power. 

The  Austrian  government  is  therefore  of  opinion  that  its  former 
assurance  to  the  Washington  Cabinet  could  not  be  held  to  apply  to 
armed  merchant- vessels,  since  these,  according  to  the  legal  standards 
prevailing,  whereby  hostilities  are  restricted  to  organized  military 
forces,  must  be  regarded  as  privateers  (freebooters)  which  are  liable 
to  immediate  destruction.  History  shows  us  that,  according  to  the 
general  law  of  nations,  merchant-vessels  have  never  been  justified  in 
resisting  the  exercise  by  war-ships  of  the  right  of  taking  prizes.  But 
even  if  a  standard  to  this  effect  could  be  shown  to  exist,  it  would 
not  mean  that  the  vessels  had  the  right  to  provide  themselves  with 
guns.  It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  arming  of  merchant- 
ships  must  necessarily  alter  the  whole  conduct  of  warfare  at  sea,  and 
that  such  alteration  cannot  correspond  to  the  views  of  those  who 
seek  to  regulate  maritime  warfare  according  to  the  principles  of 
humanity.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  since  the  practice  of  privateering 
was  discontinued,  until  a  few  years  back,  no  Power  has  ever  thought 
of  arming  merchant-vessels.  Throughout  the  whole  proceedings  of 
the  second  Peace  Conference,  which  was  occupied  with  all  questions 
of  the  laws  of  warfare  at  sea,  not  a  single  word  was  ever  said  about 
the  arming  of  merchant-ships.  Only  on  one  occasion  was  a  casual 
observation  made  with  any  bearing  on  this  question,  and  it  is 
characteristic  that  it  should  have  been  by  a  British  naval  officer  of 
superior  rank,  who  impartially  declared:  "Lorsqu'un  navire  de 
guerre  se  propose  d'arrSter  et  de  visiter  un  vaisseau  marchand,  le 
commandant,  avant  de  mettre  une  embarcation  &  la  mer,  fera  tirer 
un  coup  de  canon.  Le  coup  de  canon  est  la  meilleure  garantie  que 
Ton  puisse  dormer.  Les  nainr  de  commerce  n'ont  pas  de  canons  & 
bord."  ("When  a  war-ship  intends  to  stop  and  board  a  merchant- 
vessel  the  commander,  before  sending  a  boat,  will  fire  a  gun.  The 


APPENDIX  319 

firing  of  a  gun  is  the  best  guarantee  that  can  be  given.  Merchant- 
vessels  do  not  carry  guns.") 

Nevertheless,  Austria-Hungary  has  in  this  regard  also  held  by 
its  assurance;  in  the  circular  verbal  note  referred  to  neutrals  were 
cautioned  beforehand  against  intrusting  their  persons  or  their  goods 
on  board  any  armed  ship;  moreover,  the  measures  announced  were 
not  put  into  execution  at  once,  but  a  delay  was  granted  in  order  to 
enable  neutrals  already  on  board  armed  ships  to  leave  the  same. 
And,  finally,  the  Austro-Hungarian  war-ships  are  instructed,  even  in 
case  of  encountering  armed  enemy  merchant-vessels,  to  give  warning 
and  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  those  on  board,  provided  it  seems 
possible  to  do  so  in  the  circumstances. 

The  statement  of  the  American  Ambassador,  to  the  effect  that  the 
armed  British  steamers  Secondo  and  Welsh  Prince  were  sunk  without 
warning  by  Austrian  submarines,  is  based  on  error.  The  Austrian 
government  has  in  the  mean  time  received  information  that  no 
Austro-Hungarian  war-ships  were  at  all  concerned  in  the  sinking  of 
these  vessels. 

The  Austrian  government  has,  as  in  the  circular  verbal  note 
already  referred  to — reverting  now  to  the  question  of  aggravated 
submarine  warfare  referred  to  in  the  memorandum — also  in  its 
declaration  of  January  3ist  of  this  year  issued  a  warning  to  neutrals 
with  corresponding  time  limit;  indeed,  the  whole  of  the  declaration 
itself  is,  from  its  nature,  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  warning  to  the 
effect  that  no  merchant-vessel  may  pass  the  area  of  sea  expressly  defined 
therein.  Nevertheless,  the  Austrian  war-ships  have  been  instructed 
as  far  as  possible  to  warn  such  merchant-vessels  as  may  be  encoun- 
tered in  the  area  concerned  and  provide  for  the  safety  of  passengers 
and  crew.  And  the  Austrian  government  is  in  the  possession  of 
numerous  reports  stating  that  the  crews  and  passengers  of  vessels 
destroyed  in  these  waters  have  been  saved.  But  the  Austrian 
government  cannot  accept  any  responsibility  for  possible  loss  of 
human  life  which  may  after  all  occur  in  connection  with  the 
destruction  of  armed  vessels  or  vessels  encountered  in  prohibited 
areas.  Also  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  submarines 
operate  only  in  the  Adriatic  and  Mediterranean  Seas,  and  there  is 
thus  hardly  any  question  as  to  any  action  affecting  American  inter- 
ests on  the  part  of  Austro-Hungarian  war-ships. 

After  all  that  has  been  said  in  the  preamble  to  this  memorandum, 
it  need  hardly  be  said  that  the  declaration  of  the  waters  in  question 
as  a  prohibited  area  is  in  no  way  intended  as  a  measure  aiming  at  the 
destruction  of  human  life,  or  even  to  endangering  the  same,  but  that 
its  object — apart  from  the  higher  aims  of  relieving  humanity  from 


320  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

further  suffering  by  shortening  the  war,  is  only  to  place  Great  Britain 
and  its  allies,  who  have — without  establishing  any  legally  effective 
blockade  of  the  coasts  of  the  Central  Powers — hindered  traffic  by  sea 
between  neutrals  and  these  Powers,  in  a  like  position  of  isolation,  and 
render  them  amenable  to  a  peace  with  some  guarantee  of  permanency. 
That  Austria-Hungary  here  makes  use  of  other  methods  of  war  than 
her  opponents  is  due  mainly  to  circumstances  beyond  human  con- 
trol. But  the  Austrian  government  is  conscious  of  having  done  all 
in  its  power  to  avoid  loss  of  human  life.  The  object  aimed  at  in  the 
blockading  of  the  Western  Powers  would  be  most  swijtly  and  certainly 
attained  if  not  a  single  human  life  were  lost  or  endangered  in  those  waters. 
To  sum  up,  the  Austrian  government  may  point  out  that  the 
assurance  given  to  the  Washington  Cabinet  in  the  case  of  theAncona, 
and  renewed  in  the  case  of  the  Persia,  is  neither  withdrawn  nor 
qualified  by  its  statements  of  February  10,  1916,  and  January 
31,  1917.  Within  the  limits  of  this  assurance  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment will,  together  with  its  allies,  continue  its  endeavors  to  secure 
to  the  peoples  of  the  world  a  share  in  the  blessings  of  peace.  If  in 
the  pursuit  of  this  aim — which  it  may  take  for  granted  has  the  full 
sympathy  of  the  Washington  Cabinet  itself — it  should  find  itself 
compelled  to  impose  restrictions  on  neutral  traffic  by  sea  in  certain 
areas,  it  will  not  need  so  much  to  point  to  the  behavior  of  its  oppo- 
nents in  this  respect,  which  appears  by  no  means  an  example  to 
be  followed,  but  rather  to  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary,  through 
the  persistence  and  hatred  of  its  enemies,  who  are  determined  upon 
its  destruction,  is  brought  to  a  state  of  self-defense  in  so  desperate 
extreme  as  is  unsurpassed  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  Austrian 
government  is  encouraged  by  the  knowledge  that  the  struggle  now 
being  carried  on  by  Austria-Hungary  tends  not  only  toward  the 
preservation  of  its  own  vital  interests,  but  also  toward  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  idea  of  equal  rights  for  all  states;  and  in  this  last  and 
hardest  phase  of  the  war,  which  unfortunately  calls  for  sacrifices  on 
the  part  of  friends  as  well,  it  regards  it  as  of  supreme  importance  to 
confirm  in  word  and  deed  the  fact  that  it  is  guided  equally  by  the 
laws  of  humanity  and  by  the  dictates  of  respect  for  the  dignity  and 
interests  of  neutral  peoples. 

Ill 

SPEECH    BY    DOCTOR    HELFFERICH,    SECRETARY    OF    STATE,    ON    THE 
SUB-MARINE   WARFARE 

THE  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  May  i,  1917,  gives  the 
following  speech  by  Doctor  Helfferich,  Secretary  of  State,  on  the 


APPENDIX  321 

economical  effects  of  the  submarine  warfare,  delivered  in  the  prin- 
cipal committee  of  the  Reichstag  on  April  28th.  The  speech  is  here 
given  verbatim,  with  the  exception  of  portions  containing  con- 
fidential statements: 

"  In  the  sitt.vng  of  yesterday  a  member  rightly  pointed  out  that  the 
technical  and  economical  results  of  the  submarine  warfare  have  been 
estimated  with  caution.  In  technical  respects  the  caution  observed 
in  estimating  the  results  is  plain;  the  sinkings  have,  during  the  first 
month,  exceeded  by  nearly  a  quarter,  in  the  second  by  nearly  half, 
the  estimated  600,000  tons,  and  for  the  present  month  also  we  may 
fairly  cherish  the  best  expectations.  The  technical  success  guar- 
antees the  economical  success  with  almost  mathematical  exactitude. 
True,  the  economical  results  cannot  be  so  easily  expressed  numeri- 
cally and  set  down  in  a  few  big  figures  as  the  technical  result  in  the 
amount  of  tonnage  sunk.  The  economical  effects  of  the  submarine 
warfare  are  expressed  in  many  different  spheres  covering  a  wide  area, 
where  the  enemy  seeks  to  render  visibility  still  more  difficult  by 
resorting,  so  to  speak,  to  statistical  smoke-screens. 

"The  English  statistics  to-day  are  most  interesting,  one  might 
almost  say,  in  what  they  wisely  refrain  from  mentioning.  The 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Navy  pointed  out  yesterday  how  rapidly 
the  pride  of  the  British  public  had  faded.  The  English  are  now 
suppressing  our  reports  on  the  successes  of  our  submarines  and  our 
statements  as  to  submarine  losses;  they  dare  not  make  public  the 
amount  of  tonnage  sunk,  but  mystify  the  public  with  shipping  statis- 
tics which  have  given  rise  to  general  annoyance  in  the  English  Press 
itself.  The  English  government  lets  its  people  go  on  calmly  trusting 
to  the  myth  that  instead  of  six  U-boats  sunk  there  are  a  hundred  at 
the  bottom  of  the  sea.  It  conceals  from  the  world  also  the  true 
course  of  the  entries  and  departures  of  tonnage  in  British  ports  since 
the  commencement  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare.  And  more 
than  all,  the  English  government  has  since  February  suppressed 
most  strictly  all  figures  tending  to  throw  light  on  the  position  of  the 
grain-market.  In  the  case  of  the  coal  exports,  the  country  of 
destination  is  not  published.  The  monthly  trade  report,  which  is 
usually  issued  with  admirable  promptness  by  the  tenth  of  the  next 
month  or  thereabouts,  was  for  February  delayed  and  incomplete; 
and  for  March  it  has  not  yet  appeared  at  all.  It  is  to  be  regretted 
that  this  sudden  withdrawal  of  information  makes  it  more  difficult 
for  us  to  estimate  the  effect  of  our  submarine  operations,  but  there 
is  a  gratifying  side  to  the  question,  after  all.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  England  should  suddenly  become  reticent  in  order  to  avoid 
revealing  its  strength, 


322  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"For  the  rest,  what  can  be  seen  is  still  sufficient  to  give  us  an 
idea. 

"  I  will  commence  with  the  tonnage.  You  are  aware  that  in  the 
first  two  months  of  the  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  more  than 
1,600,000  tons  were  sunk,  of  which  probably  considerably  over 
1,000,000  tons  sailed  under  the  British  flag. 

"The  estimates  as  to  the  quantity  of  English  tonnage  at  present 
available  are  somewhat  divergent;  in  any  case,  whether  we  take  the 
higher  or  the  lower  figures,  a  loss  of  more  than  a  million  tons  in  two 
months  is  a  thing  that  England  cannot  endure  for  long.  And  to 
replace  it,  even  approximately,  by  new  building,  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. In  the  year  1914  England's  newly  built  ships  gave  a  tonnage 
increment  of  1,600,000;  in  1915  it  was  650,000  tons,  in  1916,  only 
580,000,  despite  all  efforts.  And  the  normal  loss  of  the  British 
merchant  fleet  in  peace-time  amounts  to  between  700,000  and  800,- 
ooo  tons.  It  is  hopeless  to  think  of  maintaining  equilibrium  by 
urging  on  the  building  of  new  vessels. 

"The  attempts  which  are  made  to  enlist  the  neutral  tonnage  in 
British  service  by  a  system  of  rewards  and  punishments  may  here 
and  there,  to  the  ultimate  disadvantage  of  the  neutrals  themselves, 
have  met  with  some  success,  but  even  so,  the  neutrals  must  consider 
the  need  for  preserving  a  merchant  fleet  themselves  for  peace-time, 
so  that  there  is  a  narrow  limit  to  what  can  be  attained  in  this  man- 
ner. Even  in  January  of  this  year  about  30  per  cent,  of  the  shipping 
entries  into  British  ports  were  under  foreign  flags.  I  have  heard 
estimates  brought  up  to  80  per  cent,  in  order  to  terrify  the  neutrals; 
if  but  50  per  cent,  of  this  be  correct  it  means  a  decrease  in  British 
shipping  traffic  of  roughly  one-sixth.  Counting  tonnage  sunk  and 
tonnage  frightened  off,  the  arrivals  at  British  ports  have  been 
reduced,  at  a  low  estimate,  by  one-fourth,  and  probably  by  as  much 
as  one-third,  as  against  January.  In  January  arrivals  amounted  to 
2.2  million  net  tons.  I  may  supplement  the  incomplete  English 
statistics  by  the  information  that  in  March  the  arrivals  were  only 
1.5  to  1.6  million  tons  net,  and  leave  it  to  Mr.  Carson  to  refute  this. 
The  1.5  to  1.6  million  tons  represent,  compared  with  the  average 
entries  in  peace-time,  amounting  to  4.2  millions,  not  quite  40  per 
cent.  This  low  rate  will  be  further  progressively  reduced.  Lloyd 
George  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  reckoned  on  the  last  milliard. 
Those  days  are  now  past.  Then  he  based  his  plans  on  munitions. 
England  has  here,  with  the  aid  of  America,  achieved  extraordinary 
results.  But  the  Somme  and  Arras  showed  that,  even  with  these 
enormous  resources,  England  was  not  able  to  beat  us.  Now,  in  his 
greeting  to  the  American  allies,  Lloyd  George  cries  out:  'Ships, 


APPENDIX  323 

ships,  and  more  ships  yet.'  And  this  time  he  is  on  the  right  tack; 
it  is  on  ships  that  the  fate  of  the  British  world-empire  will  depend. 

"The  Americans,  too,  have  understood  this.  They  propose  to 
build  a  thousand  wooden  vessels  of  3,000  tons.  But  before  these 
can  be  brought  into  action  they  will,  I  confidently  hope,  have 
nothing  left  to  save. 

"I  base  this  confidence  upon  the  indications  which  are  visible 
despite  the  English  policy  of  suppression  and  concealment. 

"Take  the  total  British  trade.  The  figures  for  March  are  still 
not  yet  available,  but  those  for  February  tell  us  enough. 

"British  imports  amounted  in  January  of  this  year  to  90  million 
pounds  sterling,  in  February  tp  only  70  million;  the  exports  have 
gone  down  from  46  to  37  millions  sterling — imports  and  exports 
together  showing  a  decline  of  over  20  per  cent,  in  the  first  month 
of  the  submarine  warfare.  And  again,  the  rise  in  prices  all  round 
has,  since  the  commencement  of  the  U-boat  war,  continued  at  a 
more  rapid  rate,  so  that  the  decline  in  the  import  quantity  from  one 
month  to  another  may  fairly  be  estimated  at  25  per  cent.  The 
figures  for  imports  and  exports,  then,  confirm  my  supposition  as  to 
the  decrease  of  tonnage  in  the  traffic  with  British  ports. 

"The  British  government  has  endeavored,  by  the  strictest  meas- 
ures rigorously  prohibiting  import  of  less  important  articles,  to 
ward  off  the  decline  in  the  quantity  of  vital  necessaries  imported. 
The  attempt  can  only  partially  succeed. 

"In  1916,  out  of  a  total  import  quantity  of  42  million  tons,  about 
31  millions  fall  to  three  important  groups  alone,  viz.,  foodstuffs 
and  luxuries,  timber,  and  iron  ore;  all  other  goods,  including  im- 
portant war  materials,  such  as  other  ores  and  metals,  petroleum, 
cotton  and  wool,  rubber,  only  n  million  tons,  or  roughly  one-fourth. 
A  decline  of  one-fourth,  then,  as  brought  about  by  the  first  month 
of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  must  affect  articles  indispensable 
to  life  and  to  the  purposes  of  war. 

"The  decline  in  the  imports  in  February,  1917,  as  against  Febru- 
ary, 1916,  appears  as  follows: 

"Wool  17  per  cent.,  cotton  27  per  cent.,  flax  38  per  cent.,  hemp 
48  per  cent.,  jute  74  per  cent.,  woolen  materials  83  per  cent.,  copper 
and  copper  ore  49  per  cent.,  iron  and  steel  59  per  cent.  As  to  the 
imports  of  iron  ore  I  will  give  more  detailed  figures : 

"Coffee  66  per  cent.,  tea  41  per  cent.,  raw  sugar  10  per  cent., 
refined  sugar  90  per  cent.,  bacon  17  per  cent.,  butter  21  per  cent., 
lard  21  per  cent.,  eggs  39  per  cent.,  timber  42  per  cent. 

"The  only  increases  worth  noting  are  in  the  cases  of  leather, 
hides,  rubber,  and  tin. 


324  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"As  regards  the  group  in  which  we  are  most  interested,  the 
various  sorts  of  grain,  no  figures  for  quantities  have  been  given  from 
February  onward. 

"  The  mere  juxtaposition  of  two  comparable  values  naturally  gives 
no  complete  idea  of  the  facts.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
commencement  of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  campaign  came  at  a  time 
when  the  economical  position  of  England  was  not  normal,  but  greatly 
weakened  already  by  two  and  a  half  years  of  war.  A  correct  judg- 
ment will,  then,  only  be  possible  when  we  take  into  consideration 
the  entire  development  of  the  imports  during  the  course  of  the  war. 

"  I  will  here  give  only  the  most  important  figures. 

"In  the  case  of  iron  ore  England  has  up  to  now  maintained  its 
position  better  than  in  other  respects. 

"Imports  amounted  in  1913  to  7.4  million  tons. 

"In  1916  to  6.9  million  tons. 

"January,  1913,  689,000  tons;  February,  1913,  658,000  tons. 

"January,  1916,  526,000  tons;  February,  1916,  404,000  tons. 

"January,  1917,  512,000  tons;  February,  1917,  508,000  tons. 

"Here  again  comparison  w.th  the  peace  year  1913  shows  for  the 
months  of  January  and  February  a  not  inconsiderable  decrease, 
though  the  imports,  especially  in  February,  1917,  were  in  excess  of 
those  for  the  same  month  in  1916. 

"Timber  imports,  1913,  10.1  million  loads. 
1916,    5.9  million  loads. 
February,  1913,  406,000  loads. 

1916,  286,000  loads. 

1917,  167,000  loads. 

"As  regards  mining  timber  especially,  the  import  of  which  fell 
from  3.5  million  loads  in  1913  to  2.0  million  in  1916,  we  have  here 
December,  1916,  and  January,  1917,  with  102,000  and  107,000  loads 
as  the  lowest  import  figures  given  since  the  beginning  of  1913;  a 
statement  for  the  import  of  mining  timber  is  missing  for  February. 

"Before  turning  to  the  import  of  foodstuffs  a  word  may  be  said 
as  to  the  export  of  coal. 

"The  total  export  of  coal  has  decreased  from  78  million  tons  in 
1913  to  46^  million  tons  in  1915;  in  1916  only  about  42  million  tons 
were  exported.  In  December,  1916,  the  export  quantity  fell  for  the 
first  time  below  3  million  tons,  having  remained  between  3.2  and 
3.9  million  tons  during  the  months  from  January  to  November,  1916. 
In  January,  1917,  a  figure  of  3.5  million  tons  was  again  reached;  it 
is  the  more  significant,  therefore,  that  the  coal  export,  which  from 
the  nature  of  the  case  exhibits  only  slight  fluctuations  from  month 
to  month,  falls  again  in  February,  1917,  to  2.9  million  tons  (as 


APPENDIX  325 

against  3.4  million  tons  in  February  of  the  year  before),  thus  almost 
reaching  once  more  to  the  lowest  point  hitherto  recorded — that  of 
December,  1916.  And  it  should  be  remembered  that  here,  as  in  the 
case  of  all  other  exports,  sunk  transports  are  included  in  the  English 
statistics. 

"Details  as  to  the  destination  of  exported  coal  have  since  the 
beginning  of  this  year  been  withheld.  England  is  presumably  desir- 
ous of  saving  the  French  and  Italians  the  further  distress  of  reading 
for  the  future  in  black  and  white  the  calamitous  decline  in  their  coal- 
supply.  The  serious  nature  of  this  decline,  even  up  to  the  end  of 
1916,  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures: 

"England's  coal  export  to  France  amounted  in  December,  1916, 
to  only  1,128,000  tons,  as  against  1,269,000  tons  in  January  of  the 
same  year;  the  exports  to  Italy  in  December,  1916,  amounted  only 
to  278,000  tons,  as  against  431,000  tons  in  January,  and,  roughly, 
800,000  tons  monthly  average  for  the  peace  year  1913. 

"As  to  the  further  development  since  the  end  of  February,  I  am 
able  to  give  some  interesting  details.  Scotland's  coal  export  in  the 
first  week  of  April  was  103,000  tons,  as  against  194,000  tons  the 
previous  year;  from  the  beginning  of  the  year  1,783,000  tons,  as 
against  2,486,000  tons  the  previous  year.  From  this  it  is  easy  to  see 
how  the  operations  of  the  U-boats  are  striking  at  the  root  of  railway 
and  war  industries  in  the  countries  allied  with  England 

"Lloyd  George,  in  a  great  speech  made  on  January  22d  of  this 
year,  showed  the  English  how  they  could  protect  themselves  against 
the  effects  of  submarine  warfare  by  increased  production  in  their  own 
country.  The  practicability  and  effectiveness  of  his  counsels  are 
more  than  doubtful.  He  makes  no  attempt,  however,  to  instruct  his 
allies  how  they  are  to  protect  themselves  against  the  throttling  of 
the  coal-supply. 

"  I  come  now  to  the  most  important  point :  the  position  of  England 
with  regard  to  its  food-supply. 

"First  of  all  I  would  give  a  few  brief  figures  by  way  of  calling  to 
mind  the  degree  to  which  England  is  dependent  upon  supplies  of 
foodstuffs  from  overseas. 

"The  proportion  of  imports  in  total  British  consumption  averaged 
during  the  last  years  of  peace  as  follows: 

"  Bread  corn,  close  on  80  per  cent. 

"Fodder  grain  (barley,  oats,  maize),  which  can  be  utilized  as 
substitutes  for,  and  to  supplement,  the  bread  corn,  50  per  cent.; 
meat,  over  40  per  cent.;  butter,  60-65  per  cent.  The  sugar  con- 
sumption, failing  any  home  production  at  all,  must  be  entirely 
covered  by  imports  from  abroad. 
22 


326  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"I  would  further  point  out  that  our  U-boats,  inasmuch  as  con- 
cerns the  food  situation  in  England,  are  operating  under  quite 
exceptionally  favorable  conditions;  the  world's  record  harvest  of 
1915  has  been  followed  by  the  world's  worst  harvest  of  1916,  repre- 
senting a  loss  of  45-50  million  tons  of  bread  and  fodder  grain.  The 
countries  hardest  hit  are  those  most  favorably  situated,  from  the 
English  point  of  view,  in  North  America.  The  effects  are  now — the 
rich  stocks  from  the  former  harvest  having  been  consumed — becom- 
ing more  evident  every  day  and  everywhere.  The  Argentine  has 
put  an  embargo  on  exports  of  grain.  As  to  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  the  United  States,  this  may  be  seen  from  the  following  figures: 

"The  Department  of  Agriculture  estimates  the  stocks  of  wheat 
still  in  the  hands  of  the  farmer  on  March  i,  1917,  at  101  million 
bushels,  or  little  over  2^  million  tons.  The  stocks  for  the  previous 
year  on  that  date  amounted  to  241  million  bushels.  Never  during 
the  whole  of  the  time  I  have  followed  these  figures  back  have  the 
stocks  been  so  low  or  even  nearly  so.  The  same  applies  to  stocks 
of  maize.  Against  a  supply  of  1,138,000  bushels  on  March  i,  1916, 
we  have  for  this  year  only  789,000  bushels. 

"The  extraordinary  scarcity  of  supplies  is  nearing  the  panic  limit. 
The  movement  of  prices  during  the  last  few  weeks  is  simply  fan- 
tastic. Maize,  which  was  noted  in  Chicago  at  the  beginning  of 
January,  1917,  at  95  cents,  rose  by  the  end  of  April  to  127  cents, 
and  by  April  2  5th  had  risen  further  to  148  cents.  Wheat  in  New  York, 
which  stood  at  87^  cents  in  July,  1914,  and  by  the  beginning  of  1917 
had  already  risen  to  191^2  cents,  rose  at  the  beginning  of  April  to 
229  cents,  and  was  noted  at  no  less  than  281  on  April  2d.  This  is 
three  and  a  half  times  the  peace  figure!  In  German  currency  ab 
normal  peace-time  exchange,  these  281  cents  represent  about  440 
marks  per  ton,  or,  at  present  rate  of  exchange  for  dollars,  about  580 
marks  per  ton. 

"That,  then,  is  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  country  which  is  to  help 
England  in  the  war  of  starvation  criminally  begun  by  itself! 

"In  England  no  figures  are  now  made  public  as  to  imports  and 
stocks  of  grain.  I  can,  however,  state  as  follows: 

"On  the  last  date  for  which  stocks  were  noted,  January  13,  1917, 
England's  visible  stocks  of  wheat  amounted  to  5.3  million  quarters, 
as  against  6.3  and  5.9  million  quarters  in  the  two  previous  years. 
From  January  to  May  and  June  there  is,  as  a  rule,  a  marked  decline 
in  the  stocks,  and  even  in  normal  years  the  imports  during  these 
months  do  not  cover  the  consumption.  In  June,  1914  and  1915,  the 
visible  stocks  amounted  only  to  about  2  million  quarters,  represent- 
ing the  requirements  for  scarcely  three  weeks. 


APPENDIX  327 

"We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  matters  have  developed  more 
favorably  during  the  present  year.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  import 
figures  for  January — as  published.  The  imports  of  bread  corn  and 
fodder  grain — I  take  them  altogether,  as  hi  the  English  regulations 
for  eking  out  supplies — amounted  only  to  12.6  million  quarters,  as 
against  19.8  and  19.2  in  the  two  previous  years. 

"For  February  the  English  statistics  show  an  increase  in  the 
import  value  of  unstated  import  quantity  of  all  grain  of  50  per  cent., 
as  against  February,  1916.  This  gives,  taking  the  distribution 
among  the  various  sorts  of  grain  as  similar  to  that  of  January,  and 
reckoning  with  the  rise  in  prices  since,  about  the  same  import 
quantity  as  in  the  previous  year.  But  in  view  of  the  great  decrease 
in  American  grain  shipments  and  the  small  quantity  which  can  have 
come  from  India  and  Australia,  the  statement  is  hardly  credible. 
We  may  take  it  that  March  has  brought  a  further  decline,  and  that 
to-day,  when  we  are  nearing  the  time  of  the  three-week  stocks,  the 
English  supplies  are  lower  than  in  the  previous  years. 

"The  English  themselves  acknowledge  this.  Lloyd  George 
stated  in  February  that  the  English  grain-supplies  were  lower  than 
ever  within  the  memory  of  man.  A  high  official  in  the  English 
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Sir  Ailwyn  Fellowes,  speaking  in  April  at  an 
agricultural  congress,  added  that  owing  to  the  submarine  warfare, 
which  was  an  extremely  serious  peril  to  England,  the  state  of  affairs 
had  grown  far  worse  even  than  then. 

"Captain  Bathurst,  of  the  British  Food  Controller's  Department 
(Kriegsernahrungsamf),  stated  briefly  on  April  igth  that  the  then 
consumption  of  breadstuffs  was  50  per  cent,  in  excess  of  the  present 
and  prospective  supplies.  It  would  be  necessary  to  reduce  the  con- 
sumption of  bread  by  fully  a  third  in  order  to  make  ends  meet. 

"Shortly  before,  Mr.  Wallhead,  the  member  for  Manchester,  at  a 
conference  of  the  Independent  Labor  Party  in  Leeds  had  stated 
that,  according  to  his  information,  England  would  in  six  to  eight 
weeks  be  in  a  complete  state  of  famine. 

"The  crisis  in  which  England  is  placed — and  we  can  fairly  call 
it  a  crisis  now — is  further  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the  supplies 
of  other  important  foodstuffs  have  likewise  taken  an  unfavorable 
turn. 

"The  import  of  meat  in  February,  1917,  shows  the  lowest  figures 
for  many  years,  with  the  single  exception  of  September,  1914. 

"The  marked  falling  off  in  the  butter  imports — February,  1917, 
showing  only  half  as  much  as  in  the  previous  year — is  not  nearly 
counterbalanced  by  the  margarine  which  England  is  making  every 
effort  to  introduce. 


328  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"The  import  of  lard  also,  most  of  which  comes  from  the  United 
States,  shows  a  decline,  owing  to  the  poor  American  crops  of  fod- 
der-stuffs. The  price  of  lard  in  Chicago  has  risen  from  15^ 
cents  at  the  beginning  of  January,  1917,  to  2i>^  cents  on  April 
25th,  and  the  price  of  pigs  in  the  same  time  from  9.80  to  16.50 
dollars. 

"Most  serious  of  all,  however,  is  the  shortage  of  potatoes,  which 
at  present  is  simply  catastrophic.  The  English  crop  was  the  worst 
for  a  generation  past.  The  imports  are  altogether  insignificant. 
Captain  Bathurst  stated  on  April  igth  that  in  about  four  weeks  the 
supplies  of  potatoes  in  the  country  would  be  entirely  exhausted. 

"The  full  seriousness  of  the  case  now  stares  English  states- 
men in  the  face.  Up  to  now  they  have  believed  it  possible  to  exor- 
cise the  danger  by  voluntary  economies.  Now  they  find  themselves 
compelled  to  have  recourse  to  compulsory  measures.  I  believe  it  is 
too  late." 

The  Secretary  of  State  then  gives  a  detailed  account  of  the 
measures  taken  up  to  date  in  England  for  dealing  with  the  food 
question,  and  thereafter  continues: 

"On  March  22d  again  the  English  food  dictator,  Lord  Devonport, 
stated  in  the  House  of  Lords  that  a  great  reduction  in  the  consump- 
tion of  bread  would  be  necessary,  but  that  it  would  be  a  national 
disaster  if  England  should  have  to  resort  to  compulsion. 

"His  representative,  Bathurst,  stated  at  the  same  time:  'We  do 
not  wish  to  introduce  so  un-English  a  system.  In  the  first  place, 
because  we  believe  that  the  patriotism  of  the  peopte  can  be  trusted 
to  assist  us  in  our  endeavors  toward  economy,  and,  further,  because, 
as  we  can  see  from  the  example  of  Germany,  the  compulsory  system 
promises  no  success ;  finally,  because  such  a  system  would  necessitate 
a  too  complicated  administrative  machinery  and  too  numerous  staffs 
of  men  and  women  whose  services  could  be  better  employed  else- 
where.' 

"Meantime  the  English  government  has,  on  receipt  of  the  latest 
reports,  decided  to  adopt  this  un-English  system  which  has  proved  a 
failure  in  Germany,  declaring  now  that  the  entire  organization  for 
the  purpose  is  in  readiness. 

"I  have  still  something  further  to  say  about  the  vigorous  steps 
now  being  taken  in  England  to  further  the  progress  of  agriculture 
in  the  country  itself.  I  refrain  from  going  into  this,  however,  as 
the  measures  in  question  cannot  come  to  anything  by  next  harvest- 
time,  nor  can  they  affect  that  harvest  at  all.  The  winter  deficiency 
can  hardly  be  balanced,  even  with  the  greatest  exertions,  by  the 
spring.  Not  until  the  1918  crop,  if  then,  can  any  success  be  attained. 


APPENDIX 

And  between  then  and  now  lies  a  long  road,  a  road  of  suffering  for 
England,  and  for  all  countries  dependent  upon  imports  for  their 
food-supply. 

"Everything  points  to  the  likelihood  that  the  universal  failure  of 
the  harvest  in  1916  will  be  followed  by  a  like  universal  failure  in 
1917.  In  the  United  States  the  official  reports  of  acreage  under 
crops  are  worse  than  ever,  showing  63.4,  against  78.3  the  previous 
year.  The  winter  wheat  is  estimated  at  only  430  million  bushels, 
as  against  492  million  bushels  for  the  previous  year  and  650  million 
bushels  for  1915. 

"The  prospects,  then,  for  the  next  year's  harvest  are  poor  indeed, 
and  offer  no  hope  of  salvation  to  our  enemies. 

"As  to  our  own  outlook,  this  is  well  known  to  those  present: 
short,  but  safe — for  we  can  manage  by  ourselves.  And  to-day  we 
can  say  that  the  war  of  starvation,  that  crime  against  humanity, 
has  turned  against  those  who  commenced  it.  We  hold  the  enemy 
in  an  iron  grip.  No  one  can  save  them  from  their  fate.  Not  even 
the  apostles  of  humanity  across  the  great  ocean,  who  are  now 
commencing  to  protect  the  smaller  nations  by  a  blockade  of  our 
neutral  neighbors  through  prohibition  of  exports,  and  seeking  thus 
to  drive  them,  under  the  lash  of  starvation,  into  entering  into  the 
war  against  us. 

"Our  enemies  are  feeling  the  grip  of  the  fist  that  holds  them 
by  the  neck.  They  are  trying  to  force  a  decision.  England,  mis- 
tress of  the  seas,  is  seeking  to  attain  its  end  by  land,  and  driving  her 
sons  by  hundreds  of  thousands  to  death  and  mutilation.  Is  this  the 
England  that  was  to  have  sat  at  ease  upon  its  island  till  we  were 
starved  into  submission,  that  could  wait  till  their  big  brother  across 
the  Atlantic  arrived  on  the  scene  with  ships  and  million  armies, 
standing  fast  in  crushing  superiority  until  the  last  annihilating 
battle? 

"No,  gentlemen,  our  enemies  have  no  longer  time  to  wait. 
Time  is  on  our  side  now.  True,  the  test  imposed  upon  us  by  the 
turn  of  the  world's  history  is  enormous.  What  our  troops  are  doing 
to  help,  what  our  young  men  in  blue  are  doing,  stands  far  above  all 
comparison.  But  they  will  attain  their  end.  For  us  at  home,  too, 
it  is  hard;  not  so  hard  by  far  as  for  them  out  there,  yet  hard  enough. 
Those  at  home  must  do  their  part  as  well.  If  we  remain  true  to 
ourselves,  keeping  our  own  house  in  order,  maintaining  internal 
unit} ,  then  we  have  won  existence  and  the  future  for  our  Fatherland. 
Everything  is  at  stake.  The  German  people  is  called  upon  now,  in 
these  weeks  heavy  with  impending  decision,  to  show  that  it  is  worthy 
of  continued  existence." 


330  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

IV 

SPEECH  BY  COUNT  CZERNIN  TO  THE  AUSTRIAN  DELEGATION, 
JANUARY    24,    1918 

"GENTLEMEN,  it  is  my  duty  to  give  you  a  true  picture  of  the  peace 
negotiations,  to  set  forth  the  various  phases  of  the  results  obtained 
up  to  now,  and  to  draw  therefrom  such  conclusions  as  are  true, 
logical,  and  justifiable. 

"First  of  all  it  seems  to  me  that  those  who  consider  the  progress 
of  the  negotiations  too  slow  cannot  have  even  an  approximate  idea 
of  the  difficulties  which  we  naturally  had  to  encounter  at  every  step. 
I  will  in  my  remarks  take  the  liberty  of  setting  forth  these  difficulties, 
but  would  like  first  to  point  out  a  cardinal  difference  existing  between 
the  peace  negotiations  in  Brest-Litovsk  and  all  others  which  have 
ever  taken  place  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Never,  so  far  as  I 
am  aware,  have  peace  negotiations  been  conducted  with  open 
windows.  It  would  be  impossible  that  negotiations  of  the  depth 
and  extent  of  the  present  could  from  the  start  proceed  smoothly 
and  without  opposition.  We  are  faced  with  nothing  less  than  the 
task  of  building  up  a  new  world,  of  restoring  all  that  the  most 
merciless  of  all  wars  has  destroyed  and  cast  down.  In  all  the  peace 
negotiations  we  know  of  the  various  phases  have  been  conducted 
more  or  less  behind  closed  doors,  the  results  being  first  declared  to 
the  world  when  the  whole  was  completed.  All  history  books  tell 
us,  and  indeed  it  is  obvious  enough,  that  the  toilsome  path  of  such 
peace  negotiations  leads  constantly  over  hill  and  dale,  the  prospects 
appearing  often  more  or  less  favorable  day  by  day.  But  when 
the  separate  phases  themselves,  the  details  of  each  day's  proceedings, 
are  telegraphed  all  over  the  world  at  the  time,  it  is  again  obvious 
that  nervousness  prevailing  throughout  the  world  must  act  like  an 
electric  current  and  excite  public  opinion  accordingly.  We  were 
fully  aware  of  the  disadvantage  of  this  method  of  proceeding. 
Nevertheless,  we  at  once  agreed  to  the  wish  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment in  respect  of  this  publicity,  desiring  to  meet  them  as  far  as 
possible,  and  also  because  we  had  nothing  to  conceal  on  our  part, 
and  because  it  would  have  made  an  unfavorable  impression  if  we 
had  stood  firmly  by  the  methods  hitherto  pursued,  of  secrecy  until 
completion.  But  the  complete  publicity  in  the  negotiations  makes 
it  insistent  that  the  great  public,  the  country  behind,  and  above  all 
the  leaders,  must  keep  cool.  The  match  must  be  played  out  in  cold 
blood,  and  the  end  will  be  satisfactory  if  the  peoples  of  the  Monarchy 
support  their  representatives  at  the  conference. 


APPENDIX  331 

"It  should  be  stated  beforehand  that  the  basis  on  which  Austria- 
Hungary  treats  with  the  various  newly  constituted  Russian  states 
is  that  of  'no  indemnities  and  no  annexations.'  That  is  the  pro- 
gram which  a  year  ago,  shortly  after  my  appointment  as  Minister, 
I  put  before  those  who  wished  to  talk  of  peace,  and  which  I  repeated 
to  the  Russian  leaders  on  the  occasion  of  their  first  offers  of  peace. 
And  I  have  not  deviated  from  that  program.  Those  who  believe 
that  I  am  to  be  turned  from  the  way  which  I  have  set  myself  to 
follow  are  poor  psychologists.  I  have  never  left  the  public  in  the 
slightest  doubt  as  to  which  way  I  intended  to  go,  and  I  have  never 
allowed  myself  to  be  turned  aside  so  much  as  a  hair's-breadth  from 
that  way,  either  to  right  or  left.  And  I  have  since  become  far  from  a 
favorite  of  the  Pan-Germans  and  of  those  in  the  Monarchy  who 
follow  the  Pan-German  ideas.  I  have  at  the  same  time  been  hooted 
as  an  inveterate  parti  zan  of  war  by  those  whose  program  is  peace 
at  any  price,  as  innumerable  letters  have  informed  me.  Neither 
has  ever  disturbed  me;  on  the  contrary,  the  double  insults  have 
been  my  only  comfort  in  this  serious  time.  I  declare  now  once 
again  that  I  ask  not  a  single  kreuzer,  not  a  single  square  meter  of 
land  from  Russia,  and  that  if  Russia,  as  appears  to  be  the  case, 
takes  the  same  point  of  view,  then  peace  must  result.  Those 
who  wish  for  peace  at  any  price  might  entertain  some  doubt 
as  to  my  'no-annexation'  intentions  toward  Russia  if  I  did  not 
tell  them  to  their  faces  with  the  same  complete  frankness  that 
I  shall  never  assent  to  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  going  beyond 
the  lines  just  laid  down.  If  the  Russian  delegates  demand  any 
surrender  of  territory  on  our  part,  or  any  war  indemnity,  then 
I  shall  continue  the  war,  despite  the  fact  that  I  am  as  anxious 
for  peace  as  they,  or  I  would  resign  if  I  could  not  attain  the 
end  I  seek. 

"This  once  said,  and  emphatically  asserted,  that  there  is  no 
ground  for  the  pessimistic  anticipation  of  the  peace  falling  through, 
since  the  negotiating  committees  are  agreed  on  the  basis  of  no 
annexations  or  indemnities — and  nothing  but  new  instructions  from 
the  various  Russian  governments,  or  their  disappearance,  could 
shift  that  basis — I  then  pass  to  the  two  great  difficulties  in  which 
are  contained  the  reasons  why  the  negotiations  have  not  proceeded 
as  quickly  as  we  all  wished. 

"The  first  difficulty  is  this:  that  we  are  not  dealing  with  a  single 
Russian  peace  delegation,  but  with  various  newly  formed  Russian 
states,  whose  spheres  of  action  are  as  yet  by  no  means  definitely 
fixed  or  explained  among  themselves.  We  have  to  reckon  with  the 
following:  firstly,  the  Russia  which  is  administered  from  St.  Peters- 


332  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

burg;  secondly,  our  new  neighbor  proper,  the  great  State  of  Ukraine; 
thirdly,  Finland;  and,  fourthly,  the  Caucasus. 

"With  the  first  two  of  these  states  we  are  treating  directly; 
that  is  to  say,  face  to  face;  with  the  other  two  it  was  at  first  in  a 
more  or  less  indirect  fashion,  as  they  had  not  sent  any  representative 
to  Brest-Litovsk.  We  have  then  four  Russian  parties,  and  four 
separate  Powers  on  our  own  side  to  meet  them.  The  case  of  the 
Caucasus,  with  which  we  ourselves  have,  of  course,  no  direct 
questions  to  settle,  but  which,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in  conflict  with 
Turkey,  will  serve  to  show  the  extent  of  the  matter  to  be  debated. 

"  The  point  in  which  we  ourselves  are  most  directly  interested  is 
that  of  the  great  newly  established  state  upon  our  frontiers,  Ukraine. 
In  the  course  of  the  proceedings  we  have  already  got  well  ahead 
with  this  delegation.  We  are  agreed  upon  the  aforementioned  basis 
of  no  indemnities  and  no  annexations,  and  have  in  the  main  arrived 
at  settlement  on  the  fact  that  trade  relations  are  to  be  re-established 
with  the  new  republic,  as  also  on  the  manner  of  so  doing.  But  this 
very  case  of  the  Ukraine  illustrates  one  of  the  prevailing  difficulties. 
While  the  Ukraine  Republic  takes  up  the  position  of  being  entirely 
autonomous  and  justified  in  treating  independently  with  ourselves, 
the  Russian  delegation  insists  that  the  boundaries  between  their 
territory  and  that  of  the  Ukraine  are  not  yet  definitely  fixed,  and 
that  Petersburg  is  therefore  able  to  claim  the  right  of  taking  part 
in  our  deliberations  with  the  Ukraine,  which  claim  is  not  admitted 
by  the  members  of  the  Ukraine  delegation  themselves.  This 
unsettled  state  of  affairs  in  the  internal  conditions  of  Russia,  how- 
ever, gave  rise  to  very  serious  delays.  We  got  over  these  diffi- 
culties, and  I  hope  that  in  a  few  days'  time  we  should  be  able  once 
more  to  resume  negotiations. 

"As  to  the  position  to-day,  I  cannot  say  what  this  may  be.  I 
received  yesterday  from  my  representative  at  Brest-Litovsk  the 
following  two  telegrams: 

"'Herr  Joffe  has  this  evening,  in  his  capacity  as  President  of 
the  Russian  Delegation,  issued  a  circular  letter  to  the  delegations 
of  the  four  allied  Powers  in  which  he  states  that  the  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  has  decided  to 
send  two  delegates  to  Brest-Litovsk  with  instructions  to  take  part 
in  the  peace  negotiations  on  behalf  of  the  central  committee  of  the 
Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Councils  of  Pan-Ukraine,  but  also 
to  form  a  supplementary  part  of  the  Russian  delegation  itself. 
Herr  Joffe  adds  with  regard  to  this  that  the  Russian  delegation  is 
prepared  to  receive  these  Ukranian  representatives  among  them- 
selves. The  above  statement  is  supplemented  by  a  copy  of  a 


APPENDIX  333 

"declaration"  dated  from  Kharkov,  addressed  to  the  president  of 
the  Russian  Peace  Delegation  at  Brest,  and  emanating  from  the 
Workers'  and  Peasants'  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic, 
proclaiming  that  the  Central  Rada  at  Kieff  only  represents  the 
propertied  classes,  and  is  consequently  incapable  of  acting  on  behalf 
of  the  entire  Ukrainian  people.  The  Ukrainian  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government  declares  that  it  cannot  acknowledge  any 
decisions  arrived  at  by  the  delegates  of  the  Central  Rada  at  Kieff 
without  its  participation,  but  has  nevertheless  decided  to  send 
representatives  to  Brest-Litovsk,  there  to  participate  as  a  supple- 
mentary fraction  of  the  Russian  Delegation,  which  they  recognize 
as  the  accredited  representatives  of  the  Federative  government  of 
Russia.' 

"Furthermore:  'The  German  translation  of  the  Russian  original 
text  of  the  communication  received  yesterday  evening  from  Herr 
Joffe  regarding  the  delegates  of  the  Ukrainian  government  at 
Kharkov  and  the  two  appendices  thereto  runs  as  follows: 

"'To  the  President  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Peace  Delegation. 

"'Sir, — In  forwarding  you  herewith  a  copy  of  a  declaration 
received  by  me  from  the  delegates  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants' 
Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic,  W.  M.  Schachrai  and  E.  G. 
Medwjedew,  and  their  mandates,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you 
that  the  Russian  Delegation,  in  full  agreement  with  its  frequently 
repeated  acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  self-determination  among 
all  peoples — including  naturally  the  Ukrainian — sees  nothing  to 
hinder  the  participation  of  the  representatives  of  the  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  in  the  peace  nego- 
tiations, and  receives  them,  according  to  their  wish,  among  the 
personnel  of  the  Russian  Peace  Delegation,  as  accredited  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Government  of  the 
Ukrainian  Republic.  In  bringing  this  to  your  knowledge,  I  beg 
you,  sir,  to  accept  the  expression  of  my  most  sincere  respect. — The 
President  of  the  Russian  Peace  Delegation:  A.  JOFFE.' 

"'Appendix  i.  To  the  President  of  the  Peace  Delegation  of  the 
Russian  Republic.  Declaration. 

"'We,  the  representatives  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Govern- 
ment of  the  Ukrainian  Republic,  People's  Commissary  for  Military 
Affairs,  W.  M.  Schachrai,  and  the  president  of  the  Pan-Ukrainian 
Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Council  of  the  Workers', 
Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Deputation,  E.  G.  Medwjedew,  delegated 
to  proceed  to  Brest-Litovsk  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  peace 
negotiations  with  the  representatives  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  in  full  agreement  with  the  representatives 


334  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Government  of  the  Russian  Federa- 
tive Republic,  thereby  understood  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missaries, hereby  declare  as  follows:  The  General  Secretariat 
of  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada  can  in  no  case  be  acknowledged  as 
representing  the  entire  Ukrainian  people.  In  the  name  of  the 
Ukrainian  workers,  soldiers,  and  peasants,  we  declare  categorically 
that  all  resolutions  formed  by  the  General  Secretariat  without  our 
assent  will  not  be  accepted  by  the  Ukrainian  people,  cannot  be 
carried  out,  and  can  in  no  case  be  reali/ed. 

"'In  full  agreement  with  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries, 
and  thus  also  with  the  Delegation  of  the  Russian  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government,  we  shall  for  the  future  undertake  the  conduct 
of  the  peace  negotiations  with  the  Delegation  of  the  Four  Powers, 
together  with  the  Russian  Peace  Delegation. 

"'And  we  now  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  the  president  the 
following  resolution,  passed  by  the  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Pan-Ukrainian  Council  of  Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants' 
Deputies,  on  the  3oth  December,  I9i7-i2th  January,  1918: 

"'The  Central  Committee  has  decided:  To  delegate  Comrade 
Medwjedew,  president  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee,  and 
People's  Secretary  Satonski  and  Commissary  Schachrai,  to  take 
part  in  the  peace  negotiations,  instructing  them  at  the  same  time 
to  declare  categorically  that  all  attempts  of  the  Ukrainian  Central 
Rada  to  act  in  the  name  of  the  Ukrainian  people  are  to  be  regarded 
as  arbitrary  steps  on  the  part  of  the  bourgeois  group  of  the  Ukrainian 
population,  against  the  will  and  interests  of  the  working  classes  of  the 
Ukraine,  and  that  no  resolutions  formed  by  the  Central  Rada  will 
be  acknowledged  either  by  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  government  or  by 
the  Ukrainian  people;  that  the  Ukrainian  Workers'  and  Peasants' 
Government  regards  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries  as 
representatives  of  the  Pan-Russian  Soviet  government,  and  as 
accordingly  entitled  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  entire  Russian  Federa- 
tion; and  that  the  delegation  of  the  Ukrainian  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government,  sent  out  for  the  purpose  of  exposing  the 
arbitrary  steps  of  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada,  will  act  together 
with  and  in  full  agreement  with  the  Pan-Russian  Delegation. 

"'Herewith:  The  mandate  issued  by  the  People's  Secretariat  of 
the  Ukrainian  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Republic,  3oth  December, 

1917. 

"'Note:  People's  Secretary  for  Enlightenment  of  the  People, 
Wladimir  Petrowitch  Satonski,  was  taken  ill  on  the  way,  and  did 
not,  therefore,  arrive  with  us. 

"'January,  1918. 


APPENDIX  335 

"'The  President  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Ukrainian  Council  of  Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Deputies, 
E.  Medwjedew. 

'The  People's  Commissary  for  Military  Affairs,  Schachrai. 

'A  true  copy  of  the  original. 

'The  Secretary  of  the  Peace  Delegation,  Leo  Karachou.' 

Appendix  2. 

'On  the  resolution  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Council  of  Workers',  Peasants',  and  Soldiers'  Deputies  of  Ukraina, 
the  People's  Secretariat  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  hereby  appoints, 
in  the  name  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Government  of  Ukraina, 
the  president  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Council  of 
Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Deputies  of  Ukraina,  Jesim 
Gregoriewitch  Medwjedew,  the  People's  Secretary  for  Military 
Affairs,  Wasili  Matwjejewitch  Schachrai,  and  the  People's  Secretary 
for  Enlightenment  of  the  People,  Wladimir  Petrowitch  Satonski,  in 
the  name  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  to  take  part  in  the 
negotiations  with  the  governments  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey,  and  Bulgaria  as  to  the  terms  of  peace  between  the  mentioned 
states  and  the  Russian  Federative  Republic.  With  this  end  in  view 
the  mentioned  deputies,  Jesim  Gregoriewitch  Medwjedew,  Wasili 
Matwjejewitch  Schachrai,  and  Wladimir  Petrowitch  Satonski,  are 
empowered,  in  all  cases  where  they  deem  it  necessary,  to  issue 
declarations  and  to  sign  documents  in  the  name  of  the  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic.  The  accredited 
representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Govern- 
ment are  bound  to  act  throughout  in  accordance  with  the  actions 
of  the  accredited  representatives  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants' 
Government  of  the  Russian  Federative  Republic,  whereby  is  under- 
stood the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries. 

" '  In  the  name  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Government  of 
the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  the  People's  Secretary  for  Inter- 
national Affairs,  for  Internal  Affairs,  Military  Affairs,  Justice, 
Works,  Commissariat. 

'The  Manager  of  the  Secretariat. 

'Kharkov,  3oth  December,  1917-12^  January,  1918. 

'  In  accordance  with  the  copy. 

'The  President  of  the  Russian  Peace  Delegation,  A.  Joffe.' 

This  is  at  any  rate  a  new  difficulty,  since  we  cannot  and  will  not 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Russia. 

"This  once  disposed  of,  however,  there  will  be  no  further  difficul- 
ties to  encounter  here;  we  shall,  in  agreement  with  the  Ukrainian 
Republic,  determine  that  the  old  boundaries  between  Austria-Hungary 


336  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  the  former  Russia  will  also  be  maintained  as  between  ourselves 
and  the  Ukraine. 

POLAND 

"As  regards  Poland,  the  frontiers  of  which,  by  the  way,  have 
not  yet  been  exactly  determined,  we  want  nothing  at  all  from  this 
new  state.  Free  and  uninfluenced,  the  population  of  Poland  shall 
choose  its  own  fate.  For  my  part  I  attach  no  great  weight  to  the 
form  of  the  people's  vote  in  this  respect;  the  more  surely  it  expresses 
the  general  wish  of  the  people,  the  better  I  shall  be  pleased.  For  I 
desire  only  the  voluntary  attachment  of  Poland ;  only  in  the  express 
wish  of  Poland  itself  toward  that  end  can  I  see  any  guaranty  for 
lasting  harmony.  It  is  my  unalterable  conviction  that  the  Polish 
question  must  not  be  allowed  to  delay  the  signing  of  peace  by  a  single 
day.  If,  after  peace  is  arrived  at,  Poland  should  wish  to  approach 
us,  we  will  not  reject  its  advances — the  Polish  question  must  not 
and  will  not  endanger  the  peace  itself. 

"I  should  have  been  glad  if  the  Polish  government  had  been  able 
to  take  part  in  the  negotiations,  since  in  my  opinion  Poland  is  an 
independent  state.  The  Petersburg  government,  however,  takes 
the  attitude  that  the  present  Polish  government  is  not  entitled  to 
speak  in  the  name  of  the  country,  and  does  not  acknowledge  it  as 
competent  to  represent  the  country,  and  we  therefore  gave  way  on 
this  point  in  order  to  avoid  possible  conflict.  The  question  is 
certainly  one  of  importance,  but  it  is  more  important  still  in  my 
opinion  to  set  aside  all  difficulties  likely  to  delay  the  negotiations. 


GERMAN-RUSSIAN  DIFFERENCES  AS  TO  THE  OCCUPIED  AREAS 

"The  second  difficulty  to  be  reckoned  with,  and  one  which  has 
been  most  widely  echoed  in  the  Press,  is  the  difference  of  opinion 
between  our  German  allies  and  the  Petersburg  government  anent 
the  interpretation  of  the  right  of  self-determination  among  the  Rus- 
sian peoples;  that  is  to  say,  in  the  areas  occupied  by  German 
troops.  Germany  maintains  that  it  does  not  aim  at  any  annexation 
of  territory  by  force  from  Russia,  but,  briefly  stated,  the  difference 
of  opinion  is  a  double  one. 

"In  the  first  place,  Germany  rightly  maintains  that  the  numerous 
expressions  of  desire  for  independence  on  the  part  of  legislative  cor- 
porations, communal  representations,  etc.,  in  the  occupied  areas 
should  be  taken  as  the  provisional  basis  for  the  will  of  the  people, 
to  be  later  tested  by  plebiscite  on  a  broader  foundation,  a  point  of 


APPENDIX  337 

view  which  the  Russian  government  at  first  was  indisposed  to 
agree  to,  as  it  did  not  consider  the  existing  administrations  in 
Courland  and  Lithuania  entitled  to  speak  for  those  provinces  any 
more  than  in  the  case  of  Poland. 

"In  the  second  place,  Russia  demands  that  this  plebiscite  shall 
take  place  after  all  German  troops  and  officials  have  been  withdrawn 
from  the  occupied  provinces,  while  Germany,  in  reply  to  this,  points 
out  that  if  this  principle  were  carried  to  its  utmost  limits  it  would 
create  a  vacuum,  which  could  not  fail  to  bring  about  at  once  a 
state  of  complete  anarchy  and  the  utmost  misery.  It  should 
here  be  noted  that  everything  in  these  provinces  which  to-day 
renders  possible  the  life  of  a  state  at  all  is  German  property.  Rail- 
ways, posts,  and  telegraphs,  the  entire  industry,  and,  moreover,  the 
entire  administrative  machinery,  police,  law  courts,  all  are  in  Ger- 
man hands.  The  sudden  withdrawal  of  all  this  apparatus  would, 
in  fact,  create  a  condition  of  things  which  seems  practically  impossible 
to  maintain. 

"In  both  cases  it  is  a  question  of  finding  a  middle  way,  which, 
moreover,  must  be  found. 

"  The  differences  between  these  two  points  of  view  are  in  my  opinion 
not  great  enough  to  justify  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

"But  such  negotiations  cannot  be  settled  from  one  day  to  another; 
they  take  time. 

"//  once  we  have  attained  peace  with  Russia,  then  in  my  opinion 
the  general  peace  cannot  be  long  delayed,  despite  all  efforts  on  the 
part  of  the  Western  Entente  statesmen.  I  have  learned  that  some 
are  unable  to  understand  why  I  stated  in  my  first  speech  after  the 
resumption  of  negotiations  that  it  was  not  now  a  question  at  Brest 
of  a  general  peace,  but  of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia.  This  was 
the  necessary  recognition  of  a  plain  fact,  which  Herr  Trotzky  also 
has  admitted  without  reserve,  and  it  was  necessary,  since  the  nego- 
tiations would  have  been  on  a  different  footing — that  is  to  say,  in 
a  more  limited  sphere — if  treating  with  Russia  alone  than  if  it  were 
a  case  of  treating  for  a  general  peace. 

"Though  I  have  no  illusions  in  the  direction  of  expecting  the 
fruit  of  general  peace  to  ripen  in  a  single  night,  I  am  nevertheless 
convinced  that  the  fruit  has  begun  to  ripen,  and  that  it  is  now  only 
a  question  of  holding  out  whether  we  are  to  obtain  a  general  honor- 
able peace  or  not. 

WILSON'S  MESSAGE 

"I  have  recently  been  confirmed  in  this  view  by  the  offer  of 
peace  put  forward  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America 


338  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  the  whole  world.  This  is  an  offer  of  peace,  for  in  fourteen  points 
Mr.  Wilson  sets  forth  the  principles  upon  which  he  seeks  to  establish 
a  general  peace.  Obviously,  an  offer  of  this  nature  cannot  be 
expected  to  furnish  a  scheme  acceptable  in  every  detail.  If  that 
were  the  case,  then  negotiations  would  be  superfluous  altogether 
and  peace  could  be  arrived  at  by  a  simple  acceptance,  a  single 
assent.  This,  of  course,  is  not  so. 

"But  I  have  no  hesitation  in  declaring  that  these  last  proposals 
on  the  part  of  President  Wilson  seem  to  me  considerably  nearer  the 
Austro-Hungarian  point  of  view,  and  that  there  are  among  his 
proposals  some  which  we  can  even  agree  to  with  great  pleasure. 

"If  I  may  now  be  allowed  to  go  further  into  these  proposals,  I 
must,  to  begin  with,  point  out  two  things: 

"So  far  as  the  proposals  are  concerned  with  our  allies — mention 
is  made  of  the  German  possession  of  Belgium  and  of  the  Turkish 
Empire — I  declare  that,  in  fulfilment  of  our  duty  to  our  allies,  I 
am  firmly  determined  to  hold  out  in  defense  of  our  allies  to  the  very 
last.  The  pre-war  possessions  of  our  allies  we  will  defend  equally 
with  our  own.  This  standpoint  is  that  of  all  four  allies  in  complete 
reciprocity  with  ourselves. 

"In  the  second  place,  I  have  to  point  out  that  I  must  politely 
but  definitely  decline  the  method  of  councils  such  as  we  govern  by 
in  our  internal  affairs.  We  have  in  Austria  a  parliament  elected  by 
general,  equal,  direct  and  secret  ballot.  There  is  not  a  more  demo- 
cratic parliament  in  the  world,  and  this  parliament,  together  with 
the  other  constitutionally  admissible  factors,  has  the  sole  right 
to  decide  upon  matters  of  internal  Austrian  affairs.  I  speak  of 
Austria  only,  because  I  do  not  speak  of  Hungarian  internal  affairs 
in  the  Austrian  Delegation.  I  should  not  consider  it  constitutional 
to  do  so.  And  we  do  not  interfere  in  American  affairs;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  do  not  wish  for  any  foreign  guidance  from  any  state 
whatever.  Having  said  this,  I  may  be  permitted,  with  regard  to 
the  remaining  points,  to  state  as  follows: 

"As  to  the  point  dealing  with  the  abolition  of  'secret  diplomacy* 
and  the  introduction  of  full  openness  in  the  negotiations,  I  have 
nothing  to  say.  From  my  point  of  view  I  have  no  objection  to 
such  public  negotiations  so  long  as  full  reciprocity  is  the  basis  of 
the  same,  though  I  do  entertain  considerable  doubt  as  to  whether, 
all  things  considered,  it  is  the  quickest  and  most  practical  method 
of  arriving  at  a  result.  Diplomatic  negotiations  are  simply  a  matter 
of  business.  But  it  might  easily  be  imagined  that  in  the  case,  for 
instance,  of  commercial  treaties  between  one  country  and  another 
it  would  not  be  advisable  to  publish  incomplete  results  beforehand 


APPENDIX  339 

to  the  world.  In  such  negotiations  both  parties  naturally  com- 
mence by  setting  their  demands  as  high  as  possible  in  order  to 
climb  down  gradually,  using  this  or  that  expressed  demand  as 
matter  for  compensation  in  other  ways  until  finally  an  equilibrium 
of  the  opposing  interests  is  arrived  at,  a  point  which  must  necessarily 
be  reached  if  agreement  is  to  be  come  to  at  all.  If  such  negotiations 
were  to  be  carried  on  with  full  publicity,  nothing  could  prevent  the 
general  public  from  passionately  defending  every  separate  clause 
involved,  regarding  any  concession  as  a  defeat,  even  when  such 
clauses  had  only  been  advanced  for  tactical  reasons.  And  when  the 
public  takes  up  any  such  point  with  particular  fervor,  ultimate 
agreement  may  be  thereby  rendered  impossible  or  the  final  agree- 
ment may,  if  arrived  at,  be  regarded  as  in  itself  a  defeat,  possibly 
by  both  sides.  And  this  would  not  conduce  to  peaceable  relations 
thereafter;  it  would,  on  the  contrary,  increase  the  friction  between 
the  states  concerned.  And  as  in  the  case  of  commercial  treaties, 
so  also  with  political  negotiations,  which  deal  with  political  matters. 

"If  the  abolition  of  secret  diplomacy  is  to  mean  that  no  secret 
compacts  are  to  be  made,  that  no  agreements  are  to  be  entered  upon 
without  the  public  knowledge,  then  I  have  no  objection  to  the 
introduction  of  this  principle.  As  to  how  it  is  to  be  realized  and 
adherence  thereto  insured,  I  confess  I  have  no  idea  at  all.  Granted 
that  the  governments  of  two  countries  are  agreed,  they  will  always 
be  able  to  make  a  secret  compact  without  any  one  being  aware  of 
the  fact.  These,  however,  are  minor  points.  I  am  not  one  to  stick 
by  formalities,  and  a  question  of  more  or  less  formal  nature  will 
never  prevent  me  from  coming  to  a  sensible  arrangement. 

"Point  i,  then,  is  one  that  can  be  discussed. 

"Point  2  is  concerned  with  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  In  this 
postulate  the  President  speaks  from  the  hearts  of  all,  and  I  can 
here  fully  and  completely  share  America's  desire,  the  more  so  as 
the  President  adds  the  words,  'outside  territorial  waters' — that  is 
to  say,  we  are  to  understand  the  freedom  of  the  open  sea,  and  there 
is  thus,  of  course,  no  question  of  any  interference  by  force  in  the 
sovereign  rights  of  our  faithful  Turkish  allies.  Their  standpoint 
in  this  respect  will  be  ours. 

"Point  3,  which  is  definitely  directed  against  any  future  economi- 
cal war,  is  so  right,  so  sensible,  and  has  so  often  been  craved  by 
ourselves  that  I  have  here  again  nothing  to  remark. 

"Point  4,  which  demands  general  disarmament,  sets  forth  in 
particularly  clear  and  lucid  form  the  necessity  of  reducing  after  this 
present  war  the  free  competition  in  armaments  to  a  footing  sufficient 
for  the  internal  security  of  states.  Mr.  Wilson  states  this  frankly 


340  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  openly.  In  my  speech  at  Budapest  some  months  back  I  ven- 
tured to  express  the  same  idea;  it  forms  part  of  my  political  creed, 
and  I  am  most  happy  to  find  any  other  voice  uttering  the  same 
thought. 

"As  regards  the  Russian  clause,  we  are  already  showing  in  deeds 
that  we  are  endeavoring  to  bring  about  friendly  relations  with  our 
neighbors  there. 

"With  regard  to  Italy,  Serbia,  Rumania  and  Montenegro,  I  can 
only  repeat  my  statement  already  made  in  the  Hungarian  Delegation. 

"I  am  not  disposed  to  effect  any  insurance  on  the  war  ventures 
of  our  enemies. 

"I  am  not  disposed  to  make  any  one-sided  concessions  to  our 
enemies,  who  still  obstinately  adhere  to  the  standpoint  of  fighting  on 
until  the  final  victory;  to  prejudice  permanently  the  Monarchy  by 
such  concessions,  which  would  give  the  enemy  the  invaluable  advan- 
tage of  being  able  to  carry  on  the  war  indefinitely  without  risk. 
{Applause.} 

"Let  Mr.  Wilson  use  the  great  influence  he  undoubtedly  possesses 
among  his  allies  to  persuade  them  on  their  part  to  declare  on  what 
conditions  they  are  willing  to  treat;  he  will  then  have  rendered  the 
enormous  service  of  having  set  on  foot  the  general  peace  negotia- 
tions. I  am  here  replying  openly  and  freely  to  Mr.  Wilson,  and  I 
will  speak  as  openly  and  freely  to  any  who  wish  to  speak  for 
themselves,  but  it  must  necessarily  be  understood  that  time,  and 
the  continuation  of  the  war,  cannot  but  affect  the  situations  here 
concerned. 

"  I  have  already  said  this  once  before;  Italy  is  a  striking  example. 
Italy  had  the  opportunity  before  the  war  of  making  great  territorial 
acquisitions  without  firing  a  shot.  It  declined  this  and  entered  into 
the  war;  it  has  lost  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives,  milliards  in  war 
expenses  and  values  destroyed;  it  has  brought  want  and  misery 
upon  its  own  population,  and  all  this  only  to  lose  forever  an  advantage 
which  it  might  have  won. 

"Finally,  as  regards  point  13,  it  is  an  open  secret  that  we  are 
adherents  to  the  idea  of  establishing  'an  independent  Polish  state 
to  include  the  areas  undoubtedly  occupied  by  Polish  inhabitants.' 
On  this  point  also  we  shall,  I  think,  soon  agree  with  Mr.  Wilson. 
And  if  the  President  crowns  his  proposals  with  the  idea  of  a  universal 
League  of  Nations  he  will  hardly  meet  with  any  opposition  thereto 
on  the  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy. 

"As  will  be  seen  from  this  comparison  of  my  views  with  those 
of  Mr.  Wilson,  we  are  not  only  agreed  in  essentials  as  to  the  great 
principles  for  rearrangement  of  the  world  after  this  war,  but  our 


APPENDIX  341 

ideas  as  to  several  concrete  questions  bearing  on  the  peace  are  closely 
allied. 

"The  differences  remaining  do  not  appear  to  me  so  great  but 
that  a  discussion  of  these  points  might  lead  to  a  clearer  under- 
standing and  bring  us  closer  still. 

"The  situation,  then,  seems  to  be  this:  Austria-Hungary,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  United  States  of  America,  on  the  other,  are  the 
two  Great  Powers  in  the  hostile  groups  of  states  whose  interests 
are  least  opposed  one  to  the  other.  It  seems  reasonable,  then,  to 
suppose  that  an  exchange  of  opinion  between  these  two  Powers  might 
form  the  natural  starting-point  for  a  L  mciliatory  discussion  between 
all  those  states  which  have  not  yet  entered  upon  peace  negotiations. 
[Applause.]  So  much  for  Wilson's  proposals. 

PETERSBURG  AND  THE  UKRAINE 

"And  now,  gentlemen,  I  hasten  to  conclude.  But  this  con- 
clusion is  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  I  have  to  say;  I  am 
endeavoring  to  bring  about  peace  between  the  Ukraine  and  Peters- 
burg. 

"The  conclusion  of  peace  with  Petersburg  alters  nothing  in  our 
definitive  situation.  Austro-Hungarian  troops  are  nowhere  opposed 
to  the  Petersburg  government — we  have  the  Ukrainian  against  us — 
and  it  is  impossible  to  export  anything  from  Petersburg,  since  they 
have  nothing  there  themselves  but  revolution  and  anarchy,  goods 
which  the  Bolshevists,  no  doubt,  would  be  glad  to  export,  but  which 
I  must  politely  decline  to  receive. 

"In  spite  of  this,  I  wish  to  make  peace  with  Petersburg  as  well, 
since  this,  like  any  other  cessation  of  hostilities,  brings  us  nearer 
to  the  general  peace. 

"It  is  otherwise  with  Ukraine.  For  the  Ukraine  has  supplies  of 
provisions  which  they  will  export  if  we  can  agree  on  commercial 
terms.  The  question  of  food  to-day  is  a  matter  of  anxiety  through- 
out the  world;  among  our  opponents,  and  also  in  the  neutral 
countries,  it  is  a  leading  question.  I  wish  to  profit  by  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  those  Russian  states  which  have  food  to  export,  in 
order  to  help  our  own  population.  We  could  and  would  hold  out 
without  this  assistance.  But  I  know  my  duty,  and  my  duty  bids  me 
do  all  that  can  be  done  to  lighten  the  burden  of  our  suffering  people, 
and  I  will  not,  therefore,  from  any  hysterical  nervousness  about 
getting  to  final  peace  a  few  days  or  a  few  weeks  earlier,  throw  away 
this  possible  advantage  to  our  people.  Such  a  peace  takes  time  and 

cannot  be  concluded  in  a  day.    For  such  a  peace  must  definitely 
23 


342  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

state  whether,  what,  and  how  the  Russian  party  will  deliver,  for  the 
reason  that  the  Ukraine  on  its  part  wishes  to  close  the  business  not 
after,  but  at  the  signing  of  peace. 

"I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  unsettled  conditions  in  this 
newly  established  state  occasion  great  difficulty  and  naturally  con- 
siderable delay  in  the  negotiations. 

APPEAL   TO   THE   COUNTRY 

"//  you  fall  on  me  from  behind,  if  you  force  me  to  come  to  terms 
at  once  in  headlong  fashion,  we  shall  gain  no  economical  advantage 
at  all,  and  our  people  will  then  be  forced  to  renounce  the  alleviation 
which  they  should  have  gained  from  the  peace. 

"A  surgeon  conducting  a  difficult  operation  with  a  crowd  behind 
him  standing  watch  in  hand  may  very  likely  complete  the  operation 
in  record  time,  but  in  all  probability  the  patient  would  not  thank 
him  for  the  manner  in  which  it  had  been  carried  out. 

"If  you  give  our  present  opponents  the  impression  that  we  must 
have  peace  at  once,  and  at  any  price,  we  shall  not  get  so  much  as  a 
single  measure  of  grain,  and  the  result  will  be  more  or  less  platonic. 
It  is  no  longer  by  any  means  a  question  principally  of  terminating 
the  war  on  the  Ukrainian  front ;  neither  we  nor  the  Ukrainians  them- 
selves intend  to  continue  the  war  now  that  we  are  agreed  upon  the 
no-annexation  basis.  It  is  a  question — I  repeat  it  once  again — not 
of  'imperialistic'  annexation  plans  and  ideas,  but  of  securing  for  our 
population  at  last  the  merited  reward  of  their  endurance,  and  pro- 
curing them  those  supplies  of  food  for  which  they  are  waiting.  Our 
partners  in  the  deal  are  good  business  men  and  are  closely  watching, 
to  see  whether  you  are  forcing  me  to  act  or  not. 

"If  you  wish  to  ruin  the  peace,  if  you  are  anxious  to  renounce 
the  supply  of  grain,  then  it  would  be  logical  enough  to  force  my 
hand  by  speeches  and  resolutions,  strikes  and  demonstrations,  but 
not  otherwise.  And  there  is  not  an  atom  of  truth  in  the  idea  that 
we  are  to-day  at  such  a  pass  that  we  must  prefer  a  bad  peace  to-day 
without  economical  gain  rather  than  a  good  peace  with  economical 
advantages  to-morrow. 

"The  difficulties  in  the  matter  of  food  of  late  are  not  due  solely 
to  lack  of  actual  provisions;  it  is  the  crises  in  coal,  transport,  and 
organization  which  are  increasing.  When  you  at  home  get  up  strikes 
you  are  moving  in  a  vicious  circle;  the  strikes  increase  and  aggravate 
the  crises  concerned  and  hinder  the  supplies  of  food  and  coal.  You 
are  cutting  your  own  throats  in  so  doing,  and  all  who  believe  that 
peace  is  accelerated  thereby  are  terribly  mistaken. 


APPENDIX  343 

"It  is  believed  that  men  in  the  country  have  been  circulating 
rumors  to  the  effect  that  the  government  is  instigating  the  strikes. 
I  leave  to  these  men  themselves  to  choose  whether  they  are  to 
appear  as  criminal  slanderers  or  as  fools. 

"If  you  had  a  government  desirous  of  concluding  a  peace  dif- 
ferent from  that  desired  by  the  majority  of  the  population,  if  you 
had  a  government  seeking  to  prolong  the  war  for  purposes  of  con- 
quest, one  might  understand  a  conflict  between  the  government  and 
the  country.  But  since  the  government  desires  precisely  the  same 
as  the  majority  of  the  people — that  is  to  say,  the  speedy  settlement  of 
an  honorable  peace  without  annexationist  aims — then  it  is  madness 
to  attack  that  government  from  behind,  to  interfere  with  its  freedom 
of  action  and  hamper  its  movements.  Those  who  do  so  are  fighting, 
not  against  the  government;  they  are  fighting  blindly  against  the 
people  they  pretend  to  serve  and  against  themselves. 

"As  for  yourselves,  gentlemen,  it  is  not  only  your  right,  but  your 
duty,  to  choose  between  the  following  alternatives;  either  you  trust 
me  to  proceed  with  the  peace  negotiations,  and  in  that  case  you  must 
help  me,  or  you  do  not  trust  me,  and  in  that  case  you  must  depose 
me.  I  am  confident  that  I  have  the  support  of  the  majority  of  the 
Hungarian  delegation.  The  Hungarian  Committee  has  given  me  a 
vote  of  confidence.  If  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  the  same  here,  then 
the  matter  is  clear  enough.  The  question  of  a  vote  of  confidence 
must  be  brought  up  and  put  to  the  vote;  if  I  then  have  the  majority 
against  me  I  shall  at  once  take  the  consequences.  No  one  of  those 
who  are  anxious  to  secure  my  removal  will  be  more  pleased  than 
myself;  indeed,  far  less  so.  Nothing  induces  me  now  to  retain  my 
office  but  the  sense  of  duty,  which  constrains  me  to  remain  as  long 
as  I  have  the  confidence  of  the  Emperor  and  the  majority  of  the 
delegations.  A  soldier  with  any  sense  of  decency  does  not  desert. 
But  no  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  could  conduct  negotiations  of 
this  importance  unless  he  knows,  and  all  the  world  as  well,  that  he  is 
endowed  with  the  confidence  of  the  majority  among  the  constitu-* 
tional  representative  bodies.  There  can  be  no  half  measures  here. 
You  have  this  confidence  or  you  have  not.  You  must  assist  me  or 
depose  me;  there  is  no  other  way.  I  have  no  more  to  say." 


V 

REPORT  OF  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

THE  Austro-Hungarian  government  entered  upon  the  peace  nego- 
tiations at  Brest-Litovsk  with  the  object  of  arriving  as  quickly  as 


344  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

possible  at  a  peace  compact  which,  if  it  did  not,  as  we  hoped,  lead 
to  a  general  peace,  should  at  least  secure  order  in  the  east.  The 
draft  of  a  preliminary  peace  was  sent  to  Brest  containing  the 
following  points: 

1.  Cessation  of  hostilities;   if  general  peace  should  not  be  con- 
cluded, then  neither  of  the  present  contracting  parties  to  afford  any 
support  to  the  enemies  of  the  other. 

2.  No  surrender  of    territory;    Poland,  Livonia,  and  Courland 
retaining  the  right  of  determining  their  own  destiny  for  the  future. 

3.  No  indemnity  for  costs  of  war  or  damages  due  to  military 
operations. 

4.  Cessation  of  economical  war  and  reparation  of  damages  sus- 
tained by  private  persons  through  the  economical  war. 

5.  Resumption  of  commercial  intercourse  and  the  same  provision- 
ally on  the  basis  of  the  old  commercial  treaty  and  twenty  years' 
preference  subject  to  restriction  in  respect  of  any  customs  union 
with  neighboring  countries. 

6.  Mutual  assistance  in  raw  materials  and  industrial  articles. 

A  further  point  was  contemplated,  dealing  with  the  evacuation  of 
the  occupied  areas,  but  the  formulation  of  this  had  to  be  postponed 
until  after  consultation  with  the  German  Supreme  Military  Com- 
mand, whose  co-operation  was  here  required,  owing  to  the  mingling  of 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  troops  on  the  Russian  front.  The 
Army  Command  has  indicated  a  period  of  at  least  six  months  as 
necessary  for  the  evacuation. 

In  discussing  this  draft  with  the  German  delegates  two  points  in 
particular  were  found  to  present  great  difficulty.  One  was  that  of 
evacuation.  The  German  Army  Command  declared  categorically 
that  no  evacuation  of  the  occupied  districts  could  be  thought  of  until 
after  conclusion  of  the  general  peace.  The  second  difficulty  arose  in 
connection  with  the  question  as  to  treatment  of  the  occupied  dis- 
tricts. Germany  insisted  that  in  the  peace  treaty  with  Russia  it 
should  be  simply  stated  that  Russia  had  conceded  to  the  peoples 
within  its  territory  the  right  of  self-determination,  and  that  the 
nations  in  question  had  already  availed  themselves  of  that  right. 
The  plain  standpoint  laid  down  in  our  draft  we  were  unable  to  carry 
through,  although  it  was  shared  by  the  other  allies.  However,  in 
formulating  the  answer  sent  on  December  25,  1916,  to  the  Russian 
peace  proposals  a  compromise  was,  after  persistent  efforts  on  our 
part,  ultimately  arrived  at  which  at  least  prevented  the  full  adoption 
of  the  divergent  German  point  of  view  on  these  two  points.  In  the 
matter  of  evacuation  the  Germans  agreed  that  the  withdrawal  of 
certain  bodies  of  troops  before  the  general  peace  might  be  discussed. 


APPENDIX  345 

In  the  matter  of  annexations  a  satisfactory  manner  of  formulating 
this  was  found,  making  it  applicable  only  in  the  event  of  general 
peace.  Had  the  Entente  then  been  disposed  to  make  peace  then  the 
principle  of  "no  annexations"  would  have  succeeded  throughout. 

Even  allowing  for  the  conciliatory  form  given  through  our  en- 
endeavors  to  this  answer  by  the  Four  Poweis  to  the  Russian  pro- 
posals, the  German  Headquarters  evinced  extreme  indignation. 
Several  highly  outspoken  telegrams  from  the  German  Supreme 
Command  to  the  German  delegates  prove  this.  The  head  of  the 
German  delegation  came  near  to  being  recalled  on  this  account, 
and  if  this  had  been  done  it  is  likely  that  German  foreign  policy 
would  have  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  firm  adherent  of  the 
sternest  military  views.  As  this,  however,  could  only  have  had 
an  unfavorable  effect  on  the  further  progress  of  the  negotiations, 
we  were  obliged  to  do  all  in  our  power  to  retain  Herr  Kuhlmann. 
With  this  end  in  view  he  was  informed  and  invited  to  advise  Berlin 
that  if  Germany  persisted  in  its  harsh  policy  Austria-Hungary 
would  be  compelled  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  Russia. 
This  declaration  on  the  part  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  did 
not  fail  to  create  a  certain  impression  in  Berlin,  and  was  largely 
responsible  for  the  fact  that  Kuhlmann  was  able  to  remain. 

Kuhlmann's  difficult  position  and  his  desire  to  strengthen  it  ren- 
dered the  discussion  of  the  territorial  questions,  which  were  first  offi- 
cially touched  upon  on  December  2yth,  but  had  been  already  taken 
up  in  private  meetings  with  the  Russian  delegates,  a  particularly 
awkward  matter.  Germany  insisted  that  the  then  Russian  front 
was  not  to  be  evacuated  until  six  months  after  the  general  peace. 
Russia  was  disposed  to  agree  to  this,  but  demanded,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  fate  of  Poland  was  not  to  be  decided  until  after 
evacuation.  Against  this  the  Germans  were  inclined  to  give  up  their 
original  standpoint  to  the  effect  that  the  populations  of  occupied 
territories  had  already  availed  themselves  of  the  right  of  self-deter- 
mination conceded,  and  allow  a  new  inquiry  to  be  made  among  the 
population,  but  insisted  that  this  should  be  done  during  the  occupa- 
tion. No  solution  could  be  arrived  at  on  this  point,  though  Austria- 
Hungary  made  repeated  efforts  at  mediation.  The  negotiations 
had  arrived  at  this  stags  when  they  were  first  interrupted  on 
December  2Qth. 

On  resuming  the  negotiations  on  January  6th  the  situation  was  little 
changed.  Kuhlmann's  position  was  at  any  rate  somewhat  firmer 
than  before,  albeit  only  at  the  cost  of  some  concessions  to  the  Ger- 
man military  party.  Under  these  circumstances  the  negotiations, 
in  which  Trotzky  now  took  part  as  spokesman  for  the  Russians,  led 


346  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

only  to  altogether  fruitless  theoretical  discussions  and  the  right  of 
self-determination,  which  could  not  bring  about  any  lessening  of  the 
distance  between  the  two  firmly  maintained  points  of  view.  In 
order  to  get  the  proceedings  out  of  this  deadlock  further  endeavors 
were  made  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  arrive  at  a  compromise  between 
the  German  and  Russian  standpoints,  the  more  so  as  it  was  generally, 
and  especially  in  the  case  of  Poland,  desirable  to  solve  the  terri- 
torial question  on  the  basis  of  complete  self-determination.  Our 
proposals  to  the  German  delegates  were  to  the  effect  that  the 
Russian  standpoint  should  so  far  be  met  as  to  allow  the  plebiscite 
demanded  by  the  Russians,  this  to  be  taken,  as  the  Germans 
insisted  should  be  the  case,  during  the  German  occupation,  but  with 
extensive  guaranties  for  free  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people. 
On  this  point  we  had  long  discussions  with  the  German  delegates, 
based  on  detailed  drafts  prepared  by  us. 

Our  endeavors  here,  however,  were  again  unsuccessful.  Cir- 
cumstances arising  at  the  time  in  our  own  country  were  responsible 
for  this,  as  also  for  the  result  of  the  negotiations  which  had  in  the 
mean  time  been  commenced  with  the  Ukrainian  delegates.  These 
last  had,  at  the  first  discussion,  declined  to  treat  with  any  Polish 
representatives,  and  demanded  the  concession  of  the  entire  Cholm 
territory,  and,  in  a  more  guarded  fashion,  the  cession  of  eastern 
Galicia  and  the  Ukrainian  part  of  northeastern  Hungary,  and  in 
consequence  of  which  the  negotiations  were  on  the  point  of  being 
broken  off.  At  this  stage  a  food  crisis  broke  out  in  Austria  to  an 
extent  of  which  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  hitherto  una- 
ware, threatening  Vienna  in  particular  with  the  danger  of  being  in  a 
few  days  devoid  of  flour  altogether.  Almost  immediately  after  this 
came  a  strike  movement  of  threatening  proportions.  These  events 
at  home  weakened  the  position  of  the  Foreign  Minister  both  as 
regards  his  attitude  toward  the  German  allies  and  toward  the 
opposing  parties  in  the  negotiations — with  both  of  which  he  was 
then  in  conflict — and  this,  at  a  most  critical  moment,  to  a  degree 
that  can  hardly  be  appreciated  from  a  distance.  He  was  required 
to  exert  pressure  upon  Germany,  and  was  now  forced,  not  merely 
to  ask,  but  to  entreat  Germany's  aid  in  sending  supplies  of  food, 
or  Vienna  would  within  a  few  days  be  in  the  throes  of  a  catastrophe. 
With  the  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  forced,  owing  to  the 
situation  at  home,  to  strive  for  a  settlement  of  peace  that  should  be 
favorable  to  Austria,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  our  food  situation 
and  our  labor  troubles  were  well  known  to  that  enemy. 

This  complete  alteration  of  the  position  changed  the  whole  basis 
and  tactics  of  the  Foreign  Minister's  proceedings.  He  had  to  obtain 


APPENDIX  347 

the  supplies  of  grain  asked  for  from  Germany  and  thus  to  diminish 
political  pressure  on  that  country;  on  the  other  hand  he  had  to 
persuade  the  Soviet  delegates  to  continue  negotiations,  and  finally 
to  arrive  at  a  settlement  of  peace  under  the  most  acceptable  con- 
ditions possible  with  the  Ukraine,  which  would,  if  possible,  put  an 
end  to  the  still  serious  difficulties  of  the  food  situation. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  impossible  now  to  work  on  the 
German  delegates  by  talking  of  Austria-Hungary's  concluding  a 
separate  peace  with  Russia,  as  this  would  have  imperiled  the  chance 
of  food-supplies  from  Germany — the  more  so  as  the  representative 
of  the  German  Army  Command  had  declared  that  it  was  immaterial 
whether  Austria-Hungary  made  peace  or  not.  Germany  would  in 
any  case  march  on  Pertersburg  if  the  Russian  government  did  not 
give  way.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  Foreign  Minister  pre- 
vailed on  the  leader  of  the  Russian  delegation  to  postpone  the 
carrying  out  of  the  intentions  of  his  government — to  the  effect 
that  the  Russian  delegation,  owing  to  lack  of  good  faith  on  the  part 
of  German-Austro-Hungarian  negotiators,  should  be  recalled. 

At  the  same  time  the  negotiations  with  the  Ukrainian  delegation 
were  continued.  By  means  of  lengthy  and  wearisome  conferences 
we  succeeded  in  bringing  their  demands  to  a  footing  which  might 
just  possibly  be  acceptable,  and  gaining  their  agreement  to  a  clause 
whereby  Ukraine  undertook  to  deliver  at  least  one  million  tons  of 
grain  by  August,  1918.  As  to  the  demand  for  the  Cholm  territory, 
which  we  had  wished  to  have  relegated  to  the  negotiations  with 
Poland,  the  Ukrainian  delegates  refused  to  give  way  on  this  point 
and  were  evidently  supported  by  General  Hoffmann.  Altogether 
the  German  military  party  seemed  much  inclined  to  support 
Ukrainian  demands  and  extremely  indisposed  to  accede  to  Polish 
claims,  so  that  we  were  unable  to  obtain  the  admission  of  Polish 
representatives  to  the  proceedings,  though  we  had  frequently  asked 
for  this.  A  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  this  was  the  fact  that 
Trotzky  himself  was  unwilling  to  recognize  the  Polish  party  as  hav- 
ing equal  rights  here.  The  only  result  obtainable  was  that  the 
Ukrainians  should  restrict  their  claims  on  the  Cholm  territory  to 
those  parts  inhabited  by  Ukrainian  majority  and  accept  a  revision 
of  the  frontier  line,  as  yet  only  roughly  laid  down,  according  to  the 
finding  of  a  mixed  commission  and  the  wishes  of  the  population — i.  e., 
the  principle  of  national  boundaries  under  international  protection. 
The  Ukrainian  delegates  renounced  all  territorial  claims  against  the 
Monarchy,  but  demanded  from  us  on  the  other  hand  a  guaranty 
as  to  the  autonomous  development  of  their  co-nationals  in  Galicia. 
With  regard  to  these  two  weighty  concessions,  the  Foreign  Minister 


348  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

declared  that  they  could  only  be  granted  on  the  condition  that  the 
Ukraine  fulfilled  the  obligation  it  had  undertaken  as  to  delivery  of 
grain,  the  deliveries  being  made  at  the  appointed  times;  he  further 
demanded  that  the  obligations  on  both  sides  should  be  reciprocal — 
i.e., that  the  failure  of  one  party  to  comply  therewith  should  release 
the  other.  The  formulation  of  these  points,  which  met  with  the 
greatest  difficulties  on  the  part  of  Ukraine,  was  postponed  to  a 
later  date. 

At  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  a  new  pause  occurred  to  give  the 
separate  delegates  time  to  advise  their  governments  as  to  the  results 
hitherto  attained  and  receive  their  final  instructions.  The  Foreign 
Minister  returned  to  Vienna  and  reported  the  state  of  the  negotia- 
tions to  the  proper  quarters.  In  the  course  of  these  deliberations 
his  policy  of  concluding  peace  with  Russia  and  Ukraine  on  the 
basis  of  the  concessions  proposed  was  agreed  to.  Another  question 
dealt  with  at  the  same  time  was  whether  the  Monarchy  should,  in 
case  of  extreme  necessity,  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  Russia  if 
the  negotiations  with  that  state  should  threaten  to  come  to  nothing 
on  account  of  Germany's  demands.  This  question  was,  after  full 
consideration  of  all  grounds  to  the  contrary,  answered  in  thesi  in 
the  affirmative,  as  the  state  of  affairs  at  home  apparently  left  no 
alternative. 

On  resuming  the  negotiations  at  Brest-Litovsk  further  endeavors 
were  made  to  persuade  Germany  to  give  way  somewhat  by  pointing 
out  what  would  be  the  consequence  of  its  obstinate  attitude.  In 
the  course  of  the  deliberations  on  this  point  with  Herr  Kuhlmann 
we  succeeded  after  great  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  agreement  of 
the  German  delegates  to  a  final  attempt  at  compromise,  to  be  under- 
taken by  the  Foreign  Minister.  The  proposals  for  this  compromise 
were  based  on  the  following  considerations: 

For  months  past  conflicting  views  had  been  expressed  as  to: 

1.  Whether  in  the  territories  where  constitutional  alterations  were 
to  be  made  owing  to  the  war  the  right  of  self-determination  should 
be  taken  as  already  exercised,  or  whether  a  plebiscite  should  be 
taken  first; 

2.  Whether  such  plebiscite,  if  taken,  should  be  addressed  to  a 
constituent  body  or  in  the  form  of  a  referendum  to  the  people  direct; 

3.  Whether  this  should  be  done  before  or  after  evacuation;  and 

4.  In  what  manner  it  was  to  be  organized  (by  general  franchise, 
by  a  vote  of  the  nobles,  etc.).     It  would  be  advisable,  and  would 
also  be  in  accordance  with  the  principles  adopted  by  Russia,  to 
leave  the  decision  on  all  these  points  to  the  people  themselves,  and 
deliver  them  over  to  the  "temporary  self-administrative  body," 


APPENDIX  349 

which  should,  also  according  to  the  Russian  proposal  (Kameneff), 
be  introduced  at  once.  The  whole  of  the  peace  negotiations  could 
then  be  concentrated  upon  a  single  point:  the  question  as  to  the 
composition  of  this  temporary  body.  Here,  however,  a  compromise 
could  be  arrived  at,  as  Russia  could  agree  that  the  already  existent 
bodies  set  in  the  foreground  by  Germany  should  be  allowed  to 
express  a  part  of  the  will  of  the  people,  Germany  agreeing  that  these 
bodies  should,  during  the  occupation,  be  supplemented  by  elements 
appointed,  according  to  the  Russian  principles,  by  free  election. 

On  February  yth,  immediately  after  Herr  Kuhlmann  had  agreed 
to  mediation  on  this  basis,  the  Foreign  Minister  saw  the  leader  of 
the  Russian  delegation,  Trotzky,  and  had  a  series  of  conversations 
with  him.  The  idea  of  compromise  on  the  lines  just  set  forth  was 
little  to  Trotzky's  taste,  and  he  declared  that  he  would  in  any  case 
protest  against  the  handling  of  the  self-determination  question  by 
the  Four  Powers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  discussion  did  lead  to 
some  result,  in  that  a  new  basis  for  disposing  of  the  difficulties 
which  had  arisen  was  now  found.  There  was  to  be  no  further 
continuance  of  the  conflict  as  to  whether  the  territorial  alterations 
involved  by  the  peace  should  be  termed  "annexations,"  as  the 
Russian  delegates  wished,  or  "exercise  of  the  right  of  self-determina- 
tion," as  Germany  wished;  the  territorial  alterations  were  to  be 
simply  noted  in  the  peace  treaty  ("Russia  notes  that  .  .  ."). 
Trotzky,  however,  made  his  acquiescence  to  the  conclusion  of  such 
a  compact  subject  to  two  conditions:  one  being  that  the  Moon 
Sound  Islands  and  the  Baltic  ports  should  remain  with  Russia;  the 
other  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  should  not  conclude  any 
separate  peace  with  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  whose  govern- 
ment was  then  seriously  threatened  by  the  Bolsheviks  and,  accord- 
ing to  some  reports,  already  overthrown  by  them.  The  Foreign 
Minister  was  now  anxious  to  arrive  at  a  compromise  on  this  question 
also,  in  which  he  had  to  a  certain  degree  the  support  of  Herr  von 
Kuhlmann,  while  General  Hoffmann  most  vehemently  opposed 
any  further  concessions. 

All  these  negotiations  for  a  compromise  failed  to  achieve  their 
end,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Herr  Kuhlmann  was  forced  by  the 
German  Supreme  Army  Command  to  act  promptly.  Ludendorff 
declared  that  the  negotiations  with  Russia  must  be  concluded  within 
three  days,  and  when  a  telegram  from  Petersburg  was  picked  up 
in  Berlin  calling  on  the  German  army  to  rise  in  revolt  Herr  von 
Kuhlmann  was  strictly  ordered  not  to  be  content  with  the  cessions 
already  agreed  to,  but  to  demand  the  further  cession  of  the  unoc- 
cupied territories  of  Livonia  and  Esthonia.  Under  such  pressure 


3so  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  leader  of  the  German  delegation  had  not  the  power  to  compro- 
mise. We  then  arrive  at  the  signing  of  the  treaty  with  Ukraine, 
which  had,  after  much  trouble,  been  brought  to  an  end  meanwhile. 
It  thus  appeared  as  if  the  efforts  of  the  Foreign  Minister  had  proved 
fruitless.  Nevertheless,  he  continued  his  discussions  with  Trotzky, 
but  these  still  led  to  no  result,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Trotzky, 
despite  repeated  questioning,  persisted  in  leaving  everything  vague 
till  the  last  moment  as  to  whether  he  would,  under  the  present 
circumstances,  conclude  any  peace  with  the  Four  Powers  at  all  or 
not.  Not  until  the  plenary  session  of  February  loth  was  this  cleared 
up;  Russia  declared  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  but  signed  no 
treaty  of  peace. 

The  situation  created  by  this  declaration  offered  no  occasion  for 
further  taking  up  the  idea  of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia,  since 
peace  seemed  to  have  come  via  facti  already.  At  a  meeting  on 
February  loth  of  the  diplomatic  and  military  delegates  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  to  discuss  the  question  of  what  was  now  to 
be  done  it  was  agreed  unanimously,  save  for  a  single  dissentient, 
that  the  situation  arising  out  of  Trotzky's  declarations  must  be 
accepted.  The  one  dissentient  vote — that  of  General  Hoffmann — 
was  to  the  effect  that  Trotzky's  declaration  should  be  answered  by 
declaring  the  armistice  at  an  end,  marching  on  Petersburg,  and 
supporting  the  Ukraine  openly  against  Russia.  In  the  ceremonial 
final  sitting,  on  February  nth,  Herr  von  Kuhlmann  adopted  the 
attitude  expressed  by  the  majority  of  the  peace  delegations,  and 
set  forth  the  same  in  a  most  impressive  speech.  Nevertheless,  a 
few  days  later,  as  General  Hoffmann  had  said,  Germany  declared 
the  armistice  at  an  end,  ordered  the  German  troops  to  march  on 
Petersburg,  and  brought  about  the  situation  which  led  to  the  sign- 
ing of  the  peace  treaty.  Austria-Hungary  declared  that  we  took 
no  part  in  this  action. 

VI 

REPORT  OF  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BUKHAREST 

THE  possibility  of  entering  upon  peace  negotiations  with  Rumania 
was  considered  as  soon  as  negotiations  with  the  Russian  delegations 
at  Brest-Litovsk  had  commenced.  In  order  to  prevent  Rumania 
itself  from  taking  part  in  these  negotiations  Germany  gave  the 
Rumanian  government  to  understand  that  it  would  not  treat 
with  the  present  King  and  the  present  government  at  all.  This 
step,  however,  was  only  intended  to  enable  separate  negotiations 
to  be  entered  upon  with  Rumania,  as  Germany  feared  that  the 


APPENDIX  351 

participation  of  Rumania  in  the  Brest  negotiations  would  imperil 
the  chances  of  peace.  Rumania's  idea  seemed  then  to  be  to  carry 
on  the  war  and  gain  the  upper  hand.  At  the  end  of  January, 
therefore,  Austria-Hungary  took  the  initiative  in  order  to  bring 
about  negotiations  with  Rumania.  The  Emperor  sent  Colonel 
Randa,  the  former  Military  Attache  to  the  Rumanian  government, 
to  the  King  of  Rumania,  assuring  him  of  his  willingness  to  grant 
Rumania  honorable  terms  of  peace. 

In  connection  with  the  peace  negotiations  a  demand  was  raised 
in  Hungarian  quarters  for  a  rectification  of  the  frontier  line,  so  as 
to  prevent,  or  at  any  rate  render  difficult,  any  repetition  of  the 
invasion  by  Rumania  in  1916  over  the  Siebenburgen,  despite 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
strategical  frontier  drawn  up  by  the  Army  Command,  which,  by  the 
way,  was  influenced  by  considerations  not  conducive  to  peace, 
followed  a  line  involving  the  cession  to  Hungary  of  Turnu-Severin, 
Sinaia  and  several  valuable  petroleum  districts  in  Moldavia.  Public 
opinion  in  Hungary  voiced  even  further  demands.  The  Hungarian 
government  was  of  opinion  that  the  Parliament  would  offer  the 
greatest  hindrances  to  any  peace  not  complying  with  the  general 
desire  in  this  respect,  and  leading  Hungarian  statesmen,  even  some 
among  the  Opposition  parties,  declared  the  rectification  of  the 
frontier  to  be  a  condition  of  peace  sine  qua  non.  Wekerle  and 
Tisza  in  particular  took  this  view.  Despite  this  serious  difference 
of  opinion  the  Foreign  Minister,  in  entire  agreement  with  the 
Emperor,  even  before  the  commencement  of  the  negotiations  in  the 
middle  of  February,  took  up  the  position  that  demands  connected 
with  the  frontier  line  should  not  offer  any  obstacle  to  the  conclusion 
of  peace.  The  rectification  of  the  frontier  should  only  seriously  be 
insisted  on  as  far  as  could  be  done  on  the  basis  of  loyal  and,  for 
the  future,  amicable  relations  with  Rumania.  Hungary  regarded 
this  lenient  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Foreign  Minister  with 
increasing  disapproval.  We  pointed  out  that  a  frontier  line  con- 
ceding cities  and  petroleum  districts  to  Hungary  would  be  unfor- 
tunate in  every  respect.  From  the  point  of  view  of  internal 
politics,  because  the  number  of  non-Hungarian  inhabitants  would 
be  thereby  increased;  from  the  military  point  of  view,  because  it 
would  give  rise  to  frontier  conflicts  with  unreliable  Rumanian  fac- 
tions; and,  finally,  from  the  point  of  view  of  foreign  policy,  because  it 
would  mean  annexations  and  the  transference  of  population  this 
way  and  that,  rendering  friendly  relations  with  Rumania  an  impos- 
sibility. Nevertheless,  it  would  be  necessary  for  a  time  to  hold 
fast  by  the  frontier  line  as  originally  conceived,  so  that  the  point 


352  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

could  be  used  to  bring  about  the  establishment  in  Rumania  of 
a  regime  amicably  disposed  toward  the  Central  Powers.  The 
Foreign  Minister  was  particularly  anxious  to  see  a  Marghiloman 
Cabinet  formed,  inaugurating  a  policy  friendly  to  ourselves.  He 
believed  that  with  such  a  Cabinet  it  would  be  easier  to  arrive  at 
a  peace  of  mutual  understanding,  and  was  also  resolved  to  render 
possible  such  a  peace  by  extensive  concessions,  especially  by  giving 
his  diplomatic  support  in  the  Bessarabian  question.  He  informed 
Marghiloman  also  in  writing  that  he  would  be  prepared  to  grant 
important  concessions  to  a  Cabinet  of  which  he,  Marghiloman,  was 
the  head,  in  particular  as  regards  the  cession  of  inhabited  places 
such  as  Turnu-Severin  and  Ocna,  on  which  points  he  was  willing  to 
give  way.  When  the  Marghiloman  Cabinet  was  formed  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  demands  in  respect  of  the  frontier  line  would,  despite 
active  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Hungarian  government,  be 
reduced  almost  by  half.  The  negotiations  with  Rumania  were  par- 
ticularly difficult  in  regard  to  the  question  of  two  places,  Azuga  and 
Busteni.  On  March  24th  Count  Czernin  prepared  to  terminate  these 
negotiations,  declaring  that  he  was  ready  to  renounce  all  claim  to 
Azuga  and  Busteni  and  halve  his  demands  as  to  the  much-debated 
Lotru  district,  provided  Marghiloman  were  willing  to  arrange  the 
frontier  question  on  this  basis.  Marghiloman  declared  himself 
satisfied  with  this  compromise.  On  the  next  day,  however,  it  was 
nevertheless  rejected  by  the  Hungarian  government,  and  not  until 
after  further  telegraphic  communication  with  the  Emperor  and 
Wekerle  was  the  assent  of  all  competent  authorities  obtained.  This 
had,  indeed,  been  widely  considered  in  Hungarian  circles  as  an 
impossibility. 

Another  Austro-Hungarian  demand  which  played  some  part  in 
the  Bukharest  negotiations  was  in  connection  with  the  plan  of  an 
economical  alliance  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Rumania.  This 
was  of  especial  interest  to  the  Austrian  government,  whereas  the 
frontier  question,  albeit  in  some  degree  affecting  Austria  as  well,  was 
a  matter  of  indifference  to  this  government,  which,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  did  not  sympathize  with  the  demands  at  all.  The  plan  for  an 
economical  alliance,  however,  met  with  opposition  in  Hungary. 
Immediately  before  the  commencement  of  the  Bukharest  negotia- 
tions an  attempt  was  made  to  overcome  this  opposition  on  the  part 
of  the  Hungarian  government  and  secure  its  adherence  to  the  idea  of 
an  economical  alliance  with  Rumania — at  any  rate,  conditionally 
upon  the  conclusion  of  a  customs  alliance  with  Germany  as  planned. 
It  proved  impossible,  however,  at  the  time  to  obtain  this  assent* 
The  Hungarian  government  reserved  the  right  of  considering  the 


APPENDIX  353 

question  later  on,  and  on  March  8th  instructed  their  representatives 
at  Bukharest  that  they  must  dissent  from  the  plan,  as  the  future 
economical  alliance  with  Germany  was  a  matter  beyond  present 
consideration.  Consequently  this  question  could  play  no  part  at 
first  in  the  peace  negotiations,  and  all  that  could  be  done  was  to 
sound  the  leading  Rumanian  personages  in  a  purely  private  manner 
as  to  the  attitude  they  would  adopt  toward  such  a  proposal.  The 
idea  was,  generally  speaking,  well  received  by  Rumania,  and  the 
prevalent  opinion  was  that  such  an  alliance  would  be  distinctly 
advisable  from  Rumania's  point  of  view.  A  further  attempt  was 
therefore  made,  during  the  pause  in  the  peace  negotiations  in  the 
east,  to  overcome  the  opposition  of  the  Hungarian  government; 
these  deliberations  were,  however,  not  concluded  when  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  resigned  his  office. 

Germany  had,  even  before  the  commencement  of  negotiations  in 
Bukharest,  considered  the  question  of  imposing  on  Rumania,  when 
treating  for  peace,  a  series  of  obligations  especially  in  connection 
with  the  economical  relations  amounting  to  a  kind  of  indirect  war 
indemnity.  It  was  also  contemplated  that  the  occupation  of 
Wallachia  should  be  maintained  for  five  or  six  years  after  the  con- 
clusion of  peace.  Rumania  should  then  give  up  its  petroleum 
districts,  its  railways,  harbors,  and  domains  to  German  companies 
as  their  property,  and  submit  itself  to  a  permanent  financial  control. 
Austria-Hungary  opposed  these  demands  from  the  first  on  the 
grounds  that  no  friendly  relations  could  ever  be  expected  to  exist 
with  a  Rumania  which  had  been  economically  plundered  to  such 
a  complete  extent;  and  Austria-Hungary  was  obliged  to  maintain 
amicable  relations  with  Rumania. 

This  standpoint  was  most  emphatically  set  forth,  and  not  without 
some  success,  on  February  $th,  at  a  conference  with  the  Reichs- 
kansler.  In  the  middle  of  February  the  Emperor  sent  a  personal 
message  to  the  German  Emperor  cautioning  him  against  this  plan, 
which  might  prove  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  peace.  Rumania  was 
not  advised  of  these  demands  until  comparatively  late  in  the  negotia- 
tions, after  the  appointment  of  Marghiloman.  Until  then  the 
questions  involved  gave  rise  to  constant  discussion  between  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary,  the  latter  throughout  endeavoring 
to  reduce  the  German  demands,  not  only  with  a  view  to  arriving  at 
a  peace  of  mutual  understanding,  but  also  because,  if  Germany 
gained  a  footing  in  Rumania  on  the  terms  originally  contemplated, 
Austro-Hungarian  economical  interests  must  inevitably  suffer 
thereby.  The  demands  originally  formulated  with  regard  to  the 
Rumanian  railways  and  domains  were  then  relinquished  by  Ger- 


3S4  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

many,  and  the  plan  of  a  cession  of  the  Rumanian  harbors  was  altered 
so  as  to  amount  to  the  establishment  of  a  Rumanian-German- 
Austro-Hungarian  harbor  company,  which,  however,  eventually 
came  to  nothing.  The  petroleum  question,  too,  was  reduced  from 
a  cession  to  a  ninety  years'  tenure  of  the  state  petroleum  districts 
and  the  formation  of  a  monopoly  trading  company  for  petroleum 
under  German  management.  Finally,  an  economical  arrangement 
was  prepared  which  should  secure  the  agricultural  products  of 
Rumania  to  the  Central  Powers  for  a  series  of  years.  The  idea  of  a 
permanent  German  control  of  the  Rumanian  finances  was  also 
relinquished,  owing  to  Austro-Hungarian  opposition.  The  negotia- 
tions with  Marghiloman  and  his  representatives  on  these  questions 
made  a  very  lengthy  business.  In  the  economical  questions  especi- 
ally there  was  great  difference  of  opinion  on  the  subject  of  prices, 
which  was  not  disposed  of  until  the  last  moment  before  the  drawing 
up  of  the  treaty  on  March  2&th,  and  then  only  by  adopting  the 
Rumanian  standpoint.  On  the  petroleum  question,  where  the 
differences  were  particularly  acute,  agreement  was  finally  arrived 
at,  in  the  face  of  the  extreme  views  of  the  German  economical 
representative,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Rumanian  Foreign  Minister, 
Arion,  on  the  other,  by  a  compromise,  according  to  which  further 
negotiations  were  to  be  held  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  trade 
monopoly  for  petroleum,  and  the  original  draft  was  only  to  apply 
when  such  negotiations  failed  to  lead  to  any  result. 

The  German  demands  as  to  extension  of  the  period  of  occupation 
for  five  or  six  years  after  the  general  peace  likewise  played  a  great 
part  at  several  stages  of  the  negotiations,  and  were  from  the  first 
stoutly  opposed  by  Austria-Hungary.  We  endeavored  to  bring 
about  an  arrangement  by  which,  on  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
Rumania  should  have  all  legislative  and  executive  power  restored, 
being  subject  only  to  a  certain  right  of  control  in  respect  of  a  limited 
number  of  points,  but  not  beyond  the  general  peace.  In  support 
of  this  proposal  the  Foreign  Minister  pointed  out  in  particular  that 
the  establishment  of  a  Rumanian  Ministry  amicably  disposed 
toward  ourselves  would  be  an  impossibility  (the  Averescu  Ministry 
was  then  still  in  power)  if  we  were  to  hold  Rumania  permanently 
under  our  yoke.  We  should  far  rather  use  every  endeavor  to 
obtain  what  could  be  obtained  from  Rumania  through  the  medium 
of  such  politicians  in  that  country  as  were  disposed  to  follow  a 
policy  of  friendly  relations  with  the  Central  Powers.  The  main 
object  of  our  policy  to  get  such  men  into  power  in  Rumania,  and 
enable  them  to  remain  in  the  government,  would  be  rendered 
unattainable,  if  too  severe  measures  were  adopted.  We  might  gain 


APPENDIX  3SS 

something  thereby  for  a  few  years,  but  it  would  mean  losing  every- 
thing in  the  future.  And  we  succeeded  also  in  convincing  the 
German  Secretary  of  State,  Kuhlmann,  of  the  inadvisability  of  the 
demands  in  respect  of  occupation,  which  were  particularly  voiced  by 
the  German  Army  Council.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  the  retirement 
of  Averescu,  Marghiloman  declared  that  these  demands  would  make 
it  impossible  for  him  to  form  a  Cabinet  at  all.  And  when  he  had 
been  informed,  from  German  sources,  that  the  German  Supreme 
Army  Command  insisted  on  these  terms,  he  only  agreed  to  form  a 
Cabinet  on  the  assurance  of  the  Austrian  Foreign  Minister  that  a 
solution  of  the  occupation  problem  would  be  found.  In  this  question 
also  we  did  ultimately  succeed  in  coming  to  agreement  with  Rumania. 

One  of  the  decisive  points  in  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Rumania 
was,  finally,  the  cession  of  the  Dobrudsha,  on  which  Bulgaria 
insisted  with  such  violence  that  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  it. 
The  ultimatum  which  preceded  the  preliminary  Treaty  of  Buftea 
had  also  to  be  altered  chiefly  on  the  Dobrudsha  question,  as  Bulgaria 
was  already  talking  of  the  ingratitude  of  the  Central  Powers,  of 
how  Bulgaria  had  been  disillusioned,  and  of  the  evil  effects  this 
disillusionment  would  have  on  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  war. 
All  that  Count  Czernin  could  do  was  to  obtain  a  guaranty  that 
Rumania,  in  case  of  cession  of  the  Dobrudsha,  should  at  least  be 
granted  a  sure  way  to  the  harbor  of  Kustendje.  In  the  main  the 
Dobrudsha  question  was  decided  at  Buftea.  When,  later,  Bulgaria 
expressed  a  desire  to  interpret  the  wording  of  the  preliminary 
treaty  by  which  the  Dobrudsha  "as  far  as  the  Danube"  was  to  be 
given  up  in  such  a  sense  as  to  embrace  the  whole  of  the  territory 
up  to  the  northernmost  branch  (the  Kilia  branch)  of  the  Danube, 
this  demand  was  most  emphatically  opposed  both  by  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  and  it  was  distinctly  laid  down  in  the  peace 
treaty  that  only  the  Dobrudsha  as  far  as  the  St.  George's  branch 
was  to  be  ceded.  This  decision  again  led  to  bad  feeling  in  Bul- 
garia, but  was  unavoidable,  as  further  demands  here  would  probably 
have  upset  the  preliminary  peace  again. 

The  proceedings  had  reached  this  stage  when  Count  Czernin 
resigned  his  office. 

VII 

WILSON'S  FOURTEEN  POINTS 

I.  O?EN  covenants  of  peace  openly  arrived  at,  after  which  there 
shall  be  no  private  international  understanding  of  any  kind,  but 
diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 


3$6  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

II.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas  outside  terri- 
torial waters  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the  seas  may  be 
closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international  action  for  the  enforcement 
of  international  covenants. 

III.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers  and 
the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among  all  the 
nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its 
maintenance. 

IV.  Adequate  guaranties  given  and  taken  that  national  arma- 
ments will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic 
safety. 

V.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment 
of  all  colonial  claims  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  principle 
that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests 
of  the  populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight  with  the 
equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory,  and  such  a  settle- 
ment of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best  and 
freest  co-operation  of  the  other  nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining 
for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the  inde- 
pendent  determination   of   her   own   political   development   and 
national  policy,  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society 
of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing;   and  more 
than  a  welcome  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may  need 
and  may  herself  desire.    The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her 
sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their 
good  will,  of  their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from 
their  own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 

VII.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacuated  and 
restored  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sovereignty  which  she 
enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free  nations.    No  other  single  act 
will  serve  as  this  will  serve  to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations 
in  the  laws  which  they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the 
government  of  their  relations  with  one  another.     Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  international  law 
is  forever  impaired. 

VIII.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed,  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in  1871 
in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled  the  peace  of 
the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years,  should  be  righted  in  order  that  peace 
may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  interests  of  all. 

IX.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effected 
along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 


APPENDIX  357 

X.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among  the 
nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should  be  accorded 
the  first  opportunity  of  autonomous  development. 

XI.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Monetengro  should  be  evacuated, 
occupied  territories  restored,  Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure  access 
to  the  sea,  and  the  relations  of  the  several  Balkan  states  to  one 
another  determined  by  friendly  counsel  along  historically  established 
lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality,  and  international  guaranties  of 
the  political  and  economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered  into. 

XII.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire  should 
be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationalities  which  are 
now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of 
life  and  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous 
development,  and  the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently  opened 
as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all  nations  under 
international  guaranties. 

XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected  which 
should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish 
populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free  and  secure  access  to 
the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  economic  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  should  be  guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 

XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under 
specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guaranties 
of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small 
states  alike. 

VIII 

OTTOKAR  CZERN1N  ON  AUSTRIA'S  POLICY  DURING  THE  WAR 

Speech  delivered  December  n,  1918 

GENTLEMEN, — In  rising  now  to  speak  of  our  policy  during  the 
war  it  is  my  hope  that  I  may  thereby  help  to  bring  the  truth  to 
light.  We  are  living  in  a  time  of  excitement.  After  four  years  of 
war,  the  bloodiest  and  most  determined  war  the  world  has  ever 
seen,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  greatest  revolution  ever  known,  this 
excitement  is  only  too  easily  understood.  But  the  result  of  this 
excitement  is  that  all  those  rumors  which  go  flying  about  mingling 
truth  and  falsehood  together,  end  by  misleading  the  public.  It  is 
unquestionably  necessary  to  arrive  at  a  clear  understanding.  The 
public  has  a  right  to  know  what  has  really  happened,  it  has  the  right 

24 


358  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  know  why  we  did  not  succeed  in  attaining  the  peace  we  had  so 
longed  for,  it  has  a  right  to  know  whether,  and  if  so  where,  any 
neglect  can  be  pointed  out,  or  whether  it  was  the  overwhelming 
power  of  circumstances  which  had  led  our  policy  to  take  the  course 
it  did.  The  new  arrangement  of  relations  between  ourselves  and 
Germany  will  make  an  end  of  all  secret  proceedings.  The  day  will 
come  then,  when,  fortunately,  all  that  has  hitherto  been  hidden  will 
be  made  clear.  As,  however,  I  do  not  know  when  all  this  will  be 
made  public,  I  am  grateful  for  the  opportunity  of  lifting  the  veil 
to-day  from  certain  hitherto  unknown  events.  In  treating  of  this 
theme  I  will  refrain  from  touching  upon  those  constitutional  factors 
which  once  counted  for  so  much,  but  which  do  so  no  longer.  I  do 
so  because  it  seems  to  me  unfair  to  import  into  the  discussion  persons 
who  are  now  paying  heavily  for  what  they  may  have  done  and  who 
are  unable  to  defend  themselves.  And  I  must  pay  this  honorable 
tribute  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Press,  that  it  has  on  the  whole 
sought  to  spare  the  former  Emperor  as  far  as  possible.  There  are, 
of  course,  exceptions — exceptiones  firmant  regulam.  There  are  in 
Vienna,  as  everywhere  else,  men  who  find  it  more  agreeable  to 
attack,  the  less  if  those  whom  they  are  attacking  are  able  to  defend 
themselves.  But,  believe  me,  gentlemen,  those  who  think  thus  are 
not  the  bravest,  not  the  best,  nor  the  most  reliable;  and  we  may 
be  glad  that  they  form  so  insignificant  a  minority. 

But,  to  come  to  the  point.  Before  passing  on  to  a  consideration 
of  the  various  phases  of  the  work  for  peace,  I  should  like  to  point 
out  two  things:  firstly,  that  since  the  entry  of  Italy  and  Rumania 
into  the  war,  and  especially  since  the  entry  of  America,  a  "victorious 
peace"  on  our  part  has  been  a  Utopian  idea,  a  Utopia  which, 
unfortunately,  was  throughout  cherished  by  the  German  military 
party;  and,  secondly,  that  we  have  never  received  any  offer  of  peace 
from  the  Entente.  On  several  occasions  peace  feelers  were  put 
forward  between  representatives  of  the  Entente  and  our  own; 
unfortunately,  however,  these  never  led  to  any  concrete  conditions. 
We  often  had  the  impression  that  we  might  conclude  a  separate 
peace  without  Germany,  but  we  were  never  told  the  concrete  con- 
ditions upon  which  Germany,  on  its  part,  could  make  peace;  and, 
in  particular,  we  were  never  informed  that  Germany  would  be 
allowed  to  retain  its  possessions  as  before  the  war,  in  consequence 
of  which  we  were  left  in  the  position  of  having  to  fight  a  war  of 
defense  for  Germany.  We  were  compelled  by  our  treaty  to  a  com- 
mon defense  of  the  pre-war  possessions,  and  since  the  Entente 
never  declared  its  willingness  to  treat  with  a  Germany  which  wished 
for  no  annexations,  since  the  Entente  constantly  declared  its  inten- 


APPENDIX  359 

tion  of  annihilating  Germany,  we  were  forced  to  defend  Germany, 
and  our  position  in  Berlin  was  rendered  unspeakably  more  difficult. 
We  ourselves,  also,  were  never  given  any  assurance  that  we  should  be 
allowed  to  retain  our  former  possessions;  but  in  our  case  the  desire 
for  peace  was  so  strong  that  we  would  have  made  territorial  con- 
cessions if  we  had  been  able  thereby  to  secure  general  peace.  This, 
however,  was  not  the  case.  Take  Italy,  for  instance,  which  was 
primarily  at  war  with  ourselves  and  not  with  Germany.  If  we  had 
offered  Italy  concessions,  however  great,  if  we  had  offered  all  that 
Italy  has  now  taken  possession  of,  even  then  it  could  not  have  made 
peace,  being  bound  by  duty  to  its  allies  and  by  circumstances  not 
to  make  peace  until  England  and  France  made  peace  with  Germany. 

When,  then,  peace  by  sacrifice  was  the  only  peace  attainable, 
obviously,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  there  were  two  ways  of  reaching 
that  end.  One,  a  general  peace — i.  e.  including  Germany — and  the 
other  a  separate  peace.  Of  the  overwhelming  difficulties  attending 
the  former  course  I  will  speak  later;  at  present  a  few  words  on  the 
question  of  separate  peace. 

I  myself  would  never  have  made  a  separate  peace.  I  have  never, 
not  even  in  the  hour  of  disillusionment — I  may  say  of  despair  at 
my  inability  to  lead  the  policy  of  Berlin  into  wiser  channels — even 
in  such  hours,  I  say,  I  have  never  forgotten  that  our  alliance  with 
the  German  Empire  was  no  ordinary  alliance,  no  such  alliance  as 
may  be  contracted  by  two  emperors  or  two  governments,  and  can 
easily  be  broken,  but  an  alliance  of  blood,  a  blood-brotherhood 
between  the  ten  million  Austro-Germans  and  the  seventy  million  of 
the  Empire,  which  could  not  be  broken.  And  I  have  never  forgotten 
that  the  military  party  in  power  at  that  time  in  Germany  were  not 
the  German  people,  and  that  we  had  allied  ourselves  with  the  Ger- 
man people,  and  not  with  a  few  leading  men.  But  I  will  not  deny 
that  in  the  moments  when  I  saw  my  policy  could  not  be  realized 
I  did  ventilate  the  idea  of  suggesting  to  the  Emperor  the  appoint- 
ment, in  my  stead,  of  one  of  those  men  who  saw  salvation  in  a  separa- 
tion from  Germany.  But  again  and  again  I  relinquished  this  idea, 
being  firmly  convinced  that  separate  peace  was  a  sheer  impossi- 
bility. The  Monarchy  lay  like  a  block  between  Germany  and  the 
Balkans.  Germany  had  great  masses  of  troops  there  from  which 
it  could  not  be  cut  off;  it  was  procuring  oil  and  grain  from  the  Bal- 
kans; if  we  were  to  interpose  between  it  and  the  Balkans  we 
should  be  striking  at  its  most  sensitive  vital  nerve.  Moreover,  the 
Entente  would  naturally  have  demanded  first  of  all  that  we  join 
in  the  blockade,  and  finally  our  secession  would  automatically  have 
Involved  also  that  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  Had  we  withdrawn, 


360  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Germany  would  have  been  unable  to  carry  on  the  war.  In  such 
a  situation  there  can  be  no  possibility  of  doubt  but  that  the  German 
Army  Command  would  have  flung  several  divisions  against  Bohemia 
and  the  Tyrol,  meting  out  to  us  the  same  fate  which  had  previously 
befallen  Rumania.  The  Monarchy,  Bohemia  in  particular,  would 
at  once  have  become  a  scene  of  war.  But  even  this  is  not  all. 
Internally,  such  a  step  would  at  once  have  led  to  civil  war.  The 
Germans  of  Austria  would  never  have  turned  against  their  brothers, 
and  the  Hungarians — Tisza's  Hungarians — would  never  have  lent 
their  aid  to  such  a  policy.  We  had  begun  the  war  in  common,  and 
we  could  not  end  it  save  in  common.  For  us  there  was  no  way  out 
of  the  war;  we  could  only  choose  between  fighting  with  Germany 
against  the  Entente,  or  fighting  with  the  Entente  against  Germany 
until  Germany  herself  gave  way.  A  slight  foretaste  of  what  would 
have  happened  was  given  us  through  the  separatist  steps  taken  by 
Andrassy  at  the  last  moment.  This  utterly  defeated,  already 
annihilated  and  prostrate  Germany  had  yet  the  power  to  fling  troops 
toward  the  Tyrol,  and  had  not  the  revolution  overwhelmed  all 
Germany  like  a  conflagration,  smothering  the  war  itself,  I  am 
not  sure  but  that  the  Tyrol  might  at  the  last  moment  have  been 
harried  by  war.  And,  gentlemen,  I  have  more  to  say.  The  experi- 
ment of  separate  peace  would  not  only  have  involved  us  in  a  civil 
war,  not  only  brought  the  war  into  our  own  country,  but  even  then 
the  final  outcome  would  have  been  much  the  same.  The  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Monarchy  into  its  component  national  parts  was  postu- 
lated throughout  by  the  Entente.  I  need  only  refer  to  the  Con- 
ference of  London.  But  whether  the  state  be  dissolved  by  way  of 
reward  to  the  people  or  by  way  of  punishment  to  the  state  makes 
little  difference;  the  effect  is  the  same.  In  this  case  also  a  "Ger- 
man Austria"  would  have  arisen,  and  in  such  a  development  it 
would  have  been  hard  for  the  German-Austrian  people  to  take 
up  an  attitude  which  rendered  them  allies  of  the  Entente.  In  my 
own  case,  as  Minister  of  the  imperial  and  royal  government, 
it  was  my  duty  also  to  consider  dynastic  interests,  and  I  never 
lost  sight  of  that  obligation.  But  I  believe  that  in  this  respect 
also  the  end  would  have  been  the  same.  In  particular  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Monarchy  into  its  national  elements  by  legal  means, 
against  the  opposition  of  the  Germans  and  Hungarians,  would  have 
been  a  complete  impossibility.  And  the  Germans  in  Austria  would 
never  have  forgiven  the  Crown  if  it  had  entered  upon  a  war  with 
Germany;  the  Emperor  would  have  been  constantly  encountering 
the  powerful  republican  tendencies  of  the  Czechs,  and  he  would 
have  been  in  constant  conflict  with  the  King  of  Serbia  over  the 


APPENDIX  361 

South-Slav  question,  an  ally  being  naturally  nearer  to  the  Entente 
than  the  Hapsburgers.  And,  finally,  the  Hungarians  would  never 
have  forgiven  the  Emperor  if  he  had  freely  conceded  extensive 
territories  to  Bohemia  and  to  the  South-Slav  state;  I  believe,  then, 
that  in  this  confusion  the  Crown  would  have  fallen,  as  it  has  done  in 
fact.  A  separate  peace  was  a  sheer  impossibility.  There  remained 
the  second  way — to  make  peace  jointly  with  Germany.  Before 
going  into  the  difficulties  which  rendered  this  way  impossible  I  must 
briefly  point  out  wherein  lay  our  great  dependence  upon  Germany. 
First  of  all,  in  military  respect.  Again  and  again  we  were  forced  to 
rely  on  aid  from  Germany.  In  Rumania,  in  Italy,  in  Serbia,  and 
in  Russia  we  were  victorious  with  the  Germans  beside  us.  We 
were  in  the  position  of  a  poor  relative  living  by  the  grace  of  a  rich 
kinsman.  But  it  is  impossible  to  play  the  mendicant  and  the  politi- 
cal adviser  at  the  same  time,  particularly  when  the  other  party  is  a 
Prussian  officer.  In  the  second  place,  we  were  dependent  upon 
Germany,  owing  to  the  state  of  our  food-supply.  Again  and  again 
we  were  here  also  forced  to  beg  for  help  from  Germany,  because 
the  complete  disorganization  of  our  own  administration  had  brought 
us  to  the  most  desperate  straits.  We  were  forced  to  this  by  the 
hunger  blockade  established,  on  the  one  hand,  by  Hungary,  and  on 
the  other  by  the  official  authorities  and  their  central  depots.  I 
remember  how,  when  I  myself  was  in  the  midst  of  a  violent  conflict 
with  the  German  delegates  at  Brest-Litovsk,  I  received  orders  from 
Vienna  to  bow  the  knee  to  Berlin  and  beg  for  food.  You  can 
imagine,  gentlemen,  for  yourselves  how  such  a  state  of  things  must 
weaken  a  Minister's  hands.  And,  thirdly,  our  dependence  was  due 
to  the  state  of  our  finances.  In  order  to  keep  up  our  credit  we  were 
drawing  a  hundred  million  marks  a  month  from  Germany,  a  sum 
which  during  the  course  of  the  war  has  grown  to  over  four  milliards; 
and  this  money  was  as  urgently  needed  as  were  the  German  divisions 
and  the  German  bread.  And,  despite  this  position  of  dependence, 
the  only  way  to  arrive  at  peace  was  by  leading  Germany  into  our 
own  political  course;  that  is  to  say,  persuading  Germany  to  conclude 
a  peace  involving  sacrifice.  The  situation  all  through  was  simply 
this:  that  any  momentary  military  success  might  enable  us  to  propose 
terms  of  peace  which,  while  entailing  considerable  loss  to  ourselves, 
had  just  a  chance  of  being  accepted  by  the  enemy.  The  German 
military  party,  on  the  other  hand,  increased  their  demands  with 
every  victory,  and  it  was  more  hopeless  than  ever,  after  their  great 
successes,  to  persuade  them  to  adopt  a  policy  of  renunciation.  I 
think,  by  the  way,  that  there  was  a  single  moment  in  the  history 
of  this  war  when  such  an  action  would  have  had  some  prospect  of 


362  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

success.  I  refer  to  the  famous  battle  of  Gorlitz.  Then,  with  the 
Russian  army  in  flight,  the  Russian  forts  falling  like  houses  of  cards, 
many  among  our  enemies  changed  their  point  of  view.  I  was  at 
that  time  still  our  representative  in  Rumania.  Majorescu  was  then 
not  disinclined  to  side  with  us  actively,  and  the  Rumanian  army, 
moved  forward  toward  Bessarabia,  could  have  been  hot  on  the  heels 
of  the  flying  Russians,  and  might,  according  to  all  human  calcula- 
tions, have  brought  about  a  complete  debacle.  It  is  not  unlikely 
that  the  collapse  which  later  took  place  in  Russia  might  have  come 
about  then,  and  after  a  success  of  that  nature,  with  no  "America" 
as  yet  on  the  horizon,  we  might  perhaps  have  brought  the  war  to 
an  end.  Two  things,  however,  were  required:  in  the  first  place, 
the  Rumanians  demanded,  as  the  price  of  their  co-operation,  a 
rectification  of  the  Hungarian  frontier,  and  this  first  condition  was 
flatly  refused  by  Hungary;  the  second  condition,  which  naturally 
then  did  not  come  into  question  at  all,  would  have  been  that  we 
should  even  then,  after  such  a  success,  have  proved  strong  enough 
to  bear  a  peace  with  sacrifice.  We  were  not  called  upon  to  agree 
to  this,  but  the  second  requirement  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
refused  by  Germany,  just  as  the  first  had  been  by  Hungary.  I  do 
not  positively  assert  that  it  would  have  been  possible  in  this  or  any 
other  case  to  arrive  at,  but  I  do  positively  maintain  that  during  my 
period  of  office  such  a  peace  by  sacrifice  was  the  utmost  we  and  Ger- 
many could  have  attained.  The  future  will  show  what  superhuman 
efforts  we  have  made  to  induce  Germany  to  give  way.  That  all 
proved  fruitless  was  not  the  fault  of  the  German  people,  nor  was 
it,  in  my  opinion,  the  fault  of  the  German  Emperor,  but  that  of  the 
leaders  of  the  German  military  party,  which  had  attained  such 
enormous  power  in  the  country.  Every  one  in  Wilhelmstrasse,  from 
Bethmann  to  Kuhlmann,  wanted  peace;  but  they  could  not  get  it 
simply  because  the  military  party  got  rid  of  every  one  who  ventured 
to  act  otherwise  than  as  they  wished.  This  also  applies  to  Beth- 
mann and  Kuhlmann.  The  Pan-Germanists,  under  the  leadership 
of  the  military  party,  could  not  understand  that  it  was  possible  to 
die  through  being  victorious,  that  victories  are  worthless  when  they 
do  not  lead  to  peace,  that  territories  held  in  an  iron  grasp  as  "secu- 
rity" are  valueless  securities  as  long  as  the  opposing  party  cannot  be 
forced  to  redeem  them.  There  were  various  shades  of  this  Pan- 
Germanism.  One  section  demanded  the  annexation  of  parts  of 
Belgium  and  France,  with  an  indemnity  of  milliards;  others  were 
less  exorbitant,  but  all  were  agreed  that  peace  could  only  be  con- 
cluded with  an  extension  of  German  possessions.  It  was  the  easiest 
thing  in  the  world  to  get  on  well  with  the  German  military  party  as 


APPENDIX  363 

long  as  one  believed  in  their  fantastic  ideas  and  took  a  victorious 
peace  for  granted,  dividing  up  the  world  thereafter  at  will.  But  if 
any  one  attempted  to  look  at  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
real  situation,  and  ventured  to  reckon  with  the  possibility  of  a  less 
satisfactory  termination  of  the  war,  the  obstacles  then  encountered 
were  not  easily  surmounted.  We  all  of  us  remember  those  speeches 
in  which  constant  reference  was  always  made  to  a  "stern  peace," 
a  "German  peace,"  a  "victorious  peace."  For  us,  then,  the  possi- 
bility of  a  more  favorable  peace — I  mean  a  peace  based  on  mutual 
understanding — I  have  never  believed  in  the  possibility  of  a  victori- 
ous peace — would  only  have  been  acute  in  the  case  of  Poland  and  the 
Austro-Polish  question.  But  I  cannot  sufficiently  emphasize  the 
fact  that  the  Austro-Polish  solution  never  was  an  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  peace  and  could  never  have  been  so.  There  was  only  the  idea 
that  Austrian  Poland  and  the  former  Russian  Poland  might  be 
united  and  attached  to  the  Monarchy.  It  was  never  suggested  that 
such  a  step  should  be  enforced  against  the  will  of  Poland  itself  or 
against  the  will  of  the  Entente.  There  was  a  time  when  it  looked 
as  if  not  only  Poland,  but  also  certain  sections  among  the  Entente, 
were  not  disinclined  to  agree  to  such  a  solution. 

But  to  return  to  the  German  military  party.  This  had  attained 
a  degree  of  power  in  the  state  rarely  equaled  in  history,  and  the 
rarity  of  the  phenomenon  was  only  exceeded  by  the  suddenness  of 
its  terrible  collapse.  The  most  striking  personality  in  this  group 
was  General  Ludendorff.  Ludendorff  was  a  great  man,  a  man  of 
genius  in  conception,  a  man  of  indomitable  energy  and  great  gifts. 
But  this  man  required  a  political  brake,  so  to  speak,  a  political 
element  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  capable  of  balancing  his  influence, 
and  this  was  never  found.  It  must  fairly  be  admitted  that  the 
German  generals  achieved  the  gigantic,  and  there  was  a  time  when 
they  were  looked  up  to  by  the  people  almost  as  gods.  It  may  be 
true  that  all  great  strategists  are  much  alike;  they  look  to  victory 
always  and  to  nothing  else.  Moltke  himself,  perhaps,  was  nothing 
more,  but  he  had  a  Bismarck  to  maintain  equilibrium.  We  had 
no  such  Bismarck,  and  when  all  is  said  and  done  it  was  not  the 
fault  of  Ludendorff,  or  it  is  at  any  rate  an  excuse  for  him,  that  he 
was  the  only  supremely  powerful  character  in  the  whole  of  Germany, 
and  that  in  consequence  the  entire  policy  of  the  country  was  directed 
into  military  channels.  Ludendorff  was  a  great  patriot,  desiring 
nothing  for  himself,  but  seeking  only  the  happiness  of  his  country; 
a  military  genius,  a  hard  man,  utterly  fearless — and  for  all  that 
a  misfortune  in  that  he  looked  at  the  whole  world  through  Potsdam 
glasses,  with  an  altogether  erroneous  judgment,  wrecking  every 


364  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

attempt  at  peace  which  was  not  a  peace  of  victory.  Those 
very  people  who  worshiped  Ludendorff  when  he  spoke  of  a  vic- 
torious peace  stone  him  now  for  that  very  thing;  Ludendorff  was 
exactly  like  the  statesmen  of  England  and  France,  who  all  rejected 
compromise  and  declared  for  victory  alone;  in  this  respect  there 
was  no  difference  between  them.  The  peace  of  mutual  understand- 
ing which  I  wished  for  was  rejected  on  the  Thames  and  on -the 
Seine  just  as  by  Ludendorff  himself.  I  have  said  this  already. 
According  to  the  treaty  it  was  our  undoubted  duty  to  carry  on  a 
defensive  war  to  the  utmost  and  reciprocally  to  defend  the  integrity 
of  the  state.  It  is  therefore  perfectly  obvious  that  I  could  never 
publicly  express  any  other  view,  that  I  was  throughout  forced  to 
declare  that  we  were  fighting  for  Alsace-Lorraine  just  as  we  were 
for  Trentino,  that  I  could  not  relinquish  German  territory  to  the 
Entente  so  long  as  I  lacked  the  power  to  persuade  Germany  herself 
to  such  a  step.  But,  as  I  will  show,  the  most  strenuous  endeavors 
were  made  in  this  latter  direction.  And  I  may  here  in  parentheses 
remark  that  our  military  men  throughout  refrained  from  committing 
the  error  of  the  German  generals  and  interfering  in  politics  them- 
selves. It  is  undoubtedly  to  the  credit  of  our  Emperor  that  when- 
ever any  tendency  to  such  interference  appeared  he  quashed  it  at 
once.  But  in  particular  I  should  point  out  that  the  Archduke 
Frederick  confined  his  activity  solely  to  the  task  of  bringing  about 
peace.  He  has  rendered  most  valuable  service  in  this,  as  also  in  his 
endeavors  to  arrive  at  favorable  relations  with  Germany. 

Very  shortly  after  taking  up  office  I  had  some  discussions  with 
the  German  government  which  left  those  gentlemen  perfectly  aware 
of  the  serious  nature  of  the  situation.  In  April,  1917 — eighteen 
months  ago — I  sent  the  following  report  to  the  Emperor  Charles, 
which  he  forwarded  to  the  Emperor  William  with  the  remark  that 
he  was  entirely  of  my  opinion: 

(Here  follows  the  report  in  question.) 

This  led  to  a  reply  from  the  German  government,  dated  May  gth, 
again  expressing  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  sub- 
marine campaign,  declaring,  it  is  true,  their  willingness  in  principle 
to  take  steps  toward  peace,  but  reprehending  any  such  steps  as 
might  be  calculated  to  give  an  impression  of  weakness. 

As  to  any  territorial  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  Germany,  this  was 
not  to  be  thought  of. 

As  will  be  seen  from  this  report,  however,  we  did  not  confine 
ourselves  to  words  alone.  In  1917  we  declared  in  Berlin  that  the 
Emperor  Charles  was  prepared  to  permit  the  union  of  Galicia  with 
Poland,  and  to  dp  all  that  could  be  done  to  attach  that  sta,te  to 


APPENDIX  365 

Germany  in  the  event  of  Germany  making  any  sacrifices  in  the 
west  in  order  to  secure  peace.  But  we  were  met  with  a  non  pos- 
sumus  and  the  German  answer  that  territorial  concessions  to 
France  were  out  of  the  question. 

The  whole  of  Galicia  was  here  involved,  but  I  was  firmly  assured 
that  if  the  plan  succeeded  Germany  would  protect  the  rights  of  the 
Ukraine;  and  consideration  for  the  Ukrainians  would  certainly  not 
have  restrained  me  had  it  been  a  question  of  the  highest  value — of 
peace  itself. 

When  I  perceived  that  the  likelihood  of  converting  Berlin  to  our 
views  steadily  diminished  I  had  recourse  to  other  means.  The 
journey  of  the  Socialist  leaders  to  Stockholm  will  be  remembered. 
It  is  true  that  the  Socialists  were  not  "sent"  by  me;  they  went  to 
Stockholm  of  their  own  initiative  and  on  their  own  responsibility, 
but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  I  could  have  refused  them  their 
passes  if  I  had  shared  the  views  of  the  Entente  governments  and 
of  numerous  gentlemen  in  our  own  country.  Certainly,  I  was  at 
the  time  very  skeptical  as  to  the  outcome,  as  I  already  saw  that 
the  Entente  would  refuse  passes  to  their  Socialists,  and  consequently 
there  could  be  nothing  but  a  "rump"  parliament  in  the  end.  But 
despite  all  the  reproaches  which  I  had  to  bear,  and  the  argument 
that  the  peace-bringing  Socialists  would  have  an  enormous  power 
in  the  state  to  the  detriment  of  the  monarchical  principle  itself,  I 
never  for  a  moment  hesitated  to  take  that  step,  and  I  have  never 
regretted  it  in  itself,  only  that  it  did  not  succeed.  It  is  encouraging 
to  me  now  to  read  again  many  of  the  letters  then  received  criticizing 
most  brutally  my  so-called  "Socialistic  proceedings"  and  to  find 
that  the  same  gentlemen  who  were  thei*  so  incensed  at  my  policy 
are  now  adherents  of  a  line  of  criticism  which  maintains  that  I  am 
too  "narrow-minded"  in  my  choice  of  new  means  toward  peace. 

It  will  be  remembered  how,  in  the  early  autumn  of  1917,  the 
majority  of  the  German  Reichstag  had  a  hard  fight  against  the 
numerically  weaker  but,  from  their  relation  to  the  German  'Army 
Command,  extremely  powerful  minority  on  the  question  of  the  reply 
to  the  Papal  note.  Here  again  I  was  no  idle  spectator.  One  of 
my  friends,  at  my  instigation,  had  several  conversations  with 
Sudekum  and  Erzberger,  and  encouraged  them,  by  my  description 
of  our  own  position,  to  pass  the  well-known  peace  resolution.  It 
was  owing  to  this  description  of  the  state  of  affairs  here  that  the 
two  gentlemen  mentioned  were  enabled  to  carry  the  Reichstag's 
resolution  in  favor  of  a  peace  by  mutual  understanding — the 
resolution  which  met  with  such  disdain  and  scorn  from  the  Pan- 
Germans  and  other  elements.  I  hoped  then,  for  a  moment,  to  have. 


366  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

gained  a  lasting  and  powerful  alliance  in  the  German  Reichstag 
against  the  German  military  plans  of  conquest. 

And  now,  gentlemen,  I  should  like  to  say  a  few  words  on  the 
subject  of  that  unfprtunate  submarine  campaign  which  was  un- 
doubtedly the  beginning  of  the  end,  and  to  set  forth  the  reasons 
which  in  this  case,  as  in  many  other  instances,  forced  us  to  adopt 
tactics  not  in  accordance  with  our  own  convictions.  Shortly  after 
my  appointment  as  Minister  the  idea  of  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare  began  to  take  form  in  German  minds.  The  principal 
advocate  of  this  plan  was  Admiral  Tirpitz.  To  the  credit  of  the 
former  Reichskansler,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  be  it  said  that  he  was 
long  opposed  to  the  idea,  and  used  all  means  and  every  argument 
to  dissuade  others  from  adopting  so  perilous  a  proceeding.  In  the 
end  he  was  forced  to  give  way,  as  was  the  case  with  all  politicians 
who  came  in  conflict  with  the  all-powerful  military  party.  Admiral 
Holtzendorff  came  to  us  at  that  time,  and  the  question  was  debated 
from  every  point  of  view  in  long  conferences  lasting  for  hours.  My 
then  Ministerial  colleagues,  Tisza  and  Clam,  as  well  as  myself,  were 
entirely  in  agreement  with  Emperor  Charles  in  rejecting  the  proposal, 
and  the  only  one  who  then  voted  unreservedly  in  favor  of  it  was 
Admiral  Haus.  It  should  here  be  noted  that  the  principal  German 
argument  at  that  time  was  not  the  prospect  of  starving  England 
into  submission,  but  the  suggestion  that  the  western  front  could  not 
be  held  unless  the  American  munition-transports  were  sunk — that 
is  to  say,  the  case  for  the  submarine  campaign  was  then  based 
chiefly  on  the  point  of  technical  military  importance  and  nothing  else. 
I  myself  earnestly  considered  the  question  then  of  separating  our- 
selves from  Germany  on  this  point;  with  the  small  number  of 
U-boats  at  our  disposal  it  would  have  made  but  little  difference 
had  we  on  our  part  refrained.  But  another  point  had  here  to  be 
considered.  If  the  submarine  campaign  was  to  succeed  in  the 
northern  waters  it  must  be  carried  out  at  the  same  time  in  the 
Mediterranean.  With  this  latter  water  unaffected  the  transports 
would  have  been  sent  via  Italy,  France,  and  Dover  to  England,  and 
the  northern  U-boat  campaign  would  have  been  paralyzed.  But 
in  order  to  carry  on  submarine  war  in  the  Adriatic  we  should  have 
to  give  the  Germans  access  to  our  bases,  such  as  Pola,  Cattaro, 
and  Trieste,  and  by  so  doing  we  were  de  facto  partaking  in  the 
submarine  campaign  ourselves.  If  we  did  not  do  it,  then  we  were 
attacking  Germany  in  the  rear  by  hindering  their  submarine  cam- 
paign— that  is  to  say,  it  would  bring  us  into  direct  conflict  with 
Germany.  Therefore,  albeit  sorely  against  our  will,  we  agreed,  not 
convinced  by  argument,  but  unable  to  act  otherwise. 


APPENDIX  367 

And  now,  gentlemen,  I  hasten  to  conclude.  I  have  but  a  few 
words  to  say  as  to  the  present.  From  time  to  time  reports  have 
appeared  in  the  papers  to  the  effect  that  certain  gentlemen  were 
preparing  disturbances  in  Switzerland,  and  I  myself  have  been 
mentioned  as  one  of  them.  I  am  doubtful  whether  there  is  any 
truth  at  all  in  these  reports;  as  for  myself,  I  have  not  been  outside 
this  country  for  the  last  nine  months.  As,  however,  my  contra- 
diction on  this  head  itself  appears  to  have  given  rise  to  further 
misunderstandings,  I  will  give  you  my  point  of  view  here  briefly 
and,  as  I  hope,  clearly  enough.  I  am  most  strongly  opposed  to 
any  attempt  at  revolt.  I  am  convinced  that  any  such  attempt  could 
only  lead  to  civil  war — a  thing  no  one  would  wish  to  see.  I  am, 
therefore,  of  opinion  that  the  republican  government  must  be  main- 
tained untouched  until  the  German-Austrian  people  as  a  whole  has 
taken  its  decision.  But  this  can  only  be  decided  by  the  German 
people.  Neither  the  Republic  nor  the  Monarchy  is  in  itself  a  dogma 
of  democracy.  The  Kingdom  of  England  is  as  democratic  as 
republican  Switzerland.  I  know  no  country  where  men  enjoy  so 
great  freedom  as  in  England.  But  it  is  a  dogma  of  democracy  that 
the  people  itself  must  determine  in  what  manner  it  will  be  governed, 
and  I  therefore  repeat  that  the  final  word  can  only  be  spoken  by 
the  constitutional  representative  body.  I  believe  that  I  am  here 
entirely  at  one  with  the  present  government.  There  are  two 
methods  of  ascertaining  the  will  of  the  people;  either  candidate  for 
the  representative  body  stands  for  election  on  a  monarchical  or  a 
republican  platform,  in  which  case  the  majority  of  the  body  itself 
will  express  the  decision;  or  the  question  of  monarchy  or  republic 
can  be  decided  by  a  plebiscite.  It  is  matter  of  common  knowledge 
that  I  myself  have  had  so  serious  conflicts  with  the  ex-Kaiser  that 
any  co-operation  between  us  is  for  all  time  an  impossibility.  No 
one  can,  therefore,  suspect  me  of  wishing  on  personal  grounds  to 
revert  to  the  old  regime.  But  I  am  not  o^e  to  juggle  with  the 
idea  of  democracy,  and  its  nature  demands  that  the  people  itself 
should  decide.  I  believe  that  the  majority  of  German-Austria  is 
against  the  old  regime,  and  when  it  has  expressed  itself  to  this  effect 
the  furtherance  of  democracy  is  sufficiently  assured. 

And  with  this,  gentlemen,  I  have  finished  what  I  proposed  to 
set  before  you.  I  vainly  endeavored  to  make  peace  together  with 
Germany,  but  I  was  not  unsuccessful  in  my  endeavors  to  save 
the  German-Austrians  from  ultimately  coming  to  armed  conflict 
with  Germany.  I  can  say  this,  and  without  exaggeration,  that  I  have 
defended  the  German  alliance  as  if  it  had  been  my  own  child,  and 
I  do  not  know  what  would  have  happened  had  I  not  done  so. 


368  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Andrassy's  "extra  turn"  at  the  last  moment  showed  the  great  mass 
of  the  public  how  present  a  danger  was  that  of  war  with  Germany. 
Had  the  same  experiment  been  made  six  months  before  it  would 
have  been  war  with  Germany;  would  have  made  Austria  a  scene  of 
war. 

There  are  evil  times  in  store  for  the  German  people,  but  a  people 
of  many  millions  cannot  perish  and  will  not  perish.  The  day  will 
come  when  the  wounds  of  this  war  begin  to  close  and  heal,  and 
when  that  day  comes  a  better  future  will  dawn. 

The  Austrian  armies  went  forth  in  the  hour  of  war  to  save  Austria. 
They  have  not  availed  to  save  it.  But  if  out  of  this  ocean  of  blood 
and  suffering  a  better,  freer,  and  nobler  world  arise,  then  they  will 
not  have  died  in  vain,  all  those  we  loved  who  now  lie  buried  in  cold 
alien  earth;  they  died  for  the  happiness,  the  peace,  and  the  future 
of  the  generations  to  come. 


INDEX 


ADLER,  Dr.  Victor,  a  discussion 

with,  31 
and  the  Socialist  Congress  at 

Stockholm,  187 
and  Trotzky,  260,  261,  262 
Adrianople,  cession  of,  299 
Aehrenthal,  Franz  Ferdinand  and, 

46 

policy  on  expansion,  5 
Air  raids  on  England,  cause  of,  19 

their  effect,  187 
Albania,  and  the  Peace  of  Bukha- 

rest,  7 
Queen    Elizabeth    of   Rumania 

and,  105 

Albrecht  von  Wurttemberg,  45 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Bethmann  on,  84 
cession  of,   demanded  by  En- 
tente, 184 

conquest  of,  a  curse  to  Ger- 
many, 17 
Emperor     Charles's     offer    to 

Germany,  85 
France  insists  on  restoration  of, 

189 

Germany  and,  82,  177 
Ambassadors  and  their  duties,  no, 

125 

America   and    the   U-boat   cam- 
paign, 132,  135 
enters  the  war,  20,  1 66 
rupture  with  Germany,  143 
ship-building  program  of,  323 
un  preparedness  for  war,  138 
(Cf.  United  States) 
American  government,  Count  Czer- 
nin's  note  to,  311  et  seg_. 


Andrassy,  Count,  and  Rumanian 

peace  negotiations,  289 
declares  a  separate  peace,  28,  29 
German  Nationalist  view  of  his 

action,  29 

Adrian  at  Nordbahnhof,  243 
Anti-Rumanian    party    and    its 

leader,  87 
Arbitration,  courts  of,  191,  196, 

197 

Arion,  Rumanian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, 354 

Armaments,  pre-war  fever  for,  4 
Armand-Revertera     negotiations, 

the,  183,  189 
Asquith,    a    warlike    speech    by, 

202 

Austria-Hungary,  a  rejected  pro- 
posal decides  fate  of,  2 
and  Albania,  7 
and  cession  of  Galicia,  163 
and  question  of  separate  peace, 

31,  183,  190 
and  the  U-boat  campaign,  140, 

141,  167,  366 
ceases  to  exist,  200 
consequences     of     a     separate 

peace,  28 
death-blow   to    customs    dues, 

188 

declaration  on  submarine  war- 
fare, 311 

democratic  Parliament  of,  338 
enemy's  secret  negotiations  for 

peace,  158,  181 
food  troubles  and  strikes  in,  265, 

266,  268,  346 

her  army  merged  into  German 
army,  25 


370 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


her  position  before  and  after  the 

ultimatum,  15 
heroism  of  her  armies,  368 
impossibility  of  a  separate  peace 

for,  23,  24  et  seq. 
maritime  trade  obstructed  by 

blockade,  312 
mobilization  and  its  difficulties, 

10,   II 

obstinate  attitude  after   Sara- 
jevo tragedy,  9 

parlous  position  of,  in  1917,  209 
peace    negotiations    with    Ru- 
mania, 289,  350 
peace  terms  to,  200 
policy  during  war,  Count  Czer 

nin  on,  357 

racial  problems  in,  211,  212 
separatist  tactics  in,  183 
Social  Democracy  in,  25,  35 
terms  on  which  she  could  make 

peace,  33 
the  Archdukes,  26 
views  on  a  "tripartite  solution" 

of  Polish  question,  223 
Austrian  delegation,  Count  Czer- 

nin's  speech  to,  330  et  seq. 
Austrian     government    and    the 
Ukrainian  question,  269,  270, 

273 

Austrian    navy,  the,  Franz  Fer- 
dinand and,  58 
Austrian   Ruthenians,    leader   of, 

276,  278 
Austro-Hungarian     demands     at 

Bukharest  negotiations,  351 
Austro-Hungarian  army,  General 

Staff  of,  25 
inferiority  of,  25 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  the, 

and  foreign  policy,  150 
peace  idea  of,  195 
Austro-Polish  question,  the,  and 
the  Ukrainian  demands,  269 
no  bar  to  peace,  363 
solution  of,  222  et  seq. 
Avarescu,  interview  with,  293 
retirement  of,  355 


B 

BAERNREITHER,  his  views  of  a 
separate  peace,  256 

Balkan  wars,  the,  6,  7 

Balkans,  the,  troubles  in:  atti- 
tude of  German  Emperor,  78 

Bar  along  episode,  the,  149 

Bathurst,  Captain,  and  consump- 
tion of  breadstuffs,  327 
on  an  "un-English  "  system,  328 

Bauer,  Doctor,  German-Austrian 
Secretary  of  State,  2 1 

Bauer,  Herr,  houses  Trotzky's 
library,  262 

Bavarian  troops  enter  into  the 
Tyrol,  31 

Belgian  neutrality  violated  by 
Germany,  16 

Belgian  question,  the,  Germany 
ready  for  negotiations  with 
England  on,  201 

Belgium,  England's  promise  to,  1 6 
German  entry  into,  16 
Germany's  views  regarding,  175, 

176 

invasion  of,  changes  England's 
poKcy,  3 

Benckendorff,  Count,  at  London 
Conference,  307 

Benedict    XV,     Pope,     Austria's 
answer  to  peace  note  of,  195 
German  reply  to,  365 
proposals  for  peace  by,  187,  197 

Berchtold,  Count,  and  Franz  Fer- 
dinand, 50 
and    the    Rumanian    question, 

87 
criticized  by  pro-war  party  at 

Vienna,  38 

ultimatum  to  Serbia,  8 
vacillation  of,  n 
Berlin,  Byzantine  atmosphere  of, 

72,77 

the    English    Ambassador    de- 
mands his  passport,  16 
Bessarabia,  Bolshevism  in,  295 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  and  Austria's 


INDEX 


willingness   to   cede   Galicia, 

163 

and  the  Supreme  Military  Com- 
mand, 174 

draws    up    a    peace    proposal, 
156 

opposes   U-boat   warfare,    131, 
366 

optimistic  view  of  U-boat  cam- 
paign, 169  et  seq. 

replies  to  author's  expose,  168 

requests  Vienna  Cabinet  to  ac- 
cept negotiations,  9,  10 

visits  western  front,  84 
Bilinski,  Herr  von,  and  the  future 

of  Poland,  227 

Bismarck,  Prince,  and  the  invinci- 
bility of  the  army,  20 

and  William  II,  60 

dealings  with  William  I,  75 

heritage  of,  becomes  Germany's 
curse,  17 

his  policy  of  "blood  and  iron," 

17 

Bizenko,  Madame,  murders  Gen- 
eral Sacharow,  244 

Blockade,  enemies  feeling  the  grip 

of,  329 

of  Germany,  312 
why  established  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, 313 

Bohemia  as  a  possible  theater  of 
war:  author's  reflections  on, 
28 

Bolsheviks  and  the  Kieff  Commit- 
tee, 273 

Bolsheviks,  dastardly  behavior  of, 

277 

destruction  wrought  in  Ukraine, 
281 

enter  Kieff,  277,  278 
Bolshevism,  Czernin  on,  240,  246 

in  Bessarabia,  295 

in  Russia,  235,  240,  255 

terrorism  of,  252,  255 

the  Entente  and,  304 
Bosnia,  as  compensation  to  Aus- 
tria, 230 


Bozen,  proposals  for  cession  of, 

190,  193 
Bratianu,  a  tactless  proceeding  by, 

128 
apprises    author    of    Sarajevo 

tragedy,  97 
collapse  of,  112 
Ministry  of,  100 
on  Russia,  292 
reproaches  author,  no 
"Bread  peace,"  origin  of  the  term, 

286 
Brest-Litovsk,  a  dejected  Jew  at, 

250 

a  victory  for  German  militar- 
ism, 215 

answer  to  Russian  peace  pro- 
posals, 249 

arrival  of  Trotzky  at,  259 
conflict  with  Ukrainians  at,  262 
episode  of  Rumanian  peace,  289 
evacuation  of  occupied  areas: 

difficulties  of,  344 
first  peace  concluded  at,  278 
frontier  question,  232 
further    Ukrainian    representa- 
tion at,  332 

heated  discussions  at,  253,  254 
object  of  negotiations  at,  337 
peace   negotiations   at,    242    et 

seq.,  343 
Russians  threaten  to  withdraw 

from,  253 
territorial  questions  at,  261,  262, 

263,  273 
Ukrainian  delegation  and  their 

claims,  230,  258,  346 
Briand,peace  negotiations  with, 203 
Brinkmann,  Major,  transmits  Pe- 
tersburg information  to  Ger- 
man delegation,  255 
British  losses  by  submarines,  322 
trade,  and  result  of  submarine 

warfare,  323 

Bronstein  and  Bolshevism,  235 
Brotfrieden  ("Bread  peace"),  286 
Budapest,    author's    address    to 
party  leaders  at,  194,  195 


372 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


demonstration  against  Germany 

in,  259 

Buftea,  Treaty  of,  355 
Bukharest,  fall  of,  112 

Peace  of,  7,  92,  113,  242  et  seq., 

301 
report  of  peace  negotiations  at, 

350 

Zeppelin  attacks  on,  114  et  seq. 
Bulgaria,  a  dispute  with  Turkey, 

298 
and   the   Dobrudsha   question, 

293,  355 

her  relations  with  America,  141 
humiliation  of,  7 
negotiations  with  the  Entente, 

181,  182,  299 

question  of  her  neutrality,  12 
secession  of,  205 
Bulgarian  representatives  at  Brest, 

248 
Bulow,  Prince,  exposes  William  II, 

63 

Burian,  Count,  121,  222 

and    the    division    of    Galicia, 
272  draws  up  a  peace  proposal, 

156 
his  Red  Book  on  Rumania,  in, 

129 

succeeded  by  author,  129 
visits  German  headquarters,  234 
Busche,  von  dem,  and  territorial 
concessions,  121 


CACHIN,  his  attitude  at  French 

Socialist  Congress,  238 
Cambon,  M.,  attends  the  London 

Conference  307 
Capelle  and  U-boats,  148 
Carmen    Sylva     (see    Elizabeth, 

Queen  of  Rumania) 
Carol,  King,  a  fulfilled  prophecy 

of,  99 

and  Serbia,  14 
last  days  of,  102 


peculiar  policy  of  government 
of,  92 

tactfulness  of,  90 

Tsar's  visit  to,  99 

urges  acceptance  of  ultimatum, 
1 02 

visited  by  Franz  Ferdinand,  89 
Carp,  93,  99,  107 
Catarau,  and  the  crime  at  Debru- 

zin,  101 

Central-European   question,   the, 
232 

the  terror  of  the  Entente,  192 
Central  Powers,  and  the  Bratianu 
Ministry,  no 

enemy  blockade  of,  148 

favorable  news  in  1917,  160 

why   they  adopted   submarine 

warfare,  313  et  seq. 
Charles  VIII,  Emperor,  and  Franz 
Ferdinand,  47 

and  problem  of  nationality,  213 

and  the  principle  of  ministerial 
responsibility,  64 

and  the  Ukrainian  question,  272 

apprised  by  author  of  critical 
condition  of  food-supply,  264, 
266 

cautions  the  Kaiser,  353 

communicates  with  King  Ferdi- 
nand on  Rumanian  peace,  288 

confers  a  title  on  eldest  son  of 
Franz  Ferdinand,  52 

correspondence  with  Prince  Six- 
tus,  183 

frequent  absences  from  Vienna, 
70 

his  ever-friendly  demeanor,  66, 
67 

invites  Crown  Prince  to  Vienna, 
•85 

opposes  U-boat  warfare,  366 

reinstates  Archduke  Joseph  Fer- 
dinand, 70 

rejoices  at  peace  with  Ukraine, 

278 

•    submits  author's  expose  to  Will- 
iam II,  164, 364 


INDEX 


373 


suggests    sacrifices   for   ending 

World  War,  85,  86 
visits  South  Slav  provinces,  68 
Clam-Martinic,   Count,   and   the 

customs  question,  188 
and  U-boat  campaign,  136 
attends    conference    on    Polish 

question,  228 

opposes  submarine  warfare,  366 
Clemenceau,  M.,  and  Germany, 

203 
and    the    Peace    of    Versailles, 

304 
dominant    war    aim    of,    205, 

208 
Colloredo-Mannsfeld,    Count,    at 

Brest-Litovsk,  263 
attends    conference  on    U-boat 

question,  137 
meets  author,  243 
Compulsory  international  arbitra- 
tion, 191,  197,  198 
Conrad,    Chief    of    the    General 

Staff,  50 
Constantinople,  an  Entente  group 

in,  182 

Corday,  Charlotte,  cited,  252 
Cossacks,  the,  236 
Courland  demanded  by  Germany, 

277 
Crecianu,    Ambassador    Jresnea, 

house  damaged  in   Zeppelin 

attack  on  Bukharest,  117 
Csatth,       Alexander,       mortally 

wounded,  101 
Csicserics,   Lieut.   Field-Marshal, 

243 

at  Brest-Litovsk,  263 
Czechs,  the,  attitude  of,  regarding 

a  separate  peace,  28 
Czernin,  Count  Ottokar,  a  candid 

chat  with  Franz  Ferdinand, 

50 
a    hostile    Power's    desire    for 

peace,  158 

a  scene  at  Konopischt,  45 
abused  by  a  braggart  and  brawl- 


acquaints     Emperor    of    food 

shortage,  264,  266 
activities   for  peace   with   Ru- 
mania, 287  et  seq. 
Ambassador  to  Rumania,  8 
an  appeal  for  confidence,  342 
and     American     intervention, 

138 

and  the  reinstatement  of  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand,  70 
and  the  Ukrainian  question  (see 

Ukrainian) 

answers  explanation  of  an  Amer- 
ican request,  144,  145 
appeals  to  Germany  for  food, 

265,  267,  361 

appointed  Ambassador  to  Bu- 
kharest, 87 
apprises  Berchtold  of  decision  of 

Cabinet  Council,  14 
attends   conference  on  U-boat 

warfare,  137 

avoided  by  Pan-Germans,   179 
becomes    Minister    of    Foreign 

Affairs,  129 

breakfasts  with  Kuhlmann,  256 
confers  with  Tisza,  32,  33 
conflicts  with  the  Kaiser,  367 
conversation  with  Trotzky,  277 
converses  with  Crown   Prince, 

85. 

criticizes  Michaelis,  179 
decorated  by  King  Carol,  100 
disapproves  of  U-boat  warfare, 

131 

dismissal  of,  204,  216,  297 
extracts  bearing  on  a  trip    to 

western  front,  83,  84 
friction  with  the  Emperor,  234, 

239 

his  hopes  of  a  peace  of  under- 
standing, 23  el  seq.,  195,  232, 

241,  363,  365 
imparts    peace   terms  to  Mar- 

ghiloman,  296 
informs  Emperor  of  proceedings 

at  Brest,  255 
interviews  King  Ferdinand,  294 


374 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


issues  passports  for  Stockholm 

Conference,  187,  365 
journeys  to  Brest- Litovsk,  243 
learns  of   the  assassination   of 

Franz  Ferdinand,  97 
loss  of  a  despatch-case,  ill 
loyalty  to  Germany,  359 
lunches  with  Prince  of  Bavaria, 

246 
meets  with  Emperor  William  II, 

63 

misunderstandings        resulting 

from  a  speech  by,  22,  26 
nominated  to  the  Herrenhaus, 

53 
note  to  American  government, 

311 

obtains  a  direct  statement  from 

William  II,  65 
on  a  separate  peace,  359 
on  Austria's  policy  during  war, 

357 

on  Bolshevism,  240,  246 
on  President  Wilson's  program, 

215 

on  U-boat  warfare,  166,  199, 
366 

passages  of  arms  with  Luden- 
dorff,  275 

peace  program  of,  331 

persecution  of,  232 

Polish  leaders  and,  227 

President  Wilson  on,  215 

private  talk  with  the  Emperor, 
140 

sends  in  his  resignation,  27 

sets  interned  prisoners  at  lib- 
erty, 108,  109 

speech  to  Austrian  delegation, 
330  et  seq. 

threatens  a  separate  peace  with 
Russia,  254 

unfounded  charges  against,  1 80 

urges  sacrifice  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, 82 

William  II's  gift  to,  73 

with  Emperor  Charles  visits 
eastern  front,  65 


D 

DANUBE  Monarchy,  the,  a  vital 
condition    for    existence    of 
Hungarian  state,  224 
dangers  of  a  political  structure 

for,  224 
Debruzin,   sensational   crime   at, 

100 

Declaration  of  London,  the,  312 
D'Esperey,  General  Franchet,  and 

Karolyi,  289 
Deutsch,  Leo,  and  the  Marxian 

Social  Democrats,  235 
Devonport,    Lord,    on    the    food 

question,  328 

Disarmament,     negotiations     re- 
specting, 4 

international,  191,  197,  206,  340 
question  of,  202 
Divorces  in  Rumania,  96,  97 
Dobrudsha,  the,  acquisition  of,  92 
assigned  to  Bulgaria,  298,  299 
cession  of,  at  peace  with  Ru- 
mania, 355 

King  Ferdinand  and,  295 
Marghiloman's  view  on,  296 
question   discussed   with   Ava- 

rescu,  293 
Turkish    attitude    concerning, 

298,  299 
Dualism,  the  curse  of,  154 


E 


EAST  Galicia,  cession  of,  de- 
manded by  Ukrainians,  267 
et  seq. 

"Echinstvo"  group,  the,  236 
Edward  VII,  King,  and  Emperor 

Francis  Joseph,  I,  2 
and  William  II,  73 
encircling  policy  of,  I,  73 
Elizabeth,  Queen  of  Rumania,  a 

word-picture  by,  103 
an  operation  for  cataract,  105 
her  devotion  to  King  Carol,  105 


INDEX 


37S 


Ellenbogen,  Doctor,  and  Socialist 
Conference  at  Stockholm,  187 
plain  speaking  by,  30 
England,  an  effort  at  rapproche- 
ment with  Germany  and  its 
failure,  201 
and     dissolution     of     military 

power  in  Germany,  205 
and  the  elder  Richthofen,  274, 

275 

attitude    of,    at    beginning    of 
World  War,  18,  19 

blockade  of,  by  U-boats,   160, 
169 

bread  shortage  in,  327 

declares  war  on  Germany,  16 

discards  Declaration  of  London, 
312 

distress  in,  from  U-boat  war- 
fare, 162 

distrust  of  Germany's  intentions 
in,  206 

dread    of    gigantic    growth    of 
Germany  in,  I 

Flowtow's  tribute  to,  135 

food-supply  of,  325 

freedom  in,  367 

her  desire  to  remain  neutral  at 
opening  of  war,  2 

negotiates    with    Germany    on 
naval  disarmament,  4 

public  opinion  in,  after  Sarajevo 
tragedy,  9 

refusal  to  restore  German  colo- 
nies, 185,  190 

shortage  of  potatoes  in,  328 

the  pacifist  party  in,  187 

"unbending     resolve"     of,     to 

shatter  Germany,  36,  81 
English  mentality,  a  typical  in- 
stance of,  4 

English  Socialists,  238 
Entente,  the,  adheres  to  Pact  of 
London, 233,  241 

and  arming  of  merchant  vessels, 
3i8 

and  Italy,  31 

and  the  trial  of  William  II,  76 


answers  President  Wilson,  133, 
136 

as  instruments  in  a  world  rev- 
olution, 304 

Austria  pressed  to  join,  2 
demands  abolition  of  German 
militarism,  184,  189,  191,  193, 
194 
desire  of  final  military  victory, 

182 

exterminates  Prussian  militar- 
ism, 304 
impression  on,  of  author's  speech 

at  Budapest,  198 
mine-laying  by,  146 
peace  proposals  to,  22,  23 
rejects  first  peace  offer,  130 
suspicious  of  Germany's  plans,  3 
their    "unbending   resolve"    to 

shatter  Germany,  36,  358 
views  as  to  peace,  189 
Enver    Pasha,    his    influence    in 

Turkey,  260,  300 
Erzberger,     Herr,     agrees     with 
"Czernin  scheme,"  206,  365 
and  author's  secret  report   to 

the  Emperor,  173  (note) 
Espionage  in  Rumania,  no 
Esterhazy  succeeds  Tisza,  153 
Esthonia  demanded  by  Germany, 

277,  349 

Eugen,  Archduke,  26 
Europe  after  the  war,  196 
European  tension,  beginnings  of,  I 


F 


FASCIOTTI,  Baron,  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  action  in  Bel- 
grade, 14 

Fellowes,  Sir  Ailwyn,  admits  suc- 
cess of  U-boats,  327 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Rumania,  au- 
thor's interview  with,  294 
German  opinion  of,  290 
Queen  Elizabeth's  fondness  for, 
105 


37$ 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  King,  anti- 
Serbian  policy  of,  59 
Filippescu,  Nikolai,  a  proposal  by, 

91 

Fleck,   Major,   at   Nordbahnhof, 

243 
Flotow,    Baron,    interview    with 

Hohenlohe,  133 
reports  on  German  attitude  on 

U-boat  warfare,  134 
Fourteen  Points,  Wilson's,  210  et 
seq.,  303,  338,  339,  355  et  seq. 
France    and    Austria:     effect 
Vienna  troubles,  278,  279 
Bethmann's  tribute  to,  171 
distrust  of    Germany's    inten- 
tions in,  206 

insists  on  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  189 

opening  of  war  a  surprise  to,  2 
the  pacifist  party  in,  187 
Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,  a  tribute 

to,  54 
advised  to  accept  negotiations, 

10 

and  Franz  Ferdinand,  48,  53 
and  the  principle  of  ministerial 

responsibility,  64 
author's  audience  with,  13 
death  of,  55,  56 
gives  audience  to  author,  54 
King  Edward  VII  and,  I,  2 
on  the  Peace  of  Bukharest,  7 
opposes     Filippescu's     scheme, 

91 

Franz    Ferdinand,    Archduke,    a 
fortune-teller's   prediction 
concerning,  51 
anti-Magyar  point  of  view,  44, 

57 
antipathy  to  Hungary,  41,  43, 

44 

as  gardener,  40 
as  husband  and  father,  51,  52 
dislike  for  the  Germans  of,  58 
false  rumors  concerning,  49 
fearlessness  of,  52 
friendships  of,  45 


Goluchowski,  Count,  and,  42,  43 
Great-Austrian  program  of,  47, 

57 

his  high  opinion  of  Pallavicini,  6 
his  sense  of  humor,  47 
makes  advances  to  the  Kaiser, 

49 

marriage  of,  47,  51 
mentality  of,  41 
personality  of,  39 
pro-Rumanian    proclivities    of, 

87,  88,  89 

tragic  end  of,  56  (see  also  Sara- 
jevo tragedy) 

views  on  foreign  policy  of,  59 
Freedom  of  the  seas,  197 

attacked  by  Entente,  312,  313 
neutrals  and,  316 
President  Wilson  on,  313,  339 
French  Socialistic  Congress,  238 
Freyburg,    Baron    von,    attends 
conference  on  U-boat  ques- 
tion, 137 
Friedrich,  Archduke,  a  tribute  to, 

26 

tact  of,  83 
Frontier    rectifications,    Hungary 

and,  287,  297,  351,  362 
Furstenberg,  Karl,  a  request  of, 

refused  at  Vienna,  127 
report  on   Rumanian  question 
by,  87 


G 


GALICIA,  proposed  cession  of,  22, 

86,  163,  177,  193,  364 
partition  of,  232 
Tiszaand,  151 
Gas  attacks,  reason  for  Germany's 

use  of,  19 
Gautsch,  Baron,  a  code  telegram 

from,  255 

at  Nordbahnhof,  243 
George,  Lloyd,  admits  grave  state 

of  grain  supplies,  327 
and  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  304 
author  in  agreement  with,  198 


INDEX 


377 


confers  with  Orlando,  183 
Doctor  Helfferich's  allusions  to, 

322 

his  desire  to  crush  Germany,  208 
influence  of,  207 
on  disarmament,  206 
George  V,  King,  his  telegram  to 

Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  10 
German  army,  the  General  Staff,  25 
German- Austria,  200 

population  of,  35 
German  Empire,  the,  creation  of, 

17,76 

German  government,  versus  Ger- 
man diplomacy,  12 
German  mentality,  a  typical  in- 
stance of,  5 

military  party  refuse  peace,  32 
German  Nationalists  and  Count 

Andrassy,  29,  30 
German  policy  founders  on  heri- 
tage left  by  Bismarck,  17 
German-Russian  differences  as  to 

occupied  areas,  336 
German  Supreme  Command  and 

evacuation  question,  344 
Germans  and  a  friendly  attitude 

toward  America,  138 
at  Brest  conference,  249 
attitude  of,  toward  Poland,  226 
inferior  mentality  of,  79 
"insatiable  appetite "  of,  297 
Lenin  and,  240 
oppose  peace  negotiations  with 

Rumania,  289 
refuse    to    renounce    occupied 

territory,  251 
the  dynastic  fidelity  of,  61 
Germany,  a  moral    coalition 

against,  3 
advocates  unrestricted  U-boat 

warfare,  130  et  seq. 
and  Alsace-Lorraine,  82 
and  Austro-Hungarian  military 

action  in  Ukraine,  283 
answers  the  papal  note,  198 
blind  faith  in  invincibility  of  her 
army,  20 


blockade  of,  and  her  retaliatory 

measures,  19 

confident  of  victory,  27,  82 
culpability    of,    in    matter    of 

peace,  206 
decides   on    U-boat    campaign, 

140 
declares  armistice  with  Russia 

at  an  end,  350 
disillusionment  of,  36 
dissatisfaction   in,    over   peace 

resolution  in  Reichstag,  174 
England  declares  war  on,  16 
evil  times  in  store  for,  368 
her  dream  of  a  victorious  peace, 

358,  363 
her  hopes  of  food  shortage  in 

England,  162 
Michaelis  on  internal  economic 

and  political  situation  in,  175, 

176,  177,  178 
military  party  of,  22,  359,  362, 

363 

negotiations    respecting    naval 

disarmament,  4 

post-war  intentions  of,  206,  207 
restricts    building    of    U-boats, 

148 

revolution  in,  360 
rupture  with  America,  143 
unsuccessful  effort  at  rapproche- 
ment, 201 
violates  neutrality  of  Belgium, 

16 
Goluchowski,    Count,    vacillation 

of,  41 

Gorlitz,  battle  of,  109,  122,  361 
Gratz,  Doctor,  a  good  suggestion 

by,  276 

author's  discussion  with,  243 
on    Austro-Polish    solution    of 

Polish  question,  271 
Great  Rumania,  question  of,  91 
Great    War,    the,   psychology    of 

various  cities,  219 
(See  World  War) 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  an  interview 
with  Lichnowsky,  9 


378 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


at  London  Conference,  307 
purposes  negotiations,  9 

H 

HADIK,  apathetic  attitude  of,  265 
Hague  Convention,  the,  312 
Hapsburgs,  Empire  of,  the  Treaty 
of  London  and,  24,  33,  34,  38 
Haus,  Admiral,  favors  submarine 

warfare,  366 
in  Vienna,  137 

Hauser,  and  the  question  of  sepa- 
rate peace,  256 
Hebel,  appointment  for,  172 
Helfferich,  Doctor,  disclosures  by, 

179  (note) 
on  attitude  of  William  II  during 

Balkan  troubles,  78 
speech  on  submarine  warfare, 

169,  320  et  seq. 

Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  a  tele- 
gram from  King  George  to, 

10,   II 

Hertling,  Count,  advised  to  sup- 
press "Der  Kaiser  im  Felde," 

73,74 
becomes    Imperial    Chancellor, 

221 

President  Wilson  on,  216 
succeeds  Michaelis,  179 
Herzegovina  as  compensation  to 

Austria,  230 

Hindenburg,  Field-Marshal,  mod- 
esty of,  142 

popularity  of,  in  Germany,  20 
Hoffmann,    General,  an  unfortu- 
nate speech  by,  264 
and  plans  for  outer  provinces, 

251 

high  words  with  Kuhlmann,  262 
received  by  the  Kaiser,  256,  257 
receives  a  telegram  from  Peters- 
burg, 255 
visited  by  author,  243 

Hohenberg,  Duchess  of,  47 
welcomed  in  Rumania,  89 

Hohendorf,  General  Conrad  von, 


and  his  responsibility  for  the 
war,  2 1  (note) 
Hohenlohe,  Prince,  and  settlement 

of  Wedel's  request,  143 
free  speech  from  William  II,  74, 

75 
report  on  U-boat  campaign,  131, 

132,  142 

Holtzendorff,  Admiral,  and  sub- 
marine campaign,  166 
arrives  in  Vienna,  136 
guarantees    results    of    U-boat 

campaign,  138,  366 
Hungarian   Ruthenians,    Wekerle 

on,  270 

Social  Democrats,  187 
Hungary  and  cession  of  her  terri- 
tory, 121 
and  Rumanian  intervention,  87, 

I2O, 121 

and  the  alliance  with  Rumania, 

87  et  seq. 

demands  of,  at  Bukharest,  351 
frontier    rectification    question, 

287,  296,  351,  362 
her  influence  on  the  war,  154 
indignation  in,  at  author's  ap- 
pointment to  Bukharest,  88 
"just  punishment "  of,  1 10 
opposes  economical  alliance  with 

Rumania,  297,  352 
question  of  a  separate  peace,  31 
repellent  attitude  of,  122 
struggle  for  liberty  in,  224 
why  her  army  was  neglected,  25 


IMPERIAL,  Marchese,  points  sub- 
mitted to  London  Conference 
by,  307 

International  arbitration  (see  Ar- 
bitration) 

International  disarmament,  191, 
196, 197 

International  law,  Germany's 
breach  of,  in  adoption  of  U- 
boat  warfare,  312,  313 


INDEX 


379 


Internationalists,  Russian,  235 
Ischl,  an  audience  with  Emperor 

Francis  Joseph  at,  13 
Iswolsky,  13 
Italy,  Allied  defeat  in,  205 

and  Albania,  7 

and  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  304 

Czernin  on,  340 

declares  a  blockade,  313 

points    submitted    to    London 
Conference,  307 

stands  in   way  of  a  peace  of 
understanding,  209 

ultimatum  to,  14 

why  she  entered  the  war,  3 


JACZKOVICS,  Vicar  Michael,  tragic 

death  of,  100,  101 
Jagow,    Herr   von,    a   frank   dis- 
closure by,  1 6 
Joffe,   Herr,   a  circular  letter  to 

Allies,  332 

conversation  with,  at  Brest,  245 
criticisms  on  the  Tsar,  252 
Jonescu,  Take,  and  the  Sarajevo 

tragedy,  98 

Joseph  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  26 
appointed  chief  of  Air  Force,  72 
reinstatement  of,  70 
relinquishes  his  command,  71 
the  Luck  episode,  70 


K 

KAMENEFF  at  Brest,  244,  349 

Karachou,  Leo,  secretary  of  peace 
delegation,  335 

Karl,  Emperor,  peace  proposals  to 
the  Entente,  23 

Karl    of    Schwarzenberg,    Prince, 
Franz  Ferdinand  and,  45,  46 

Karolyi     and     Rumanian     peace 

negotiations,  289 
his  attitude  before  the  Ruma- 
nian declaration  of  war,  32 


Kerenski  and  the  offensive  against 

Central  Powers,  235 
newspaper  report  of  condition  of 

his  health,  236 

Kiderlen-Waechter,  a  satirical  re- 
mark by,  73 
Kieff,  a  mission  to,  280 

entered  by  Bolsheviks,  277,  278 
in  danger  of  a  food  crisis,  281 
peace  conditions  at,  231 
Kieff  Committee  and  the  Bolshe- 
viks, 273 

Kiel  Week,  the,  72 
Kienthaler  (internationalists),  235 
Konopischt  and  its  history,  39  et 

seq. 

Kreuznach,  a  conference  at,  163 
Kriegen,  Doctor  Bogdam,  a  ful- 
some work  by,  73 
Kuhlmann,  Doctor,  and  the  food 

shortage,  265,  266 
author's  talk  with,  247 
difficult  position  of,  345 
high  words  with  Hoffmann,  262 
his  influence,  221 
informed    of    Rumanian    peace 

overtures,  290 
on  the  Kaiser,  254 
returns  to  Brest,  256 


LAMEZAN,     Captain     Baron,     at 

Brest-Litovsk,  259 
Landwehr,  General,  and  the  food 

shortage,  265,  267 
Lansdowne,     Lord,     conciliatory, 

attitude  of,  205,  206 
Larin  and  Menshevik  Socialists, 

235 

League  of  Nations,  the,  340 
Lenin,  author  on,  240 

opposed    to    offensive    against 

Central  Powers,  235 
Leopold    of    Bavaria,    Prince,   a 

day's  shooting  with,  257 
chats  with  author,  244 
Lewicky,  M.,  268 


380 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Lichnowsky    interviews    Sir    Ed- 
ward Grey,  9 

Liege  taken  by  Ludendorff ,  25 
Lithuania,  Germany  and,  277 
Livonia  demanded  by  Germany, 

277,  349 
London,  Declaration  of,  discarded 

by  England,  312 
London,  Pact  of,  24,  190,  192,  200, 

360 

desired  amendment  to,  164 
text  of,  24,  307  et  seq. 
Lubin,  German  demand  for  evac- 
uation of,  226,  227,  228 
Luck  episode,  the,  26,  120 
Archduke     Joseph     Ferdinand 

and,  70 

Ludendorff  and  Belgium,  208 
and  the  Polish  question,  229, 

230 

candid  admission  by,  275 
compared   with  enemy   states- 
men, 22 
confident  of  success  of  U-boat 

warfare,  142 

congratulates  Hoffmann,  264 
displays  "a  gleam  of  insight," 

256 
dominating   influence    of,    130, 

142,  143 

German  hero-worship  of,  20 
his  independent  nature,  69,  70 
how  he  captured  Liege,  25,  26 
personality  of,  363 
Lueger  and  Franz  Ferdinand,  58 
Luxemburg,  German  invasion  of, 
18 

M 

MACKENSEN,  a  fleet  of  Zeppelins 

at  Bukharest,  114 
failure  at  Maracesci,  290 
headquarters  at  Bukharest,  119 
Magyars,  the,  and  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand, 44,  58 
author  and,  88 

Majorescu   and  Austria's  policy, 
362 


and  territorial  concessions,  110, 

121 

forms  a  Ministry,  91,  93 
Mapdazescu,  arrest  and  extradi- 
tion of,  101 

Maracesci,  attack  on,  290 
Marghiloman  and  co-operation  of 

Rumania,  121 
forms  a  Cabinet,  296,  352 
Marie,  Queen  of  Rumania,  Eng- 
lish sympathies  of,  in,  112 
Marne,  the,  first  battle  of,  20 
Martow  and  the  Menshevik  party, 

235 

Martynoz  and  the  Russian  Inter- 
nationalists, 235 

Medwjedew,  J.  G.,  Ukrainian  dele- 
gate to  Brest,  333 

Mennsdorff,    Ambassador,    inter- 
views General  Smuts,  189 

Menshevik  party,  the,  235 

Meran,  the  Entente's  proposals  re- 
garding, 190,  193 

Merchant  vessels,  arming  of,  au- 
thor on,  317 

Merey  meets  Czernin  at  Brest,  243 

Michaelis,  Doctor,  appointed  Im- 
perial Chancellor,  175 
defines  Germany's  views  regard- 
ing Belgium,  175, 176, 177, 178 
on  peace  proposals,  176 
Pan-Germanism  of,  179 

"Might  before  Right,"  Bismarck- 
ian  principle  of,  18 

Miklossy,  Bishop  Stephan,  mar- 
velous escape  of,  101 

Militarism,  German  faith  in,  20 
England's  idea  of  German,  186 

Monarchists  v.  Republicans,  60,  61 

Monarchs,  hypnotic  complacency 
of,  67  et  seq. 

Moutet,    attitude   of,   at   French 
Socialist  conference,  238 

N 

NATIONALITY,  problem  of,  212 
Franz  Ferdinand  and,  213 


INDEX 


381 


Naval  disarmament,  negotiations 

on,  4 
Nicholas,   Grand  Duke,  and  the 

military  party  in  Russia,  2 
Nicolai,  Tsar,  Joffe  on,  252 
North  Sea,  the,  blockade  of,  312 
Noxious  gas,  why  used  by  Ger- 
many, 19 

O 

ODESSA,  in  danger  of  a  food  crisis, 

281 
Orlando  confers  with  Ribot  and 

Lloyd  George,  183 
Otto,  Archduke,  brother  of  Franz 

Ferdinand,  42 


PALLAVICINI,  Markgraf,  discusses 
the   political    situation    with 
author,  6 
Pan-Germans,  362 

conditions  on  which  they  would 

conclude  peace,  179 
Pan-Russian  Congress,  the,  236, 

237, 238 

Papal  note,  the,  187,  198 
Austria's  reply  to,  195 
German  reply  to,  365 
Paris,  negotiations  in  camera  at, 

302 

Peace  by  sacrifice,  359 
Peace  Congress  at  Brest-Litovsk, 

242  et  seq. 
Peace  movement,  real  historical 

truth  concerning,  207 
Peace  negotiations,  Count  Czer- 

nin  on,  330  et  seq. 
deadlock  in,  203 
the  Pope's  proposals,  187,  195, 

197,  365 

Peace  resolution,  a,  and  its  con- 
sequences, 174 

Penfield,  Mr.,  American  Ambas- 
sador to  Vienna,  147 

People's  Socialists,  the,  23$ 


Peschechonow,  Minister  of  Food, 

236 

Petersburg  and  the  Ukraine,  341 
Plechanow,  Georgei,  and  the  Rus- 
sian Social  Patriots,  235 
Poklewski,    Russian   Ambassador 

to  Rumania,  98 
Poland,  a  conference  on  question 

of,  228 

becomes  a  kingdom,  222 
conquest  of,  120 
Count  Czernin  on,  336 
Emperor  Charles's  offer  regard- 
ing, 86 

future  position  of,  225 
German  standpoint  on,  226 
Michaelis  on,  177 
reorganization  of,  163 
the  German  demands,  272 
unrepresented  at  Brest,  and  the 

reason,  336,  347 

Poles,  the,  and  Brest-Litovsk  ne- 
gotiations, 231 
party  divisions  among,  227 
Polish  question,  and  the  Central- 
European  project,  232 
difficulties  of,  222 
Popow,     Bulgarian     Minister    of 

Justice,  248 
Pro-Rumanian  party  and  its  head, 

87 
Prussian     militarism,     England's 

idea  of,  186 
extermination  of,  304 
fear  of,  194 
(See  also  German  military  party) 

Q 

QUADRUPLE    Alliance,    the,    dis- 
sension in,  279 
Germany  as  shield  of,  204 
peace  terms  in  Rumania,  291 


RADEK,  a  scene  with  a  chauffeur, 
264 


382 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Radoslawoff,  ignorant  of  negotia- 
tions with  Entente,  181 

Randa,  Lieut.-Col.  Baron,  a  tell- 
ing remark  by,  118 
and  Rumanian  peace  overtures, 
289,  291,  351 

Reichstag,  the,  a  peace  resolution 

passed  in,  174 

demands  peace  without  annexa- 
tion, 174,  178 

Renner  and  the  Stockholm  Con- 
gress, 187 

Republicans  v.  Monarchists,  60,  61 

Ressel,  Colonel,  294 

Revertera   negotiates   for   peace, 
183, 189 

Revolution,  danger  of,  165 

Rhondda,     Lord,     British     Food 
Controller,  169 

Ribot  confers  with  Orlando,  183 
statement  by,  170 

Richthofen  brothers,  the,  274,  275 

Rosenberg  meets  author  at  Brest, 

243 
Rudolf,  Crown  Prince,  and  Franz 

Ferdinand,  43 
Rumania,  87  et  seq. 

a  change  of  government  in,  91 

a  land  of  contrasts,  95 

affairs  in,  after  Sarajevo  trag- 
edy, 98 

and  the  Peace  of  Bukharest,  7 

author's  negotiations  for  peace, 
287 

between  two  stools,  291 

declares  war,  124,  311 

espionage  in,  1 10 

freedom  of  the  press  in,  95 

Germany  and,  292,  297 

her  treachery  to  Central  Pow- 
ers, 292 

how  news  of  Sarajevo  tragedy 
was  received  in,  98 

Marghiloman  forms  a  Cabinet, 
296 

negotiations  for  peace,  350 

out  of  action,  27 

peace  concluded  with,  355 


question  of  annexations  of,  177, 
230 

question  of  neutrality,  14,  107 

Russian  gold  in,  127 

social  conditions  in,  96 

ultimatum  to,  14,  292 

why  she  entered  the  war,  3 
Rumanian   invasion   of   Transyl- 
vania, 123 

Rumanians,    mistaken    views    of 
strength  of,  290 

their  love  of  travel,  96 
Russia,     a    contemplated    peace 
with,  235 

abdication  of  the  Tsar,  159 

an  appeal  to  German  soldiers, 
277 

begins  military  operations  with- 
out a  declaration  of  war,  3 

Bolshevism  in,  235,  240,  255 

declares   for   cessation   of   hos- 
tilities, 350 

difference  of  opinion  in,  as  to 
continuance  of  war,  235  et  seq. 

enters  the  war,  9 

Francis     Joseph's     inquiry    as 
to  a  possible  revolution  in, 

120 

her  responsibility  for  Great  War, 

ii 
incites  German  army  to  revolt, 

349 

negotiations  for  peace,  330 
out  of  action,  27 
peace  treaty  signed,  350 
prepared  for  war,  127 
the  military  party  in,  3,  n 
ultimatum  to  Rumania,  292 
Russian  Revolution,  the,  159,  165, 

235  et  seq. 

Russians,  their  fear  of  Trotzky,  264 

Ruthenian  districts  of  Hungary, 

Ukrainian  demands,  269 


SACHAROW,   General,   murder  of, 
244 


INDEX 


383 


St.-Mihiel,  author  at,  84 
St.-Privat,  reminiscences  of,  84 
Salzburg  negotiations,  the,  234 
Sarajevo,  the  tragedy  of,  7,  56 
sounds  death  knell  of  the  Mon- 
archy, 37 
Sassonoff ,  a  momentous  statement 

by,  100 
attitude  of,  after  declaration  of 

war,  9 

visits  Bukharest,  128 
Satonski,    Wladimir    Petrowitch, 

334 

Schachrai,  W.  M.,  at  Brest,  333 

Schonburg,  Alvis,  and  the  Em- 
peror Charles,  71 

Schonerer,  Deputy,  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand and,  58 

Secret  diplomacy,  abolition  of: 
author's  view,  338,  339 

Sedan,  a  house  with  a  history  at, 

85 

Seidler,  Doctor  von,  a.  faux  pas  by, 

65 

and  the  food  shortage,  267 
and  the  partition  of  Galicia,  232 
and    the    Ukrainian    question, 

232, 270, 271 

apathetic  attitude  of,  265,  266 
author's  meeting  with,  256 
visits  South  Slav  provinces,  68 
Seitz,   and   the   Stockholm   Con- 
ference, 187 
Serbia,  arrogance  of,  7 

ultimatum  to,  8 
Sewrjuk,  M.,  268 
Sixtus,  Prince,  letters  from  Em- 
peror Charles  to,  183 
Skobeleff  and  the  Mensheviks,  235 
Skrzynski,  Herr  von,  278 
Slapowszky,  Johann,  tragic  death 

of,  101 
Slav   provinces,    a    visit    by   the 

Emperor  to,  68 
Smuts,    General,    interview    with 

Mennsdorff,  189 

Social  Democrats  and  the  ques- 
tion of  peace,  30,  35 


and  the  Stockholm  Conference, 

187, 365 
Hungarian,  270 

opposed  to  sacrifice  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  82 

"Social  Patriots,"  Russian,  235 

Social  Revolutionary  party,  the, 
236 

Socialists  and  offensive  against 
Central  Powers,  235 

Spanish  reports  of  war-weariness 
in  England  and  France,  160 

Stirbey,  Prince,  293 

Stockholm,  a  Socialist  Conference 

at,  187,  365 

Russians  ask  for  a  conference 
at,  255 

Stockholm  Congress,  negative  re- 
sult of,  189 

Strikes  and  their  danger,  342 

Stumm,  von,  on  Ukrainian  claims, 
268 

Sturdza,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  ex- 
traordinary behavior  of,  94 

Stiirgkh,  Count,  21  (note) 
recollections  of,  53 

Submarine  warfare,  author's  note 
to  American  government  on, 

3ii 

Czernin  on,  366 

destruction     without     warning 
justified,  315 

enemy  losses  in,  322 

enemy's      "statistical     smoke- 
screens" as  to,  321 

question  of  safety  of  passengers 
and  crews,  314 

speech  by  Doctor  Helfferich  on, 
320 

why  adopted  by  Central  Pow- 
ers, 313,  et  seq. 

(See  also  U-boats) 
Sudekiim,  Herr,  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary's peace  proposals,   173, 

365 

Supreme  Military  and  Naval 
Command,  conditions  of,  for 
peace  negotiations,  177 


384 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Switzerland,  reported  disturbances 

in:  author's  disclaimer,  367 
Sycophancy  in  high  places,  67,  69, 

72,  73,  74 

Sylvester,  Doctor,  and  the  Ger- 
man-Austrian National  As- 
sembly, 30 


TALAAT  Pasha,  arrives  at  Brest, 

260 

influence  of,  161 
threatens  to  resign,  300 
Talleyrand,  a  dictum  of,  194 
Tarnowski,  Count,  author's  opin- 
ion of,  125 

German  Ambassador  to  Wash- 
ington, 143 

Thomas,  M.,  war  speech  on  Rus- 
sian front,  238 

Tisza,  Count  Stephen,  21  (note) 
a  characteristic  letter  from,  223, 

224,  225,  226 
advocates  unrestricted  U-boat 

warfare,  130,  366 
and  American  intervention,  138 
and   author's   appointment   to 

Bukharest,  88 

and  cession  of  Hungarian  ter- 
ritory, 151 
and  control  of  foreign  policy, 

150 
and  the  Stockholm  Conference, 

187 

assassination  of,  154 
at  a  U-boat  campaign  confer- 
ence, 137 

author's  conference  with,  31,  32 
defends  Count  Czernin,  123 
dismissal  of,  152,  225 
Franz  Ferdinand  and,  44 
his  influence  in  Hungary,  31 
leads  anti-Rumanian  party,  87 
lively  correspondence  with  au- 
thor, 144,  145 

on  dangers  of  pessimism,  172 
on  the  Treaty  of  London,  31 


opposes  annexation  of  Rumania, 

230 

opposes  the  war,  1 1 
opposes  U-boat  warfare,  147,366 
peace  proposals  of,  156 
pro-memoria  of,  on  Rumanian 

peace  negotiations,  288 
question    of    frontier    rectifica- 
tions, 351 
refuses    cession    of    Hungarian 

territory,  122 
speech  at  conference  on  Polish 

question,  228 
tribute  to,  154 
views  regarding  Poland,  222 
visits  the  Southern  Slavs,  34 
Transylvania,  193 

opposition  to  cession  of,  122 
proposed  cession  of,  32,  57 
Rumanian  invasion  of,  123 
Trentino,  the,  offered  to  Italy,  86 
Trieste,  Entente  proposals  regard- 
ing, 190,  193 
"Tripartite    solution"    of    Polish 

question,  Tisza  on,  223 
Trnka  and  the  customs  dues,  188 
Trotzky,  a  tactical  blunder  by,  263 
accepts     the     German-Austria 

ultimatum,  261 
and  the  Internationalist  party, 

235 

arrives  at  Brest,  258,  259 
declines  to  sign,  278 
his    brother-in-law    Kameneff, 

244 

his  library,  262 
negotiations  with,  276 
opposed  to  ill-treatment  of  war 

prisoners,  262 
ultimatum  to,  260 
Trudoviks,  the,  236 
Tscheidse,   and  the  Mensheviks, 

235,  237 

Tschernow,  speaks  at  Peasants' 
Congress,  236 

Tschirsky,  Herr  von,  a  momen- 
tous communication  to  Berch- 
told,  9 


INDEX 


385 


and    a    telegram    from    King 

George,  10 
his  desire  for  war,  37 
untactful  diplomacy  of,  12 
Tseretelli    and    the    Menshevik 

party,  235 
Turkey,  a  dispute  with  Bulgaria, 

298 

asks  for  munitions,  108 
how  the  Sultan  was  deposed,  260 
probable  secession  of,  300 
Turkish  Grand  Vizier  arrives  at 

Brest,  259 

Turks,  a  reported  advance  by  a 
hostile  Power  for  a  separate 
peace,  161 

at  Brest  Conference,  247 
Tyrol,  the,  German  troops  in,  28 

U 

U-BOAT  warfare,  129  et  seq. 
a  conference  in  Vienna  on,  137 
"a  terrible  mistake,"  141 
and  America's  entry  into  the 

war,  142 
and  why  adopted  by  Germany, 

19 

Czernin  on,  166 

political  arguments  against,  132, 

133 

what  it  achieved,  199 
(See  also  Submarine  warfare) 
Ugron,  Herr  von,  and  the  "tripar- 
tite solution"  of  Polish  ques- 
tion, 223 

Ukraine,  and  Petersburg,  341 
Bolshevik  destruction  in,  281 
food-supplies  from,  280  et  seq., 

347 

military  action  in,  and  the  con- 
sequences, 282 

peace  concluded  with,  278 

revolution  in,  282 

survey  of  imports  from,  284 

treaty  signed,  349 
Ukrainian    Army   General    Com- 
mittee appointed,  238 


delegates  at  Brest,  257,  332 
Workers'   and   Peasants'    gov- 
ernment, a  declaration  from, 

333 

Ukrainians   and   their   demands, 

231,267,346 

dictatorial  attitude  of,  268 
negotiations  with,  347 
United   States,    the,    scarcity   of 

supplies  in,  326 
(See  also  America) 


VERSAILLES,    opening    of    Peace 
Congress  at,  218 

terrible  nature  of,  304 

the  Council  of  Four  at,  302 

the  Peace  of,  21,  302 

triumph  of  Entente  at,  207 
Vienna,  a  council  in,  137 

differences  of  opinion  in,  87 

disastrous  effects  of  troubles  in, 
278 

disturbances  in,  67 

food   shortage  and   strikes  in, 
265,  266,  268,  346 

politicians'  views  on  peace  pro- 
posals, 256 

psychology  of,  219 

warlike  demonstrations  at,  after 

Sarajevo  tragedy,  37,  38 
Vredenburch,    Herr   von,    Dutch 
Ambassador  to  Rumania,  118 


W 

WALES,  Prince  of  (see  Edward 
VII,  King) 

Wallachia,  occupation  of,  112, 
119 

Wallhead,  Mr.,  327 

Washington  Cabinet,  and  Austria- 
Hungary's  attitude  to  sub- 
marine warfare,  311 

Wassilko,  Nikolay,  leader  of  Aus- 
trian Ruthenians,  276,  278 


386 


IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Wedel,    Count,   calls   on   Count 
Czernin,  143 

disclosures  of,  179  (note) 

revelations  of,  173  (note) 
Weisskirchner,  Burgemeister,  coins 
the  term  "bread  peace,"  286 
Wekerle,  Doctor,  and  the  Polish 
question,  225 

author  and,  153,  256 

on     the     Ukrainian    question, 
270 

standpoint    of,    on    Rumanian 

peace  negotiations,  289,  351 
Western  front,  an  Entente  break- 
through on,  205 

Western   Powers,   the,  and  Ger- 
many's ambitions,  2 
Wiesner,  Ambassador  von,  and  a 
Pan-German,  179 

at  Brest-Litovsk,  263 

author  discusses  Russian  peace 

with,  243 

Wilhelm,  Crown  Prince,  and  Franz 
Ferdinand,  49 

anxious  for  peace,  83 

author's  conversation  with,  85 

his  quarters  at  Sedan,  85 
William  I  and  Bismarck,  75 
William   II,    Emperor,   and   Bis- 
marck, 60 

and  Franz  Ferdinand,  49 

and  the  German  Supreme  Mili- 
tary Command,  20 

as  causeur,  76 

as  the  "elect  of  God,"  60,  6 1 

cause  of  his  ruin,  72  et  seq. 

demonstrations  against,  in  the 
Reichstag,  63 

desires  to  help   deposed  Tsar, 
80 

difficulties  of  his  political  advis- 
ers, 69 

fails  to  find  favor  in  England, 
72 

his   projected   division   of   the 
world,  78 

impending    trial    of:     author's 
protest,  76 


informed  of  serious  nature  of 
situation  for  Allies,  364 

instructions  to  Kuhlmann,  277 

long  years  of  peaceful  govern- 
ment, 78 

longs  for  peace,  81 

on  food   troubles  in  England, 
162 

on  impending  attack  on  Italian 
front,  82 

presents     author     with     "Der 
Kaiser  im  Felde,"  73 

Prince  Hohenlohe  and,  74 

question  of  his  abdication,  85 

the  press  and,  75 

warlike  speeches  of,  79 
Wilson,  President,  advantages  of 
his  "Fourteen  Points,"  210 

as  master  of  the  world,  214 

author  on  his  Message,  337 

Count  Andrassy's  note  to,  29 

Count  Czernin  on,  214 

Entente's    reply   to   his    peace 
proposal,  133,  136,  138 

his    Fourteen    Points   and    the 
Peace  of  Versailles,  302 

on   the   freedom   of   the    seas, 

313 

ready  to  consider  peace,  279 
reopens  hopes  of  a  peace  of  un- 
derstanding, 211 
speech  to  Congress,  215 
text   of   the   Fourteen   Points, 

355 
Wolf,    K.    H.,    a    scene    in    the 

"Burg,"i88 
World-dominion,  Germany 'sdream 

of,  1,2 

World  organization,  a  new,  prin- 
ciples of,  195  et  seq. 
World   War,   the,   an   important 

phase  of,  122 

attempts  at  peace,  150  et  seq. 
author's  impressions  and  reflec- 
tions on,  217  et  seq.,  302  et 
seq. 

by  whom  started,  21  (note) 
causes  of,  3 


INDEX 


387 


President  Wilson  and,  210  et 

seq. 
question   of   responsibility   for 

outbreak  of,  2 
U-boat  warfare  in,  129  et  seq. 

(see  also  Submarine  warfare 

and  U-boat) 
violent   measures   adopted   by 

Germany  in,  18, 19 


ZEPPELIN  raids  on  Bukharest,  114 
Zimmermann,  Herr,  and  author's 

peace  proposals,  163 
opposes     unrestricted     U-boat 

warfare,  130,  136 

Zimmerwalder   (Russian   Interna- 
tionalists), 235 


THE   END 


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